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By Anna Robeson Burr

RELIGIOUS CONFESSIONS AND CONFESSANTS.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY.

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RELIGIOUS CONFESSIONS AND CONFESSANTS

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WITH A CHAPTER ON THE HISTORY OF INTROSPECTION

BY

ANNA ROBESON BURR

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"O this gloomy world!
In what a shadow or deep pit of darkness
Doth womanish and fearful mankind live!"

The Duchess of Malfi.

PREFACE

It has been the privilege of the writer to do much of her work in the library of the late Dr. Henry C. Lea—its shelves still laden with that material which assumed so significant an aspect under the guidance of his distinguished mind. Such surroundings were in themselves an inspiration and she is grateful for the kindness which procured them.

Thanks are also due for the courteous co-operation of the librarians of the two Friends' Libraries, of the Presbyterian and Methodist Historical Societies, of the Philadelphia Library, of Haverford College, of S. Carlo Borromeo, and of S. Thomas of Villanova. Through the kindness of Dr. Jastrow, the University of Pennsylvania Library gave the writer access to her material all over the country. Such goodwill has lent the work an ever-increasing pleasure.

While reading for an earlier study on autobiography, the writer had been impressed by the present superabundance of works on religious and mystical theory, side by side with a total absence of any collation of the documents of personal religion. No one has apparently thought it worth his while to examine the foundations on which the current elaborate doctrines are based. Some years of investigation have resulted in this book. If the work has turned in directions not at first anticipated, yet it formulates

no theory except by induction from the data it furnishes. In its final position, it agrees with Hobbes, when he remarks,—"that ignorant and superstitious men make great wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from nature (which is not the immediate but the ordinary work of God), admire not at all."

March, 1914.

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RELIGIOUS CONFESSIONS AND CONFESSANTS

I

INTRODUCTORY

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RELIGIOUS CONFESSIONS AND CONFESSANTS

I

INTRODUCTORY

One of the characteristics of the present age, so often accused of infidelity, is its interest in religion. Works upon this subject were never so many in the ages of faith. Indeed, one may almost go so far as to say that the study of religion is a study essentially modern. In the past, men studied dogma, they studied theology, they studied metaphysics and mystical philosophy, but they did not study religion. For such study there is necessary not only a knowledge of certain basic sciences very recent of date in themselves, —such as ethnology and anthropology, biology and psychology,—but also the security of our latter-day ideals of tolerance. Protected by these, the writer on religious topics has been able, for the first time in the world's history, to place his matter in perspective for proper examination. The strict limitations imposed on such work in the past, with the sinister shadow of the Inquisition ever ready to fall across his page, produced in the writer a fret and a tension which caused him too often to be personal and acrimonious in

tone, while in statement he remained safely indefinite. To-day, his manner is calmer and less controversial, while the nature of his work has tended to become less abstract and more concrete, more specialized, and more individual.

The present essay is an attempt to handle, in a broad way, some of the more intimate aspects of man's knowledge of himself. A chief element of this knowledge has been his natural interest in the question of his ultimate destination, with his concomitant feelings and ideas respecting all that part of his nature which is unknown to him. This interest in, this curiosity about, self, was made the subject of observation and theory long before the simplest knowledge of physical man had been acquired. But such theory necessarily remained *a priori* for centuries, until the bulk of scientific facts increased sufficiently to allow of sounder methods.

If sounder method is possible to-day, it must be borne in mind that *possible* is the word. Many difficulties will occur to the student; there are many which may not occur to him. He will easily recall the names of several recent books on religious psychology, and he will agree that their effect, on the whole, has been far from conclusive, while yet he may or may not realize that this impression springs from their fundamental weakness in the matter of data. To do such work to-day there is needed, first of all, a definitive, systematic collection of the available data of personal religious experience, and such a collection may come to the rescue of the theorist.

The material for such data is not wanting; it lies

embedded in the recorded history of the human mind for over two thousand years. Scattered in a hundred corners, it has crumbled with the crumbling edifice of succeeding civilizations, and the fragments that remain have been trodden under foot by prejudice, or ignored by tradition. Its presence has had little significance for the exact mind, and as to its value, opinions have fluctuated. Bacon held that "as for the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either not true or not natural, and therefore impertinent for the story of nature."[1] At the same time, while he decided that the "narrations which have mixture with superstition be sorted by themselves," he yet would not omit them altogether. Our modern idea holds rather that "the study of religion is essentially psychological. . . . Whatever else can be predicated of religion, we must admit that it consists of a great variety of mental experiences";[2] and the difficulty of obtaining the facts concerning such experience—although acknowledged—constitutes no valid excuse for ignoring them. The student must simply apply to their examination certain important correctives, just as he must apply similar correctives to the examination of any mass of facts. He will rather repeat the words of Montesquieu: "J'ai d'abord examiné les hommes et j'ai cru que, dans cette infinie diversité de lois et de mœurs, ils n'étaient pas uniquement conduits par leurs fantaisies."[3]

Thus what appears to be mere chaos, is not so; and through all these passions, characters, and experiences, there operates the universal law of the identity of our common nature. "The life of the individual," says

Caird, " is a sort of epitome of the history of humanity";[4] and it must be studied from this point of view, not forgetting the corrective influence brought to bear upon it by the broader outlines of history.

If opinions as to the value of the material are not unanimous, yet there has been no doubt as to the immediate necessity for its examination. The religious confession, with which it is the main object of this essay to deal, is nothing less than the first coherent, systematic, voluntary attempt at self-study, by which man has sought to determine the nature and the limits of his consciousness. From this first effort has been evolved all later, more complex religious ideas, and many of the later philosophic ideas. The confession, therefore, would have a vital historical interest for us if it had no other. But in reality it has far more. It serves to lay bare the fundamental forces of history. A recent historian[5] has made a penetrating commentary on the value of the private record as a means of understanding public action; while a recent psychologist[6] has observed that the most instructive human documents lie along the beaten highway. The personal record, in many cases, furnishes the only valid means of observing the movement of certain minds under the pressure of given circumstances.[7] Any work upon the development of the idea of sect must needs be built upon these documents, whose existence alone has made it possible. If any excuse were needed for this attempt to bring the alien, uncharted matter into the domain of law, it will surely be found in the present cry of the scientist for more facts.

"Il n'y avait point d'emploi plus légitime et plus honorable de l'esprit," writes Sainte-Beuve, "que de voir les choses et les hommes comme ils sont et de les exprimer comme on les voit, de décrire, autour de soi en serviteur de la science, les variétés de l'espèce, les divers formes de l'organisation humaine, étrangement modifiée au moral dans la société et dans le dédale artificiel des doctrines." [8]

To be the servitor of science, in regard to the study of men's beliefs, is, as we have said, an ideal of to-day; yet in saying this, one must not forget that the very constitution of the religions preceding Christianity admitted of a similar ideal.

Havet [9] points out that the ancient religions, so exacting in respect of cult, had comparatively few dogmas, thus leaving open a vast field for those fruitful discussions which Christianity forbade. In the fragments of those discussions which remain to us, there is a freshness and often a boldness of conception which render them significant and suggestive, bringing, as they do, the mind of the ancient student closer to the mind of the student of to-day. When Manu speaks of self-consciousness and egoism as "lordly" he joins in the speech of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche. [10]

Both ancient and modern students recognize two main approaches to the study of religion. This force in human life is manifested in two ways: it may be observed in its effect upon the mass, through its group-manifestation; or in its effect upon the individual, through its personal, psychological manifestation. The gate of the first approach has been open for cen-

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turies; philosophers and historians have passed thereby, each aiding future generations, though not always in the way he expected. The gate of the second approach has not yet been opened to the investigator; and the difficulties in the way of a valid study of religion in the individual cannot be over-impressed upon the reader's attention.

The perplexing question of fundamental sincerity has been dealt with in a preceding volume.[11] When the degree of this sincerity has been, relatively speaking, determined, the student is brought face to face with the equally perplexing problem of classification. A fair degree of candour in the personal revelation may be admitted; and yet how are the results of such candour to be rendered amenable to science? Can they be so rendered? At first sight nothing would seem more impossible "than to find law, order, and reason in what seems accidental, capricious, and meaningless."[12] Nevertheless, no mean authority assures us that this is the true work of science; and while he suggests its accomplishment by restricting the field, and by limiting its content as much as possible, Caird adds that, while the spiritual life is most complex and difficult to understand, yet it must be intelligible; for, if man can comprehend the phenomena of the universe, he should surely be able to comprehend his own![13]

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that what is fortuitous or casual in itself does not enter into the domain of science. Law is only "that constant rule to which a given order of facts is subservient."[14] It may be determined from observation of the facts themselves, when they are properly limited,

classified, and compared. The broad general principles of science in regard to this classification and comparison must be brought to bear upon this material. Human specimens must needs be subjected to the same treatment as botanical or marine specimens. They must be gathered, identified, labelled, and made accessible to study. And human specimens have this permanent disadvantage as specimens, that in the nature of things they cannot present data mechanically consistent. The data are in fact accidental and capricious to a degree, varying in different examples, but *always* sufficiently to daunt the orderly mind.

The first task, therefore, must be to determine the constant factors in each case, analyze the elements thereof, and classify these elements for comparison. It has been remarked of the comparative method that it can be properly employed only where the things compared resemble each other. Yet the things compared must also differ from one another or there would be no need to compare them. The presence of a definite religious emotion, then, is the first factor whose presence should determine the use of a document for this work. Various as may be the manifestations of this emotion, it must exist in a recognizable form.

The second factor, not less important, must be the first-hand composition of the document—it must be the work of the person himself. Such limitation permits us to include, beside formal autobiography or confession, the material contained in journals, daybooks, diaries, intimate letters, as well as that which

may be found in philosophical disquisition or in theological apologia—asking only that it be *religious,* that it be *personal,* and that it be composed by the subject himself. Those "young adventurers who produce their performance to the wise ear of Time,"[15] have equal right to be heard in this regard with the mediæval mystics or the self-analyzing philosophers, since all are moved by the same spirit.

> "Once read thine own breast right,
> And thou hast done with fears;
> Man gets no other light,
> Search he a thousand years.
> Sink in thyself! there ask what ails thee, at that shrine!"[16]

And it is with the seekers at this shrine that we are here to deal. It would seem obvious that the study of religion in its group-manifestation must precede and lay the foundation for any study of the individual manifestation, yet it were well at the outset to remind one's self of this truth. No overcharged attention to a task apparently more novel should cause the student to minimize the greater relative importance of the historical treatment, or to undervalue its effect upon the work at hand. The individual may be properly understood only through a study of his group, his nation, his race. "If religion is veritably to be based upon experience," Dr. Watson reminds us, "no one is justified in citing the partial and fragmentary consciousness of this or that individual."[17] He must generalize rather from a whole than from a partial experience.

Such work as we are to do in this place must needs be supplementary to any broad, general study; and

the work and conclusions of the greater religious historians must take precedence of it, must form its proper corrective. By no means does this fact lessen the value of an investigation into the individual mind, it rather heightens such value. By specialization, a service is rendered to all those engaged in generalizing, and who are perpetually in search of suitable material. In the following pages we shall endeavor to contribute to the work of religious investigation an amount of data, which has at least the merit of having been collated under a salutary method. Should it be impossible to arrive at any conclusions as to the major problems presented by the subject, such conclusions may, perchance, be suggested to the mind of some future investigator.

Our business, then, to put it briefly as may be, is to study, by means of induction through individual examples, the manifestation in human life of that force to which tradition has assigned the name *religion*. This is no new idea, for just so do we study, by means of its manifestations, that physical force to which we have assigned the name *electricity*. Both of these forces proceed from unknown and invisible causes. Both of them are observable only through their direct and indirect effects. Both of them are continuously present, though dormant, in the very atmosphere around us; from both of these silent, invisible forces, the proper agent will on an instant draw the leaping spark. Our prejudices in the past have so hampered us, by attaching a factitious and sacrosanct character (almost in the nature of the savage tabu) to the manifestations of the force known

as religion, that we are much more deficient, scientifically speaking, in our knowledge thereof.

We have not weighed it, nor measured it, nor studied, in any fulness, the conditions which give rise to it, nor noted when we may expect it, and when we may not expect it. Our reverence forbade us to experiment in the ages when experiment might have been of value. But if reverence once hampered us, irreverence to-day hampers us still more. The subject of electricity and electrical forces does not tempt the untrained; nor will the ignorant gather an audience if he theorize thereon. But upon the obscure subject of religion, any fool is sure of an audience to his folly. Our irreverence toward our fellow-men has cast them helpless into the power of the sciolist and the charlatan, who have added to the confusion by obscuring the facts. For, upon this vital subject there appears to prevail a constitutional inability to preserve what Delacroix has called "l'intégralité du fait."[18]

To the facts, then, and to the facts alone, we must turn and return. The subjective can only be reached objectively; these cases must be handled in the same way as are other natural phenomena. A full list must include emotional natures and philosophical natures, objective types and introspective types, normal cases and abnormal cases. Many writers have dealt with religion; we shall seek to know the religious. Tiny as the individual may be, he is at least a part, by means of which the mind may better grasp the whole.

As for the proposed method, it is similar to that now advocated by students of English law. Law had

been taught as philosophy was taught, from textbooks of broad general principles. Science has to-day tended to substitute the inductive method; and from groups of cases, the student is now required to induce a principle and to make the application. There is no reason why such method should not be equally valid for the study of religion, even though the law has the immense advantage in having had its data mechanically collected, for centuries past, into systematic records.

The difficulties in the way of so collecting the religious data are very great, but they are not insurmountable; they but demand a special word of warning. The great temptation in all work of this nature is to carry it too far. Human specimens are not marine specimens, and human cases are not law cases; and if it be important that the student should be able to see the conclusions they present, it is even more important that he should be able to refrain from seeing what is not there. For, when he falls into that error, he at once lowers himself to the level of those recent writers on mysticism, whose method has thus effectually checked all progress in the direction of truth.

There is much to repay the patient collector of these facts. In her preface to Obermann, George Sand says, most beautifully, that "for all profound and dreamy souls, for all delicate and openminded intelligences,"[19] the rare and austere productions of human suffering have an importance even greater than that of history. Anything, she adds, which assists us to understand such suffering must ultimately

assist us to ameliorate it. And this voices the stimulating, the sustaining hope of such an inquiry as the present.

There is need to point out that the inductive method may yield a very different result from the selective method. It is one thing to evolve a theory, and after it has taken shape, to seek for its confirmation by means of some ten or twenty carefully selected cases; it is quite another to start without any *a priori* conceptions,—simply to gather together all available data bearing on the subject, and then to note how the cases so gathered may confirm, contradict, or comment upon each other. It is one thing to select a special set of facts to confirm your special theory; it is another to determine which theory will best account for all the facts. Through a peculiar misconception as to the nature of the material at hand, the first of these methods has been used, practically without exception, in all work on this subject; and used, moreover, by those who must needs have been aware of its technical unsoundness.[20] And it is doubtless for this if for no other reason that the new religious psychology has produced, as a whole, such negligible results. Once more we must repeat that a definitive collection of the data of religion must needs take precedence of any theory.

The essential difficulty in treating this subject is just that it is religion—and religion is the product of centuries of emotion, and indissolubly woven into the very fabric of the theorist's race and temperament, prejudices and traditions. The very word implies idealism; the very conception colors the mind dealing

with it. Thus, that writer whose mystical temperament inclines him to believe in the influence of this force for good, will select his evidence according to its beauty and balance; while that writer whose cynical temperament inclines him to believe in the influence of this force for evil, will select his evidence according to its ugliness and abnormality. One writer hopes that doubt will be cleared and faith stimulated by such investigation; while another believes that by the same investigation ancient superstition will receive its death-blow.

No other scientific work seems to strike its roots thus, through the intellect, into the obscure depths of hereditary tendency and emotional bias. It seems too much to ask of us—being what we are, the children of our fathers—to handle the material bearing on the religious life coolly and impersonally. Yet an approach to impersonal coolness must be made if any real work on this topic is ever to be done. Man, hitherto, has made it the battleground of his passions; surely, in this tolerant age, he should be able to go soberly to and fro, and decide how much of it is worth his contest. The field lies open to certain fundamental and searching queries. What are the manifestations, in an individual, of the force we name religion? What reasons have we for thinking these particular manifestations are due to that particular force and not to some other force? How do we know them to be religious? Since we can judge this force only through its effects, and since each one of us during his life can come into contact with but few of these effects, how can we be sure that we are correct in ascribing

them to that cause? What are the recognizable symptoms of the religious experience?

These are vital questions, and it is worth while to attend to them, even if most of us, being what we are, should fail to give an answer. At least, we may examine the material at hand, since such examination is a part of "the proper study of mankind."

A word as to the plan of approach. Since the motive-power of this documentary material lies in certain impulses and faculties, which, in themselves, have had no small influence over the trend of literature and philosophy, the first two sections of this work have been devoted to their better understanding. The impulse toward confession, and the faculty of introspection by which such impulse is usually accompanied, are here discussed in their broader aspects. The records are next approached through an analysis of their main characteristics and are related to the groups or sects from which they have emanated. Then the data in the records are classified under separate heads, in such manner that the reader himself may follow the progress of the religious experience in every phase, from its first indication to its termination. A thorough comprehension of underlying conditions, together with the cases which they have produced, is essential to the reader's grasp of the final, theoretical sections. Distinct as these seem in treatment and manner, their conclusions are based upon the preceding material—without which they must lack stability and authority. The bearing of the data on the fundamental question of the existence and meaning of religious instinct, is the *raison d'être* of its collection and of this book.

II

CONFESSION AND APOLOGIA

I. 1. Confession in ancient religions, Egyptian, Babylonian, Islamic, Vedic, Manu.
2. Buddhistic, Greek, Hebrew.
3. The early Church, Origen.
4. Rite of Exomologesis, libelli, Loyola, Abélard, Othloh.
5. Augustin and his imitators.
6. Port-Royal, Petrarch.

II. 1. The confessional impulse; publicity as privacy.
2. Relation of thought and speech.
3. Power of ideas; exaggeration; Macaulay, Shelley, Morley.

III. 1. The classic apologia.
2. Rufinus and Jerome; the personal note.
3. Middle Ages, *testamenta, apologiæ, confessiones.*
4. The mystics and their records.
5. Hamilton and the Reynolds Pamphlet.
6. Development of the modern personal apology.

II

CONFESSION AND APOLOGIA

Most of us are so well accustomed to the phenomena of our conscious being that its common miracles of thought and emotion no longer rouse astonishment. Now and again, however, one of us will call the others to some appreciation of these imperious wonders, as Stevenson, when he found the universal ideal of duty "strange to the point of lunacy."[1] The uneasiness of thought concealed, the pain of having something "on one's mind," the relief when one is rid of it—these rank surely among our most familiar mental sensations, without which no one of us can live for long. Yet how often do we ask ourselves why this should be? Why is there, for most of us, an uneasiness in the fact of concealment, and why does the act of confession bring so definite a relief? What is the reason that our thoughts are, on the whole, so difficult to hide, and so easy to avow?

People exist, of course, in whom this impulse counts for little; to whom concealment is more natural than avowal. Yet this temperament is rare and is regarded as apart from the common human type. And what is the reason? Is nature a moralist in this respect, laying some vital prohibition on the hiding of the truth? Whence spring those impulses which urge us

to tell what we know? That we are so urged is matter of human history, and is traceable long before the time religion caused the impulse to crystallize into the shape of ritual.

To-day we associate the idea of confession wholly with confession of sin, and with that group of ideas concerning penitence and submission. And yet its presence in that group is not readily accounted for. Has human nature elaborated an idea having a source purely artificial and ritualistic; or rather, has ritual seized upon and elaborated an idea sprung from a fundamental need of human nature?

To the impulse toward confession and its evolution, much in literature is owing, and this fact is a sufficient warrant to justify any formal enquiry into its nature and origin. Nor could there be a better introduction to such an inquiry than an historical survey of its presence in its technical religious form. Brief as this survey will be, it should at least serve to connect in the reader's mind the auricular, with the written confessions of the past; a formal act of penitence and submission, with that spontaneous, individual, even, if one will, rebellious, movement of the suffering human soul.

The rite of confession of sin in the Christian Church has a direct, concrete bearing on the genesis of the written confession, and its significance is shown by its great antiquity. Public confession of wrongdoing was current in the ritual of the ancient religions, although holding no such important place therein as it came later to acquire in the Christian ritual. The confession-idea, however, will be found manifest in some

very curious and suggestive forms. In the religion of ancient Egypt, for instance, it is connected with that elaborate trial of the soul after death of which we possess full records. The dead soul was obliged to make a curious "plea" or "negative confession," when it came before Osiris and forty-two other judges in Amenti.[2]

"I have not told falsehoods," pleaded the soul, awaiting judgment, "I have not done any wicked thing. . . . I have not murdered. . . . I have not done fraud to men. . . ." And so on, through a catalogue of acts and deeds, ending, "I am pure . . . I am pure . . . I am pure!"

This formula appeared to have a cleansing and absolving significance, and was evidently not intended to be taken literally. Then followed a positive confession addressed to the gods of the underworld. "I live upon right and truth," the soul declared. . . . "I have performed the commandments of men. . . . I have given bread to the hungry man . . ."[3] And the same idea was repeated in a litany or hymn to Osiris, which formed part of the ceremony of the soul's reception. Each verse ends, "For I am just and true, I have not spoken lies wittingly nor have I done aught with deceit."[4] After such formulæ the soul was weighed and admitted.

The Babylonian religion had a conventionalized form of confession which does not appear to have expressed any individual appeal, although the Babylonian penitential hymns contain certain forms of confession of suffering, wherein the supplicant, who has failed to fulfil the law, bewails his sin.[5] But there

is little likeness to any modern spiritual confession in these forms, nor in that avowal of guilt which was required by the ritual of Zoroastrianism.[6] The faith of Islam is too objective to make any such requirement of confession of sin as it made of fighting for the Prophet. The Koran makes but an insignificant reference to this spiritual need; and in truth, humility was not insisted upon by Mahomet save under certain special conditions. It is interesting to contrast Islam, in this respect, with the various religions of India, whose deeply introspective character caused them to lay great stress on the idea of self-examination and confession of sinful act and thought.

This is clearly developed in the collections of Sacred Books. Manu says: "In proportion as a man who has done wrong himself confesses it, even so far is he freed from guilt as a snake from its slough."[7] There will also be found in one of the Vedas (the ceremonial code of the Brahmans) the statement that, "when confessed, the sin becomes less because it becomes *truth.*"[8] The Mahavagga of the Palis contains the sentence: "For this is called progress in the discipline of the Noble One [i.e., the disciple of Buddha], if one sees his sin in its sinfulness, and duly makes amends for it, and refrains from it in future."[9]

Upon the idea of the value of self-examination were founded the practices of the Buddhist "Samgha"—a confraternity of monks, who, at stated intervals, made confession one to another according to a fixed form.[10] Such a rite is familiar to the Christian, who will not have forgotten that it is advocated by St. James, in no uncertain words.[11] To find that the earlier Buddhist

doctrines had so clear an idea of the need for self-study and confession as an aid to religious development, would seem to prove that the religions of India had passed through their subjective period long before the Western world came into contact with them;[12] and before such ideas as these crystallized into mere formalism. The naturally introspective cast of the Oriental mind tended to adopt all such religious practices, although they have later developed the more mystical at the expense of the less.

Definite public confession was enjoined by the Greeks under certain circumstances, when it was addressed to an oracle or to a priest. "In the days of Socrates," recounts Plutarch, "Lysander consulted the oracle at Samothrace, and was told by the priest to confess the worst actions of his life. 'Is it thou who commandest this,' he asked, 'or the gods?' The priest replied, 'It is the gods.' 'Then at once retire,' said Lysander, 'that I may answer the gods!'"[13]

This anecdote displays a typical situation as regards the confession; i.e., the priestly effort to make use of it as a weapon for the benefit of the hierarchy, with the ensuing resentment of a certain kind of penitent. Moreover, it is precisely this Lysander-type whose influence has been set against the practice from the beginning and continues until the present day. A masterful man is willing to confess to God, but not to the priest; and had there been more examples of this temperament, the control of the confessional would have lapsed more slowly into priestly hands. Early ideas of submission and of discipline, with the early lack of individualism, made this control inevitable;

but that Lysander and his like existed and must be reckoned with, cannot be ignored when the origin of the written confession is to be discussed.[14]

From very early times, the Jews made confession on the eve of Day of Atonement. The form which they recited differs little from that employed by Christianity; and involved an act of atonement, just as, later on, the penitent will be found making a rich gift to the Church. But the Hebrew confession was less individual than national; the people, as one penitent, could and did make confession of their sin.[15] From the evidence of the Old Testament, this movement seems to have sprung from a deep and spontaneous emotion of patriotism; and its impressiveness had, doubtless, much to do with its later influence over the penitential system of the Church. The emotional Aramean, who beat his breast and confessed his sin, presented a more vivid picture of remorse than the pagan world was accustomed to behold. Thus, many of the rites and formulæ, which served to heighten the emotional appeal of Christianity, were retained therein, despite their origin.

The Jewish confession does not seem to have been often a written document; but preserved its public and national character. Unquestionably, this was at first also the character of the Christian confession. It was enjoined by the Church as a public, penitential, and disciplinary formula, without any individual significance whatever, and this fact must be remembered when the reader plunges into the vast literature of the Christian ritual. There was no need for Lysander to protest in those days. By the time public confession

of sin had become a regular sacrament of the Church, its disadvantages were manifest and its use had begun to create scandal; while to regularize the practice by private confession had become inevitable.[16] The period of transition, according to scholars, is somewhat vague; for the Church long wavered between her definite dogmatic necessities and the authority of certain texts, which, though clear in their general meaning, were yet not specific.[17]

In the first and second centuries confession preceded baptism. "The pardon symbolized by the baptismal rite," says Dr. Lea,[18] "was only to be earned by a cleansing of the heart, confession of sin to God and earnest repentance. . . ." This confession, which was supposed to be public and voluntary, was to be rewarded by a mitigation of that penalty which the sinner incurred as discipline, at the hands of the Church.[19] Nor would the Church, even at this date, have permitted so high-handed an action as that of Lysander: she was already jealous of her authority. "Public confession and public penance were the only process then recognized by the Church;" while Origen[20] in his "Homilies" recommends the penitent to lay bare his soul to some expert in whom he has confidence.

It appears to be the influence of Origen, rather than the action of Pope Calixtus, which systematized definitively the rite of confession. The former had instituted it in 218 A.D.;[21] but the rite of *Exomologesis*, as it is called, and as it appears in the old Armenian service-books, was but a repetition of the rite of baptism, involving confession, but involving much else

beside. The confession-idea, in reality, was therefore but a part of the whole penitential system—it had no such importance as it afterwards received, and some historians even make no separate mention of it.[22] Origen planned the different steps and stages of penance as "contrition, satisfaction, and self-accusation or confession."[23] During the transition period, to which we have just alluded, this confession varied. Sometimes "it was private before the bishop or priest, sometimes public before the whole congregation, Public confession was demanded of persons who were guilty of grievous public sins"; unless the recital of such sins would tend to create scandal. In other words, the bishops were required to use their own judgment; in special cases they are found consulting their diocesan counselor, or asking the advice by letter of their brother-bishops.

Such was the situation regarding confession of sin, in which the penitent Christian convert of the first and second centuries found himself. The public recital of his crimes was no doubt even then largely conventional, consisting, as it now does, in the repetition of a set formula. But his vital offences were obliged to have a private hearing; and this latter practice so personal, so intimate, fed the Church's growing need of power to knit together her isolated congregations. For this reason, if for no other, the practice of auricular private confession was encouraged.[24] Yet so many of the devout shared the objection of Lysander that progress in this direction was felt to be provokingly slow; the cases remaining scanty, indeed, even in the third century.[25] The

custom was held to be salutary for the penitent, and a wholesome exercise in the development of self-restraint, but since Dr. Lea writes that it was far from common as late as 850 A.D., one may judge of its infrequency in the days of Augustin.

The name of the great Bishop brings us without further parley to the immediate point of departure between the spoken and the written confession. While his influence on the latter is profound, it formed but a part of his general influence on the whole penitential system of the Church; while the breadth and force of this personal and intellectual influence is difficult to overestimate. "In the Decretum of Gratian, no less than 607 canons are taken from his works. St. Paul furnished but 408. It was on Augustin rather than on Paul that the schoolmen built."[26] So writes the historian, not omitting to note that in the "Confessiones," Augustin had laid a foundation upon which not only the Church, but the whole world of thought was to build.

The modern student of philosophy[27] sees in Augustin "a virtuoso of self-observation and self-analysis"; and to the open-minded reader his greatest book is charged with the vital power of literary genius, and full of the zeal and color with which genius informs a new idea. This literary quality must not be forgotten, because it is a factor only recently acknowledged as responsible for the book's success. To find in publicity all the sacredness of the confessional, is Augustin's new idea; and his genius pours forth his sin and his humility, his love and his joy, "in the ears of the believing sons of men." While it is easy to

realize the effect upon the sensitive mind of such confidences as these, and to understand how literature at large came to regard them, yet their immediate result was not literary but theological, heightening the importance of Exomologesis in the eyes of the Church.

There has never been a shorter and more inevitable road to power than that furnished by the confessional.[28] The rule laid down by Gregory of Nyssa "mitigated all penance to those persons who voluntarily revealed any sin not before known, and who sought a remedy."[29] Gradually the practice became regularized after the penitent had been taught the means of duly expressing his humility. The word *confessio* meant also *memoria,* the burial-place of a martyr, or the shrine of a reliquary; and in this manner the idea of revealing something precious and hidden became identified with the idea of a self-revelation.

It is not easy to state when the practice of writing the confession developed; doubtless in the beginning it was the necessary result of the distances which separated the members of those early isolated congregations. *Libelli* (as these written records were called) came to be read aloud in church to spare the personal mortification of the penitent.[30] St. Basil, who advocated this custom, states that he received such a written record from a woman in Cæsareá, of high rank but very evil life,—who, in this manner, laid confession of her sins before the Lord.[31]

In the ninth century, Robert of Le Mans, when sick unto death, sent a written statement of his sins to the Bishop, and received absolution in the same way.[32] But by the thirteenth century the written records were

forbidden, and the rule finally established that all confession must be auricular. Dr. Lea, however, reminds us that the practice itself did not become annually obligatory on the faithful until the year 1216, in the reign of Pope Innocent III.[33]

With the history of auricular confession this study has little to do. After it has been related to the special document with which it is our business to deal, the evolution of the practice does not greatly concern us. The fathers differed widely in their opinion of its value, and these opinions furnish a suggestive commentary upon their personalities. Abélard is not sure it is always desirable; St. Bernard is never weary extolling its virtues.[34] Long after private confession had superseded the older public form, that form survived when men made confession to one another, in crises where no priest was to be had.[35] This act had the warrant of St. James, and more than one autobiography of the Middle Ages make mention of the occurrence. "When the expected day of battle came," writes Loyola, "he made his confession to one of the nobles who had often fought by his side, and who, in turn, also confessed to him."[36] To a similar impulse is due Abélard's letter, "Historia Calamitatum"; while Abbot Othloh of St. Emmeran writes a detailed account lest death should prevent him from making a full oral confession.[37] No better proof could be given of the penitent's deep humility and sincere repentance. Other mediæval expedients show the depth of this feeling. The nun, Maria Maddalena de' Pazzi, was used to kneel in the chapel and, after repeating certain psalms, to recite aloud her faults of the day,

addressing herself directly to God. In a phraseology full of touching humility and beauty, she accused herself of negligence and of preoccupation with things of the flesh. Her very simplest thoughts, she felt, were wholly unworthy of her Lord. "Déjà, mon Dieu, la nuit arrive, et je n'ai rien fait encore sans vous offenser!"[38] was her avowal. And no doubt there were many to follow her pious example.

The intensity of this desire to confess will be felt by even the most casual student of these days. Augustin's influence, both literary and theological, had been to vitalize all penitential practices with the breath of emotion, and to stimulate them by his literary genius. His work lent the penitent a sacredness which he has not lost even to-day; a sacredness which Augustin felt to be inherent in his own humility and love of the Divine. No cold array of dogmas could possibly have roused the sinful man to a sense of his sinfulness, as does this personal contact with the soul of another man who is at once his fellow-sinner and his guide. What the Church owes Augustin on this one count is incalculable, since he provided a means whereby the Lysanders of this world may be brought to their knees without a loss of self-respect. That there are yet other sources affecting both the production and the character of these documents, cannot be forgotten, and they are to receive, in their turn, full consideration at our hands. Yet, when all is said and done, it may be doubted if they are more powerful than the personal appeal of the "Confessions." The author's understanding of human nature is equal to his pity, and both are based on real experience. No figment of

life had he lived—the Bishop of Hippo! He knew the horror of the sinner and the exaltation of the saved. He had realized to the full a Vedic saying, "that, when confessed, the sin becomes less, because it becomes truth": and he felt in his own proper person the "purifying influence of public confession" by which "hope in lies is forever swept away." [39]

In treating his "Confessions" as a perfect type of this document, one desires to do away with those clouds which the misinterpretation of centuries has caused to dim its brilliant surface. Perfect confession is indeed rare and difficult and distrusted of men. According to Ramon de Peñafort it must be "bitter, speedy, complete, and frequent." [40] So hard is it for an active, objective mind to grasp the principles of self-examination that it tends to confuse the practice with an unhealthy self-depreciation. Along with reverence for Augustin, distrust of Augustin's introspection has gone hand in hand for centuries, and it has so permeated many minds that we find the edition prepared for general reading has most of the self-study expurgated. It is a shock to the Church, it is a shock to the average reader, to find so great a figure making an avowal of this and that, with such a great humility. But to another type of mind this avowed kinship is as the breath of life; nor can Augustin have lacked the knowledge that herein lay the great value of his work. No book has been more studied, and to less purpose; no book has been more read, and is less really known. The world, for a thousand years and more, has tried to open these doors without a key. Just as in the case of Jerome Cardan's

very different but equally candid life,[41] the world has been obliged to wait until science gave it both the facts and the knowledge of how to apply them, which it needed to elucidate the writer's statements.

Meanwhile, a mountain of exegesis, criticism, and so-called interpretation has been piled upon the "Confessions." The favorite attitude of critic and commentator insists that the "Confessions" are not autobiographical at all and were never intended by the author to be thought so. The Church is very strong upon this view, chiefly, it would seem, to preserve the great Father's sanctity; and in order that the vulgar shall not have the satisfaction or the scandal of believing that he lied, or stole, or dwelt "in a chaldron of unholy loves." As he is St. Augustin, argues the Church, he cannot have done these things. He must have exaggerated his trifling peccadilloes, because we have canonized him. The logic here is the logic of the cleric, but its effect has so deeply permeated the history of the subject as to have an unfortunate result for the written confession in general. For Augustin's supposed exaggeration has, of course, been made a text for the exaggeration of his followers, without the churchly reasoning being taken into account.

Quite apart from questions of hierarchical policy, Augustin has suffered, with many another, from that passion of the commentator for the involved, indirect explanation, invented by himself, instead of the simple, direct explanation furnished by the words of the subject.[42] Even in the English standard edition, the translator is found to have made the important discovery that the "Confessions" are only "con-

fessions of praise." This is based on an observation of Augustin in his exposition of the Psalms, that "Confessions of sin all know, but confessions of praise few attend to." These words, together with the undercurrent of worship and praise carrying along the music of the prose, satisfy this editor that Augustin did not intend to tell all about himself.

One is roused in these latter days to a weary impatience when it comes to combating such artificial views as these, but it must be done, since they prevent us from seeing our subject as it really is. From the standpoint of reverence—which should have weight with many—it would seem very little to listen and believe what Augustin tells us. We know his heart to beat with ours, we have the best of human reasons to feel his truth and his sincerity; let us be confident, then, that he did what he says he did, and that he confessed his sins when he declares that he confessed them. The words are there in all their poignancy, and the man who wrote them did not write for the purpose of hiding his real meaning. Moreover, it is not difficult to decide whether or not the "Confessions" form a genuine autobiography. We have but to compare the body of facts which the book contains with the body of facts obtainable from other sources. If the book be not intended as an autobiography, then these facts will necessarily be fewer and less essential than the outside facts; and we should be able to gain just as clear a picture of the man if he had never written any confessions at all.

A rapid examination of the different chapters will show, better than any words, how exceedingly rich

they are in personal data. In his first book Augustin presents a minute analysis of his childish development, not omitting such details as his prayer to God that he might not be flogged.[43] Book II contains a study of the crisis of puberty; and after that a careful description of his education.[44] Book III opens with one of the most striking pictures in all literature of the effect of life and art upon a vivid, youthful imagination; its new joy in ideas, and chiefly in the drama, whence came, he declares, "my love of griefs."[45] If his purpose, indeed, was not primarily autobiographical, why these analyses? Whence these details? They serve no purpose in the scheme of a "confession of praise." Let the reader compare them with Rousseau; or their vitality of ideas with the similar youthful vitality displayed in such letters as those of Shelley[46] or the young Goethe, and he will see that the religious purpose has not been allowed to interfere with the intention of sincere self-study. Later, in depicting his period of temptation through the senses, Augustin's self-observation is remarkably full and valuable. He tells of his indifference to perfume, his fondness for music, his delight in beautiful imaginings and colors, and "that vain and curious longing" which he terms the "lust of the eye for things hidden."[47] There are similar details given in such highly secular studies as Cardan's,[48] and the "De Profundis"[49] of Oscar Wilde, and for the same reason, i.e., *that the writer may be known to the reader as he really is.* Augustin's whole book, in truth, loses meaning if it be regarded in the sense insisted upon by the religious world as that of a mere penitential handbook of prayer and

praise. Such prayer and praise it contains in full measure,[50] but they are intended to be secondary and should be so regarded.

Moreover, the power and influence of Augustin's "Confessions" over the world of literature has been maintained for no other reason than their sincerity and truthful information. Prayer and praise have their own beauty and place, but they make no such universal appeal to man as do the works which add to his stock of knowledge. In vain has the Church warned the faithful that he must not dare to suppose Augustin lived in sin simply because he says that he did; the human heart knows better. It knows that for one exaggeration of an error, a man will write ten understatements. It feels exactly what Augustin meant when he cried out to God; "Accept the *sacrifice* of my confession by the agency of my tongue."[51] And it echoes and reëchoes the words of his humility through all the years to the present, when yet another sinner repeats them: "A man's very highest moment is, I have no doubt, when he kneels in the dust and beats his breast, and tells all the sins of his life."[52]

"What, then, have I to do with men that they should hear my confession?" Augustin asks of future generations. "A people curious to know the lives of others, but slow to correct their own."[53] To-day we wonder if his wildest dreams showed him to what extent this estimate was true. The effect of the "Confessions" during certain eras became a sort of spiritual contagion; and a volume would be all too small to hold its manifestations. Of M. de Saint-Cyran the Port-Royalist, we read, for instance, that he "plunged and re-

things, who might long ago have learned even from the pagan philosophers that nothing is wonderful but the soul. . . . I turned my inward eye upon myself, and from that time not a syllable fell from my lips until we reached the bottom again. Those words had given me occupation enough. . . ." [58]

In this passage the world may almost be said to come of age; the mind of man, if we permit Petrarch to personify it for us, attains maturity. The touch of Augustin has led many another to that threshold since, but no one has described the crisis more beautifully.

> "The face of all the world is changed, I think,
> Since first I heard the footsteps of thy soul
> Move still, oh, still, beside me . . ." [59]

has been the cry of the devout heart to the Bishop of Hippo, from almost every reader of his great "Confessions." Later in his life, Petrarch definitely imitates them, and, by the practice of self-examination, "laid open the secret uncleanness of my transgressions," [60] not once but many times. And from Petrarch's day it shall be our task to mark the footsteps of the saint, as he walks through these pages beside the souls of men.

With the appearance of Augustin's book, a means was indicated to the sincere and introspective man, whereby he might, as it were, make his confession direct to God. Such a man must have felt very early the inadequacy, for his soul's needs, of the auricular confession; and that he did so feel is shown by the rapid growth of the written record. Dr. Lea [61] has fully determined (though the question is somewhat

beside our present business) that the salutary effect of confession largely ceased when addressed in private to a single priest. Too much power had been delivered into priestly hands; while the confession itself tended to lose spontaneity. Similar objections may be raised to the questionnaire method in general, wherever it obtains, and whether it be applied by religion or by science, by the confessor, or by the psychologist. [62]

But at the moment this question does not concern us. What we wish to emphasize is the recognition by Augustin, in the fourth century, of a fundamental psychological fact, and his own admirable use of it for the purpose of leading souls to God. From this recognition we may date the appearance, in literature, of the "Confessant" himself. The term is used and sanctioned by Bacon in order to escape the ambiguity of the word "Confessor," which, as we have seen, may indicate both the penitent and the priest to whom the confession is addressed. From this time on, we shall make use of Bacon's term in discussing the person with whom it is the object of this book to deal. The confessant, as he appears in these pages, is personally, at least, the direct result of the influence of Augustin.

That human impulse to "cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff which weighs upon the heart," [63] first really understood by the Bishop of Hippo, is responsible for more than one philosophic and literary tendency. Reading the "Confessions" from this point of view, the author's subtlety of understanding seems freshly amazing, so does it outrun the develop-

ment of the surrounding civilized world. Modern to the last degree, both in its expansions as in its reticences, it proves at least the familiarity of the idea of self-study to the more cultivated minds of that time. Dr. Lea has exhaustively portrayed the Church's effort to utilize this human impulse in a social-religious attempt to bind together its congregations; but he nowhere suggests that such an attempt was other than instinctive. It seemed simply a part of the natural effort at unification, for the purpose of self-preservation. If we know all about each other's sins and errors, then we must stand and fall together. A solidarity is at once formed, based on mutual understanding and mutual leniency, and this solidarity was the pressing and immediate need of the Church for several centuries. Later conditions tended to conventionalize this idea into a ritual, but in this universal human impulse the Church found a weapon which it did not scruple to use for its own purposes and the purposes, supposedly, of Heaven.

How may one best define this universal human impulse? Though we know it to be influential upon almost all branches of literature, yet, by scholars, it has been practically ignored. "All men have a natural impulse to communicate their inward feelings and sensations," writes a modern investigator. "The desire to 'tell all about it' produces intense satisfaction of the emotions. Suppression of it involves a tension . . . and a general uneasiness. Criminals are not seldom led by this impulse to confess offenses committed long before. This impulse is quite a normal one, and belongs in some measure to every man."[64] The writer

adds that in poets and artists this feeling is apt to be intensified, although he does not tell us why; and our case-list more or less confirms his observation. In the simple fact of suppression, involving tension and uneasiness, lies the whole religious situation of the converted individual.

The practice of written confession, as we have seen, composed in heart-searching privacy, permits the confessant to gain all the benefit, all the exaltation, of the confession-idea, without the humiliation attending upon the auricular form; it encourages self-discipline and self-knowledge, without weakening the individual will. So long as the Church, recognizing the soul's impulse to "tell all about it," made use of that impulse for the health of the soul itself, just so long was a direct means provided for a human need. But the moment that the Church began to use the confession-idea, if only partially, for its own benefit and that of its confessors, at once the practice degenerated into tyranny of a peculiarly hateful sort. No necessity is there to repeat in these pages the details of that tyranny and the protests against it;[65] the reader sees for himself at once that the independent mediæval mind must needs have found another channel for its impulse to "tell all about it." Even Augustin, in the fourth century, knew this; and under his influence the written confession sprang into being, supplying in a measure the place of that general, public avowal which prevailed in the naïf beginnings of the early Church.

For public opinion—to which such a record is confided—is safer than the seal of the confessional.

Men may securely tell their sins to a collective body of their fellow-men; such confidence presupposes a very sacredness of privacy. That this paradox is true is proven by the nature of some of the sins thus entrusted to the printed page, by such confessants as Abélard [66] and Cardan, such self-students as Benvenuto Cellini and Rousseau. The feeling which realizes that this privacy is real because it is also publicity, forms a part of the autobiographical intention toward sincerity, which is one of the basic ideas of self-study in autobiography.[67]

The origins of the written confession, therefore, are seen to be social, literary, and psychological; and these must receive due consideration, since the religious self-study is in a measure evolved from all of them. At the moment, our purpose is but to establish the connection between the ritual and the document, with the effect on both of the work of Augustin. When that original, human impulse to "tell all about it" had familiarized itself with a form of expression provided for its aid by the builders of the early Church, a fresh impetus was given to all similar forms. Hence Augustin's "Confessions" introduced to the confession proper the autobiographical intention and idea. It was plain that a full sincerity involved giving the complete history of the subject, the sources of his sin, the progress of his conversion-process. A definite plan of self-study thus came to be formulated. Augustin not only taught this self-study to be full and sincere, but furnished an imperishable classic by the way of example, and one which was to be followed by the most enthusiastic imitation. Through him, the

religious record became the natural means of expression for the emotions of the Middle Ages.

Since the day of the Bishop of Hippo, the further evolution of this type has been comparatively slow. Already has it been noted that the derivation of the confession-idea from paganism was hardly more than formal; and that in the more ancient religions it lacked both in vitality and personal appeal. Its vital conception is purely the flower of Augustin's genius. Modern exponents have added but little: more facts, perhaps; a clearer understanding of what was seen; better comparison in the matter of case and case; nothing more. There are more minds of an introspective cast to-day, owing to the tendency and development of modern thought, yet their records have added but little to the form bequeathed by Augustin. His fascination over their imaginations has endured for nearly one thousand years, while his method of self-revelation has proved more satisfying than that of the confessional. To its disciplinary effect, since it requires an equally stringent self-examination, there are many to testify; while the ugliness of the written sin constitutes no light penance for the sensitive mind.

Many temperaments are aided and uplifted by this act of confession; it is their natural need, and may be the only hold which goodness has upon them. Literature is filled with examples to show that the impulse may become overmastering,—such as the cases in "The Scarlet Letter," or in Dostoievski's "Crime and Punishment." [68] But it does not need examples so melodramatic to bring this truth home to us. What

mother has not had the startling yet sacred experience of hearing a sensitive child make sudden and voluntary confession? Some evil act—which may be wholly unsuspected—or some evil thought which has been too long suppressed—serves to set up an unbearable tension and uneasiness. Is not this what De Quincey meant when he wrote, "If in this world there is one misery having no relief, it is the pressure on the heart from the Incommunicable. And . . . what burden is that which only is insupportable by human fortitude? I should answer . . . it is the burden of the Incommunicable."[69] True, indeed, it is that "For him who confesses, shams are over and realities are begun."[70] The soul's endeavor to purge itself is an impulse so definite and so universal at certain stages in its development, that to determine these stages forms a valuable point of departure for a psychological analysis.

The question asked at the outset of this chapter will not have been forgotten by the reader. When we turn to science and enquire why the act of confession should bring a relief so intense to the mind and spirit, the mental physiologist has an answer ready. If it seem an answer more or less theoretical, one must not forget that the whole subject, after all, is still in the realm of hypothesis and theory, and that a categorical reply cannot in the nature of things be given until there is a further advance in the study of the mental phenomena. Yet much has been determined. By recent experiment it has been shown that the connection between our speech and our ideas is closer than we used to think; that the latter, indeed,

is practically dependent upon the former; and that upon the faculty of language our whole intellectual fabric really rests.[71]

Many philosophers have suggested this dependence in the past. From Abélard to Humboldt, it has been the favorite paradox of the bolder mind. But it can never have been more than a paradox, a suggestion, until the modern experiments in the study of the deaf-mute revealed its possibilities as a truth. These studies have demonstrated at least one fact; i.e., that the person deprived of the faculty of speech (and this includes, of course, any possibility of *hearing* and *understanding* speech) is deprived as well of those mental images which are associated with language. Lacking the means of expression, the subject will be found also lacking in the ideas to express. The teachers of Helen Keller [72] describe her original condition as one almost of idiocy. This woman, who now wields a prose of extraordinary clarity and beauty in the service of the most poetic and complex ideas, as a young child felt none but brute emotions, such as hunger or anger; and was incapable of anything even approaching an abstract conception. By the restoration of the normal channels to thought, very gradually, but very surely, the ideas themselves, first simple, then more elaborate, were evolved and restored to their domination in the human scheme. The power of forming a conception is by this example seen to be dependent on the means of expressing it; while language takes its place as the normal and indispensable prerequisite to thought.[73]

Once possessed of language, man raised himself very

rapidly above the brute-level, for his every new word became the nucleus for a group of new concepts. Communicativeness, as such, is therefore his natural tendency; his mental capital must be kept constantly in circulation if it is to increase; and the busy garrulity of the world is a guaranty of its vitality. Further, it is normal, if not inevitable, for speech to utter whatever thought the mind conceives. That restless spirit which we call human cannot lie hid; it must forth or die. After having once attained to a certain degree of vitality, no concept can be suppressed without strain. An idea, once formulated in your mind, is a power which must act, and if you fail to give it an outlet by your utterance, it is apt to create a disagreeable tension. That these suppressions are abnormal, that if persisted in they cause a marked uneasiness, that one's natural impulse is to share one's thought or idea with another, we do not need to read in books; they are matter of daily experience.

Such popular phrases as "having something on one's mind," express clearly our perception of this condition. In children, to whom fresh ideas are a continual source of excitement, the strain may become exaggerated. Wholly apart from conduct, many a child cannot eat or sleep normally if it be prevented from "telling mother" of some new idea which has taken a hold upon its mind. A child known to the writer will lie awake for hours under the tension of such a suppression, and be asleep in five minutes after the perplexity has been communicated, even when all explanation has been postponed till morning. Adults have naturally more self-control; yet literature is filled

with the struggles involved by such suppression, when the suppressed idea is one of importance. Bizarre avowals, confessions, and explanations crowd the pages of history; yet we continue to wonder at the candid revelations of Pepys, or Cellini, Ivan the Terrible, or Catherine of Russia, without realizing the power of the law by which they are driven to make them.[74]

It has been assumed that the idea must attain to a certain degree of importance in the mind conceiving it. No ideas are more important to most of us than those affecting our own conduct or opinions. A person having these under consideration has created a group of ideas concerning self. If he adds thereto dissatisfaction with himself due to newly aroused religious feeling, immediately this nucleus is charged with emotion, penitence, grief, and humility. Thus heightened, it becomes an unbearable centre of mental activity, possessing temporarily all his energies, and in its struggle for expression, distracting the whole poor creature. Hawthorne vividly describes this condition in "The Marble Faun."[75] "I could not bear it," Hilda cries. "It seemed as if I made the awful guilt my own by keeping it hidden in my heart. I grew a fearful thing to myself. I was growing mad!" The relief when she makes her confession is described as unspeakable,—the satisfaction of a great need of the heart, and the passing away of a torture.[76]

For a longer or shorter period of time, according to the subject's strength of character and the various crises through which he may pass, this suppression continues, bringing with it an intense misery. The religious crisis forwards the moment of confession by

softening the man's heart and loosening his will. And when, by his first words of avowal, this tension is relaxed, the relief has been compared to the draining of an abscess. Physicians understand this fact so well, in their treatment of many nervous cases, that confessions are not discouraged, and are treated as under the seal. The writer heard not long since how a famous neurologist had treated a woman patient unsuccessfully for many months; but after she had confessed to a hidden sin, she recovered rapidly.

In examples where this impulse is heightened by literary gifts and natural expansiveness, the relief is touched with joy. Not only has a channel been provided through which the pent-up feelings may readily flow, but it is a channel also open to the creative faculties—a new outlet for newly acquired powers. Thus Augustin is filled with exultant delight, praising God; thus, too, is Teresa, casting aside her diffidence. The sense of serene power, so strong in Cardan's "Life," and in the opening books of Rousseau's "Confessions," is due to such a combination. Many critics have set this emotion down to piety only, but if we regard it nearly, we will see that it partakes the characteristics of a joy more constant and less subject to fluctuation than the pious joy—no less than the happiness of intellectual creation.

Were it possible to obtain the data, it would be interesting to determine the usual length of the period of suppression and its cause. These must vary widely. Criminal annals have shown us cases where such a suppression has lasted for many years; and there may, of course, be natures who die unconfessed.

But when we realize that the recipient of the confession need only be one other, and that the relief of such confession may be just as great if no action of any kind follow it, we see that it is very doubtful if many men go to their graves carrying with them secrets which no other human being has shared. And if any religious emotion or disturbance enter into one's life at all, its first effect would be unquestionably to rouse and to excite this impulse to confess.

The characteristics of the earlier confessions are readily comprehended. Their motive-forces have not changed to-day, although familiarity with the literary form has brought into play the confusing elements of imitation, and the ages have weakened the primal emotions. Still are they being written under the influence of that *autobiographical intention,* which has been discussed elsewhere,[77] and which has been defined "as writing as though no one in the world were to read it, yet with the purpose of being read."[78] In the privacy of unveiling the soul to God and so making a fuller revelation to man, the first religious confession was written, and the last will be written. "Columbus," says Emerson, "discovered no isle or key so lonely as himself,"[79] and this is the first discovery of all serious self-study. Charged with a feeling the more intense because of its previous suppression, a confessant sits down to "tell all about it" as far as his gifts and powers of expression will permit. We have seen how these differ, and we shall return to this difference, which is important. All confessants are not Augustin, nor yet Bunyan, nor yet James Linsley, nor yet John Gratton. But they must and do

share certain characteristics and tendencies, however wide the variations in individual force.

Surely the very act of writing a confession presupposes that the emotions confessed have dropped from their first height, and reached a secondary stage. This subsidence must not be forgotten, though it generally is; it is equally true of *every* feeling described, of love or hate, of pious or criminal passion. The mere fact of writing about it shows that the high-water mark of the emotion itself has been passed. Failure to comprehend this is one of the most potent sources of prevalent misinterpretation of the document. When the confessant writes, "I feel thus and so," a distrust is immediately bred in the mind of the reader, who, finding it impossible to believe that a fellow-creature can so catch his own moods and feelings "on the wing," as it were, communicates this distrust to the *matter* of the record. Less difficulty is experienced where the writer substitutes the past tense; remembering that all confessions must needs be confessions of something which the mind is able to analyze and survey, i.e., of something past. That in a sensitive nature the mental eye may exaggerate the past experience, is of course true; but it is less common than many have imagined. The reasons why Augustin is accused of it have already been mentioned. Many of us, however, share Macaulay's feeling, that the religious man over-accents his wickedness. "There cannot be a greater mistake," declares Macaulay with his usual emphasis, "than to infer from the strong expressions in which a devout man bemoans his exceeding sinfulness, that he has led a worse life than his neighbors.

Many excellent persons . . . have in their autobiographies and diaries applied to themselves, and doubtless with sincerity, epithets as severe as could be applied to Titus Oates or Mrs. Brownrigg." [80]

Macaulay, with many others, fails to observe that the difference here is not that the converted man has led a worse life than his neighbors, but only that he is now able to recognize it as evil. Bunyan's youth resembles that of many men, yet the moralist does not find it admirable any more than Bunyan did.[81] The early years of Tolstoï differ very little from those spent by other young Russians of his day and society; but are we required to think, for that reason, that they were well spent? Do we really feel as we read his avowals, or those of Alfieri, for instance, that he exaggerates when he calls that preconverted time immoral? [82] When John B. Gough describes his drunkard degradation, and George Müller the vices for which he was arrested,[83] are they exaggerating because they have come to see themselves as others see them? The facts of the case are against Macaulay. And if we shift our standards a little, believing that the eyes which see the hideousness of sin are now open, when before they were closed, then we feel no distrust of the self-depreciation of our great confessants.

In one of Shelley's letters, he remarks that "Rousseau's 'Confessions' are either a disgrace to the confessor or a string of falsehoods, and probably the latter." [84] The "either-or," in this sentence is very characteristic of Shelley's hasty and tumultuous mind; and his criticism well exhibits his inability to see things as they really were. With all his high ideals

of virtue, his acts yet produced the miserable results of vice; with all his delicate sensitiveness to beauty, his private relations yet show an ugly aspect; while the lack of courageous self-knowledge hampered him throughout his life. A man like this finds an indelicacy in all real candour, and by temperament would rather never look facts about himself in the face. His attitude toward Rousseau is shared by many,—even Lord Morley thinks that the opening sentences of the "Confessions" are blasphemous.[85] Yet it is to such an one, if he be at all open-minded, that the sincere confession is especially addressed, and for whom it has a particular value. It may form, perhaps, his only influence on the subjective side, causing him for once to examine his real state; "to strip himself bare as Christ stripped himself before crucifixion . . . to look at the face of his soul in the mirror of the virtues of Christ."[86] Such examination is in itself a religious act, and shows its effect by the impression which these records have produced in times past over minds by no means naturally introspective.

For the introspective person has his uses, though he will never form one of the majority. He is a development of the Christian influence, which has for centuries worked to produce this special and highly evolutionized type of the inward-looking mind. What religion encouraged, on the one hand, science also, with her perpetual questioning and analyzing, encouraged on the other, so that the very word philosophy has today become almost a synonym for subjective discussion. What result these influences have had upon the

evolution of modern man, and modern thought; upon the recorded inner life of the first, and the special trend of the second, must needs form the subject of a separate chapter.

It has been noted that there are other sources for the early religious self-study, and other influences affecting its character, upon which we have not yet touched. Before entering on the study of the basic underlying problems of subjectivity and introspection, it were well to consider such of these sources as may be revealed by history. The connotation in our minds of the words "apologia" and "confession" is founded on a very modern *rapprochement* of the two ideas. When Newman wrote an "Apologia pro Vita sua," he used a title which already carried for his reader an idea beyond mere exposition, and involving excuse. Now, this meaning of excuse is modern and secondary, although in a sense it usurps the functions of the primary meaning of exposition. When one examines that group of writings technically known as the "Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum," or the "Body of Christian Apologetics," he is struck with their impersonal character. A defence of the faith by means of an adequate exposition of its doctrines,—this was the original aim of the apologist. To him, there would have been dishonor in the faintest suggestion of excuse.

This same intention is maintained here and there in literature, during the Middle Ages, and there are returns to it, occasionally, even to-day. But these returns only serve to mark more strikingly that a new, personal meaning is now attached to the word

"apology." When Pietro Pomponazzi [87] wrote an "Apologia" for his materialistic tract whose doctrine disagreed with the doctrine of the soul's immortality, one somehow expects to find it contain his personal excuses for his lack of faith. When Sir Leslie Stephen [88] calls his volume of essays "An Agnostic's Apology," one is somehow surprised to find the term used in its elder sense of doctrinal defence and exposition.

How, then, did this idea of defence by exposition come to include that of personal statement and personal confession? The Greek word means simply the speech of a defendant in reply to that of a prosecutor.[89] Hence the "Apology" of Socrates, whose defiant attitude seems in our minds a very contradiction of his titular address.[90] "I am conscious of no guilt," he declared; and then entered on certain arguments in support of his opinions which permitted him to display his powers in their most characteristic form.[91] There is certainly here no intention of excuse.

It has been similarly suggested that Christianity, being a prophetic religion, should not have descended to argument, but should have continued merely to declare God's will. The Fathers, however, did not find that a mere declaration sufficed them. During that great second century, when apologetics [92] became practically a science, all literature of this kind begins to change in tone. It displays, in fact, the first effects of that spontaneous evolution from the objective to the subjective which was characteristic of other lines of thought as well. The Fathers may not have known, as we know, that every creed must pass through its

apologetic stage, when the energy of its adherents must needs be devoted to doctrinal exposition, definition, and defence. The building of a Church from a creed, of an organization from a set of opinions, is largely dependent upon the manner in which this primary exposition is accomplished. The definition and development of men's ideas as to the value of such and such a belief, is naturally of the greatest importance in causing that belief to prevail.

Christianity possessed an immense advantage in the vitality, the acumen, and the energy of its primary apologists and expositors. It is true that the modern reader will have difficulty in finding a single document of this large group [93] which bears what he to-day would term an apologetic significance. Their attitude is as sure and unswerving as that of Socrates himself; nor must it be forgotten that the whole world stood, at this time, for the prosecutor of Christianity, whose place at the bar was not unlike that of the Greek philosopher, while facing some of the same charges.

These disquisitions are almost wholly doctrinal in character, many of them occupied only in the analysis of certain moot-points of dogma. The only suggestion of personality about them lies in their acrimony; for the vexation of the writer is an indication that his feelings and his temperament in general are involved in the discussion.

By the time of the Renaissance, the classic, i.e., the impersonal, intellectual apology, had grown to be differentiated from the personal apology. This last was the child of Christian controversy, born of the furious

zeal of the saints, to whom a difference of opinion on doctrinal points meant life or death. To our greater tolerance there is something strange and unnecessary in this ready anger of the Fathers, which charged their writings with animus, while at the same time it removed them even further, if possible, from our present conception of the sphere of apology. Let us take the famous controversy between Rufinus and Jerome.[94] The former states his attitude toward Manichæanism, with his reasons for making certain interpretations from the works of Origen; the latter directly attacks these views, and gives his reasons therefor. Both adopt an assertive manner quite contrary to what we should now term "apologetic" in any current sense of that word. Rufinus talks of Jerome's "invectives" and of his "subterfuges of hypocrisy." Jerome retorts upon "the unprecedented shamelessness" of Rufinus, whom he scruples not to call "a scorpion." Each accuses the other of heresy and of double-dealing; each defends himself by accusing the other.[95] When Rufinus asserts that Jerome is still a Ciceronian, notwithstanding his dream that God accused him of following Cicero more ardently than Christ, Jerome opens the full vials of his irony upon his less cultured opponent. He congratulates Rufinus upon a literary style, so unclassical, so rough and thorny, which shows that *he* has not been hampered by any love of the classics! Although Jerome himself has written of his famous dream as a complete conversion to things heavenly; yet he cannot bear that Rufinus should say a word against "My Tully"; and immediately rushes to declare, with all heat and defiance, that

no sensible person would hold himself to be bound by a promise given in a dream!

Neither of these two men offers any explanation of his own views which would convince a modern, unpartisan outsider that he had the right to such a hostile attitude toward the views of the other. Apologetic is the least accurate possible word to describe the assaults of Jerome's wit, his irony, vituperation, and impatient energy of refutation. Yet both in his matter and manner, in his imagery and his attack, there is seen the development of a *personal* note; and this personal tone is augmented by the introduction of autobiographical details, though these are scattered and slight.[96]

Here, then, is the beginning of the personal note in apology; and of course it is more marked in a nature like that of Jerome than it would be in a cooler head and heart. John Chrysostom [97] makes use of the personal manner, but he is not, like Jerome, introspective. In Justin Martyr, the personal tone has grown into a full personal explanation.

The study of early Christian apologetics will not further our purpose in these pages beyond this point. It will be understood that the drill in exegesis which work of this type lent to the powerful intelligences of the Fathers tended to expand and heighten the qualities which make for self-study and self-understanding. Jerome and Rufinus may confine their personal exposition to an interchange of vituperation; Tertullian's voice may thunder down the ages bearing his expression of opinion; but the tendency to make personal all religious appeal becomes more

marked. No man can explain to another a truth very near his own heart without studying his own nature; nor can any one vividly expound his religious views without drawing some picture of their effect upon himself. An appreciation of this verity is borne in upon us on reading such documents as Justin Martyr's "Dialogue with Trypho," and the apocalyptic "Shepherd of Hermas." In the former, several paragraphs, dealing with Justin's education and religious development, show how keenly he felt the need of a personal exposition of these matters. The unknown Hermas, author of the "Shepherd," makes one of the earliest attempts in literature to give a systematic account of a personal revelation through divine visions.[98] Thus, the appeal of a man's belief to himself, its influence on himself, are, after all, his chief reasons for trying to impose it upon another, as well as his best guides as to the manner of so doing. Faith is an emotional factor; and no one can hope to make converts by a mere abstract discussion of its validity or its reasonableness. "La raison," observes Renan, "aura toujours peu de martyrs." The doctrines of Manichæus seemed to Augustin to have been based on a truly scientific method,[99] but that fact could not hold him, once their personal appeal had waned. The instant they ceased to affect him for good, to aid his steps, that instant they appeared to his mind to be pernicious and heretical. The influence which sways another to our view is, first of all, the effect our opinion has had upon ourselves. The vitality in all defence, in all apology, lies here.

Once introduced into the religious literature of the

early Middle Ages, this personal note becomes clearly traceable through the scattered monkish and ecclesiastical and even the secular *confessiones, testamenta,* and *apologiae* of the first twelve centuries. In many cases, such as that of the anti-Christian Epistle of the Neo-Platonist Porphyry to the prophet Anebo,[100] the personal manner is merely rhetorical, and is not intended to be taken literally. In this Epistle, the author states his religious doubts and asks for their elucidation, with an assumption of ignorance which we know cannot have been real; though it is interesting to find him using a personal method. The oft-cited passages in the work of Philo-Judæus [101] contain not only real and important self-study, but also some of the earliest data obtainable [102] on the influence of that Dæmon, "who is accustomed," writes Philo, "to converse with me in an unseen manner, prompting me with suggestions." The material, however, is embodied in this paragraph without further evolution; it has evidently little self-consciousness in its testimony.

A number of autobiographical, apologetic confessions are to be found during the centuries before these documents took the conventional shape to which we are now accustomed. Some among them suggest the religious confession of the future; although it must be remembered that, before the unrest preceding the Reformation, they lacked the powerful motive for completeness which is furnished by change of sect. Among the more noteworthy should be mentioned the testament and confession in Syriac, of Ephraim of Edessa,[103] who, in the fourth century, accuses himself

of being envious, quarrelsome and cruel, until his heart was touched by a spirit. Some doubt attaches to the authenticity of this document in its present form, but it holds a curious interest for us. The better-known "Confessio Patricii" [104] is entirely personal, touching, and complete. There will be occasion later in these pages to refer to the narrative of Patrick's conversion and following career which it contains; at the moment, attention should be called only to the accent of humility in which the writer describes himself: ". . . I, a rustic, a fugitive, unlearned, indeed . . ." or again: "I, Patrick, a sinner, the rudest and least of all the faithful, and most contemptible to very many."

Similar records, if of less value, are enshrined in Latin collections. Prosper of Aquitaine [105] is said to have left a confession markedly personal in tone. Perpetuus,[106] Bishop of Tours, confided the statement of his beliefs to a "Testamentum," about the same date. Alcuin's [107] "Confessio Fidei" is said to be the work of his disciples, although it makes use of the first person. A confession in metrical Latin prose, by Paul of Cordova,[108] is filled with prayer and invocation. A monk, Gotteschalchus,[109] who was tried for heresy in the same century, expresses himself both in a "Confessio," and a "Confessio prolixior" (*post hæresim damnatam*), supporting his apology with texts from Scripture.

By the eleventh century, one may easily find full-formed and highly developed confessions, whose original religious purpose has already begun to be modified from other causes. The famous letter of Peter Damiani [110] in which he terms himself "Petrus peccator,"

shows self-study as well as self-accusation. The tone of this letter is deeply penitent, and the writer charges himself with many sins, especially those of scurrility and laughter. Anselm of Canterbury,[111] according to his friend and biographer, Eadmer, portrays his own remorse in his "Oratio meditativo," whose outburst of anguish is, indeed, piercing. Wholly different is its accent from that of a naïf chronicler like the monk Raoul Glaber,[112] whose narrative contains his own reformation through the visit of a hideous fiend. When this visitant perched, with mops and mows, upon the foot of Glaber's bed, terror drove him to pray in the chapel for the rest of the night.

Such examples serve, at least, to show the trend of the document, its descriptive idea, its personal note, its apologetic tendency. Heterogeneous forms begin already to appear; and the twelfth century gives us, beside the Augustinian confession, the personal apology, the confession of revelation, the narrative of visions, or of travels to the unseen world, whether of heaven or hell.[113] Monkish historical chronicles there are, not at all religious and but indirectly autobiographical, while the germ of the scientific self-study begins to show itself in descriptions of one's own education, records of mental development, and the like.

Abélard's "Letter II,"[114] Guibert de Nogent's "Life," prefixed to his "History of the Crusades,"[115] are documents beginning to mark this differentiation in tone. The "Metalogicus" of John of Salisbury[116] gives a plain account of the course of studies pursued by that famous scholar. Full of greater de-

tail is a similar record, the "Euriditionis Didascalicæ" [117] of the mystic, Hugo of St. Victor, who is also reported to have left a "Confessio Fidei." Roger Bacon makes his apology to the Pope, in a letter describing his labors and struggles.[118] Often religion enters into such documents as these only when they come under the fear of the Inquisition; their nature is, of course, affected by such fear, and their appeal is made directly to the authorities of the Holy Office.

The entrance into this field of the mystics and their records, or revelations, brings us to a final division of the subject. It was in these centuries that the Via Mystica opened to the imagination of the Middle Ages. Along that Way are to pass a great company—"Itinerarium mentis in Deum," as John of Fidanza [119] named his own progress thereon. The gates of this Way had been indicated by Augustin, by Plotinus, as some have thought, and by Iamblichus, since undoubtedly Neo-Platonism is the source of all later mysticism.[120] The visions and revelations to saints and contemplatives, such as Hildegarde of Bingen, Elizabeth of Schönau, and their like, threw the gates wide. Some of the more important of these pilgrims will be considered later in this book.

With the introduction into the apology, of personal confession, the use of this form as a plain exposition of doctrine slowly declined. It was no longer needed in the same way; the Church was the indisputed mistress of the mediæval world. Her votaries were no longer obliged to explain their views to the crowd, since the crowd believed as they did. It was no longer necessary to convince the Stoic, or the dilettante, or

the aristocratic Epicurean of the elder Roman order, that he must believe and be saved. Much of the seriousness of self-study had been born of this earlier necessity, when a man was forced to look very nearly to his own mind and beliefs, since he wished his family and friends to share them. He felt he must show how he had changed for the better; he must describe what he was before his conversion as well as what he became after it. Difference of opinion, heresy, in a word, was always wickedness, and the man who felt his conduct or his opinions to stand in need of defence or excuse, kept alive the apologetic attitude, as we understand it to-day.

Later on, it seems only conduct that evokes apology. Not Bruno's [121] heresy, but Lorenzino de' Medici's crime [122] needs an *apologia*. Still later the tone lightens; in the hand of Colley Cibber,[123] for instance, the apology becomes almost gay. But even in our own day the examples of this form may be found in all their original seriousness with only that change in accentuating conduct which we have just noticed. Newman [124] felt that not his change to Catholicism required an apology; but rather the charge of double-dealing in connection with his submission to the Church. This he justifies, he excuses, as best he may; it is not easily explained. His attitude is curiously non-apologetic on that side where some apology would seem to have been demanded by the nature of the acts confessed. But then the apologetic attitude would seem to be almost wholly a question of temperament, not that of will. Augustin, Rousseau, Oscar Wilde, possess it; and there exist candid confessions where it never

seems even to have been felt by the confessant himself, and where he merely states the facts without comment. Cardan is an example of this; so is his contemporary, Cellini;[125] De Quincey is another notable instance; and there is a curious example of a non-apologetic state of mind contained in that confession by Alexander Hamilton which was known as "The Reynolds Pamphlet."[126] Hamilton had been accused of speculating with the public funds, such being the general explanation of his relations with Reynolds. The real explanation was an intrigue with Mrs. Reynolds, utilized by the husband for purposes of blackmail. Hamilton is forced to make a full statement of the truth. He writes in this tone: "I proceed . . . to offer a frank and plain solution of the enigma, by giving a history of the origin and progress of my connection with Mrs. R . . ." And later, "I had nothing to lose as to my reputation for chastity; concerning which the world had fixed a previous opinion."

After remarking that this opinion was the correct one, and that "I dreaded extremely a disclosure and was willing to make large sacrifices to avoid one," he proceeds energetically to refute the embezzlement charges, pointing to the truth as to a justification. The relative importance in his mind of the two sins is at once characteristic and suggestive. What would to many minds have appeared to require a sincere apology (if only to Mrs. Hamilton), is treated as the insignificant explanation of an unjust accusation.

The literary influence of the body of Christian apologetics has thus been exerted in unexpected directions; and has, partially at least, endured until the

present time. From Jerome and Pamphilus to Newton and Whiston the difference in their theological manner is comparatively slight. It is true that one must not exaggerate their influence, since it was their ardent faith that counted rather than their intellectual force.[127] Until the nineteenth century, whenever the apologist made his appearance, it was to build his explanation upon the old foundations, and to raise his defence upon the classic plan.[128] Still, for him did theology, philosophy, and metaphysics form the three strands of one cord. But with the latter-day growth of scientific methods, these strands have been permanently loosened. The new psychology, the anthropology of Tylor, Spencer, and Frazer, the evolution theories as affecting biology, all these have tended to separate and divide those various elements which together form a man's philosophy and religion. Thus the self-student can no longer approach his *apologia* in the same spirit. His candour may produce similar results, but it has a different motive power. He realizes, as Augustin, by reason of his genius, realized, that the accurate effect of the religious experience upon himself is better worth analyzing than all the metaphysics of the Schoolmen. Augustin felt this when he devoted ten books of the "Confessions" to the psychological treatment of his subject, and only three to the theological. Our modern confessant has done well to observe the same general proportion.

The "Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum" has maintained its effective position in religious literature by reason of the vigorous intellectual force originally responsible for all exposition and defence of doctrine.

The personal record owes it much beside name and flexibility of treatment. In modern times, its classic animosity of tone has been transferred to the controversies of science; while the milder apology, so-called, has tended to become the property of that mind which is anxious to convince itself of its own strength or weakness. Hence to-day we readily connect the idea of apology with that of excuse.[129]

In the study of any subject by a valid method, classification and analysis must precede induction. If these are full and sufficient, then the reader is often able to foresee the conclusions of his author. When it be understood how the written confession arose at the inspiration of Augustin, just as the practice of public confession was tending to decline (in the second and third centuries), then it will be readily comprehended that its literary style must have been formed by the explanatory drill in the works of the Christian Apologist. That its vitality came from yet another source—that subjective trend developing in the world of thought—must not be forgotten, although the discussion of this source is necessarily postponed until the following chapter. But even without any tendency to subjectivism being taken into account, history makes plain certain personal attitudes, which, even in the time of Rousseau, remained obscure. If the forces governing thought and controlling literary movements are noted in their beginnings, their later progress presents few difficulties to our comprehension. Science to-day, as never before, aids the task. Psychology, teaching the relation between idea and language, together with the power of group-imitation;

anthropology and sociology, unfolding the growth of peoples and of societies, now throw a clearer light upon the individual records with which we are about to deal. The time spent in analysis, therefore, has not been wasted, since it permits us to approach the more complex parts of our subject, with confidence that its historical and literary elements have been disentangled, and are understood.

III

INTROSPECTION: THE INTROSPECTIVE TYPE

I. 1. Definition, and attitudes toward introspection.
2. Plato, Christianity, the Sophists, Protagoras, Democritus.
3. Animism, metaphysics, the Church.
4. Tendency toward subjectivity; Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus.
5. Self-study and mysticism; Neo-Platonists, Plotinus, Augustin.

II. 1. Self-consciousness.
2. Mental processes.
3. Psychology.
4. Value of introspection in the past.
5. The Ego.

III. 1. The types in literature and philosophy; Augustin.
2. England and Germany; Al-Ghazzāli and Descartes.
3. Kant, Comte, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche.
4. Dante, Petrarch, Eneas Sylvius, Montaigne.
5. Browne, Rousseau, Cardan, Byron, and Shelley.
6. Minor examples.
7. Emerson, Amiel, the Gurneys, and Oscar Wilde.

III

INTROSPECTION: THE INTROSPECTIVE TYPE

It is now determined of what main elements the first religious confessions were composed, how partly the general drift of thought, and partly the direct impulse given by individual genius, was responsible for their form and for their content. Nor will it be found difficult to believe that the training in exegesis and in dialectic of those earlier apologists, would later, have a perceptible influence. Thus, gradually, the records of personal religious experience came to have a definite character of their own, one, moreover, which tended to become more and more subjective. But such influences in themselves do not wholly account for the increasing development in religion of the mental habit which we term introspection; they might give definiteness and direction to the introspective tendency, but they could not of themselves create it. A new element introduced into thought will of necessity create new literary forms and fresh points of view. It remains for us to ascertain what were the elements introduced by introspection into the religious life, and what new literary forms it has served to produce.

The word means no more, of course, than "looking within"; although it is used to describe a familiar mental state, and one which we are apt to think of

as wholly modern. All that is implied in this modernity is best defined in the words of Mill, when he remarked that "the feelings of the modern mind are more various, more complex and manifold than those of the ancients ever were. The modern mind is what the ancient was not, brooding and self-conscious; and its meditative self-consciousness has discovered depths in the human soul which the Greeks and Romans did not dream of, and would not have understood." [1]

That the world has owed much to this power of "meditative self-consciousness," Mill hardly needs to remind us; yet no one will deny that it is in general regarded with distrust. There has come to be attached to our conception of the introspective state of mind the idea that it is unwholesome and abnormal; and this connotation suggests that the world clings to certain standards of what is normal, long after they have ceased to be in any sense accurate. The introspective type of mind has ceased to be a rarity; and one may well question if it be advisable to thrust it aside as abnormal without a more valid reason than is furnished by instincts half-vestigiary. No doubt the presence of a self-analytical tendency in some neurotic conditions, and the "culte du moi" in certain so-called decadent literary schools, have had their share in maintaining this antagonism. Yet it will be noticed that even when there is no neurosis and no decadence—when the introspective tendency is coincident with a healthy energy and a robust scientific habit—yet the world's antagonism is never lessened. In fact, it is a sentiment only to be accurately defined by the use of such terms as "instinctive uneasi-

ness," "instinctive distrust," suggesting that it is in itself a part of our inheritance from the past. Possibly it is to this same instinctive distrust that we owe the curious silence of some of our greatest critics on the subject—a silence which seems at times, to be almost deliberate. Arnold, for instance, though he loved to write of such profoundly introspective natures as Amiel, or the de Guérins, and of such topics as "Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment"—yet somehow contrives to avoid any discussion of the degree and the value of a "looking within." He accepts the introspection contained in these thoughts and journals, but it does not appear to hold any significance for him. Nor is this true of Arnold only; it is true of other critics, both English and foreign; it makes the pathway which we have to tread singularly barren of comment. No authoritative voice speaks to us concerning this trend of the human mind. We are unguided when, in our endeavor to look into the past, we seek for the earliest indications of that tendency which was to mark the world's maturity. For to the Greek, to the pagan mind, introspection as we know it, was practically non-existent; and there came a time when a joyously objective world beheld with anxiety the clouding of its sky by the development of self-consciousness. It is true that the contemplative religions of the East had long held another ideal.

When Manu describes the creation of the universe, he tells that "From himself [Buddha] drew forth the mind, which is both real and unreal; likewise from the mind *egoism* which possesses the function of self-con-

sciousness, and is lordly."[2] This sentence has a modern ring; it bears, indeed, almost a Nietzschean quality. It would seem to mark the contrast between Eastern and Western philosophy. Yet even among the Greeks there are to be found, if one searches, the germs of what appears to be in the nature of a curiosity about self, which, later, was to evolve new types of thinkers and of thoughts. But of what nature is this curiosity? Is it properly to be called subjective at all? It is true that Socrates quoted that ancient Delphian inscription "Know thyself,"[3] and in a manner suggestive of modern conceptions: "I must first 'know myself,' as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. . . . Am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort?"[4] Although Socrates asked such questions, he did not attempt to answer them by any method which to-day would be called introspective. In his mind these queries rather served a disciplinary purpose; much, indeed, as the modern philosopher loves to propound anew the ultimate enigmas in order both to humble his reader and to justify his speculation. Plato's introduction to the "Alcibiades"[5] (the authenticity of which remains in doubt) contains a paragraph wherein Socrates recommends his "sweet friend" to attain self-knowledge through observation and an open mind.[6]

There is small suggestion of any real "looking within" about this. Yet there are historians who still insist in placing upon Plato the entire responsibility

for the modern interest in self. Notwithstanding the fact that Plato specifically condemns it as a weakness, —and this for reasons to be noted later,—this fact of his depreciation of the Ego has been held by these critics to constitute the source of the later Christian doctrine of self-mortification![7]

No doubt the conception of a multiple personality, of an Ego, which was not one but two, or even more; of one Self ruling, or watching, or struggling with another Self, is very, very old. No doubt it is the first of our conceptions the formation of which was due to a deliberate effort at introspection, however rudimentary. There are traditions, for example, that Pythagoras recommended self-examination to his disciples, but they remain traditions.[8] Such a conception, at such a time, must have been a veritable *tour-de-force;* and would necessarily have been followed by a reaction.

Comments are freely made by critics and historians on the incapacity or the unwillingness of the Greeks to let us see anything whatever of their thinking and feeling selves. It was a practice so foreign to their habit of mind, that when Pater causes Marius "to keep a register of the movements of his own private thoughts or humors," he is obliged to excuse the proceeding for his hero, by terming it a "modernism." "The ancient writers," Pater continues, "having been jealous for the most part of affording us so much as a glimpse of that interior self, which, in many cases, would have actually doubled the interest of their objective informations."[9]

This incapacity or unwillingness becomes more com-

prehensible when we turn from the Greek mind itself, to the nature of the beliefs with which it was filled. To us, maturity means self-knowledge, and self-knowledge implies the ability to distinguish the subjective from the objective, the actuality from the illusion. Our minds have incorporated into such ideas the experiences of many centuries, and so completely, that to detach our ideas from their fundamental bases is difficult, if not impossible. Let us try, at least, to conceive the Greek imagination as filled wholly with the conception of forces possessing a real, objective existence. The Self, or Spirit, was as real to him, as it is to-day to the Australian bushman, and in much the same way. It was no less than a little, tangible image of the man, winged, elusive, and under the control of powerful invisible forces quite outside the natural visible forces which he understood. Its movements, passions, and destination were not in the least affected by the will of the possessor. Naturally, therefore, he did not like to talk about it, nor indeed to think or write about it; since, when he did so, he only felt the more his helplessness in the grasp of Destiny. Moreover, to examine too closely into the habits of this co-dweller, might be apt to call down upon the inquisitive the wrath of his gods, whose power lay in their mystery. No wonder the Greek remained jealous of affording us any glimpse into that interior self,—real dweller on the threshold of life!

A change, of course, in these semi-savage imaginations came at last. And for this change, and its bearing on the development of the introspective tendency, one must turn to the histories of philosophy. One

and all, these unite in attributing to that strange group of men, known as the Greek Sophists, the first attempt at a definitely subjective philosophical conception.[10] Yet, if one bears in mind the fact that to the Greek, his *eidolon*, his image of himself, which comes near to what to-day we should call the soul, had a definitely *objective* existence, much of his antagonism to the Sophist teaching is made plain. We understand much better why he felt it to be destructive.

Turning to inner experience, the Sophists made what is believed to be the first attempt to study man, through his mental life. Their doctrine, startling in its novelty, held that religion lies within our consciousness, and does not reside in the performance of traditional rites and customs.[11] Protagoras, the first to avow himself Sophist,[12] stated the formula, "Man is the measure of all things;"[13] which, if accepted, takes for granted a modern attitude, and no small amount of subjectivism. Tracing his idea to its source, it will be remembered that tradition assigns to Protagoras as teacher that Democritus of Abdera, in whose doctrine a high place was allotted to a distinct conception of soul. This soul, we know must have been objective; it was the *eidolon* of the man. Yet, in itself, such a conception postulates a rudimentary introspection; while there remain to us also fragments by Democritus of an autobiographical character.[14]

Even the developed subjective doctrines of the Sophists seem to-day elementary from the philosophical point of view, but their tendency is significant. That such tendency should have produced little of definite importance is not surprising when we know that

most of the facts essential to the formation of a subjective philosophy were lacking at the time, even to those men who held the soul to be distinct from the body, and who advocated a study of self. The entrance into the field of investigation at this point of the ethnologist and anthropologist, with their comparative data, opens a new and fascinating approach to the study of mental development, nor is it possible to ignore that striking theory wherein Tylor accounts by his data upon animism, for the first subjective tendencies of thought.

Tylor's arguments are exceedingly interesting, and we shall have frequent occasion to refer to them in a later section of this book. "The savage thinker," he writes, "though occupying himself so much with the phenomena of life, sleep, disease, and death, seems to have taken for granted, as a matter of course, the ordinary operations of his own mind. It hardly occurred to him to think about the machinery of thinking. . . . The metaphysical philosophy of thought taught in our modern European lecture-rooms is historically traced back to the speculative psychology of ancient Greece. . . . When Democritus propounded the great problem of metaphysics, 'How do we perceive external things?' . . . he put forth, in answer, . . . a theory of thought. He explained the fact of perception by declaring that things are always throwing off images (*eidola*) of themselves, which images . . . enter a recipient soul and are thus perceived. . . . Writers . . . are accustomed to treat the doctrine as actually made by the philosophical school which taught it. Yet the evidence here brought for-

ward shows it to be really the savage doctrine of object-souls, turned to a new purpose as a method of explaining the phenomena of thought. . . . To say that Democritus was an ancient Greek is to say that from his childhood he had looked on at the funeral ceremonies of his country, beholding the funeral sacrifices of garments and jewels and money and food and drink, rites which his mother and his nurse could tell him were performed in order that the phantasmal images of these objects might pass into the possession of forms shadowy like themselves, the souls of dead men. Thus, Democritus, seeking a solution of his great problem of the nature of thought, found it by simply decanting into his metaphysics a surviving doctrine of primitive savage animism. . . . Lucretius actually makes the theory of film-like images of things (*simulacra, membranæ*) account for both the apparitions which come to men in dreams and the images which impress their minds in thinking. So unbroken is the continuity of philosophic speculation from savage to cultured thought. Such are the debts which civilized philosophy owes to primitive animism." [15]

These brilliant pages of a brilliant book have a significance for us in the course of the present enquiry which they have acquired since they were written; and the last two sections of this work must needs return to them. By connecting the doctrine of object-souls with the first efforts of the Greek mind in formulating a coherent metaphysics, Tylor establishes many other links in that continuity between savage and civilized thought. Yet one must not allow these ideas wholly to submerge his mind. The whole significance of Protag-

oras and his disciples, and of the Sophist teachings, lies just in the fact that they made the first definite attempt to get away from the animistic doctrine lingering over from savage times, and that this effort was one of the results of an elementary introspection. The endeavor of the Sophist to study mental life, by turning toward inner experience, led to his first shadowy perception of subjectivity, and to a differentiation between that reality and the appearance with which men so often confounded it. Once men, through self-observation, began to perceive the illusory nature of much that had seemed to them real, and imbued with life,—once they had come to grasp the significance of their own *state of mind,* an immense stride had been made away from savagery. Just the difference between the beliefs of to-day and those of the ancient or mediæval world, lies in the fact that the modern mind is introspective enough to perceive the subjective nature of many of those impulses which, to the Greek, possessed an objective existence.

Protagoras, therefore, marked an era in more senses than one. There is an especial suggestiveness in the fact that the teachings of the Sophists were received with general distrust. That there was, after all, but slight reason for holding Protagoras and his followers to constitute an influence toward public corruption, is of less interest than the fact that by public opinion they were so regarded. The antagonism which has been noted is thus seen to be no new antagonism; it is a dislike and distrust sprung up among that portion of mankind who are still to be found clinging instinctively to standards of the normal which have long

ceased to obtain. Unquestionably, the Sophistical doctrines tended toward the destructive effects inherent in any broad, general scepticism; and apparently they failed to satisfy the robust mental needs of their day.[16]

The present writer, in a former volume,[17] commented on the fact that no definitive history of the subjective trend in literature has been written, and that its origins remain complex and obscure. What is true of subjectivity in general, is true of introspection in particular. The omission is of importance, because, the more one studies the subject, the more it seems as though a history of introspection involves the approach of philosophy from a new direction. For what, after all, is philosophy, if it be not our intellectual effort to systematize all our conclusions respecting the phenomena of life and nature, which seem to us so capricious and inexplicable? And of these phenomena, those proceeding out of our own consciousness, and constituting our own personality, will ever be the most vital.

We know that it is practically impossible for philosophy to do without the consideration of these phenomena for any length of time. Their vitality remains unimpaired despite the philosophers who claim to ignore them, and to despise that psychology which is the science created for the purpose of dealing with them in detail.

Such an one was Auguste Comte, who stated that "after two thousand years of psychology no one proposition is established to the satisfaction of its followers."[18] This belief is founded upon the idea that

psychology is necessarily dependent upon metaphysics, and metaphysics upon introspection. Comte denies that the intellect can pause during its activities to examine its processes. That such processes could come in the future to be automatically registered by means of machinery, Comte, of course, had no idea, since his work antedates the precise experiment of the psychological laboratory. It may be true that, if we use the first term in its modern sense, psychology and metaphysics are no longer interdependent; they have, indeed, differentiated since the days of the St. Victors. And it remains equally true, be one's conclusion what it may, that in the realm of metaphysics every theorist, from Descartes to Bergson, has been forced to rely upon introspection as an essential factor. Is Comte thereby justified in claiming that no progress has been made on this account? [19]

The nature of any philosophical advance is twofold; it may be an advance in *idea,* it may be an advance in *method.* Comte may be right in denying that introspection, *in se,* has been the means of furnishing any ideas to philosophy; but without the use of introspective methods, few of those ideas could have obtained a hearing. In metaphysics, for instance, it is practically impossible to make any proposition clear, without a decided degree of "looking within," in order to force one's hearer to "look within" also. The metaphysician must tell his reader what passes in his own mind, and the reader must "look within" and see if this be true. Explanations do not explain unless one's inner observation confirms them. A writer's statement of what he has found to be true in him-

self has no vitality, no significance for the reader, until this reader pauses and looks inward to see if it be equally true in his own case. If it be not, he shakes his head and throws aside his book; if it be, the philosopher has gained an adherent. In any case, upon this faculty of introspection, the metaphysician is bound to rely—and it therefore follows as a corollary, that the degree of introspection prevalent among certain societies and at certain times has had a powerful influence upon the spread of certain doctrines. Realizing this necessary reliance, the German school of philosophy has for more than a century made copious use of the first person, of the introspective demand upon the reader, and of the argument by direct personal experience. Self-examination and introspection have been the very foundation stones of the German metaphysical philosophies.[20]

The connection between introspection and metaphysics is not closer than the connection of introspection with religion. The earliest possible exercise of this faculty in half-civilized man must have been to heighten any religious sentiment. So soon as any introspection is possible to a man, there springs up in his imagination the resultant conception of a dual or multiple personality. This is his way of defining what happens when he "looks inward" and perforce decides that there exists in himself a something which looks, and a something which is being looked at. The appreciation of this dual state is by no means confined to the metaphysician; it is a world-wide and common possession of our humanity. Colloquial speech is full of idioms, phrases, and imagery which

show its realization. In English, such sentences as, "It lies between me and my conscience," or, "You were more frightened than you realized," give expression to this conception of the many in the one. Now this very conception must necessarily have some religious significance. It is inextricably interwoven with ideas of good and evil, and with the perpetual struggle between darkness and light. Our selves were felt by the Church to hide innumerable puzzling and dangerous entities which could be routed only when we turned the light of self-observation into our darker corners.

Hence the insistence early laid by the Church on the daily exercise of a stringent self-examination. It is commended as a discipline and as a means of perfection.[21] The great abbot, Richard of St. Victor, whose doctrines had such vogue during the Renaissance, gave word to the cumulative thought of many centuries, when he wrote his reasons for introspection. "Who thirsts to see his God," he cried, "let him cleanse his mirror and purify his spirit. After he hath thus cleared his mirror, long and diligently gazed into it,—a certain clarity of divine light begins to shine through upon him, and a certain immense ray of unwonted vision to appear before his eyes. From this vision the mind is wondrously inflamed." Here are the introspective practices advocated as a means of contemplation, which has always been their first use to the mystical mind;—but Richard goes somewhat further. "If the mind would fain ascend to the height of science, let its first and principal study be to know itself,"[22] he says; thus showing in his proper person

that the effect of the earlier, rudimentary self-study leads to mysticism.

In Jeremy Taylor's "Holy Living and Dying," the diligent and frequent scrutiny of self is recommended, as the fit preparation for each night's rest; "when we compose ourselves," as the good bishop quaintly puts it, "to the little images of death."[23] But by his reference to Seneca throughout this chapter, the reader gathers that the influences traceable in Taylor's thought were stoical and pagan rather than Christian and Catholic. In any case, it will be enough to show that the practice of self-examination is everywhere not only generally preached, but was followed from earliest times. Ephraim Syrus is quoted as practicing it twice daily and as comparing himself to the merchant who keeps a daily balance.[24] Basil, Gregory the Great, and Bernard commend it.[25] Origen held that self-knowledge through self-contemplation was a part of the Divine Wisdom.[26] What Augustin felt we know. Jerome may not have preached a doctrine of self-study, but that he practiced it his letters and treatises testify.[27]

The question of the immediate effect of Christianity and its teachings upon any latent introspective tendency, is one of great interest. Existence of this tendency at all must necessarily imply that man is no longer that savage "who took for granted the ordinary operations of his own mind."[28] It must, therefore, have made its appearance comparatively late in his evolution, and it rather belongs to his equipment of maturity. Once it be assumed that a stage in mental growth was reached at which man's intellectual

curiosity turned inward for its satisfaction, then not only the influence, but the acceptance of Christianity as a religion, becomes clear. Not only did the Christian doctrine give impetus to all introspective practices; but the latent tendency toward greater subjectivity of thought itself made for the success of the Christian faith. The rite of confession, with which we have just dealt in the preceding chapter, must have both heightened and directed such tendency.

This idea of the importance of self was comparatively new, for at least it had not been advocated in any coherent system among the ancients. The learned world of the first and second centuries, therefore, was without classical guide in the presence of this new force. Plato had depreciated the Ego, which he taught also it was healthy to ignore. The Christian philosopher, while he might believe with Pascal that "Le Moi est haissable," yet constantly magnified the Ego by discussing and cataloguing its iniquities.[29] When to save his own soul became man's first business, he must needs know that soul, must study, must examine it. Prescribed as a duty, introspection became at once a main characteristic of religious life. Those great contemplatives and saints, upon whose guidance the whole of early Christianity depended, established the cult of introspection and introspective practices. It seems as though they must have recognized as a truth the generalization "that the sentiment of religion is in its origin and nature purely personal and subjective." [30]

That the tendency toward subjectivity was present

to assist the spread of Christianity, we know by its appearance under other shapes during the same centuries, and chiefly by its government of certain markedly non-Christian philosophies and philosophers. A favorite assumption on the part of some Church historians holds that the introspective tendency in the work of Seneca or of Marcus Aurelius is accounted for by their real but concealed sympathy with certain Christian doctrines. The world's general intellectual disposition to "look within," which disposition had its religious as well as its philosophical side, would appear to be the more accurate explanation. Nor must it be forgotten that the Stoic doctrines by which these writers were influenced, were informed by a deep sense of moral responsibility which augmented the tendency.[31] To a serious nature, any introspective practice intensifies the importance of conduct, independently of the religious rite to which he may be accustomed. Seneca[32] advocates self-study as a personal duty. "I use this power," he declares, "and daily examine myself when the light is out and my wife is silent. I examine the whole day that is past . . . and consider both my actions and words. I hide nothing from myself; I let nothing slip, for why should I fear any of mine errors?" This last phrase is in the key of Rousseau—a valid justification for any self-analysis. More familiar to the reader, perhaps, are the passages in which Marcus Aurelius expresses the same influence at work upon his mental life.[33] The Greek Epictetus,[34] in the second century, held also, "The beginning of philosophy to him at least who

enters on it in the right way . . . is a consciousness of his own weakness,'' thus more or less predicating self-study.

One evidence of the growth of subjective thought at this time, will be found when we turn to that group of philosophical writers, who, gathered in Alexandria, made the last definite, intellectual stand against the Christian doctrine. The Neo-Platonists have certain characteristics which later were to become loosely identified with Christianity; but which in reality are but another manifestation of similar tendencies. Their mysticism is due less to the influence of Christian mystics, than to the fact that it is sprung from a similar source. The reader will not forget—it is of even greater importance later in this discussion —*that the first effect of all elementary or imperfect self-study is mysticism.* The first emotion raised by any ''looking inward'' is wonder, and a sense that a new world has been opened to the traveller. Upon the path through this world—the *via*—only the mystically inclined sets forth—only the genuine mystic arrives at the goal. From the third to the fifth centuries, the Neo-Platonists, markedly influenced by their efforts at introspection, practically anticipated, in the person of Plotinus, the Christian mediæval mysticism. For instance, it is recorded that four times in six years Plotinus attained to that ecstatic moment of union with God, which, first in the Middle Ages, was called unification.[35] The doctrines of this philosophical school show introspective tendencies not unlike those of the Christian philosophy. The Enneads of Plotinus, by an analysis of the

senses, by the thesis that to know the Divine is the property of a higher faculty, and one in which the subject becomes identified with its object, show the result of a systematic attempt at psychological introspection. Once this fact is clear, Neo-Platonism ceases to seem fantastic or bizarre; it becomes rather the logical effect from a cause. Any elementary introspection undertaken without scientific knowledge or guidance, is apt to lead the mind in the direction of transcendentalism. The mind's eye—"looking inward"—is confused by what it sees, by the action and interaction of the intellect, the senses, the emotions, and the will. How is the ignorant and inexperienced self-observer to differentiate? Since all is mystery, only mystery accounts for all. Thus we see in the fifth century that Proclus,[36] analyzing Plato's "Know Thyself," appears to take for granted that to look truly within is to provide the only means of looking truly without. Thus follow his ideas of Divine revelation, since the inward eye alone may catch the flash of divinely directed inspiration. By another route, the same conclusion is reached by the mediæval mystic, when he, too, looking within, confuses and misinterprets the phenomena he beholds. Porphyry, in his letter to Anebo, and Iamblichus in the answer thereto, had already begun to formulate a systematic demonology;[37] but these ideas were succeeded by the more abstract ones of Proclus,—that last flame in the flickering Alexandrian lamp.

Christianity, while embodying many of the inherent principles of Neo-Platonism, had an anchor in the form of its ethical conceptions, which were of the most

objective and definite type. Among other advantages over Neo-Platonism, was that of the practical applicability of its philosophy to the various minds around it. Neo-Platonism held an introspection merely speculative, and as incapable of evolving any scientific method as it was of using any scientific material. As a philosophy it was necessarily sterile and perishable, but it holds interest for us as a landmark in the history of the subjective and introspective tendency.

It has been noted that Augustin's mastery in the portrayal of psychical states "formed a new starting-point for philosophy."[38] The metaphysics of inner experience took their rise in his ability to use, with a fresh meaning, the suggestions of Plotinus. His intense consciousness of self, of personality, lifts him above the mists of his time; while by his doubts and fears, he repeats the "Cogito; ergo sum" of Descartes. Augustin, the first great Christian psychologist, uses with the vitality of genius the tentative or ill-defined ideas prevalent in his day; and through him Christianity came to absorb the suggestions of Neo-Platonism. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the direct effect of the introspective tendency upon Christianity is as marked as the effect, a little later, of Christian teaching upon introspection. In showing man how to preserve "the reverent relation to his own past,"[39] there is added to the need of "looking within" that other need of looking backward, of surveying the whole of one's life as a process, divinely guided, and with salvation for an object. Thus, from the Christian standpoint, no duty is more religious than introspection; and no practices testify more

deeply to the religious import of life than do self-study and self-examination.

Before proceeding further, it would seem necessary to look a little more closely into the nature of that self-consciousness from which, according to Schopenhauer,[40] we proceed. No longer is Schopenhauer held to be our guide, yet it is important that we should know something more of our self-consciousness. How has it been observed and how determined? Until the last century, all theories on the subject must have been necessarily *a priori*. There is hardly a portion of the body, from the spine to the pineal gland, which has not in turn been named as the seat of self-consciousness, or the Ego.[41] When one reads some of these theories, one is not amazed at Comte's estimate of psychology; and even to-day, in the face of more precise experiment, one is constantly confronted by expressions which show how little has really been accomplished.

"Man by the very constitution of his mind," says Caird[42] ". . . can look outwards . . . inwards, and upwards. He is essentially self-conscious"; and again: "Man looks outward before he looks inward, and looks inward before he looks upward." This is more antithetical than accurate. Tylor and others would seem to show beyond dispute that man looks upward before he looks inward; and scientific observation adds in her turn that once he begins to look inward, then he rarely comes again to look upward in the same way. Introspection and introspective habits have a way of absorbing a man's religious energies, causing him to watch and follow the religious life wholly as

within himself. Fascinated by the inward stir and tumult, he lifts his eyes from it no more, but passes through the world listening only to the inward voice, seeing only the inward vision. The outer world, the world outside of self, is very dim and insubstantial to such an one, who to many of us has represented our so-called highest religious type—the mystic or contemplative. Such were the two St. Victors, the Abbots Hugh and Richard, in whose ideas mysticism and philosophy were blended.[43] Now the highest type of metaphysical philosopher resembles the religious mystic so much in his method, that we are apt to call him mystical, when we really do not mean mystical but rather introspective. Both of them are attempting the same thing, to obtain truth by watching their own processes and seeing what particular truth sought is thereby revealed to the watcher; and either one may succeed in proportion as he is able to recognize the different elements constituting his self-consciousness. How is he able to do this?

The study of mental processes is a recent one, for it is practically only since the experiments of the modern psychological laboratory that science has even been willing to declare what is truth and what illusion, what is fact and what fallacy in the region of mind. For centuries men worked perforce in the dark, since by its very constitution the brain cannot explain itself, and, when passive, no organ gives less hint of its methods.[44] Hence, the world failed to connect the brain with feeling at all (which was supposed to be seated in the bowels, or, later, in the heart), until a comparatively recent date. When Paul Broca[45] gave to the

world, in 1861, his discovery of the activities in that convolution which now bears his name, he did much more than merely to determine which region of the brain governed our speech. He gave a starting-point for other investigations into the various brain-regions, ideas regarding which had remained in confusion since the phrenological fallacies of Gall.

It is not for us to lead the student through the fascinating by-paths of mental physiology, to the conflicts which still rage upon the subjects of Personality and Self-Consciousness. Space and authority are lacking here for any proper treatment of themes so perplexing. Rather will we ask of him to give his attention to some of the views expressed by the psychologist regarding the results obtained by the use of introspection in this field. It is true that a purely introspective method has been held to resemble that of "a man who tries to raise himself by his own boot-straps"; [46] but it is also true that but for an original faculty and desire of "looking within," we should never know we had any self-consciousness or personality at all. The savage is unaware of any self, until his first pause of elementary introspection brings that fact to his attention. One observes, moreover, that until he attains to that point of self-consciousness, any deliberate progress in any given intellectual direction is impossible to him. The first introspection, therefore, with its concomitant first self-consciousness, is a crucial moment in the history of mind. During that moment the human intellect crossed at one leap the major part of the distance which lies between ourselves and such a creature as the Neanderthal man.

"The existence of which we are the best assured and which we know the best," says a recent philosopher, "is incontestably our own, since of all other objects we have notions which one might judge exterior and superficial, while we perceive ourselves interiorly and profoundly."[47]

This consciousness of self has been given concrete illustration by a number of self-students, whose observations have been noted in a previous book.[48] The profundity and power of their interior realization has been found to produce a species of terror, an emotion both individual and indescribable, whose roots strike into primal depths. The boy who cried out at one instant, "I am a Me"![49] was experiencing a crisis not only individual, but racial and primitive; and it is a crisis brought about by the first attempt at introspection.

Since the result of this first introspection is accompanied by decided and characteristic emotion, the act remains significant in the history of individual mental development. To many natures it points a crisis, and such natures come to it as the traveller stumbles upon a forgotten sign-board, half-obliterated by a thicket of newer growth. Philosophy, impersonating the surveyor of this strange country, must take account of such crucial impulses. And there are other reasons why the philosopher still clings to the introspective method, despite the continually narrowing limitations prescribed by science. The reader will find in the history of philosophy something of the struggle to escape from introspection and to provide other means, because of the realization that interior phe-

nomena are so much less susceptible of direct observation than are exterior phenomena.[50]

Yet this realization was long in coming, and there was a period in the world's history when the interior phenomena must have seemed the clearer of the two. Scholars now unite in thinking that the first attempts at what we call modern psychology, took their rise in the abbey of St. Victor, under the efforts of those great mystics known as the Victorines. The first of these men, Hugh of St. Victor, was held by the Middle Ages so high as an authority, that he received the name of the "second Augustin." His works are quoted by every great writer and doctor of the time, since his attempt to formulate a system of mystical philosophy appealed at once to the intellect and to the piety around him. Even to-day, if the mysticism of Hugh seems naïf, his accent is still that of a spiritual force. "All the world," he wrote, "is a place of exile to philosophers," and to live content in this exile, he believes should be man's aim. Undoubtedly, his general transcendental doctrine has had more listeners than his purely philosophical doctrine. Naturally a delicate, an exalted temperament, he made the strongest effort to combine the floating mystical ideas of the day into a working system. Hugh took from Dionysius and applied to the mystical life, the idea of "spiritual grades or steps," by whose aid the soul was to mount up to that ineffable union with God which is conceived as the final stage in the mystical way. By such means, he endeavored to intellectualize the entire scheme of mysticism, substituting for the three usual steps of purgation, illumination, and union, three other steps of

cogitation, meditation, and contemplation. Any attempt to systematize the indefinable is foredoomed to failure, but Hugh and his successors reached a primary *consciousness of inner experience.*[51] With constant delicate perception and feeling, through constant self-study and self-analysis, this introspective habit developed powers of self-observation till then unknown. The history of one's soul became the most important of all histories, and through the need of salvation there arose a need of psychology.

The successor and nephew of Hugh of St. Victor, the abbot Richard, carried out the psychological work of his master in a manner yet more detailed, and with results even more far-reaching. Taking for his great book a text from Psalms, LXVII, 28 (in the Vulgate), "There is Benjamin, a youth in ecstasy of mind," Richard of St. Victor takes the type of an ecstatic as being the highest possible to humanity. He thus laid himself open to all that rational criticism of the mystical life, which later ages cannot forbear. Such criticism will be given expression in another section of this book, for our purpose is to consider him at the moment merely in the character of an embryonic psychologist. "Full knowledge of the rational spirit is a great and high mountain," is Richard's teaching; and the study of self becomes a prerequisite to an entrance upon the Via Mystica. Moreover, he developed the system of his predecessor into a still more minute elaboration of grades and steps, by which very definition real psychology was considerably advanced. The symbols, the analogies used by Richard of St. Victor,—such as his comparison of the thoughts in the contemplative mind

to a flock of little birds, ever wheeling and returning, —all have suggestiveness from a psychological point of view.[52]

That psychology made such strides in the work of the Victorines was possible only because of their continued introspection, applied steadily in the direction of religious experience. The use of the introspective methods continued until the advance of the exact sciences began to impose on them certain necessary limitations. Then arose a conflict out of which —at the beginning of the last century—developed a reaction, not only against the methods, but against psychology itself.

It has been noted how Comte's theory regarded the psychology of his day. Kant[53] expressed similar doubt, if less formally, while yet the very habit of his mind was profoundly subjective. The French philosopher characteristically suggested substituting for introspection the classification and analysis of human phenomena, which is, in truth, much according to the modern plan. Herbart,[54] by his effort scientifically to reduce consciousness to its simplest elements, opened the door for the experimental psychology of to-day. The feeling among philosophers seems to be that to achieve valid results by introspective methods, we should regard ourselves first of all in the nature of automata, and then, having registered the effects of our automatic behavior, bring those effects under the observation of our conscious intellect. Once its definite limitations be understood, true introspection retains its value as a means of securing data. For even if a man really believes with Taine,[55] that "Nul œil

ne peut se voir soi-même," yet he cannot deny that there are moments in his life when the veil between him and himself is lifted. If every person now living were to contribute one single fact about himself, the total result would be heterogeneous, indeed, but it would still be data. Our tendency, therefore, should be not to disdain introspection in psychology as valueless, but rather to limit its observation to pre-determined fields; remembering that "no interpretation can be arrived at without the direct cognition of the facts of consciousness obtained by means of introspection, aided by experiment."[56]

Training, of course, is of the utmost importance in this regard. As introspection grows less fortuitous, and, being trained, becomes more accurate, as the mind, "looking within," knows when to look and for what objects, then will science be aided and not merely hampered by the contribution. Meanwhile, the reader will have recognized: First, the presence of the subjective and introspective trend as indicating a certain stage in the evolution of human thought. Second, the developing and heightening influence of introspection itself on all religious sentiment. And when these two ideas shall have been confirmed by the third and most important, namely, that an elementary introspection will lead the subject inevitably toward mysticism and toward transcendentalism, the purpose of this examination will have been, in the main, accomplished. Aided by these conclusions, the reader should at least be better able to understand his own nature in the different stages of its growth and to see in the history of introspection, scientifically considered, nothing less

than the movement of the human intellect toward maturity.

It may be well to ask what facts can the introspection of the past be said to have contributed? If it has done nothing else, it has at least furnished a starting-point for all our modern conceptions of self-consciousness and identity. Every self-student is aware that his looking within has given him a number of new ideas, together with the power to differentiate his old ideas. For instance, he was probably unaware of the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness until absorbed in the effort of mental concentration which continuous introspection involves. Then he notes "a succession of ideas which adjust and readjust themselves,"[57] which he had not before noticed and in which there is very little actual self-consciousness. In ordinary objective life, the one state practically includes the other. Another contribution to thought which we owe to introspection alone, is the better definition of all our simple concepts; and the discrimination between the various parts of our more complex concepts. Without a systematic introspection this discrimination would have been impossible; and Fichte notes it as present even in the most fleeting self-observation.[58]

Moreover, without the introspection of the past we should never have been able to see and to differentiate between the various elements of the Ego. Observing the Self of another person does not readily aid one in such differentiation, because, seen from our own sphere of identity, his sphere of identity appears to be far more homogeneous and unified than it really is.

Without looking within, the psychologist [59] would never have been able to observe the Ego divided into the several social, material, and spiritual selves, with their differing constituents and qualities. The theories describing these Selves and accounting for their fission, change too fast for the average reader to keep pace with them; but his own "looking within" is sufficient to convince him that there are many selves in one. He perforce returns again and again to this conception, however he may try to get away from it, and he is just as dependent upon it to explain himself to himself and others to himself, as he was in the days of Augustin. Moreover, this is quite as true of the most vividly objective person among us, as of a Cardan or a Maine de Biran. "A psychological sense of identity," to use James's phrase, is common to all of us, and in all ages. Placed as such a sense is, just beyond the easy reach of our minds during the daily round, yet it is within the grasp of any and all of us, once interest or need has made it plain.

Metaphysicians are constantly reminding us that however imperfect the instruments at hand may be, yet we can hardly afford to discard them, while there remains any likelihood of their becoming more valuable through evolution or by training. As an instrument, introspection has undoubtedly so become. "The empirical conception of consciousness," says Villa,[60] "is that of the consciousness of self. It is characterized by the fact that its content is very restricted, though vivid, consisting of organic sensations, together with a particular feeling of activity owing to which we 'feel' that we are a spontaneously acting

personality. . . . As the complexity of our mental processes increases, the consciousness of our personality becomes clearer and extends itself to a greater number of phenomena."

This excellent definition is of interest here from the fact that its conclusions could have been reached only through means provided by the introspective observer and his introspections. It gives us a warrant for examining in detail that type of document from which science has heretofore derived much of the material respecting ourselves. This material has been cast into various moulds; it is sometimes in the shape of fact, sometimes in the shape of theory. The presence in the world of the subjective philosopher, seems to be the manifestation of an introspective tendency in our intellectual life; and has, moreover, an importance for this study, from its close connection with the religious tendency. Types of an introspective cast have always preserved an influence over the world of thought, and a consideration of them has all the value of a concrete example.

In dealing with those individual cases of introspective writing, whose influence has been so marked at different times, upon literature, art, and philosophy, some selection must needs be made, if only to avoid repetition. Many of the names considered are more accurately to be analyzed on another account. Augustin, for instance, is not the less introspective because he is the more religious; but citations from his "Confessions" are used so constantly in the body of this work, that it were superfluous to repeat them. The same is true of one or two other cases, who are

to be dealt with more fully under separate heads. Our endeavor in this section should rather be to classify and to analyze, for purposes of comparison, those self-students whose work, while exhibiting equal sincerity and candour, is yet *not* directed by a purely religious impulse, nor strictly affiliated with religious tenets. Such analysis and comparison will aid us to compute the sum of the purely religious impulse in the introspective document and the amount and force of the purely introspective tendency in the religious confession. Some confusion has attended opinion on these points, and critics therefore have come to discuss them largely according to personal likes and dislikes. Thus we find Caird terming that important element of self-examination in religion (without which, as we have seen, the religious idea could hardly have developed to meet our latter-day spiritual uses) as "the great plague of our spiritual life"; [61] and this opinion is shared by many a devout theologian. Study therefore of introspection as introspection, may be of value in clarifying our ideas.

The use of this element in philosophy—when it does not take the direct and formal shape of autobiography —usually takes that of personal explanation. Much of the material respecting ourselves which has been yielded through introspective methods, has been overlooked by the student in his concentration on theory. He reads the "Discours" of Descartes for its central theme rather than for the light which it may cast on the author's mind and personality. Therefore, much significant matter lies buried under the drifting sands

of controversy, or is lost like the Neo-Platonists beneath some abandoned philosophic structure.

Present-day English science shows the marked effect of the introspective tendency. Guided by the idea [62] that a natural history of one's self is a proper complement to one's system of thought, the group of writers clustering around the crisis of 1850 have practically without exception left definite personal records. One type of mind, such as G. J. Romanes, expresses similar ideas in an intimate "Diary," [63] while yet another, following Descartes,[64] will incorporate the result of his introspection into the body of his thesis. An Italian critic [65] has commented with penetration on this instinct of the robust intelligence to observe itself and study the secret of its being. This tendency is plainly traceable throughout the philosophical systems of Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Reid, and Hartley, where it forms part of their method of reaching and impressing other minds.[66]

It is not, however, in England that the subjective and introspective philosophy is to be found in its typical completeness. German metaphysicians may differ widely as to conclusions, but they are practically of one mind as to their method. In German thought, the subjective tendency seemed to become even more the property of philosophical doctrine than of religious doctrine, since the number of these documents outweighs the number of religious confessions. Most of the former display the same motives which underlie the latter, such as dissatisfaction with self, and the effort to comprehend the basic principles of conscious-

ness. German subjective philosophy, together with all modern philosophy, dates from the sixteenth century and the work of Descartes.[67] Certain earlier names shine out from the vast epoch of the Middle Ages, but they do not dim that of the great Frenchman. One of these—Al-Ghazzāli,[68] the Arabian—has left us a philosophical introspective record which deserves to be compared with the "Discours de la Méthode." Neither must we forget the sceptic monk, Giordano Bruno,[69] who, in his various replies made during his trial before the Inquisition, developed, if somewhat baldly, the theme and outline of an introspective philosophy. He is "entirely ready to give an account of myself,"[70] as he puts it; and does describe his change of view; how "alone retaining the crucifix" he tried to turn his religion into a philosophy. But in respect of our present investigation, the ideas of Bruno are not of sufficient weight to detain us longer.

The similarity which has been noticed between the "Discours" of Descartes and the "Confession" of Al-Ghazzāli,[71] suggests at once a possible debt of the Western to the Eastern mind. Did the introspective philosophy take its rise among those peoples, naturally meditative, naturally prone to abstract conceptions? The question is not one to be lightly answered. Unquestionably, the habit of certain highly introspective practices had been developed in India, in Persia, and in Arabia, for centuries past. One might expect, therefore, to find elaborate systems of subjective philosophy permeating the arid and eager Western world from this ancient source.

The reason why such has *not* been the case would seem to lie in the predominance, over East and West alike, of the huge and objective intellect of Aristotle, whose systems dwarfed for centuries any independent thought, while they absorbed, in exegesis and elucidation, the best minds of Arabia as of Europe.

The work of Al-Ghazzāli, in the twelfth century, is an indication of a fresh effort at mental independence. The Aristotelians, the Platonists, and the Neo-Platonists seem to have absorbed the world's stock of ideas, as, later, the Schoolmen seem to have absorbed its stock of mental energy. All the world over, men were but entombing their minds in those huge and futile folios, which stand to-day, like forgotten sarcophagi, the objects of our curious and reverent pity. In such a record as this Arabian sage's, may be read the attempt to come out from under the shadow of those traditions into the light of reality and experience.

"Tu m'as prié, ô mon frère en religion, de te faire connaître les secrets et le but des sciences religieuses . . ." he begins, and adds, further, that he will depict his own sufferings in his search for truth.[72] His was suffering, indeed, because it led in the direction of a general scepticism and negation, a state even harder to bear during the twelfth century than in our own. "I have interrogated the beliefs of each sect," proceeds the Arabian, "and scrutinized the mysteries of each doctrine. . . . There is no philosopher whose system I have not fathomed, nor theologian the intricacies of whose doctrine I have not followed

out. . . . The thirst for knowledge was innate in me from an early age; it was like a second nature implanted by God. . . . Having noticed how easily the children of Christians become Christians, and the children of Moslem embrace Islam . . . I was moved by a keen desire to learn what was this innate disposition in the child, the nature of the accidental beliefs imposed on him by the authority of his parents . . . and finally the unreasoned conviction which he derives from their instructions." [73]

The idea with which Al-Ghazzāli followed this survey of conditions is simply to ascertain "what are the bases of certitude." Misled by false appearance, by the illusions attendant on observing the action of the senses, he finds every doctrine around him in every direction untrustworthy, and so falls into the deepest doubt. During this state, which lasted about two months, he presents to our view all the familiar phenomena of so-called religious depression, terminating in a complete nervous prostration with aphasia. "But God," he fervently exclaims, "at last deigned to heal me of this mental malady; my mind recovered sanity and equilibrium." [74] And, turning his energies toward a careful introspection, Al-Ghazzāli found that it led him directly toward the mysticism of the Sufis.

It will not be forgotten that the effect of all elementary and untrained introspection, whether in religion or philosophy, is inevitably in the direction of mysticism, and nothing so clearly shows that four hundred years have passed between Al-Ghazzāli and Descartes as the comparison of their conclusions in

this regard. Without insisting too closely thereon, it will be admitted that the aim of both philosophers was identical in their search for Truth.[75] Each begins his work with a personal statement of his fitness for this search, his position at the present stage, and the further aims of his mind. That there existed a strong similarity in their mental situations, a glance will show. "J'ai été nourri aux lettres dès mon enfance," writes Descartes. ". . . Mais sitôt que j'eus achevé tout ce cours d'études . . . je me trouvais embarrassé de tant de doutes et erreurs, qu'il me semblait n'avoir fait aucun profit."[76] And again, on the study of philosophy, he observes that "considérant combien il peut y avoir de diverses opinions touchant une même matière, qui soient soutenues par des gens doctes, sans qu'il en puisse avoir jamais plus d'un seul qui soit vraie, je réputais presque pour faux tout ce qui n'était que vraisemblable."[77]

Here stand these two young men, each in his early twenties, side by side on the same path of enquiry. Here their ways part, led by the vital and significant influences developed by four hundred intervening years. The Oriental mind, interrogating each dogma in turn and finding all false, bends aside in despair to take refuge in that perpetual mystery which opens before the inward-looking eye. "To believe in the Prophet is to admit that there is above intelligence a sphere in which are revealed to the inner vision truths beyond the grasp of intelligence,"[78] is the practical conclusion of the Arabian.

The Occidental mind, interrogating each dogma in

turn and finding all false, turns aside in hope, and bends all its energies into the search for *method.*[79] The man resolves to study himself and to conduct his own reason, for the purpose of evolving a method which will lead him in the direction of the truth. Let us abandon, he remarks, these problems which appear so distant and insoluble, and devote our energy to the best means of reaching them by regular steps. "Même je ne voulus point commencer à rejeter tout-à-fait aucune des opinions qui s'étaient pu glisser autrefois en ma connaissance," he writes, "[mais] chercher la vraie méthode pour parvenir à la connaissance de toutes les choses dont mon esprit seroit capable."[80] Descartes is thus separated from Al-Ghazzāli by his conception of and his insistence on the importance of *method.*

It will be asked in what manner was the soil during these four hundred years prepared for the plough of such a mind as Descartes, and an answer must be, though all too briefly, suggested. The limitations imposed upon the present essay make it impossible to treat at any length of those Renaissance discussions between the Aristotelians and the Platonists on such ultimate questions as the nature and immortality of the soul,[81] by and through which our modern conceptions have been slowly evolved. Those controversies added to the world's stock of definitions at the same time that their use made flexible various types and forms of philosophy and metaphysics, including the introspective. The scientific self-study and autobiography also made its appearance to add to the world's stock of ideas. By the lives of Cellini

and Cardan, the essays of Montaigne, and other similar records, psychological introspection was developed from a rudimentary condition to a state of efficiency which made it a valuable tool in the hand of the science of that epoch. No longer elementary in character, it ceased, as we see in the case of Descartes, to lead in the direction of mysticism and transcendentalism.

At the same time that the psychologist, in the person of Cardan, was endeavoring by close self-analysis to comprehend something of his own obscure problems, the idea of the value of such self-knowledge was slowly growing in the world's mind. The power and charm of Augustin, exerted during the early Middle Ages,[82] heightened this estimate of self-knowledge, while causing it to take its position as a department of science. Descartes, who, as we have read, had pursued all the philosophical doctrines prevalent during his youth, could not have failed to draw, from this development of self-knowledge, one of his greatest elements of strength. His Augustin he must have read; something he must have known of Nicholas Cusanus, and of Giordano Bruno.[83] Such earlier influences as the treatises of the Neo-Aristotelian, Pomponazzi,[84] for example, "the last of the Schoolmen," as he has been called, show the rationalistic tendencies at work upon men's minds, which cannot, either, wholly have escaped Descartes. Pomponazzi[85] questioned the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, denied that there are apparitions of the dead; emphasized the study of the history of religions, and concerned himself chiefly with the degree of the soul's relation to reason

or intelligence.[86] Such a sceptical and subjective treatment of great problems had a widespread effect upon men's attitude toward them, and prepared the way for a method based on pure introspection.

These pages are not the place for a complete analysis of the Cartesian philosophy in all its far-reaching effects, nor would such analysis be of any real service to the present investigation. It were well, however, to point out that the introspectiveness of Descartes does not limit itself to the opening pages of description and examination.[87] On the contrary, it is interwoven with his thoughts both in the "Discours" and in the "Méditations." It is condensed and expressed in that phrase, "Je pense, donc je suis,"[88] by which his philosophy is identified; it is employed on every page by way of definition, and in one of his responses,[89] he avers that it is not possible for him to separate his thought from himself. The one thing of which he is entirely conscious, as Augustin was, is himself: and thus, both in manner and in matter, he remains the distinguished example of the philosophical introspective type.

It is natural that such intense introspection as resides in the manner of Descartes should be followed by a reaction, and this reaction came in Spinoza and in Leibnitz. Nevertheless, so deep and far-reaching was the Cartesian philosophy, that it ushered in what has been called "The Age of Enlightenment,"[90] when man became interested above all things in himself, and in the workings of his own mind. Reaction, therefore, could not carry men very far from an attitude which still maintained for them its freshness and

force. Thus the eighteenth century became an age of personal affirmation and explanation, when the discovery made by philosophy and expressed in literature by Rousseau was freshly for each man: "Si je ne vaux pas mieux, au moins je suis *autre.*" [91]

Not in his two great "Critiques" [92] is the introspective tendency of Kant to be noted; but rather in his "Prolegomena of a Future Metaphysic" wherein he avows that "Hume interrupted my dogmatic slumber." [93] Much of his personal introspection is fragmentary and incomplete, but the tendency is so marked as to cause him to compare himself to Rousseau.[94]

Immediately following Kant, German philosophy entered upon its great subjective period, when, aided by the influence of Locke and certain others of the English school, introspection became generally diffused throughout the whole realm of metaphysics. Its results, in a sense, are assumed, and the separate development of that branch of science which we call psychology, is not the least of them.[95] From this time, the psychologists became a separate group of investigators, and the value of introspection in psychology fluctuates, as we have seen, according to the opinions generally prevailing amongst the different groups.

Philosophically speaking, the introspective tendency reached its height in Fichte, who, in his "Science of Knowledge," bases his entire doctrine on subjective idealism. "If I abstract myself from thought," he writes, "and look simply upon myself, then I myself become the object of a particular representation." [96]

Thus making himself his own object, Fichte takes what he considers to be the first important step. "The question has been asked," he proceeds, "what was I before I became self-conscious? The answer is, I was not at all, for I was not I. The Ego is, only in so far as it is conscious of itself."[97] Here is introspective doctrine of the type of Augustin carried to a higher degree of development. In the "Destination of Man," Fichte still further elaborates the results, direct and indirect, of his systematic looking-inward. "There was a time, so others tell me . . . in which I was not, and a moment in which I began to be. I then only existed for others, not yet for myself. Since then, myself, my conscious being, has gradually developed itself, and I have discovered in myself certain faculties, capacities . . . and natural desires."[98] "My existence must necessarily be aware of itself—for therefore do I call it mine. . . . By the limitations of my own being I perceive other existences which are not me. . . . The foundation of my belief in the existence of an external world lies in myself and not in it . . . but in the limitations of my own being. In this manner I obtain the idea of other thinking beings like myself."[99]

Fichte thus finds in self-examination the beginning of all philosophy, and in his work it touches the highest fruitfulness. Generalized later in the work of Schelling,[100] it became much less significant. Still later, Schopenhauer[101] displays the introspective tendency in scattered, incoherent paragraphs, capricious, and lacking in constructive power.

Nietzsche,[102] in our own day, made an attempt to

return to scientific introspection; but the mental conditions were untoward, and his efforts ended in a mere insane shouting of "I am this" and "I am that."

Sporadic minor examples—such as that Novalis [Friedrich von Hardenberg] to whom Carlyle consecrates an essay—exist here and there in Germany and in Scandinavia;[103] but the influence of Comte, which, as we remember, was antagonistic, caused a second reaction from introspective methods in psychology. That this reaction has reached its limits there are several indications at present, among which is the vogue attendant on the metaphysics of Henri Bergson.

In literature as in philosophy, the forces underlying the Renaissance gave an impetus to all forms of expression, subjective as well as objective. The Italians first indicate this movement; among them are to be found the earliest examples of what later was to become a familiar literary type. Such Florentine domestic chronicles as that of Lapo da Castiglionchio, for instance (to name one of many during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), display qualities speedily to be developed and popularized into regular autobiography. Italy resembled a youth but half-awakened, who looked eagerly around him upon a new and vigorous world. A passionate interest in general observation and description embraced the inner as well as the outer phenomena of life. Again men turned back to the great introspective leaders of Christian doctrine, striving through their eyes to look higher and lower and deeper than ever before.

This newly aroused desire for knowledge led men far, and in directions as yet undreamt-of.

"In the Middle Ages," writes one historian, "both aspects of consciousness—that which faces the world and that which looks toward man's own inner life, lay dreaming, or but half-awake, under a veil which shrouded them. . . . In Italy first this veil was lifted . . . the things of this world generally began to be treated objectively; but at the same time the subjective asserted its rights; man becomes a spiritual individuality and knows that he is such." [104]

These pages have already noticed how this spiritual individuality began to be evolved; how its growing introspective tendency led it to mysticism; and how, in turn, this mysticism heightened the introspection. The St. Victors show in a striking manner the interrelation of these two influences on the religious mind, together with an intellectual attempt to formalize their results into a system. On the side purely secular and profane, the introspective type was necessarily slower in its development, nor can it be detached from the study of religion until a period later in the history of literature.

Dante has frequently been cited in this connection, but Dante, notwithstanding certain passages in the "Convito," must have been always an outward-looking, rather than an inward-looking, mind. The letter to Can Grande, for instance, is written on a personal subject, one near to religious experience, yet its tone remains impersonal and even abstract.[105] The "Vita Nuova" [106] is throughout handled in a manner curiously outward,—it is a setting for poetic jewels, a dec-

orative framework for sonnet or *ballata*, rather than a spiritual self-study. The flame-color of the garment of Beatrice, the wingèd Love in a blaze of fire,—these are the images which dominated the imagination of its writer. True, Dante tells how his passion affected his health, and how his grief undermined it, but he is nowhere definitely personal; he writes poetically, and he withholds the key to his conduct so effectually, that the whole tone has remained artificial.

The mind of Dante was not made of modern stuff. However different his attitude from your true introspective, he yet belongs to the same spiritual family as that Francis who preached to the birds, as that Ubertino da Casale, whose meditations made him a member of the Holy Family, sitting at table with them. Even in the personal portions of the "Commedia," Dante's direct, concrete imagination displays the power of a mind turned outward. Not upon himself, but upon the world without, his gaze is fixed. His heaven and hell are distinct with the imagery of real things; they have the classes and circles and divisions of the visible universe; the empyrean itself shows a decorative plan. Their vividness is due to this; it is the vividness of the Italian painters; while both belong to the unself-conscious and objective past. There are many to whom the sombre figure of the Florentine, in its fierce gloom and faith, serves to personify the Middle Ages. The chasm that separates Dante from Petrarch is wider than the width of years; it is the gulf between the ancient and the modern world. Boccaccio accused Petrarch of indifference toward the elder poet, and

although Petrarch defends himself with skill in a long letter, yet the very terms of this defence show plainly that Dante's attitude of mind is as far from him as it is from ourselves. It has been said of Petrarch that he was not content to live unquestioningly, but must be constantly preoccupied with his own aims and motives.[107] His passion for the works of Augustin, and especially for the "Confessions," roused in him a desire for self-understanding which he enriched by a matured power of psychological analysis.

We have seen him already upon Mont Ventoux, smitten with wonder, not only at the wide sunny stretch of country, but also at the miracle of his beholding self; and none of the thoughts and emotions roused in him by the sight are alien to our own ideas. He stands ever as an immortal Youth upon a mountain-top, to whom life opens a wider and wider prospect, while the centuries, rolling by, reveal shining peaks perpetually to be climbed.

The introspective tone of Petrarch has throughout a literary quality. At no time does he show any anticipation of scientific self-study, of which Cardan, only two hundred years later, was to give so remarkable an example. The tone of the poet's "Epistle to Posterity," [108] is ceremonious and condescending, the facts are furnished to an admiring public by a celebrated personage. "As to my disposition, I was not naturally perverse nor wanting in modesty," he says, noting also, "my youth was gone before I realized it . . . but riper age brought me to my senses." He tells of his quickness, comeliness, and activity; how his

health endured until old age brought "the usual train of discomforts"; and of his deep conviction that only "by a tardy consciousness of our sins we shall learn to know ourselves." One feels that this man wished posterity to remember the esteem in which he was held by the great of his own day; and how, without regret, he had relinquished that popularity.

Less formal are his letters, yet they, too, echo this successful assurance. So highly were they valued by the writer, that he spent six years editing them for publication, with the result that, however interesting, they lack spontaneity.[109] Not only are they introspective, they are often self-conscious. When he writes of, "my inexorable passion for work," or comments, "my mind is as hard as a rock,"[110] the tone is that of the literary man, satisfying the curiosity of an eager and respectful public.

The work which particularly concerns us here, is contained in a group of three dialogues to which he gave the title, "De Contemptu Mundi," while alluding to them also as his secret—"Secretum Suum."[111] Both from a religious and an introspective aspect they have much importance for the present enquiry. They form indeed a confession, wherein the figure of Augustin plays the part of spiritual director. Composed in Petrarch's thirty-eighth year, they picture a man in conflict with his youthful errors and passions. In these dialogues, the poet, the lover, the courtier, give place to the student whose quenchless love of letters is the only mundane interest which a newly aroused religious feeling will allow him to indulge.

"May God lead me," is his cry, "safe and sound

out of so many crooked ways; that I may follow the Voice that calls me; that I may raise up no cloud of dust before my eyes; and, with my mind calmed and at peace, I may hear the world grow still and silent, and the winds of adversity die away!" [112]

This, surely, is another man from him who told us with complacency that his intimacy was desired by noble persons! And, moreover, it is in these very dialogues that we see the change accomplished. Truth herself, a dazzling angel, led Augustin to the perplexed poet, saying that his sacred voice would surely bring peace to one so tossed, so troubled. And Petrarch warns us that this little book is not to be regarded critically, as are his other compositions, for it is written chiefly that he himself may renew, as often as need be, the salutary effects of the interview. The attack on himself is opened by an arraignment (placed in Augustin's mouth) of his own worldliness and vanity. To this accusation he is depicted as listening in all humility.[113] By comparison with the younger Augustin drawn in the "Confessions," his repentance seems less deep, his tears are less bitter, his clinging is closer to the world. Yet he avows: "I am made partaker of your conflict . . . I seem to be hearing the story of myself . . . not of another's wandering, but my own. . . ." [114]

His defence of himself against the saint's accusation appears of more strength to us to-day than it could to himself; it prevails far more than he realized against the Augustinian asceticism. To our ideas, the great, busy, material world, and men's achievements therein, possess a hold over the moral sense

which they had not in the fourteenth century. In words spoken by Augustin, Petrarch draws an accurate picture of the ascetic system of the Middle Ages, as it appears to modern eyes. All unwittingly, he places the ethics of the past in antagonism to the ethics of the present. He argues for the life of moderation, reason, and energy, as against the life of fanaticism, superstition, and quiescence. He pleads for the mental images of life and light; while his Augustin, in all sternness, dwells on the power of those images of darkness and of death. If Petrarch makes the saint carry the day in this discussion, it is because Augustin, after all, expressed both the religious and the moral ideals of the time. "I will not deny," Petrarch cries, "that you have terrified me greatly by putting so huge a mass of suffering before my eyes. But may God give me such plenteous mercy that I may steep my thoughts in meditations like these!" [115]

Dialogue second analyzes Petrarch's love of wealth and fame; while again the part he bears against Augustin represents the modern ideal. Doctrines of industry, activity, and study, are advanced against the saint's plea for passive renunciation. His figure of Augustin here is not wholly consistent; for, when he describes himself as suffering from a causeless and poetic melancholy, in which he morbidly took a false delight,[116] he suddenly changes the exhortations of the saint, from advising a constant meditation on the grave, to the urging of courageous cheerfulness. This very inconsistency has a lifelike quality; though it is true that Petrarch's Augustin seems harsher than

the Augustin we love. The progress of the composition as a whole marks a growing absorption in its self-analysis, which tends to weaken the part borne therein by the saint. At the end, Petrarch even allows himself the last word, for, although he is buffeted by the wind of argument, and stung by the arrows of Scripture, yet he stoutly declares that he can never relinquish his love of study.

In this little work, introspection takes a large stride, and enters into possession of literature. It shows—as no other book could show—how the grasp of Augustin was on the very fibre of men's hearts and minds; how, like religion and like philosophy, literary ideas lay helpless in that grasp for centuries. But then Augustin is identified with the greater moments of life; he voiced its crucial struggles. Men like Petrarch turned his pages with tears and prayer; they could no more have read them from the coldly literary point of view than they could have read their Bibles. Moreover, the style of Augustin's "Confessions" throughout is wonderfully delicate and colored, and the whole of that marvellous Tenth Book is written as though it were to be sung to the music of a harp.

Life is seldom, after all, in the lyric mood; and as self-observation grew more frequent, the "looking-within" extended itself to the mere daily round of common thoughts and feelings. The Renaissance revived the sceptical spirit, it became the spectator, half-cynical, half-amused, of itself. Man was interested in man, going to and fro about his ordinary business. Until the fifteenth century, the disposition to look in-

ward had been connected with religious discipline; and was associated with the practice of auricular confession, at that time firmly established in the Church. Once the introspective tendency transferred itself to the field of secular writing, it developed with such rapidity that by the sixteenth century there existed classic self-studies [117] with no religious feeling whatever as their basis.[118] The rise of this tendency during the Renaissance may be noted in such writings as those of Eneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who afterward became Pope Pius II. He left much self-study in his "Commentary," in his letters, and in a "Retractation," imitating Augustin. His temperament was primarily literary, cool, and sceptical, the latter to such an extent, indeed, that even when he was Pope, he observed that "a miracle should always be regarded with mistrust." [119] In the personal parts of his "Commentary," as in his letters, he is extremely candid; especially concerning that period in his life, when, although neither a pious nor a fervent person, he desired to abandon his youthful errors. This change is expressed in words of sincere doubt and contrition. "I cannot trust myself," he sorrowfully writes, "to take a vow of continence." And again: "I have been a great wanderer from what is right, but I know it, and I hope the knowledge has not come too late." [120]

Papal responsibilities educated Eneas Sylvius into deeper seriousness than was his by nature. His "Retractation" testifies to a sense of his own worldliness; and he asks that posterity remember him as Pius, rather than as Eneas. Throughout, he shows the crit-

ical habit of mind; and forms a significant link between the ardent nature of such as Petrarch and that later introspective type, that smiling spectator of self,—Montaigne.

After the Renaissance, a nature like Montaigne's seems an embodied reaction. So much piety, so much fervor, so much intensity, so much art and color, and passion and energy and heat,—and then, Montaigne. He meets the mood of satiety for the first time in literature; in him we see that the world has put forth too much force and is tired; it is beginning to ask "*Cui bono?*"—and to be amused by its own activity. This is his charm, his friendliness for us when we are weary of ardor. With pipe and by the chimney-corner, a man longs most for the society of him called by Sainte-Beuve "l'Homme sans Grâce,"[121] while the self-study of this man without grace, has evoked much similar study from other graceless men. "C'est moy que je peinds," he writes, ". . . tout entier et tout nu . . . . Ainsi, lecteur, je suis moy-même la matière de mon livre."

It has been suggested that Montaigne's sceptical attitude was due to his sympathy with the Pyrrhonistic philosophy.[122] Reading him to-day, it appears rather as an affair of temperament than of intellect, as an instinctive scepticism of the literary man, rather than as the reasoned scepticism of the *doctrinaire*. His avowals of orthodoxy are joined to the tranquillity of a fundamental materialism. He seems to be asking, with Emerson, "So hot, my little sir?" His self-observation partakes of this character; it is

formless and scattered, though Cardan himself could hardly be more minute. From literature he sought amusement, as well as from that science "qui traite de la connaissance de moy-même." Like the Italian physician, he gives his likes and dislikes, his habits, his food and drink; but his reason for so doing differs vastly. To Cardan, there seemed about his own personality a something vital and significant which it behooved other men to know, while Montaigne appears to regard himself largely as a means of pleasant communication with other men of the same kind. He offers himself to the reader in a friendly fashion; the result of his introspection brings no surprise nor shock, and his final estimate is, "pour moy doncques, j'aime la vie et la cultive."

The absence of all serious fervor, of "la Grâce," in Montaigne, strikes us sympathetically in our worldly moments; but it has had one ill effect. Using self-study, while yet, as it were, disregarding it, Montaigne could not fail to be imitated by the incoherent mind. There may be little excuse for egotism in any form, but there is none whatever for such loose and vague methods of self-observation. Thus, any mind which is naturally inclined to wander from the subject, hastens to take refuge in an imitation of the "Essais." Contemporary literature acknowledges Montaigne as a type of introspection, but the direct effect of his influence is to deprive us of a great deal of valuable personal matter.

Among the typical records of the seventeenth century, the "Religio Medici" [123] must not be forgotten,

for the quaint elevation of its style added much weight to the force of its opinions. It is meditative, but not detailed, self-study, with something of Montaigne's influence showing in the crabbed phrases. The author tells us that he read Cardan, and he shows the same feeling for the vastness of this great universe of which one reads in the life of the Italian physician. "Every man is a Microcosm and carries the whole World about with him," he writes; also telling us, "the world that I regard is myself." Browne is as sceptical as Montaigne, but with this difference: he hesitates to believe because the question of religion interests him so much, rather than because it interests him so little. His looking-within is a looking upon still greater miracles. Browne's open mind and intellectual curiosity, his lack of prejudice and of superstition, place him among the forerunners of that later type of philosopher whose high seriousness constitutes, in itself, a religion.

The documents of an introspective kind are few during this period, and they are not to be found where one would expect to find them. For instance, the ponderous "Diary" of the scholar, Isaac Casaubon, is detailed but non-introspective, concerning itself little with the inner life of the writer. Our modern standards for this sort of record, both as to candour and fulness go back no further than to Rousseau.[124] His type of introspection is the type which has influenced the world to-day. His emotional power, his feeling for style and for nature, struck a chord so responsive in eighteenth-century minds, as to

evoke a large group of similar confessions, frankly imitative in their nature. Rousseau's feeling that he was different from other men held also, as did Cardan's, the belief that this difference was, *in se*, profound and important. In a manner somewhat cloudy, yet as a result of methodical observation, Rousseau comprehended that the forces which produced him were sociological and economical; while to himself he typified the great individual struggle with these forces. He knew that he was neurotic and saw what early conditions had caused the neurosis; he knew that he was frail of physique, and yet industrious. He felt within himself the presence of a high creative imagination, and he had faith in the power of its ideas. His faith was justified, for he beheld the nations shaken by the wind of his words, and he felt it necessary that men should know something of what he was and whence his spirit.[125]

It is much the fashion to decry Jean Jacques, to sneer at and to despise him, to shudder at his premises and to cavil at his conclusions. Morley, for instance, finds that "The exaltation of the opening page . . . is shocking. No monk or saint ever wrote anything more revolting in its barbarous self-feeling."[126] There is a virtuous indignation expressed here which savors a thought too much of Mrs. Grundy to be convincing to the critical mind. For, if we look upon the "Confessions" from one point of view, we find ourselves infinitely in their debt. True, Cardan is the first to suggest that by the study of abnormal man, much might be learned about normal man. Cardan

passed with the passing of the sixteenth century; and suspected as he was, both of heresy and of madness, his work has been left locked within its Latin tomb.[127]

Rousseau attempted the same task in a living tongue. Through him, through his appeal, the exceptional person, the atypical child, the individual with the intense sensibilities or emotions, have come to be more sympathetically understood. His looking-within, it is true, revealed much that was unbalanced and ugly, but it also revealed what was human nature, and common to all humanity. The part borne in his life by the pressure of monstrous social injustices is differentiated and made plain, and this constitutes no small part of our indebtedness. In fact, the rising humanitarianism of the present day has been influenced greatly, if not wholly produced, by Rousseau. Modern child-study and child-training, the endeavor to help the atypical person generally, have been aided by his showing us himself. The facts are placed vividly before us, when he purges his soul in all sincerity. His introspections are properly balanced by the historical method and made constructive by the autobiographical intention.[128]

The imitators of Rousseau follow most often his attention to nature, and its reaction upon his own sensibilities. A number of dreamers, led by his example to note their dreams, follow his footsteps in a rapturous, feminized manner. Ecstatic over mountains and waterfalls, these dreamers lament and bemoan their misfortunes without displaying any of the robuster qualities of Rousseau's naked candour. Lavater, Richter, and Kotzebue in Germany; Ugo

Foscolo and Giusti in Italy, are instances of this type.

Closer to Rousseau's sense of style is that of De Senancour, of whose "Obermann"[129] George Sand has written an exquisite appreciation. The foundation of De Senancour's book is fictitious; its descriptive passages resemble, and at moments equal, Rousseau, and by its introspection it is the forerunner of Amiel. "Je m' interrogerai," writes Obermann, "je m' observerai, je sonderai ce cœur . . . je determinerai ce que je suis."[130] The result in this instance upon the self-analyst is particularly destructive; his lack of mental vitality renders him incapable of action. Years slip by filled with a sense of infinite illusion; this feeling extends even to his nearest friends. Withal, he is unquiet and sad, yet, in the manner of the neurasthenic, even the sadness has but little meaning, while everything in life seems vague and trivial. The book's vogue was taken as an indication of that *maladie du siècle,* which was echoed by Alfred de Musset,[131] Baudelaire, and the lesser Byronists.

The twentieth-century mind looking back over the nineteenth, is at times inclined to wonder how much of the so-called Byronism was due to Byron.[132] The Byronic attitude is supposed to include all possible introspective egotism, yet Lord Morley is at hand to point out the fundamentally objective character of the poet and his activities.[133] Study of his journals and memoranda—which are all that remain of the destroyed memoir—display an introspection generally constructive and well balanced. Of his work, he writes that it will be "a kind of guide-post . . . to

prevent some of the lies which will be told and destroy some which have been told already.''[134] No doubt his expressed wish that Lady Byron should be his reader, is responsible for his intention to be faithful and sincere.[135]

The ''Detached Thoughts'' display a remarkable keenness and justice in their self-observation. ''My passions were developed very early,'' he writes, ''perhaps this was one of the reasons which caused the anticipated melancholy of my thoughts.''[136] The ''Journal,'' however, is more melodramatic, more typically Byronic. One catches the morbid mood, one feels the scribbler at work. Nightmares are made much of; there are such phrases as ''Ugh, how my blood chilled!'' and the *''Heighos''* of the blood-and-thunder school.

The contrast between Byron and Shelley in this regard is curious and illuminating. With all his melodrama, Byron's self-study makes an attempt at candour, fulness, and method. Shelley, on the contrary (whose opinion of Rousseau's ''Confessions'' has not been forgotten), found the truth during all his life to be an unpleasant surprise, because things as they are were such an ugly contrast to things as Shelley thought they ought to be. His nature seemed incapable of self-understanding, just as we read in his letters that it was incapable also of understanding others. He was vividly mistaken in his estimates of the character of almost every one with whom he came into close contact,—Harriet and Eliza Westbrook, Miss Hitchener, Hogg, Claire Clairmont, Byron himself.[137] To the end, he retains his ''colossal power of self-

deception," as Arnold calls it; he remains the supreme example of a man untouched by the modern wave of subjective and introspective philosophy.

"The subjective movement," says Caird, "indicates a relative advance in man's consciousness of himself . . . for although the mind turned back upon itself may become troubled and unhealthy, yet its pain and disease are necessary steps in the way of a higher life." [138]

This relative advance Shelley never made; with the result that he caused quite as much suffering as though he had been an unthinking sensualist of the Cellini type. One cannot forget poor, silly, little Harriet writing, in a gust of admiration, how Mrs. Nugent was there, "talking with Percy about virtue!" And one notes how his total lack of self-study and self-understanding caused Shelley to dash himself to pieces against the disapproval of a world, not so much more moral as more subjective, and thus unable to see why Shelley could not see what Shelley really was. With what different and deepened feelings do we read the letters of that sheltered recluse and poet, Mrs. Browning, filled, as they are, with the most delicate and just self-observation! "I have lived only inwardly," she says, "or with sorrow for a strong emotion . . . my heart in books and in poetry . . . my experience in reveries." [139]

If this modern subjectivity be an advance in the gain of truth, we owe it to Rousseau. But the twentieth-century mind under modern science has carried the faculty of introspection far beyond that of the eighteenth, and into details which escaped Jean

Jacques. Moreover, the mutual interchange of languages and literatures has developed a type of greater sensitiveness to all moods and to all shades of thought.

The recently published notebooks of Emerson foreshadow many of the newer preoccupations, by means of an intellect possessing the fresh classic quality, though in novel surroundings. His tendency toward philosophical mysticism has more importance for the reader when a perusal of these journals indicates its source. Over and over again the young Emerson makes note of the influence upon his mind of the Neo-Platonists, especially Proclus, by whom his thought and style were colored. Those passages entitled "Myself," display some of the acuteness of the modern scientific self-study, if expressed in an outworn poetical manner.[140] He records his exaltation under the stimulus of nature and literature, with the depression arising from his wavering health. Deep religious feeling pervades many of the entries. "I am to give my soul to God, and to withdraw from sin and the world,"[141] he wrote; and we know, kept that resolution.

An entry made on his nineteenth birthday forms a valuable aid to an understanding of the man. This youth writes of "a goading sense of emptiness and wasted capacity," but grants himself "an intellectual stature above the common." Of his affections, he notes: "A blank, my lord. . . . Ungenerous, selfish, cautious and cold, . . . I yet wish to be romantic. There is not one being to whom I am attached with

warm and entire devotion."[142] No doubt such "frightful confessions" are exaggerated; yet they define that lack of human warmth which underlay his whole philosophy. If he was not to remain the "barren and desolate soul"[143] he called himself; yet he knew his weakness. Later, he notes that he lacked strong reasoning power;[144] in other respects his intellect seems to have made, in a single year, gigantic strides toward greatness.

Modern self-study, however, is not typically seen in a mind like Emerson's, whose calibre and character are those of the past. The "Journal" of Henri-Charles Amiel,[145] to certain temperaments, has carried an infinitely greater aid and suggestiveness. Many see in him a true example of the highest introspection, for, while he paused to watch himself, he expressed what he saw in words of the most accurately delicate beauty. The effect of the book was immediate;[146] there are those to whom it has seemed to voice the very rhythm of life. The style was so sensitive, so flexible, so full, that one read on in a sort of bewilderment, as a traveller might behold, on either side of his path, the strange charms of a new country.

In her admirable "Introduction to the Journal," Mrs. Ward calls Amiel "the brother of Obermann," but to our minds there seems little real brotherhood between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Amiel himself wrote that he resembled "that eternal self-chronicler, Maine de Biran," whose introspective experiments had so little success, at least on the positive side. What Amiel did not take from French

psychology, he drew from the German subjective philosophers, and the combination served to heighten far beyond the average his power of "looking within." While he is "the spectator of his life-drama," he, too, like Cardan, like Obermann, or any other neurasthenic, brings with him, into the world-theatre, that strained sense of universal illusion.

Nor did his tendency to constant personal analysis fail of destructive effect. Confidence he always lacked. "That energetic subjectivity which has faith in itself," he observes, "is unknown to me." "I have never felt any inward assurance of genius . . . what dreams I have are all vague and indefinite." How different the note struck by that Italian doctor struggling against a host of difficulties unknown to modern lives! "I have lived to myself," cried Cardan, "so far as has been permitted to me, and in the hope of the future I have despised the present." [147]

The self-distrust of Amiel was based on his self-knowledge. He was undecided and overscrupulous: discouragement and ennui early laid hold on him. Moreover, he was one of those unfortunate beings whom nature has so stinted of vitality that the mere demands of daily life draw too heavily upon them, and they shrink fearfully from the greater demands of emotion, or of ambition. To such an one, any creative work is undertaken at a heavy price. Thought alone, to Amiel, was immense and satisfying; practical life seemed but to terrify him. He was perpetually preparing for a work which he had never the energy to begin. "I play scales as it were," he writes; "I run

up and down my instrument, I train my hand . . . but the work itself remains unachieved . . . and my energy is swallowed up in a kind of barren curiosity." Such a nature, like Balzac's artist,[148] has spent its force in experiment, and has none left for the appointed task. Hence Amiel's languor and ennui, the sense of emptiness which caused him to lose himself in the mists of philosophical speculation. "What interested me most in myself," he notes, "has been the pleasure of having under my hand a person in whom, as an authentic specimen of human nature, I could follow . . . all the metamorphoses, the secret thoughts, the heart-beats, the temptations of humanity." To himself, he is continually as "a window open upon the mystery of the world." At moments there flutters across his page one of those delicate moods, whose description defies our grosser analysis, but which Amiel beholds in all its tenuous iridescence: "I can find no words for what I feel. My consciousness is withdrawn into myself. I hear my heart beating and my life passing." And again: "My sensible consciousness is concentrated upon this ideal standing-point . . . whence one hears the impetuous passage of time, rushing and foaming as it flows out into the changeless ocean of eternity."

Amiel has served us here as an example of pure and heightened introspection, but his journal is also a record of his religious feeling. This feeling links him with the mystics of the past—notably Richard of St. Victor, with whom he has many points of likeness. His religion is of the metaphysical, mystical type,

tinged by his German heritage, and is nowhere so intense, emotionally, as the introspection by which it was accompanied.

Minor types of the modern developed self-observer are many, and fall under various classifications. Those who watch their own processes should be considered at the moment rather than the scientific self-students who merely survey themselves as they would study a crystal of definite character and fixed shape. The great latter-day autobiographers, Harriet Martineau, Mill, Spencer, and others, are among these last, and have furnished us with the best means of examining the modern scientific movement. Yet the smaller group of the purely introspective must not be overlooked. Their observations form at least a solid basis "in a world most of whose other facts have at some time tottered in the breath of philosophic doubt." [149] The reader is referred to such books as the "Journals" of Eugénie and Maurice de Guérin, to that of Marie Bashkirtsev, and to such collections of letters as Mérimée's, Balzac's, and the Brownings, if he is interested in the further manifestations of this tendency.

As we turn to review the names in this section, we feel the justice of that view by which the introspective nature has, since the day of Protagoras, been linked with morbid conditions. Certainly, Montaigne, Cardan, Rousseau, De Senancour, Amiel, are not the types of health. Yet there are very striking exceptions to this rule. Take that extraordinary family of English Quakers, the Gurneys of Earlham,[150] and note how

the connection between introspection and sickliness is contradicted by the facts of their lives. Both descriptions and portraits of the members of this family show them to have possessed an unusual degree of physical beauty and vigor, health and intelligence. The gallery of miniatures shows one lovely young face after another. Their family history radiates cheerfulness, activity, and high spirits. They went fox-hunting, a cluster of pretty girls, in "pink" coats, which at that time no tenet of the Society of Friends forbade them to wear. They were never idle, they were much outdoors; they danced and gave dinners and were as gay as their neighbors. With all this, the deepest, the most introspective and intense religious life formed the primary occupation of that family. Each member kept an introspective journal, and one of these (Rachel's) runs to seventeen quarto volumes. As each grew to maturity, this religious sentiment shaped itself variously, retaining a uniform standard of goodness and zeal. The unique condition existed among them, in that their individual changes of creed caused no break in their family harmony. All show balance and self-control. Mrs. Fry records the death of her beloved sister, Priscilla Gurney, as "a sweet time," and her account reads with the calm solemnity of a church service.

From childhood, the Gurneys were in the habit of noting every passing mood. Meditation and journalizing were two family dogmas; a part of each day was set aside, and absolute truthfulness was exacted, even although the elders did not demand to read the result. One is tempted to linger over the naïveté and charm

of these entries. "I feel this evening," writes Richenda, "in a most comfortable mind. . . . I really felt true pleasure while I was eating an excellent apple pudding. . . . I walked by myself about the fields, with the most melancholy, delightful feelings, reflecting on a future state." "As I went down the dance yesterday," writes her sister Louisa, "I thought of Heaven and of God." One of the brothers, John James, enters in his diary a series of questions for the purpose of systematic self-examination; while the elder sister Catherine, who left the Society to join the English Church, analyzes at length the effect which Butler's "Analogy" had on her religious views. This useful, happy, and amiable family serves to remind us that the introspective habit is by no means necessarily destructive. When the inner life of an individual is full of vitality, the introspection is often a natural means of preserving that vitality. As a group, the Friends have always possessed it; nor can it be shown to have interfered with their output of practical achievement. Worldly interests rarely suffered at their hands; and their tendency to self-observation was, in most cases, a constructive factor in their lives.

There is another sense in which an introspective nature may be at its best during its introspections; since the light will be cast into any morbid shadows by any honest effort at self-understanding. The name of the late Oscar Wilde, during his lifetime and before the tragedy which closed it, was linked in men's mind with the world's *poseurs*. The cleverness of his work and its æsthetic finish hardly atoned for its insincerity,

its perversity, and its exaggerated pose. Had death but overtaken him in time, he might easily have gone down into the ages along with George Brummell, or William Beckford, or the Count de St. Germain,—and little would have remained but a poem or two, a *bon-mot,* the tradition of a sunflower in a velvet coat. But life is a ruthless dramatist, who startles us without compunction. From this figure—cast into the torture-chamber of her grimmest forces, crime and shame and judgment,—there rises a poignant cry "out of the depths." Strange, that the most sincere piece of self-study of our day should have come from the least sincere writer, that this most religious of modern soul-studies should be the work of the most pagan of modern souls!

The "De Profundis" was written in prison during the last years of the nineteenth century. Mention of it should fitly bring this long survey to a close. Its style is not always free from phrase and paradox, ("I went down the primrose path to the sound of flutes" [151]), and the author exaggerates his position in contemporary letters by comparing himself to Byron. But his work is much more than an exposition of personal vanity; and it is in no sense an apology. The absence of weak excuse helps to make it the most inspiring study of the effects of suffering upon character that we possess in English. "In the beginning God made a world for each separate man, and in that world, which is within us, we should seek to live. . . . I must say to myself that I ruined myself and that nobody great or small can be ruined except by his own hand." [152] These words express a truth which

cannot be reached save through the bitterest experiences, while to have realized it is almost to have freed one's self from their worst bitterness.

"There is only one thing left for me now, absolute humility."[153] This realization is the saving grace of the man who wrote; nor is there anything in literature closer to truth than his own analysis of the reasons for his fall. He was, indeed, "that man, who, wishing to write about everything, must know everything,"[154] of Balzac. His belief in reconstruction through suffering is reiterated in a noble music of language; for he, who began life by turning his back on all sorrow, had now come to feel "that sorrow is the most sensitive of all created things."[155] "Nothing seems to me," he writes, "of the smallest value except what one gets out of one's self. . . . I have got to make everything that has happened to me good for me." In the crucible of humility and suffering some of the shame has been purged away; the sketch ends in the renewal of hope, of life, of beauty,—if upon other terms. The mere composition has been an aid to the spirit of hope, "since it is by utterance that we live."

A communication such as the "De Profundis" brings nearer the sense of human dependence. Each one of us is forced by inexorable law to pass on to the race the result of his experience. An identical impulse moved Augustin or Descartes, as it moved Abélard or Wilde. For many centuries, introspection has been the instrument in the hand of this impulse; and as an instrument, it has not been found more imperfect than the other means through which humanity strives continually to attain the truth.

IV

THE DOCUMENTS

I. Change of belief.
II. Genius.
III. Groups.
IV. Methodists.
V. Quakers.
VI. Mormons.
VII. Identity of emotion.
VIII. Candour.
IX. Scientific self-observation.

IV

THE DOCUMENTS

As we approach the self-study more nearly, it becomes evident that some adequate plan for its survey must be formulated. The documents themselves are various as the personalities responsible for them; while the matter they contain is so scattered and so heterogeneous, that the task of sifting it seems at first sight to be as hopeless as the task which Venus set before Psyche.[1] The temptation, to which many workers in this field have yielded, is to make use of separate records as instances, to cull here and there the striking example, omitting the commonplace; to select, in a word, only those cases which serve to support their special theory. Such method is quite impossible in the case of the present volume. If this is to be an inductive study from all the obtainable facts, then a classification under different heads is naturally the first step. Ere we set to work to make this classification, let us glance at the main characteristics of the records, in the light of those fundamental causes which have just been discussed.

That all religious self-studies have been produced by the confession-motive working along with the tendency toward introspection, would seem to have been the conclusion arrived at by an investigation

into these basic principles. The wish to "tell all about it" produces a necessary "looking-within" to see what there is to tell. Upon the web of a fabric whose warp and woof seem to be always woven from the same threads, there is a design wonderfully varied and complex, in colors often strange and new. Just as the Polynesian tapa, at the first glance, seems to show in its pattern a purely individual caprice, yet, when studied, its design will be found to contain elements tribal, hereditary, even national, and individual only as they are combined—so it is with these narratives. Their individual qualities may readily be differentiated, they lie rather in arrangement than in *motif*. All come under the sway of the same social and psychological influences, such as group-contagion, imitation, social conditions, and changes in belief. In addition, there are always a few which are purely the outcome of the creative instinct, the result of genius. These form the main *motifs* in the design of the religious confession; and one must examine them well if he would understand the often elaborate figures of which they form an intricate and essential part.

That human nature does not take an account of itself when in a state of repose and equipoise, appears obvious; change therefore is the first law of the religious confession. Once his poise is disturbed the subject tends to ask himself: What am I? and whence these changes?

The ardently pious mind, having passed through a crisis caused either by a shifting of his religious point of view [2] or by the actual birth of a feeling unknown

before,[3] reaches a pause of comparative calm whence two impulses arise. If the condition be one of peace and joy,—which, temporarily, it is apt to be,—he is filled with a desire to communicate and to express his happiness. Using his own phrase, he longs "to bear testimony to the goodness of God"; and his confession thereupon becomes the Augustinian "Confession of praise."[4]

More frequently it happens that the storm through which his soul has just passed has been severe enough to shake the very foundations of the mind with uncertainty and terror. To review it upon paper, to re-trace the circumstances of his conversion and thus reassure himself of its blessed existence, is a means of establishing that serenity, of which, even now, he is by no means certain.[5] If he has friends, family, followers, he is eagerly desirous that they shall witness his conflict and appreciate the worth of his victory.[6] It is more than important to him that the world should know he is not now what he was before.

Of inspiration, of genius, at this crisis, our mention may be but brief. Such cases, at best, are all too few. Nevertheless, it were well to repeat that the great religious leaders, by the very fact of their genius, must needs leave behind them some systematic personal data. As a matter of fact, most of them have done so; and such material has been left in various forms, in sermon[7] or parable,[8] diary[9] or revelation.[10] Since they have prevailed as leaders largely through the force of personality, to impress that personality as much as possible, becomes an inevitable duty of their sacred mission. No religious

leader has succeeded—nor could he hope to succeed —without a plentiful use of the "I." His genius must make its direct personal appeal. And in these later days this personal appeal must be printed if it would reach a wider audience, such as earlier gathered to hear him when he preached to them upon a mountain,[11] or under a sacred tree,[12] or in the market-place of a Grecian city.[13] He may leave this appeal only in his letters to intimate friends and disciples;[14] or in a diary to which, under the seal of a cypher, he confided his combats and discouragements;[15] yet often there will be present, even in these private forms, an autobiographical intention showing his instinctive desire that the record should survive him, that it should be read.

But genius is genius, and for one Fox, for one Wesley, there are many Woolmans and Hansons. Of the asteroids which circle about genius as about a luminary, some merely reflect his light, while others will be found to shed a paler light all their own. The formation of groups in human society differs little from the group-habit of the cosmos. Laws governing this formation have received some attention in a former volume,[16] though in a wider and more general connection, and were therein shown to follow the principles obtaining in the formation of all crowds. The confessant, as a matter of fact, is completely subject to what has been termed "the law of the mental unity of crowds";[17] and is much affected by contagion.

The particular groups through which we may study these typical conditions readily occur to the mind. Such are the Gottesfreunde, in fourteenth-century

Germany; the English Quakers grouped around the leadership of George Fox; the English Methodists similarly grouped around John Wesley; the Scottish seventeenth-century Pietists; the French Port-Royalists; the American Mormons. The family likeness shown by the individual members of these clusters is sufficiently striking to demonstrate the closeness of the tie between them. Nor must one forget what Sainte-Beuve is at some pains to remind us; that until modern days the influence of Augustin was manifest not over one, but over all types of the creative religious mind.[18] Augustin was in fact "a great empire divided among such distinguished heirs as Malebranche, Bossuet, and Fénelon." Already have we noticed in another section the breadth of that kingdom, which includes him who was named as the first of the moderns.

A general study of religious movements will serve to confirm our impression of the part played therein by group-contagion. Inevitably one returns to the importance of the personal element; and to the need, felt by every religious leader, of making that element prevail. The means lay at hand ever since the printing-press stood ready to carry the Gospel among the Gentiles. Through this means, the freshness and force of the original emotion will have all the weight that the leader can give to it, will create new centres of that emotion and charge them with new energy.

If this religious leader be a mystic of the ancient pattern,—a Teresa, or a Mme. Guyon—she is urged to expression through the influence of the confessional. If he be a reformer like Fox or Swedenborg, the motive

of self-preservation acts as a strong incentive; for such a leader must leave an image of himself upon the printed page, so that his followers may be cheered when he has left them. If the conditions surrounding him have been those of success, this motive may be weakened, the diary or the day-book may be briefer and more formal. This is to be seen in the case of the Wesleys, whose personal success was so overpowering. But such success is, after all, not common; the religious reformer is apt to die while still uncertain as to the accomplishment of his mission.

The exact relation of the confessant to his group is one not easy to determine; since he is chary of material serviceable to that end. Individuality is ever jealous; and a confessant dislikes to admit his conformity to any existing pattern. He is apt, on the other hand, to protest loudly his entire originality, and to cry that the extent of his candour in self-revelation has never been before attempted.[19] Style is at times the only link which appears to bind him to the other members of his group. Usually he will describe the social conditions surrounding himself and the circumstances of his belief, thus displaying the strength of the religious influence to which he has been exposed. In the earlier confessions this may only be done indirectly; we may have lost much because of the silence of Augustin, concerning all these matters.

The force of group-contagion is almost always underestimated. The great religious leader is far too often treated as an isolated phenomenon, when, as a matter of fact, he is almost never an isolated phenomenon. There seems to prevail the opinion that

he would become less important and less worthy if this truth were known. Actually, this is not the case. Joan of Arc [20] has not been rendered less extraordinary because she is now shown to have been but one of many seers of visions and hearers of voices, all eager to aid in quieting their distracted country. Is Christ less wonderful because of John the Baptist? Religion, as one of the more communicable emotions, postulates the existence of a leader or leaders and a group of followers; some of whom may possess talent and force enough to become leaders in their turn, and to set up a further group-contagion. This is as true of later literary groups, as of the earlier clusters who listened and followed the man himself.

The main clusters of confessants are thickest during and after the upheavals of the Reformation. Those documents which exist earlier come from convents and monasteries, and their character is largely predetermined by their surroundings. Bearing all the marks of an early simplicity and credulity, they are of great value, for by means of these records may be studied the whole of mediæval mysticism, and in particular that state known as sanctification, so vehemently discussed to-day. But as nuclei, as definite groups, these records cannot be considered with any justice, since the countries and the periods of time which they cover are too wide for satisfactory classification.

Let us rather direct our attention, for the moment, to the typical record-groups of the Protestant sects. The seventeenth and eighteenth century pietistic revivals furnish an abundance of material toward the

study of these religious families; not the least important of which lies in their strong individuality and marked communal feeling. The English Quakers, the later English Methodists, possess striking group-characteristics, and are wholly accessible for the purpose of comparative study. An examination of them, as groups, will form a useful background to our further consideration of their individual examples.

Although John Wesley left no autobiography and although his journal is by no means so introspective as many another, yet he understood in the fullest measure how important was this method of perpetuating a religious movement. The lives led by most of his preachers were full of physical as well as spiritual adventure; and Wesley, when editing the "Arminian Magazine," appreciated to the full the value of all this material. We read that: "Mr. Wesley requested many of the itinerant preachers who were employed under his sanction to give him in writing an account of their personal history, including a record of their conversion to God, of the circumstances under which they were led to minister the word of life, and of the principal events connected with their public labours."[21]

Here it is evident that Wesley's keen perception assured him of the need to cultivate a group-sentiment around the Methodist revival; and our knowledge of his mind leads us to suppose that he was well acquainted with similar, earlier groups. Be that as it may, the result of his request was a collection of testimonies which formed an admirable basis for any study of the tendencies of that period, and which, together

with the Quaker group, forms a complete record of religious history during two centuries.

It will be observed that Wesley merely outlined the plan of these biographies, leaving the widest latitude to their writers. He seems to have had an unconscious reliance upon that impulse which we have named "the autobiographical intention," and he does not appear to place the slightest faith in the method known later as the "questionnaire." And it is amazing how well he is justified in this opinion. The Methodist testimonies, as a whole, are reliable, accurate, well-balanced, full of detail, yet marked with brevity, and pervaded with a feeling for essentials. Compared to the confusion, the vagueness, the lack of character in most "questionnaire" replies, these facts are very striking. They serve to show beyond possible contradiction that the spontaneous action of the mind upon any subject is an absolute prerequisite to gaining the truth; while forcing the mind and memory arbitrarily in a given direction, as is done by a set of questions, inevitably causes the writer to omit, or to distort the emphasis, or to shift the facts. That vital element of the unexpected must perforce be lacking; while an over-zealous desire to furnish an interrogator with data will oftentimes cause the writer to manufacture it when it is not there. The questionnaire is intended to be a short-cut, and it has the disadvantages of most short-cuts; together with fundamental unfitness of its means to its material. Wise John Wesley, to ask of his ministers only "an account of their personal history with a record of their conversion to God"!

By no stretch of imagination can Wesley be termed a mystic, yet it is strangely true that there are more mystics among his followers than among those of George Fox himself. This impression may be due to the fact that it is only the leaders of the Methodists —the active preachers of the sect—who have left their testimony; whereas the feeling among the Friends was such that the humblest among them has left a record of God's dealings with him.

More women write their experiences among the Friends than among the Methodists; yet, although the Wesleyan movement bears all tokens of its later development, there still remain striking likenesses between the two groups. Both are part of that great revival springing from the people—a wave of emotion sweeping up from the hearts of the poor.

Although we know that the Society of Friends has been in existence only since the lifetime of George Fox;[22] yet every Philadelphian, at least, refers with assurance to the Quaker face, the Quaker character, and even to minor Quaker traits and idiosyncrasies. Many of these characteristics, of course, have nothing to do with the Society; but are merely indicative of that type of English person, and that section of English country, from which its votaries were originally drawn. Yet many traits remain, which in a space of but two hundred years have stamped themselves upon human life in such a manner as to produce a recognizable type. Any one noting an example so pertinent of human malleability can no longer wonder at the effect which religious beliefs have produced in a comparatively short time upon communities, even

upon nations. To such an one the cruelties of the Spanish during the time of the Inquisition, the insensibility of the modern Japanese to pain and death, present no longer any enigma. These are, indeed, but manifestations of the peculiar susceptibility of the human race as a whole, and of some nationalities in particular, to *suggestion:* and this *suggestibility* is thus seen as a great factor in our evolution. So great a factor, is it indeed, that the disappearance of a special suggestion (furnished in many cases by the tenets of religion) is followed by the disappearance of the special type, and the rapid subsidence of its particular idiosyncrasies, under the pressure of fresh suggestions. Rare to-day, and becoming rapidly rarer, is that controlled, serene personality which was produced and educated under the influence of the Society of Friends. The reader of their memoirs, testimonies, and convincements may, if he will, observe the type in the making.

With very few exceptions, it is worth observing that the Society drew its membership in the beginning from persons who, since childhood, had been naturally serious and devout. The reader may be interested, if he will glance over their abstracts in sequence, to see how few are the conversions to Fox's views, of nonreligious persons, or of those previously steeped in vice or in crime. Such a man as John Bunyan [23] was not drawn to them—in fact, he proclaims their abominable errors. There are men among the Methodists who avow that they had little or no religious feeling; who, as soldiers or sailors, were dissipated or vicious, drunkards or seducers; such are seldom found among the Friends.[24] But the

religious man who feels he is not religious enough; the good person tormented by a sense of indwelling sin; the pious nature dissatisfied with its present belief;—to these, the working mysticism offered by George Fox was a perfect solution of all their troubles. Their literal interpretation of the text, that he who humbleth himself shall be exalted, formed their guiding principle. The plain speech, the plain dress, were expressions of this idea of passing unnoticed by the world.[25] One man sees the vision of a lowly people;[26] another dreams concerning a persecuted people;[27] both join the Society. Conversions among Friends on the whole are less emotional and less violent. They have not to create a new sentiment for God, but only to change its form and give it freer rein. Hence the phrases, "under a concern," "weights and exercises fell upon me," "I was moved to go" here and there; phrases which rather under- than overcharge their emotional conditions.[28]

No doubt the persecution of the first Friends, their sufferings and imprisonments, ridicule by families and neighbors, had its effect in heightening their self-control and strengthening their philosophy. No doubt, living as they did close to the source of a vital emotion, they drank deep thereof and found it sustaining and pure. Their records, as a whole, are on a remarkably high ethical level for persons so circumstanced; their mysticism is under far more control and is less fanatical than one would have supposed. Much is due to the contagion of the Quaker meeting, where, by the very conditions of required passivity, there was induced in these groups a remark-

able suggestibility. In meeting, fell those "weights and exercises"; in meeting, the inward voice speaks and the heart is tendered. Fox, himself, of course, was a case more definitely mystical; and to his idea he joined a fierce vindictiveness which was the very reverse of a meek and quiet spirit.[29] Any analysis of Fox would give all the particulars of his individuality in this respect; the reader need only compare him with other members of the Society. Such natures as Ellwood, Woolman, Howgill, Chalkley, or the entire family of the Gurneys of Earlham, appear much more typical of what we call to-day the Quaker spirit than does Fox.

But these great qualities of early Quakerism held in them certain sources of weakness, which became apparent so soon as by a generation or so, its votaries were removed from the sources of their faith. In the first place, the tenets of their belief, if logically pursued, endangered self-preservation. Non-resistance tends to develop inertia; the practical condemnation of art gave an opportunity for the self-destructive tendencies of studied mental inferiority. There is no more striking proof that the vitality of a religious sentiment is highest at its source, that this vitality either does not persist, or becomes of little real worth where it does persist, than is shown by the later history of the Society of Friends.

When we come to consider Wesley and the eighteenth-century Evangelical movement, other particulars are presented to our notice. The most prominent characteristic of the Quaker attitude toward God is *love,* the most prominent Methodist characteris-

tic is *fear*. The children of Israel under the whip of Pharaoh's overseer present no more vivid picture of persecuted terror than do Wesley's followers. The only questions which seem vital to them are those concerning Hell and Damnation; there is present in their narratives a perpetual undercurrent of gloomy excitement. In fact, a large number of these cases write of their condition before their conversion in terms suggesting insanity. "I was as one distracted," says John Haime. "I fell on the ground groaning and pulling the hairs off of my head," cries Thomas Walsh. "The sweat poured from off me," write Whitefield and John Nelson. "I seemed to be hanging over the brink of hell," and so on.[30] Visions of Christ on the cross [31] or bathed in blood,[32] of a dazzling light,[33] of a strange animal [34] or a strange bird,[35] with voices whispering of evil [36] or of aid, meet us on every page. The relapses and reactions are uniformly violent; the arc of the pendulum is wide and its swing is extreme. Whitefield, in this regard, is really more typical than either of the Wesleys; for the latter were by temperament much less emotional than most of their disciples. Like many great actors, theirs was the gift of producing a higher degree of excitement than they were feeling. Whitefield,[37] a dissipated youth, "froward," as he declares, "from my mother's womb"; loving cards, "affecting to look rakish"; then suddenly overwhelmed with the inward darkness of terror, the sweat pouring from him in his agony of prayer, is more typical of Methodism, than the scholarly John Wesley or the gentle Charles.[38]

The cultivated youth, the intellectual attitude of the

great leader of Methodism, remove him, as a personality, very far from such as Whitefield, or Jaco,[39] or Joyce.[40] Even in the darkest time preceding his change of belief, Wesley cannot find that he has been very sinful; only that he has been unable to reduce himself to a wholly passive state of obedience to God.[41] By nature he was spiritual in his outlook; if he grows fearful, it is because, like Suso,[42] he works himself deliberately into a state of depression and alarm. And when at last he found himself; when he assumed that task the magnitude of which one cannot overestimate; when, physically frail and always ailing, he travelled, preaching and evangelizing throughout the length and breadth of England without rest or pause; then he obtained a complete and an enduring peace, quieted and calmed by finding a suitable outlet to his genius. The fire which burned in his frail body lit a thousand other fires, as is the way with genius. More than any other modern man, he moved and vitalized the crowd who listened, and sent them home to new sufferings, to unimagined terrors. In their narratives they tell us of poignant repentance, of groans and sleeplessness, fevers and sweats, the howls of fear, the collapse from exhaustion. Man after man, standing in those immense crowds, listens and is touched; we who read, may almost see that great wave of emotion sweep over and carry on with it, these helpless human atoms.

The wave of Methodism did not spend itself in Great Britain, but travelled across the ocean to the United States. Here it found conditions especially favorable to the spread of such emotion. A people,

who had succeeded at immense cost in achieving independence, during these first years seemed to have achieved thereby only a fresh isolation. Exhausted by a war which had been an additional strain on those pioneers whose very existence was perpetual war, many families ceased to look hopefully upon the future, and relapsed into a sort of listless terror. Near the growing cities, a fresh and animating current of vitality stimulated men to the building of the new Republic; but only those who are familiar with the personal writings of pioneer families can appreciate how little this new hope held for their solitary lives. The situation was as favorable as that in the Middle Ages for the revival or recrudescence of emotional religious experience. The heredity of the pioneers, their surroundings, their traditions, all predisposed them to a passionate interest in the subject of religion. There will be later occasion to quote in detail from Jonathan Edwards' "Narrative of the Great Revival in New England," [43] which was the most powerful manifestation of this movement. All sects received an immense impulse, new communities were constantly being formed; and new revelations received in the wilderness.

The Mormon movement (which we cannot omit to note as a minor group) was an offshoot of the Great Revival. The family of Joseph Smith, senior, after wandering through Vermont, settled in Ontario County, near Niagara.[44] This district was still close enough to the remnants of the Iroquois tribes for dread of them to be an important psychological factor in the life of the Smiths. The whole frontier had, in

truth, been ravaged by the Indians but two years previously. In addition to the hardships of the frontier life, the severe winters, the scanty food, and the incessant labor, there was this active, unremitting, vigilant terror of the Indians. Nor were the Smiths alone under the obsession of this dread, which entered into and became a part of their religious fears; it is noted in many another record. The Iroquois, painted, bestial, incredibly cruel, incredibly cunning, is a figure which comes nearer to a realization of the devil than any other on earth; just as the experience of his captives must have come near to the realization of hell. This fear of hell and the Indian, this linking of these two ideas, beset the imaginations of the pioneer children, stamping them with an ineffaceable impression. The same combination made the Salem witch-trials yet more hideous; and it accounts for much beside Joseph Smith's vivid picture of the "Lamanites as the Devil's children."

Historians of Mormonism emphasize the multiplication of sects, the general religious ferment, which surround the youth of the founder.[45] Smith himself calls the place he lived in, "the burnt-over district." It had been shaken by Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian agitation; the Restorationists, the Pilgrims, the Shakers, had wandered through it to disappear in the West.[46] The "revival-meeting" (that unconsciously accurate phrase!) had come into fashion, confusing and bewildering simple-minded and pious youth.[47] For Joseph Smith to receive a revelation, and to found a new sect, was therefore entirely in order with surrounding circumstances. Our mention

of his personality and psychology in their proper place will show that these were likewise entirely in accord. He was at first, he says, drawn to Methodism; then swerved toward the Presbyterians; and his first vision came as an answer to this uncertainty.

Mormonism serves a definite purpose, and must not be omitted from a survey of the group, because of its nearness to our own time; but that very nearness has deprived it of certain typical features. The calibre of the Prophet's mind, the style of his revelations, show a marked deterioration in the quality of this particular revival. Smith's biographer comments that "Joseph's first prophecy, at the age of eighteen, concerned Deacon Jessup and the widow's cow"; [48] and there were revelations concerning farms, and boarding-houses, Emma Smith and so forth. There is even sheer nonsense;—"And they had horses and asses, and there were elephants, and *cureloms* and *cumoms*," [49] which last beasts, Mr. Riley scruples not to class with the Jabberwock. But because we observe in this outbreak signs of distinct degeneration, vulgarity, charlatanry, and cheapness,—almost beyond any point yet reached by human delusion,—we must not, therefore, consider it as something entirely different. It is hard for our minds not to reject with disgust any possibility which would link "peep-stone Smith," and his revelations concerning boarding-houses, with the elegant mind of a Wesley, or the splendid fire and penetration of a Luther, or a Fox. Yet, if we look more closely, we see that this is wrong. The wave is moving through particles of muddy water, but it is the same wave.

The intensity of these narratives, the movement of these communities under the influence of emotion, are sufficient to bear witness to their real, if often piteous, sincerity. By contrast, the concerns and exercises of the Friends seem certainly less heightened. Yet no Mormon, and few Methodist confessions have the literary accent which one may enjoy in the first Quakers, nor have they that intense, poetic phraseology.

All these groups regarded death in the light of a spiritual drama, during which the chief actor must undergo every possible emotional influence in order to make his ending the culmination of all previous religious excitements. James Lackington, during a mood of reaction, writes of his wife, that "she died in a fit of enthusiastic rant, surrounded by several Methodistical preachers." [50] To Mrs. Fry, her sister's demise was "a sweet time." [51] Here are opposite points of view which yet indicate like conditions. It will not be forgotten how, at his mother's passing, Augustin checked all noisy grief. He writes, "My own childish feeling, which was through the youthful voice of my heart finding escape in tears, was restrained and silenced. . . . For we did not consider it fitting to celebrate that funeral with tearful plaints and groanings." His friend Evodius taking up the psalter, the mourners thereupon joined in the psalm.[52] Modern pietist sects echo the ideas and practice of the primitive Church before the dogmatic ritual had chastened and controlled them.

The student, considering the appended data, will

no doubt observe that in their composition the Quaker and Methodist records testify not to fortuitous circumstance, nor to individual caprice, but to the operation of a general human law. According to such law, all emotions—and especially those which are novel to the subject—tend to express themselves and be communicated in writing or speech. The persistence of religious movements is dependent upon this law; since but for the relief afforded by self-study and confession, the original impetus given to the movement by emotion must soon have died away. These rows of dun-colored volumes, therefore, shed much light upon certain complex and obscure processes of the modern man; so that what before seemed futile as the dust becomes charged with vital significance. Many of us have looked upon the Sunday School autobiography (as we may call it) with wonder that it should exist, or that, existing, it should differ so little from its fellows. Few realize that it is this very spontaneous similarity which makes it so valuable. A conchologist may make little out of a single shell, but bring him fifty, and he will describe and classify the species. These memoirs share in common characteristics that enable the student to determine the extent, depth, and quality of the feeling which inspired them; together with their difference from similar manifestations, their variation from other groups.

Reading these documents, the student gains a conviction of the identity of religious emotion under all circumstances, at all times, in all nations and natures. Each protest of originality, each effort of the subject to be himself, forms another link in the human chain.

Each convert, in turn, cries with Rousseau, "au moins, je suis autre." Each convert is by that very protest linked to every other convert; while the very repetition is warrant of the identity of the impulse. The first effect of these bubbles of individuality, rising and subsiding again into the whirlpool of life, is to impress one with the uniformity of their cause.

The confessant, telling of his life and his sins, seeking to kindle others with the fire in his own soul, is making a passionate effort for individualism. He does not realize that when you read him with eighty or more fellow-Methodists or Quakers, his individuality disappears almost as completely as though he were a Hebrew chronicler in the earliest days. His actual religious idea—no matter how great—will never be found to stand quite alone. Thus Jesus, Buddha, Mahomet, Augustin, Calvin, Luther, touch hands across the globe and across the ages. Each has dipped his cup in the same spring.

The common identity of the essential human emotions has never been established more forcibly than by a study of the religious confession. We think always, as did Sir Thomas Browne, that " 'tis opportune to look back upon old times and contemplate our forefathers. Great examples grow thin and to be fetched from the passed world."[53] Yet these sentences were written in the seventeenth century; and before some of the greatest examples in literature, at least, were born.

The lesser religious cases are linked with the greater, and the slow processes of evolution cause but slight changes over the centuries. Lay Augustin side by

side with Hurrell Froude, or Amiel, and we shall note the difference. The quality of religious feeling is higher and more beautiful and more intense in the Bishop of Hippo. Apart from genius this is natural; he is closer to the source of his emotion. The introspection is more developed in the two moderns; in whom it has become a conscious, no longer an unconscious factor. It affects their composition and it is systematized by them in a way unknown to Augustin. These three minds differ widely in idea, in force, and in intellectual quality; yet all three are recognizably permeated by the same emotion.

There are qualities in the religious confession, however, which do not remain stable; which shift with every age; and whose presence or absence affects very greatly the total impression made by the confessant. The most important of these is candour. Now, standards of candour have changed very much, and developed in accordance with the development of men's powers of introspection. The deeper a self-observer looks within, the more he tries to see, the vaster appears to him that cloudy country of self. He is like the traveller on foot, to whom at every mile the land of his pilgrimage seems to increase in extent. According to the ideas of his age, Augustin is uncommonly candid, but to our minds his candour is perforce incomplete. It was impossible for Augustin, like Amiel, "to hear his heart beating and his life passing."[54] One of the chief reasons for this is that he was the possessor to a high degree of what Amiel had not, namely, "that energetic subjectivity which has faith in itself." Genius though he was, his intro-

spective powers were rudimentary in certain respects, compared to what such powers have since become. He told truly what he knew, and what he knew is just as important now as when he told it. Since Augustin, we have been led to know more and more; until we know now much that he never dreamed of; and our candour is greater in proportion.

At all times, candour is a variable and an uncertain quality in the confessant. Its limitations are also the limitations of temperament; and in this regard, the difference among writers is amazing. Intelligences accustomed to a developed introspection find no difficulty in describing what other minds could not even think. What A will regard as a simple statement of fact, may appear to B as an arduous piece of self-revelation. An enquiry considered by C as scientific and legitimate, and by him satisfied with the minuteness of a medical report, will seem to D an outrageous public glance into the private chambers of life. Newman begins the "Apologia" with an accent of solemnity, as if about to wrest from his soul a sacredly intimate revelation. What he tells us, after this preamble, is his change of creed, his views about guardian-angels, the Tractarians and the Monophysites. Obviously, such matters are sacredly intimate to him. His real springs of thought and action are studiously concealed; and thus his candour is seen to be as slight as his introspective power. The reader feels that Newman would have found it impossible even to understand such a sentence as Augustin wrote about giving up his mistress,[55] for he had no such gift of accurate self-observation. "I never work better," ob-

serves the candid Martin Luther, "than when I am inspired by anger . . . for then my whole temperament is quickened, my understanding sharpened."[56] The ability to make such self-study as this is rare; and it is of particular value to the confessant. Cardan, Rousseau, Alline, and even George Müller, and John Trevor, gain in use and dignity, easing their souls by the acknowledgment of vices and habits which with many persons never even take on the crystallization of words. Their candour is a part of the special discipline of truth.

De Quincey has remarked that some persons have it not in their power to be confidential; they are really incapable of piercing the haze which envelops their secret springs of action.[57] Naturally, therefore, their lack of introspection limits the extent of their candour. If a man has the ability to look deep within himself, then merely to speak of that which lies near to the surface, cannot seem unduly frank; whereas, if he lack this ability, then to lay bare any fact lying beneath the topmost layer of convention, must seem unduly frank. The degree of unreserve in a self-portrayal becomes a question of individual temperament, and the revelations resulting from this unreserve, should in truth be so regarded whenever they are brought into contact with prevalent standards of taste. Such standards alter from age to age, if not from generation to generation; and yet it is by them the confessant is apt to be held to a final judgment. Moreover, standards of taste often prevail in unexpected directions, guiding the confessant himself. What else makes the "Spiritual Diary" of Sweden-

borg so vile, and the "De Profundis" of Wilde so beautiful? Each is perfectly candid; and the matter confessed in both is piteous and horrible. But the emphasis, the balance, the standard of taste, is preserved in one and not in the other; so that the reader may read one with tears in his eyes, and the other with a sense of nausea.

Balance in candour is less apt to be maintained in the religious than in the secular confession. Humility being to the confessant his first need, he is unquestionably apt to dwell upon his pre-converted state of sin. He will thus often be candid only about the period before conversion. George Müller's early immoralities are peculiarly shocking;[58] his candour about them is disagreeably complete; but once converted, we hear nothing more from him of a personal kind. Biographers of Alexander Pope have found him insincere,[59] but what a beautiful example of well-balanced candour he gave us, when he declared: "I writ because it amused me; I corrected because it was as pleasant to me to correct as to write." In fine, the intellectual or scientific impulse to candour is even greater than the religious or emotional. The intellectual reverence for the fact is as intense as the religious reverence for the idea. Therefore to many minds, the great self-studies, the work of Herbert Spencer, of Cardan, Cellini, Rousseau, and Mill, contain qualities seriously appealing as the work of Augustin, or Teresa, or George Fox. These readers will be, in general, thoughtful and unemotional minds, those to whom the service of the truth means in itself the service of God. Reading Augustin may lead one to

prayer and praise; reading Rousseau leads one to think and tremble. Seriousness and sincerity are often in themselves religious qualities, and the reader is awed in the presence of a really elevated candour, no matter what the cause.

For these, if for no other reasons, an especial interest is attached to those records of self-experiment written in a particular style and for a particular purpose. Space forbids that all of these should be listed here, while a lack of human interest in most of them renders it unnecessary. But there are some instances which may not be omitted, of men who minutely note the result in themselves of an illness, or of a cure, or of a condition, or of a scientific experiment. De Quincey is a case in point.[60] Insanity is noted with care by B. R. Haydon[61] and Clifford W. Beers.[62] André de Lordes,[63] the author of "Théâtre d'Epouvante," gives a careful analysis of his early preoccupation with the emotion of fear.[64] Neurasthenia has lately formed the subject for similar self-studies, all more or less unsuccessful. The idea of scientific self-observation goes well back into the eighteenth century. Hibbert carefully notes the narrative of Nicolai,[65] a bookseller of Berlin, who, during an attack of bilious fever, noticed that his dreams grew so vivid as to partake of the nature of visions. Further illness and anxiety turned them into visions altogether, which were systematically studied by himself and his doctor until he was cured. Nicolai, though very much frightened at times, is on the whole wonderfully calm. "Had I not been able to distinguish phantasms," he writes, "I must have been insane . . . but I considered them what they

were, namely, the effects of disease and so made them subservient to my observations." This is a remarkably strong-minded person, and one wonders what the end of his life brought forth. Nicolai had an imitator in a man who, upon an attack of inflammatory fever, accurately transcribed his hallucinations, which were supernatural in character.[66]

The famous Dr. Pordage,[67] rector of Bradfield, Berks, on the contrary, had a very mystical and ingenious theory to explain the visions which worried him in the night. He believed that the "Gyant with a great sword in his hand," and the dragon with fiery eyes, were especial evidences of God's interest and favor. They might, he thought, "have caused a great distemper," had not angels in person come to his rescue. The doctor's explanation seems to us to-day quite as fantastic as his apparitions. Cardan (to whom one must needs return for all these matters) had a plentiful experience of visual and auditory phenomena; and many theories for their explanation.[68] In his turn he is cited by the learned Dr. John Beaumont,[69] who himself underwent the most remarkable attention from spirits of all sorts.[70] Their first visitation followed hard upon an illness; the second was some years later. There were visions and little bells ringing in his ear, which he seems to have taken calmly and describes carefully. Many scattered instances of this kind occur in the literature of autobiography.[71]

The self-experimentalists form another group in this particular connection. Charles Babbage,[72] the mathematician, roasted himself in an oven. Various per-

sons note the effects of ether or chloroform.[73] "Trélat cites the author St. Edmé, who put himself to death and who minutely observed the last impressions of his last night."[74] There is extant a like narrative from a Corsican named Luc-Antonio Viterbi.[75] No less a person than Sir Humphry Davy[76] wrote a monograph "on the effects of nitrous-oxide gas" tried upon his own person. The result was of some value in showing how his spirits were thereby heightened, and how images arose and turned into delusions.

The reader will not have failed to remark the seriousness with which these experiments are undertaken. It is, indeed, their only excuse. "Agir et écrire comme en la présence perpétuelle d'un spectateur indifférent et railleur," as Taine wrote of Mérimée, "être soi-même ce spectateur";[77]—this defines the danger in self-observation. This attitude is the sterile Byronism, the "maladie personnelle," which has been named as "the great plague of our spiritual life."[78]

Undertaken from this cynical point of view, self-study becomes worse than useless; and is open to all the objections which have been urged against it. The service of Truth, whether one be enrolled under the banner of science or of religion, is the most important task known to man. The mere cynical self-analyzer is rarer than many critics would have us believe. He may, in fact, be left wholly aside, as we proceed in our attempt to examine and to classify that material which the sincere servants of truth and confessants of religious experience place at our disposal.

V

THE DATA ANALYZED: I

I. Parentage: Heredity: Education.
II. Health—poor.
III. Health—good.
IV. Pathological records.
V. Criminal records.
VI. Witchcraft records—possession by devils.
VII. Contagion.

V

THE DATA ANALYZED: I

From the moment that a study of groups has established the common identity of their emotional religious experiences, much is felt to have been gained. The student is thereby enabled to move upon broader lines, and to consider the various aspects of the subject as though they belonged to something homogeneous. No longer is it needful to differentiate between the feelings of the Methodist, the Catholic, or the Friend. Each believes that he upholds, as a torch, the flame of Truth; yet to us, on beholding them all from the same distance, one star differs little from another star in glory.

There is another point of view, from which the data appear as more significant than had at first been anticipated. No one studying the appended cases can fail to note that they mark the difference between the emotional process involving revelation and faith, and the intellectual process involving the formulation of a dogmatic belief. Whereas the first experience is fundamental and universal, the second has ever been to a large degree factitious and circumstantial. That feeling which leads a man to seek for a fresh religious inspiration, does not of necessity entirely govern the shape which his belief will eventually take. Many

influences combine to determine his choice of a sect, or of a dogma, which influences have had absolutely no part in the great initial impulse of his religious need.

Scientists have, of course, commented long ere now upon this fact, according to their several investigations. Delacroix has pertinently noted the identity of the formulæ of mysticism, an identity persisting, whatever the variation in the creed of the mystic. "Les mystiques," he wrote, "separés par le temps, l'espace, le milieu historique, forment un groupe, et leur expérience se rattache à un même type psychologique."[1]

But the facts go beyond mysticism; they include all religious experience. The form which emotional experience takes in the human soul, the process which it must follow, are governed by basic laws of heredity, physique, and temperament. The form which intellectual belief takes in the human mind, is governed by much narrower social and artificial conditions. The age a man dwells in, the society wherein he plays his part, affect the latter process; often he elects to join some congenial group less because of religious interests than because of social interests. The question of affiliation with a special group or sect may be due to environment or to a reaction from environment.[2] There is a very wide diversity in the articles of faith subscribed to, let us say, by the Gottesfreund, the Scots Presbyterian, and the Quaker; yet who will deny the identity of the feeling in the soul of Suso and Luther, Haliburton and George Fox? It is not even necessary to confine the comparison to the sects of Christianity alone. From Al-Ghazzāli the

Arabian, to Uriel d'Acosta the Portuguese Jew, the same process is at work, identical in manifestation, identical in progressive symptoms.

Differences in creed dwindle to a very unimportant place in the scheme of any investigation. The subject may be a Mormon, a Christian Scientist, or a Buddhist; either because his parents were, or because they were not. Once the heat of emotion is passed, social pressure aids in the crystallization of an evolved belief. The man has undergone certain feelings, and from them has drawn certain inductions leading in the direction of certain opinions. Human-like, he seeks to ally these opinions with other similar views, both to strengthen them and to make them prevail. What he does not usually recognize, but what we at this distance recognize for him, is that the emotions which gave birth to his opinions are not peculiar to himself, nor to his sect, nor to his nation, nor to his race.

The subject, in fact, frequently confuses the effect with the cause. Just as the lover thinks that it is because his beloved outvies all other women, that he loves as no man ever loved, so the religious confessant thinks that it is the importance of what he thinks and believes that causes him to suffer so intensely or to rejoice so exceedingly. The fact is he would suffer and rejoice to the same degree, no matter in what port his troubled mind finally decided to drop anchor. The emotion is human, basic, and universal; the particular dogma is rather its result than its cause.

If there is one good office which the reading of all these lives may do, it is to eliminate the idea that any one creed has a right to hold itself as more religious

than any other creed. It is not religious feeling which guides a man in the choice of a Church; rather is it his intellectual conception of the relation to conduct of the emotion he is undergoing or has just undergone. This is proven by the fact that not one case of religious inspiration can be found in one sect which has not its exact parallel in another sect. The matter of all men's views is as diverse and fluctuating as the matter of their feelings is constant and stable, therefore it is with this stable matter of feeling that we have chiefly to do.

The data provided in these cases are to be considered as uniform, and to be classified according to human nature and to psychology. They may be roughly divided under two main heads, the personal and the purely religious. The latter is apt to be furnished us in a confusing fulness, so that it is often hard to sift the trivial from the important features of the case. The former, on the contrary, is frequently scanty and is sometimes omitted entirely. The reason for this will be readily understood.

Even so late as the eighteenth century the pious and uplifted person regarded his own piety and exaltation as a something wholly "not himself," having no relation to his daily life and habits, or to hygiene, or social conditions, or to heredity or health. Indeed, when we realize how completely this was true, and frequently is still true, we marvel that the confessant gives us even so much information. An historian of the modern scientific spirit, to-day become as dominant a quality as ever was the credulity of the Middle Ages, will no doubt observe its en-

trance into the religious narrative, in the modern tendency to insert therein any material elucidating the personality or the situation of the author. Unconscious of its value, unaware, as it would seem, that accuracy of detail had any bearing on his particular religious problem, the confessant, about the middle of the sixteenth century, began to systematize his record—to abandon his mediæval vagueness—and to open the work with an account of his parents and his infancy, his health and his education—furnishing us, in a word, with the data of his case. Should any one desire concrete illustrations of the change in manner, let him compare the writings of Thomas à Kempis,[3] the abbot Herman,[4] Juliana of Norwich, Angela da Foligno, Gertrude of Eisleben, Mechtilde, and so on, with similar confessions by Carlo da Sezze, Teresa, Jeanne de la Mothe-Guyon, or the *mémoiristes* of Port-Royal. The difference is not merely literary,—for the earlier records are extremely diffuse,—but lies in a new perception of the value of *all* the facts when presenting a case.

Single writers, scattered through the Middle Ages, are not lacking in this perception, which indicates their distinction of mind. Augustin had it as a part of his genius. It will be found in the abbot Guibert de Nogent, slightly in Abélard, and strongly in that remarkable woman Hildegarde of Bingen,[5] whose candour received as much contemptuous misunderstanding as ever that of Cardan or Rousseau. Her scientific tendency is explained by her genuinely scientific mind, for she was a distinguished botanist and physician. When we read to-day her conscientious endeavor to

present and to understand her own case, we are inclined to agree with Michelet that she showed "the last gleam of good sense"[6] in her age, and not with the later critic who dismisses her as "a mad old woman."[7] Since nothing during the Middle Ages so quickly brought upon one the stigma of insanity, as scientific attainments or ambitions of any sort, it is not to be wondered at that Hildegarde stands *sui generis*. Religious dogma, one must not forget, was in those days a matter not to be examined or questioned, but to be accepted and adored.

For the bulk of our personal data, therefore, we are largely dependent upon the documents of later times. The purely religious data are naturally composed of the mystical and the non-mystical. Whether the latter, indeed, comes within the purview of this study is a question for further discussion. Since our plan is inductive, it follows that definitions should come last of all; and to separate the mystical data from the non-mystical appears to be largely an affair of definition. Should we try to solve the problem by a change of names, and term our matter normal and abnormal, our task is no easier, for the criterion by which we judge the norm shifts with the centuries, and often with the decades. The non-mystical is not necessarily always the normal, though our materialistic age prefers to think so. It seems wiser, therefore, for the purpose of present investigation to take these terms simply at their face value and so to make use of them. Through these two main doorways all religious emotion has passed to manifest itself in the individual.

For the more convenient purposes of classification, the personal data have been grouped under three main heads: Parentage, Education, and Health. Each of these heads is to be considered in the light of as many cases as possible, for the sake of the cumulative effect of the evidence. In the same manner will the rest of the data be grouped under three main heads: Beginnings of religious emotion; Conversion; Termination of religious emotion.

These divisions are, of course, susceptible of minor subdivisions, while the discussion of conversion-phenomena and theory will occupy a separate section. The reader will bear in mind the flexible nature of much of the evidence, which may cause the omission of some and the repetition of other instances, in a way that may at first sight appear capricious and arbitrary. But with the patient application to each minor case of those broad principles underlying their confession, which he has just determined, he cannot be long impatient or much at fault.

To sift the facts of value in the history of the confessant from the facts of no value, is a task which at best cannot be complete. In many instances, such facts are few; in many others, they become submerged by the ideas, feelings, and impressions which flow abundantly from the writer's pen; in others still, the character of the document precludes their use. Journals and diaries, dealing only with the religious crisis itself,—such as that of Swedenborg, or of Fox, or of Wesley,—omit matter which they consider extraneous. Therefore, a study is

limited in large measure to records regularly autobiographical in form. Even in these, the seeker after facts is often disappointed, since the confessant naturally lays stress on the impression which was strongest in his imagination, and, therefore, does not readily discriminate between values. Many names must needs be passed over in silence for one or the other of these reasons; and this silence will include most of the mediæval confessants, so enormously significant on other counts. The confessant usually gives some details on education and the character of his forebears: inferences as to his heredity we must of course make for ourselves.

Thomas Boston [8] of Ettrick was piously reared, of God-fearing Scots parentage. He was a bookish child and well-taught, prepared for college at fourteen, but was held back from entrance for a couple of years. His career there was brilliant; and he showed much taste for music. His preoccupation with the religious life came gradually. Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe was from infancy vowed to the Blessed Virgin by her fervent parents, and given the education of a religious. Her subsequent mysticism is shown to be a natural outcome of her teaching and of her surroundings. The same direct inheritance of piety is shown by that Quaker family, the Gurneys of Earlham. Their education intensified this spirit and the example of a deeply fervent, elder sister completed the cycle of influences. The zeal and ardor of St. Paul's character was affirmed by his orthodox Hebrew parentage and his thorough education. Rolle of Hampole quaintly says of himself only: "My youth was fond, my

childhood vain, and my young age unclean." Of his parents nothing is known.

The father and mother of Thomas Haliburton "were eminently religious." At school he remained idle and dissipated and did not do any work until after his eighteenth year, when he began to study for the ministry. Joseph Hall's mother was a woman of rare sanctity, who filled his young mind with pious dreams and visions. Her weakly body he seems also to have inherited. So apt and talented was he, that he was sent to college, although one of a family of twelve children. Newman's religious education was thorough; and while still very young he read such books as Law's "Serious Call," Milner's "Church History," and Newton "On the Prophecies." At Oxford he fell under the influence of Keble and of Pusey. Nietzsche, in the "Ecce Homo," and in a brief sketch of his childhood, mentions his youthful desire for universal knowledge, led thereunto by reading Humboldt. Schopenhauer was a great force in his life. He remarks that his father was delicate and morbid, and died young. At school, the abbot Othloh was first severely beaten, but he succeeded by reason of his powerful memory. Love of books and the classics much preceded his religious interest; and like Guibert, he felt them to be a stumbling-block in the true way. Swedenborg's parents were pious, believed warmly in spirits, heard voices and saw visions. His father, Bishop Svedberg, made note of a personal conversation with an angel. The son Emanuel had a thorough education of the scientific kind, and when he began to write, it was on economics, physiology, and metallurgy. The

heredity of Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, is as significant as Swedenborg's. His grandfather, mother, and father were subject to religious gloom, dreamed dreams, saw visions and lights. The whole family was imaginative, lazy, shiftless, and credulous: all showed certain literary aptitudes. Deep melancholies and doubts beset this family, together with a fear of Indians which is reflected in Joseph's writings, where he identifies the savages with the powers of hell. Joseph had little schooling: and prided himself on his illiteracy. His apt memory and ability to pick up and use a miscellaneous reading are shown in the Book of Mormon. John Wesley's parents were of the conventional, Church of England type, his mother a woman of strong character, his education that of an English gentleman destined for the Church. The zeal, the power, the emotion, were his alone. Uriel d'Acosta was gently educated and could ride the "Great Horse." At the proper age he studied law, but religious ideas, and his changes of view concerning them, soon excluded all other interests in his mind. "I was educated," he writes, "according to the custom of that country, in the Popish Religion; and when I was but a young man the dread of eternal Damnation made me desirous to keep all its doctrines with the utmost exactness." Henry Alline went early to school and was forward in learning. Augustin's relations with his mother, Monica, are too widely known to need comment here. He shows, in truth, very marked traits inherited from both parents, and his description is sympathetic. "In this my childhood," he says of his education, "I had no love of learning and hated

to be forced to it. I would not have learned had I not been compelled." He liked Latin, but disliked Greek; loved Euclid, but hated Homer, and was much beaten because of this. All works of eloquence, "of a dramatic type," appealed to his mind, and he was deeply influenced first by a dialogue of Cicero—the "Hortensius"—and later by Aristotle. His subsequent career of dissipation terminating in the depression and discontent with self, which were the first steps toward his conversion, are dealt with under other heads. The influence of Monica on her son, both direct and indirect, is marked throughout his life. Another pious mother had for her son the great Cardinal Bellarmin, whom, with his four brothers, she destined to the priesthood. They were the spectators of her fasting and flagellation; indeed, all their early influences turned them to the Church. In addition, however, to his strong clerical bent, Bellarmin was talented, very quick, and a lover in boyhood of poetry and of the classics. He notes his taste for music and singing, and that he could mend nets very well. A Jesuit at seventeen, he pursues his education thereafter in the direction of theology and Hebrew, making a grammar of the latter tongue, for his own use. Another precocious child, whose education aided a development first wholly intellectual, but which later became religious, and mystical, was Pascal.

In her curious record of changes in creed, Annie Besant describes her father as a sceptic and savant; and says that her own ardently religious bent, in the beginning, was spontaneous and individual. Robert Blair, early left an orphan, was educated at Glasgow

College, where Augustin's "Confessions" deeply impressed him. He developed the gift of extempore preaching, and although he had his full share of the superstition of his day, yet he showed the gradual and steady evolution of his religious nature. Bunyan's schooling amounted to little more than learning to read and write. In youth he was exceedingly vicious; and was noted always for a vivid imagination. Thomas Chalkley is more a man of the world than most Quakers; he studied hard in his Philadelphia home; and seems to have had normal youthful influences. His temporal affairs prospered, showing that he had business talent and industry. J. F. Clarke was taught classics and mathematics by his grandfather; he had much taste for nature and for literature. His development was normal. Few Quakers give us any information on matters temporal, but Richard Davies, unlike many others, was "brought up in a little learning." At birth, John Dunton lost his mother. He was a sickly child, fanciful and dreamy, disliking study. A violent love-affair, at thirteen, caused him still further to neglect his education; but a year later he was ready to enter Oxford. C. G. Finney's parents were not "professors"; but his friends soon turned him toward religion. James Fraser of Brae learned well at school, but his temper was peevish, he says, and he was no "dawty." The strictness of his rearing caused many violent reactions. George Fox says little of himself as a child, save that he had "gravity and stayedness, with innocency and honesty." He had but little book-learning and that self-taught. Very different were the cultivated sur-

roundings of the Arabian Al-Ghazzāli, who was a savant at twenty, yet as perplexed about religious matters as ever Fox himself. Edmund Gosse contributes an admirable modern study of heredity in his book entitled "Father and Son." The intensely pious parents—members of the strict sect of Plymouth Brothers—work on the imagination of their child till he becomes an elder at ten. But the father was a man of science, and this inheritance, together with the crucial intellectual conflict of the fifties, carried the son to a total change of view. Evangelistic influences of a certain type, with their inevitable effect upon a sensitive nature, have never been more admirably described than in this volume, which has the rare virtue of sympathy for outworn ideas.

Unusual in a Quaker, James Gough had "a good genius and a propensity to learning,—" and easily knew Latin and Greek. He was also given to poetry, until convinced of its wickedness. Yet he thinks that his youth was "a complication of ambition, envy, craft, and deceit," before his religious interests became dominant.

The abbot Guibert de Nogent is one of the more direct examples of hereditary mysticism. The excessive piety of his parents kept them apart for much of their married life; and when his mother left him alone at eight years old to enter a convent, she already spoke of demons and visions as matters of daily occurrence. His training was very severe; he followed his mother's example and at twelve became a monk. There ensues between them a correspondence full of their visions and mystical experiences by which each

seeks to excite and animate the fervor of the other. Like the preceding example, and many another, Guibert sacrificed his poetic tastes, and turned, at cost of many sighs, to the study of theology. The same mystical atmosphere surrounded Madame de la Mothe-Guyon in her infancy; her parents, too, were zealots, although she thinks that in every way but the religious they neglected her and her education. It is worthy of note that she accuses practically every one with whom she comes into contact, of neglect and persecution,—sisters and servants, husband, mother-in-law, and the world in general,—all, according to her narrative, unite in tormenting this harmless girl. Even her extremely ostentatious humility, the irritating way in which she turns the other cheek, and makes gifts to those who beat her, is not enough to account for such systematic and continuous persecution; it ends by making the reader sceptical, as though it were a delusion.

A. J. C. Hare gives an interesting record of a severely devout education, the fervency of which, however, did not retain its full effect upon his gentle, somewhat dilettante character. Frederic Harrison, in his "Apologia," draws a picture of the *via media*, of a healthy upbringing, simple, cheerful ideas, holding neither hell nor terror, followed by a gradual evolution to more scientific views. James Lackington is of peasant-stock and self-taught. Through many devious wanderings in faith, he returns at the end to his inherited simplicity. John Livingstone underwent the customary arduous Scottish education; he says he was well-beaten and so became proficient! His religious

feelings developed slowly and gradually superseded every other interest. The comte Loménie de Brienne evidently drew a certain zeal from his father, the pious Huguenot minister to Henri IV, but a court-education was followed by violent dissipation and mania, so that much of his later life was spent at St. Lazare. The parents of Henry More were Calvinists, and he was severely reared, yet he did not naturally turn to that faith, being of a speculative mind. Knowledge and learning were at first the most important objects of his life; his religious ideas were slowly evolved and came to take first place. John Newton, the son of poor parents, had but two years' regular schooling. By the aid of a powerful memory, however, he "picked up" French and Latin, and after his conversion he taught himself both Greek and Hebrew. As a boy, he is not quite so illiterate as Patrick, the saintly swineherd, who terms his own writings "drivel."

Bishop Symon Patrick, that cheerful person, blesses God for his bookish family and his careful training. This included short-hand, with which he noted sermons. He went to Cambridge as a sizar, but soon obtained a scholarship, work, and friends. Paulinus (of Pella) gives an interesting account of his pre-Christian education. He read Homer and Plato in his fifth year, but his studies were interrupted by ill-health. Mark Pattison's uncommonly slow development interfered with the normal course of his college career. When he does begin to develop in the early twenties, he says, "I read enormously." Renan's Breton parentage brought the Breton inheritance of dreamy imagination. He also, he thinks, inherited his "in-

capacity of being bad." Placed in a Roman Catholic seminary, he had in all respects the clerical training, added to the temperament of a priest. Only his intellect, unfettered, gigantic, turned toward *"la science positive"* making all else of no regard. Few personal studies remain to us of more value and suggestiveness.

Among the more vivid records, that of M. A. Schimmelpenninck gives the picture of a pietist rearing. Delicate and frail, at the side of an ailing mother, this girl undergoes a strenuously thorough religious education. Taught by a father who thinks it his duty to be harsh, she suffers agonies of nervous dread and misery. The ensuing resentment, reaction, and shrinking from everything religious, culminating in melancholy and conversion, seem to be thoroughly explained by these facts. Teresa's parents were noble and gave her the upbringing of a woman of the world. Her entrance into convent-life did not alter this ideal for some time, until, indeed, she began to burn with the zeal for reform. She says little of her early self, but shows in every line she wrote her executive ability. Léon Tolstoï was also of a noble family, and brought up as the conventional young aristocrat. From this life, however, he later turned in horror, as did another Russian noble, G. Schowvaloff. Anna van Schurman was trained first in the arts; and had done wonders in glass-etching, tapestry, and paper flowers, before she turned her attention to Hebrew and the classics. She was chiefly taught by her father, from whom she had her serious and scholarly inclinations. Blanco White, like Renan,

was educated for the priesthood. The piety of his parents was mingled with other characteristics in his strange personality. George Whitefield was "froward," disliked study, and had an impudent temper. His dramatic tastes developed young and lasted all his life. At Oxford he set to work in earnest. In the "Dialogue with Trypho," Justin Martyr outlines a brief account of his education, of his inborn love of philosophy, and of how he turned toward Christian ideas.

Details of education and heredity among the earlier minor Roman Catholic cases, we have already stated to be few. Save that she was an "*indocta mulier*," and concealed her revelations from her family, Hildegarde of Bingen gives no information. The Mère Jeanne des Anges had thoroughly upset her family with her extravagances by her fifteenth year, so in despair they sent her to a convent. She seems to have been given a good education and was very fond of reading. Loyola received the training of a Spanish aristocrat and soldier, "delighting in feats of arms." In these words he dismisses the matter as trifling. That "little, prittie Tobie," as Charles I calls Sir Tobie Matthew, was trained in Protestantism and for a career of diplomacy. When he began to be interested in Catholicism, his father's thunderings seemed to have but hastened his decision. Gertrude More's father disciplined her severely, yet her girlhood was wilful and headstrong. De Marsay had Protestant parents who gave him a devout upbringing. The young Angélique Arnauld, one of a deeply religious family, fulfilled her destiny and heritage when she

became a mystic. Both Sainte-Chantal and M. M. Alacoque came of devout parents. Paul Löwengard and Alphonse de Ratisbonne were both of Jewish descent. The former, in temperament being sensitive to religious ideas, suffered from the mockery of his free-thinking father; so that his conversion to Catholicism seemed more or less inevitable. The latter's family were deeply fervent in their religious nature, and a brother preceded him into the Roman Catholic Church. This is also the case of F. Liebermann. Although J. J. Olier had orthodox parents, yet they doubted his vocation because of his heady temperament, and so gave him a worldly training. F. Ozanam's devout nature was shared by every member of his family; his sister "was as pious as an angel," and his college life was filled with religious struggles and triumphs. Another convert, Fanny Pittar, had conventional parents, a normal education, and a lively disposition. The famous Antoinette Bourignon suffered much because her father and mother quarrelled, and jeered at her infantile devotion. She felt obliged to leave home, and, later, became a recluse. John Eudes says that his parents were humble and pious like himself. Mary of the Angels was vain and fond of dress: the gentleness of a kind priest influenced for good her education and nature. Sister Thérèse, Carmelite, was one of five sisters, who all took the veil. Religious matters had always formed the chief occupation of this family. Carré de Montgéron was spoiled by an indulgent father and gave himself up to pleasure. His own wickedness, however, soon alarmed him and he began to think of reform. The parents of Anne Catherine

Emmerich encouraged her in practices of excessive devotion, with the least possible food and sleep. One does not often find a confessant congratulating herself with a pious joy on her complete ignorance. "Grace à Dieu," she cries, "je n'ai presque jamais rien lu." Peter Favre, the friend of Loyola, was brought up "by good, Catholic, and pious parents," who saw his ability and sent him to school, instead of rearing him a Savoyard shepherd like themselves. Hugo of St. Victor gives an account of his studies and his progress, much as does John of Salisbury. In a group of modern Catholic converts, giving brief accounts of their submission, will be found several Swedenborgians, whose parents were unable to satisfy them by rearing them in the mystical tenets of that sect.[9] The nun Osanna Andreasi had parents so extraordinary for the seventeenth century, that when she began to have divine visions and conversations, they thought her epileptic and insisted that she consult a physician!

Henry Suso inherited both his mysticism and his nervous temperament from a devout mother. Fräulein Malwida von Meysenbug had a keen natural piety, but received no training whatever. The cult of heroes was, for a long time, her childish religion. She underwent a long struggle with the aristocratic prejudices of her family, and finally was obliged to break with them. John Trevor had a conventional education in religious matters, and was early impressed by the tragic side of life. H. Fielding writes that he was piously reared, and by women only. D. Jarratt came of poor parents, and was being led into

vice by his idle, dissipated brothers. By his mind and memory, however, he gained his schoolmaster's interest, and so was saved to be trained for a teacher. During boyhood H. Martyn's relations badgered him with pious exhortations; at college he was irritable at being unsuccessful. On his father's death he became more thoughtful. J. Lathrop had a devout mother and was early susceptible to religious contagion. Helen Keller's entire education is of great interest. The religious side of it was conducted by Phillips Brooks, and accepted by her without question. Though Friedrich Schleiermacher's mother was devout, yet she could not keep her son from a phase of peculiar scepticism. After some time his college career at Halle steadied his mind. J. de la Fontaine shared the piety of his Huguenot family, and, though he failed in his studies, became a minister. A large number of Quakers were born to some faith equally rigid; and given the severe training in morals which was common one hundred years or more ago. Education among this group is represented by but a few years' schooling. Such instances present very little which may distinguish the one from the other in this particular; it is therefore hardly worth our while to give separate mention to the family influences and education of J. Hoag, O. Sansom, E. Stirredge, W. Williams, R. Follows, C. Marshall, J. Fothergill, R. Jordan, J. Croker, Daniel Wheeler, David Hall, J. Wigham, William Evans, S. Neale, A. Braithwaite, J. Richardson, H. Hull, M. Hagger, J. Dickinson, T. Shillitoe, B. Bangs, J. Hoskins, and Ann Maris. Christopher Story's father kept a tavern, by which

the son was much subjected to temptation. John Gratton was a poor ignorant herd-boy. George Whitehead was bred a Presbyterian, and Mary Dudley educated as a Methodist, but the result upon each nature is much the same. Few are as healthily reared as Margaret Lucas, who was taught music and dancing; or allowed to be frivolous and read novels and plays like William Lewis. Mildred Ratcliff's mother, seeing the child morbid and depressed, urged her away from religious subjects; while Stephen Grellet, born a conventional French Catholic, is later horrified at his own "worldly" upbringing. He had "scarcely so much as heard whether there were any Holy Ghost"! John Banks's poor, honest parents do not seem to have worried him much about religion.

If the Friends were in general an humble and unlearned sect, it will be remembered that their leader, Fox, was at no time a man of books. John Wesley, on the contrary, had more than the customary Latinity and cultivation, and John Calvin had the training of a scholar. The majority of Methodist examples are much like the Quakers in the respect that they are simple and unlettered. Among other Dissenters, George Müller, who was an exceedingly vicious youth, had worldly parents, and was given little or no moral training. Oliver Heywood fears that he grieved his good, careful parents; but at college he changed and came to prefer divinity to the classics. Ashbel Green, James Melvill, Alexander Gordon, and William Haslett had pious inheritances and strict care. John Murray's parents were very strict during his childhood, and he suffered from their discipline. William

Wilson's peasant father and mother were illiterate, and he was put, like St. Patrick, to be a herd-boy. Cotton Mather's heredity and education were of the strictest type: Oliver Taylor's parents, if poor, were pious; A. H. Francke's education was theological almost from the beginning; and Samuel Hopkins had a pious ancestry and college training. On the contrary, J. A. James notes that he had no religious training whatever, a circumstance which, as the reader has doubtless already observed, is decidedly rare among these cases. The Methodists, of devout parentage and careful early rearing, of whom little else need be said, are: John Prickard, R. Rodda, R. Roberts, T. Payne, A. Mather, P. Jaco, J. Young, J. Travis, William Capers, J. Allen, Ben. Rhodes, T. Rankin, J. Nelson, Freeborn Garretson, Peard Dickinson, A. Torry, T. Ware, T. Hanson, T. Tennant, J. Mason, and William Carvosso. Neither of J. Marsden's parents was at first religious, but later his mother had an attack of religious mania, which made a deep impression on his mind.

Opposed to these, however, are a number of Methodist examples lacking pious early influences or inheritances. Samson Staniforth, one of thirteen children, can remember no religious instruction whatever. J. Pawson's family were disgusted with his zeal, and used him harshly. T. Hanby lost his mother, had a drunken father, and lacked all training. B. Hibbard, the eighth child of a poor shoemaker, was harshly treated and much beaten; Duncan Wright had received no education whatever until nearly twenty, when he enlisted. Neither had J. Furz much religious in-

struction. M. Joyce, born a Catholic, was a sailor and a very wild youth. T. Rutherford, though his parents were religious, and he devoted to them, yet was led away, influenced by vicious comrades. C. Hopper, the youngest of nine children of a farmer, thinks his family cold as to religion. T. Walsh, of an Irish Catholic family, was bred quite indifferent to the subject. W. Ashman's parents had no religion. Very interesting in this regard are the cases of the Evangelists Jerry McAuley and Billy Bray. The first, of a criminal Irish family, was a thief during boyhood and imprisoned at nineteen. The latter, by seventeen, was also a criminal, and a drunkard, but he had a pious father. Normal upbringing, and natural childish indifference to the subject of religion, is noted (in the case of the first with horror) by C. S. Spurgeon and by Orville Dewey.

Henry Ward Beecher was the child of sensible and intelligent people, reared in an active-minded New England household. Granville Moody had normal family influences and education, though he was still a boy when he began to worry about the liquor question. Interesting, indeed, by comparison with the foregoing, are the scattered bits of information which Jerome gives us about his childhood and education: "... how I ran about the offices where the slaves worked ... how I had to be dragged from my grandmother's lap to my lessons," and so on. Long ere his conversion, he had cut himself off from this pleasant, cultivated home and dainty food, because of his religious ideas. Unfortunately for us, he does not continue the personal part of his famous "Apology."

The result of this collocation of evidence is seen to be, after all, by no means negative. A preponderance of persons whose interest in religious matters was fostered by parental teaching and example, throws into strong relief the few in whom this was not the case. The effects of direct heredity are to be seen in more families than it is possible to recapitulate here. The question of education—if that term be limited to book-learning, is much less important, if it be important at all. The range of emotional religious experience is wide enough to include the saint and the savant (Augustin, Bellarmin), the tinker and the maidservant (Bunyan, Joanna Southcott).

That the tendency toward emotional religious processes is hereditary, fostered and heightened by family atmosphere and family training, is proved, by the aggregate of these examples, beyond the possibility of doubt. Cases in which this family tendency is absent altogether, in which the religious interest is wholly individual,—although they have been made much of in certain quarters,—are seen to be too few to contribute any substantial weight to any opposite theory.

Although the facts concerning the subject's parentage, heredity, and education are often interesting and suggestive in regard to his religious development, yet they have no such significance as have the data of health. This is, in truth, the most important contributing physical factor to the entire result, and one given, in one form or another, in practically every case.

The manner in which it is furnished may vary exceedingly; the data may be dwelt upon at length, or dropped in passing, may be much over-emphasized in order to throw some miraculous recovery into relief, or may be touched upon only as matter of "misinterpreted observation." The simplest and most thorough method for analysis would seem to be that of grouping together, first, those confessants whose health has on the whole been *poor;* second, those whose health has on the whole been *good;* and third, those exhibiting mental derangement or any defined pathological conditions, which require separate consideration.

The reader will note that an especial reference is made, wherever possible, to the physical situation of the subject in childhood and during the period of puberty; since this is most essential to the proper understanding of his case.

Discussion of the conclusions to which these data point, must necessarily, according to our inductive plan, be made later and be drawn from them. In the section on "Mysticism," there must needs be a return upon, and a repetition of, these. The whole question of religious experience has been clouded for most of us by a misunderstanding of the health data; the student vibrating between the attitude of the medical materialist, to whom every example is crazy, or hysterical, or neurasthenic; and that of the ecstatic pietist, to whom Catherine of Genoa and Catherine of Siena represent the highest types of health. Abandoning for the present all *a priori* conclusions and all unscientific and unjustified attitudes and theories, we

shall give ourselves up for a few pages to the humble task of finding out what the facts about this matter really are. Dull though this may be, partaking little of the exhilaration attached to glittering generalities, it has the advantage at least of being a task undertaken austerely, in the service of truth.

The first group—the mediæval records—give us no classified health data, and commonly omit all reference to childhood. Angela da Foligno gives no physical facts before she became a mystical recluse. Thereafter, however, she mentions intense bodily suffering. "Never am I without pain, continually am I weak and frail. . . . I am obliged to be always lying down . . . my members are twisted . . . also am I unable to take sufficient food." Margaret Ebnerin, of the Gottesfreunde, notes her own intolerable sufferings when meditating on the Passion. Blood poured out of her mouth and nose; she remained comatose. Pain in the head and trembling were other symptoms of this attack, which was suddenly cured on an Easter Saturday. The nun Véronique Giuliani had a similar attack, the pain lasting for over twelve years. The stigmata and other symptoms followed, and the Church made them matter of investigation. Another nun, Osanna Andreasi, was suspected by her parents of epilepsy. Mary of the Angels, Carmelite, brought herself into a state of aggravated illness by her austerities. She was subject to attacks which were cured by a direct command of her confessor. In this case the exorcism of earlier times is seen in practice. The mystical abbess, Maria d'Agréda, was as a child subject to great variations in mood. When she became

a visionary, she suffered intensely; her body, she says, "was weak and broken." Sister Thérèse, Carmelite, at nine years old, had an illness resembling meningitis. She was never strong thereafter, at thirteen suffered acutely because of religious scruples, and, shortly after taking the veil, died of consumption. An obscure illness afflicted A. C. Emmerich at the age of fourteen, and she had several visions. As these grew more frequent, her health steadily declined. A similar illness increased the piety of Peter Favre. Joanna Southcott's extraordinary delusion that she was about to give birth to the Messiah was undoubtedly due to an illness, and is not uncommon. Of her health as a child, she says nothing save that her dreams were intensely vivid. R. Baxter had symptoms of tuberculosis in youth, and grew very weak, besides having "difficulties in his concernments." On recovery these disappeared. Thomas Boston ailed constantly as a result of improper nourishment at college. Dyspepsia and fainting-fits followed him through life. He died in middle age from a complication of maladies. During the attacks of illness his Calvinism grew more harsh and his gloom deeper. The Mère Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe was born nearly dead. After taking the veil, her health grew increasingly bad. She was always falling ill, and her religious state became one of gloom and doubt. Weak from illness and terror of her condition, she suffers constant pain, can hardly stand for trembling, and during this time undergoes frightful temptations to blasphemy; with sleeplessness, diabolic persecution, and so forth. She passes out of this condition and recovers a portion of her

normal health, but illness recurs at shorter and shorter intervals, until death comes at fifty-six. Gertrude of Eisleben's general health appears to have been poor, but she gives no details of any value. The physique of Thomas Haliburton was never robust; he dies, in his thirties, of a pleurisy. Bishop Joseph Hall tells us of his health only that it did not permit him to overstudy. Hildegarde of Bingen notes many illnesses, by which she was beaten and overwhelmed "even from my mother's breast." After her fourteenth year she grew stronger till middle age, when she seems to have suffered an inflammation followed by catalepsy; during ecstasy "her veins and flesh dry up," and she took to her bed. She had her first visions at three, at eight had others and took the vows; at fifteen they became frequent. Her physical and nervous suffering during ecstasy was intense. Jerome writes that "a deep-seated fever fell upon my weakened body . . . and wasted my unhappy frame." It was during this illness his famous dream occurred. No less a saint, Ignatius Loyola, while gallantly fighting at the siege of Pampeluna, was severely wounded in both legs, it being necessary to re-break and reset one. During his painful and tedious convalescence, thoughts of another world began to occupy his mind, till then filled by the love of his lady. On recovery, he went on pilgrimage through Spain dressed as a mendicant, and it is interesting to read that here he began to see visions hanging in the heated air. After such an illness, insufficiently fed and wandering all day under a Spanish sun, we are not surprised that depression fell upon him, and that, when entering a monastery and practis-

ing all austerities, he should be "violently tempted to throw himself out of the window of his cell." Othloh had a bad fever and delirium, taking the form of a castigation by demons, and he reluctantly contemplated entering the monastery. A second illness, causing temporary paralysis, was needed to complete his conversion, and his health thereafter is not noted. Although Wesley had a trying illness just at the time of his change in views, and was a slight, small man of delicate physique, with a chronic bilious catarrh, yet his later health must have been of iron to permit those evangelistic feats of preaching, those horseback journeys over all the length and breadth of England. Henry Alline fell so ill at fourteen that he hardly cared to live. He kept late hours and lived unwholesomely, while his "conscience would *roar* night and day." Matters grew worse, and he died of a decline at thirty-six. Augustin makes note of an illness from weak lungs, and conditions of nervous exhaustion after his Carthage experiences, but he gives no general health data. Bellarmin's health seems to have been consistently bad; he was a chronic sufferer from insomnia and headache; at one time his lungs were threatened; at another he nearly died of a dysentery. Blair owns to severe illnesses. A tertian fever came, he thinks, because "I was puffed up by profiting well in my bairnly studies." A poor regimen at college helped to injure his health, as well as encouraged him in seeing visions. Charles Bray had a delicate childhood and was ever under suspicion of phthisis. Bunyan's tumults and melancholies are intermittent, and he often connects them with "weakness

in the outer man." Peter Cartwright's conversion-crisis took the form of an attack in which "my heart palpitated and in a few minutes I turned blind." In later life he was strong. The reader cannot forget what befell Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus, whether he believe it to have been an ophthalmia or no. "The stone" was an especial discipline to the sedentary person in the past; and Stephen Crisp is among those who suffered from it. Fraser of Brae says he was not like to live as an infant, but was wholesome thereafter in his childhood. At eighteen, religious torment fell upon him, upset his health and disturbed his mind. Later, an illness is associated with a very black relapse of melancholy and horror. The Arabian philosopher Al-Ghazzāli was completely prostrated nervously by his search for the truth, and for a time could neither talk, swallow, nor digest. Mme. Guyon was a fragile infant, frequently ill; at nine, she nearly died; and another severe malady beset her at conversion. A bad attack of smallpox follows later. Indeed, her ill-health on the mystical way, beset by horrible visions and fiendish manifestations, is continuous. Alice Hayes was delicate and lame; Joseph Hoag, "of a weakly make, with gatherings in the ears"; but he improved, till at eighteen, he pined away and wasted, thinking the Devil was coming for him in person. Francis Howgill tersely describes himself during his mental conflict: "I became a perfect fool, I was as a man distracted," from weakness and sleeplessness. Lutfullah, the Mohammedan Pundit, who was a man at eight years old, has a severe illness thereafter which leaves him weakened. His devotion to the

faith of Mahomet never wavers, while his natural piety is extraordinary. Any reader of Macready's diary will recall how the serious and devout tone heightens after a severe illness. Bishop Symon Patrick was in great danger from a fever when twelve years old, whereupon he took serious resolves. Later, overstudy brings on a "sore distemper," but he takes warning, and at eighty, when his narrative closes, seems to have been hale and hearty. Ill-health interrupted the studies of Paulinus Pellæus, whose doctor ordered him an outdoor life. Mark Pattison, as a boy, was highly nervous and delicate, tardy in development, and had trouble with his eyes. During his pious and Puseyite period and the reaction therefrom, his health suffered from insomnia, depression, and palpitations; but he came out of this safely, and does not further comment on physical conditions. Renan is another free-thinker whose early religious phase is strong enough and minutely enough described, to warrant his inclusion in the lists. He was a frail infant and feeble child, and later his back was bent and his health was injured by incessant study. His conversion to free-thought bears almost the same symptoms, physical and nervous, as the more orthodox conversions, and is compared by him to "une violente encéphalite, durant laquelle toutes les autres fonctions de la vie furent suspendues en moi." Mrs. Schimmelpenninck was constantly ill as a young child, and had nervous fears of the dark. "I was by nature timid, I had from my cradle miserable health," she says. A spinal weakness developed later, and her gloom increased with the necessary inaction. Terror rode her like a hag, terror

of the dark and of her father—fear of *everything*, like Harriet Martineau. Elizabeth Stirredge is so miserable in her tender years, of such a sad heart, weeping and praying, that her mother feared a decline. Suso is one of those monastic examples where a naturally strong person, "full of fire and life," is brought, by self-torments and the cloistered regimen, into a ruinous and shattered state of morbid mind and nerves. He notes a catalepsy—to our modern ideas it is a marvel that he survived at all the hideous self-tortures imposed by his faith. Teresa's is a similar case of this particular type. She was a healthy child and a young girl of bounding vitality and love of life. She had been cloistered for some time, when a long illness set her to reading Augustin and caused her ideas to take on a darker hue. When they once fairly begin, the phenomena of mysticism progress steadily; but her case is *sui generis* in that she retained to the end a high degree of bodily vigor. Teresa is the rare example of the mystic who yet possessed a healthy energy, efficiency, and executive ability, and for this reason it is totally misleading to use her as a type. F. A. von der Kemp, impairing his health at college by chemical research and overstudy, soon became excited by religious subjects and began to make an enquiry as to truth. J. Blanco White had an illness in youth which persisted through life and which was fostered by his morbid shyness. Several short fits of sickness influenced George Whitefield at a time when Charles Wesley had moved his mind. His depression was so great that his relatives thought him insane. A sudden abstinence precipitated an illness of six or

seven weeks, during which the crisis is overpast. But Whitefield was of a vigorous physique, whom one would hardly consider as other than healthy. Illnesses shake the youth of Isaac Williams, but the conditions of this case cause it properly to be classed under another heading. Solomon Mack, the grandfather of Joseph Smith, had his visionary lights when severely ill with rheumatism. At seventy-six he wrote of "many sore accidents in his childhood," and suffered from the prevalent dread of Indians.

The Quaker group furnishes much significant data on health matters. James Gough was undersized and his constitution was weak and tender. M. Lucas's excessive piety so exhausts her vitality that she is prostrated. She remarks that at the time she was "seized with a weakness of the body," which lasted the rest of her life. Elizabeth Collins leaves a record of illness beginning ere she was twelve. On the other hand, John Churchman seems to have held his consumption in check by his outdoor life and horseback journeys. A severe illness brought W. Lewis "dreadfully to feel the state I was in." Catherine Phillips, whose girlhood was hideous with terror of guilt, remarks that she was several times "visited with fevers which brought me very low." At ten, David Hall had smallpox which left him with a nervous affection resembling palsy. He seemed almost idiotic for several years. At twenty, he was beset with religious ardor to exhort others, and with many zealous extravagances. The state of irreligion in France excites Mildred Ratcliff, a poor widow in delicate health and with seven children, and she sets out on foot as a

preacher. The Lord instantly sent her renewed health and strength for this task, which she never once, of course, connects with fresh air and exercise. Samuel Neale was brought very low by smallpox at twelve, wherefore he covenanted with God. Fever adds to his depression at conversion. Anna Braithwaite's friends send for the doctor during her period of conflict, while John Richardson allows that he "was weak in body." Joseph Oxley from accident was dwarfed and deformed. Henry Hull was a good boy, but at nine years old he had an illness, and thereafter took solitary walks, and at sixteen had serious impressions. His health remained poor and his spirits low. George Bewly, a morbid lad, was fearful at twelve of losing his innocency from contact with rude companions. During illness the tempter sets upon him and he bargains with God for a return of health. A malady when she was sixteen brought serious thoughts to Mary Hagger. Benjamin Bangs has poor health; and John Gratton is visited with a grievous illness just before his conversion. A fit of sickness nigh unto death seems to Jane Hoskins to signify that she should emigrate to Pennsylvania. Patrick Livingstone is at times subject to "infirmities and sickness," which bring deep melancholies and heart-searchings. All John Fothergill tells us is that he had "many afflicting dispensations." He fasts and goes without sleep for months. A. Jaffray falls into "a dull, languid frame," when worried about religion. Edith Jefferis and Mary Dudley were tuberculous. The former had one of those slow cases of consumption oftener met with in past days than now. The latter, always frail,

had many bouts of illness when a child, and later "was affected to trembling." It is typhus fever which shakes the guilty soul of Daniel Wheeler.

There are certain cases of which we can note only that they "enjoyed poor health," as the phrase was, without learning further particulars. Such were John Prickard, Thomas Rankin, John Furz, John Pritchard. Thomas Oliver's severe illness brings him to serious thoughts, while restless nights, terrifying dreams, and other nervous symptoms cause Peter Jaco to resolve upon reform. Jacob Young had a sickness at three which left him a confirmed asthmatic, and a sickly, home-kept boy. After his conversion at ten his health improved, but mental reactions tread hard on the heels of physical ones throughout his life. Asthma and bad dreams together at the age of twelve stirred Lorenzo Dow to piety and despair; William Capers, a fragile and puny child, is often ill; but his health greatly improves later in life, and he is shown to be a well-balanced, sensible, and unemotional type of person. Satan attacked John Allen during an illness, and threw him very low. Like Cardan, R. Wilkinson was often frighted by dreams and waked shrieking. Depression after fever affects George Shadford to such a degree of misery about his future state, that he has thoughts of suicide. J. W. de la Fléchère's self-observation is more minute than that of most when he remarks: "I have sometimes observed that when the body is brought low, Satan gains an advantage over the Soul!" In his case, watching, fasting, and abstinence from meat bring an inevitable consumption. Illness in his early twenties

brought John Nelson into great fear and distress. High fever and blood-pressure add to the hideous terror of John Haime, who laments his sin, "howling like a wild beast." After being in bad health as a child for two years, Christopher Hopper was pronounced incurable, whereat, he says, "I judged it was high time to prepare for a future state," and began to read and pray. On his recovery, his sentiments cool. Mary Fletcher was a backward child of weak understanding, whose conversion was attended with markedly nervous and pathological symptoms. She is always ailing or ill, yet is energetic in the work of the Methodist Society. Many consumptives display the first indications of their condition during their period of religious stress. So did Thomas Walsh, who is dead of his disease, at twenty-eight. The constitution of Peard Dickinson was weak from birth; fever marked his religious conflict; but on emerging into light, he gains some access of strength, although his health remains poor to the end of his life. Although exceedingly sensitive and anxious, yet Joshua Marsden observed no illness until he reached the age of twenty. Charles Wesley's conversion followed upon weak health and palpitations of the heart. He never had the vigor of his famous brother. Thomas Ware was so prostrated by disease at about sixteen, during religious struggles, that he was little better than a maniac. During a sudden attack attended with violent delirium and convulsions, Richard Williams, a surgeon of free-thinking tendencies, was overwhelmed with terror as to his future. On his recovery he became a believer. Sharp bouts of illness heightened the

mental conflicts of Andrew Sherburne. Upon George Müller, his vices brought a train of ills by which he is at length warned. When Luther Rice was a little boy, his excessive and gloomy piety impaired his health. James Marsh was phthisical, and John Stevenson scrofulous. Ashbel Green fell into a poor condition from overstudy, and grew anxious about his soul. William Neill, as a boy afflicted with a serious disorder, betook himself to secret prayer. One of David Brainerd's worst seasons of gloom befell him during the measles. T. R. Gates had a pleurisy when fourteen; he shuddered at the fear of death, and saw a vision of a black man. He suffered from steadily progressive weak health, with insomnia, melancholy, and fear of suicide. John Winthrop, at fourteen, had a fever. Though he had previously been "lewdly disposed," he now betook himself to God. Joseph Thomas, lame from a tuberculous swelling, and sickly always, yet heard the call to preach when he was only sixteen years old. Thomas Scott, being in doubtful health, was much disquieted, and turned to an arduous search for the truth which led him through devious ways. Jacob Knapp's health declined from his mental distress on the subject of religion. Orville Dewey at first was strong, and indifferent to his salvation. Overwork at college brought on "a nervous disorder of the brain," which injured his general health for the rest of his life. He began immediately to be worried about doctrine. Jerry McAuley turned to thoughts of religion upon imprisonment for theft, during which his health was affected. C. S. Spurgeon's nerves were much upset by the crisis of puberty. H. Fielding

writes that he was delicate and ailing, morbid and fearful. Fräulein von Meysenbug was delicate; her morbid speculations led her to a sort of pantheism. John Trevor describes himself as a frail baby and a morbid, sensitive child, who suffered tortures from nightmares. At the crisis of puberty he underwent much suffering; and his conversion is followed by a physical collapse. He had poor health all his life and many fits of nervous illness.

Among the Moravian testimonies, which so moved Wesley that he copied them into his journal, we read that David Nitschman fell into a fit of sickness and turned to despair for a whole year. A long, dangerous illness influenced the religious crisis of Christian David. The other Moravians and the minor Roman Catholic cases listed under the heading of "Roads to Rome in America," contain no health data of any significance.

The poor health of mystics has frequently been made the subject of comment; and the conditions of life in mediæval convents and monasteries would seem fully to account for it. Yet it is odd to note how slight a difference exists in this regard between the cloistered nun and the travelling Quaker. The mystical philosopher de St. Martin was a weakly creature. De Marsay, a devout youth, who prayed for days together, was at no time strong of body. The terrible mental distress into which he fell was soon aggravated by signs of consumption; but he improved in health after a time. The death of his wife in melancholy and gloom, having ruined her constitution by her austerities, appeared to have its effect on his mind;

he exerted his will upon himself to advantage, and regained his serenity. Angélique Arnauld, the young abbess of Port-Royal, at fifteen is afflicted by fever, an illness which transforms the active girl into a mystic under the touch of "la Grâce." It is interesting to read that it needed a "fièvre quarte" with a second "coup de la Grâce" to complete the work. Two modern cases of converted Jews, A. de Ratisbonne and Paul Löwengard, mention delicate health; the latter adds a vicious and unwholesome life, and became a decadent poet while still a schoolboy. Nervous prostration accompanies his turn toward the Church. Mother Juliana of Norwich calls herself "a simple creature, living in deadlie flesh, whose pious wish it is, to have of God's gift a bodilie sickness." Becoming a recluse, she is immediately gratified in this regard; fever, delirium, all miseries and heaviness, afflicting her thereafter. Like many a convent-bred baby, M. M. Alacoque was a nun to all intents and purposes, at four years old. But her actual vows followed upon an illness from her tenth to her twelfth year. The gentle Carlo da Sezze was alarmed by a vision of death, vouchsafed him during a bad fever. He had no further visions until after he became a monk. Although Antoinette Bourignon was born "très disgraciée de la nature," and displays some very odd characteristics, yet she never tells about her general health, other than to mention visions at the time of puberty. The nun Baptiste Varani was infirm for years. The apostle Paul notes many infirmities of body, and describes one attack of blindness. He alludes also to some chronic ailment which is not, how-

ever, further defined. Amiel was certainly ill. Obermann (De Senancour) had nervous prostration. Jonathan Edwards had an illness at college "which brought me nigh to the grave and shook me over the pit of hell." The nun Jeanne des Anges was hysterical from an early age: her autobiography describes minutely an attack of a particular form of hysteria. Rulman Merswin so chastised his body "with sore and manifold exercises" that he became so weak he thought he would die. At times he feared for his reason, and fell into swoons from terror. Mechtilde observes with particularity her own constant state of ill-health and suffering from the stone. Fanny Pittar began as an active girl, but later underwent many severe attacks of sickness. Charles Simeon says, "I made myself quite ill" from religious worry, when at college. Joseph Lathrop is often infirm, but was aided by an outdoor life. Hurrell Froude was a youth when he contracted tuberculosis; fasting, worry, and general pious austerities, served to end his life while still young. Both William Plumer and N. S. Shaler started life as weakly children, but gained in strength and health after puberty. Their religious experiences passed through an emotional stage and terminated in a calm agnosticism.

As a final commentary upon this group as a whole, the student is asked to observe the almost unvarying presence of an attack of illness preceding or during a conversion-period, *even when the subject is otherwise healthy.* In cases of continuous ill-health this attack may not be specifically mentioned.

The cases of those religious confessants whose health has on the whole been good, are few, indeed, in comparison with those we have just reviewed. Yet they are interesting and suggestive. Marie de l'Incarnation is a striking instance, for she writes emphatically that she was "never ill." John Wesley, that powerful engine, has been described as weak, yet he did the work of a strong man. He cannot really be classed among either group. Patrick of Ireland was vigorous; and Tolstoï, that modern mystic, had robust health. So had Rolle of Hampole; and Dame Gertrude More was full of vitality and strength until the convent-life depressed her. Henry Ward Beecher had enlarged tonsils as a boy, and so was dull, but he had excellent health. Billy Bray, despite the drink, displayed the high spirits and joyousness of a well person. Carré de Montgéron was strong and full of ardor for the life of the senses. Abélard appears to have started life in possession of an admirable constitution. Samuel Hopkins outgrew his fragility and became strong; while John Murray's naturally good health suffered only during a period of pious excitement. Rather by way of supplement than illustration, may be added in this group the names of Sir Thomas Browne and of Frederic Harrison. The Quaker Gurneys of Earlham were a really remarkable example of a family whose emotional religious feeling is coincident with health, beauty, and strong physique, to say nothing of high spirits and intelligence. Among other confessants, Cardinal Newman seems to have had good health in the main; as also did the Evangelist, C. G. Finney, whose conversion-phe-

nomena were so striking. James Lackington, the bookseller, was a healthy person. John Livingstone could ride long distances without fatigue, and had many years of excellent health. Abuse of his powers, however, had its effect in sundry illnesses. Among the Quakers, J. Woolman, though a cripple, was yet sturdy; while John Wigham, Richard Davies, William Evans, and Thomas Shillitoe all showed a normal physique. The Methodists, William Capers and Richard Rodda, differ from the majority of their co-religionists in making mention of good health. And among others J. G. Paton, Oliver Heywood, and Calvin himself, had excellent health and vigor.

The confessants who exhibit definite abnormal or pathological characteristics, must needs be placed in a group apart, as it does not seem quite fair to classify and compare them with the rank and file. Helen Keller's case, for instance, develops several facts of interest already mentioned in these pages. The religious education and growth of this most intelligent young woman took place under special conditions, and therefore cannot with justice be compared with a similar development in those of us who speak, and see, and hear.

There should also be classed apart those persons whose records exhibit signs of mental derangement in its various forms. John Dunton "was born so diminutive a creature that a quart-pot could contain the whole of me." Sickly and precocious as a child, abnormal as a youth, his record foreshadows in its matter and style the insanity of his later years. Count Loménie de Brienne (*fils*) is a man who writes

cheerfully of his pious feelings during lucid intervals. Isaac Williams's mind was clouded by a peculiar and obscure nervous malady, indicated in his record. Two rare Quaker tracts by John Pennyman and John Perrot, show their writers to have been unbalanced; the first by the execution of Charles I, whereat he fell into a melancholy. The second is mere religious raving, and is signed "From the prison of Madmen, in the City of Rome." Thomas Laythe is a Friend who fasted until his friends were alarmed at his altered countenance. David Hall, whose ill-health has been noticed, had an affection like the palsy, and ever displayed his pious zeal in a manner highly extravagant. The heredity of Joseph Smith, the Mormon, points to bad health on both sides. Students of his case suspect epilepsy; there was certainly great weakness and exhaustion in his fifteenth year, just before his first vision. Toward the end of his life, such remarks as "I know more than all the world put together; and God is my right-hand man!" savor of dementia. There is no doubt that he drank to excess and was otherwise vicious. Neither is there any doubt that he was a man of force and powerful physique. The cases of Crook and of Fox are yet more difficult to classify than that of Smith. Undoubtedly the former suffered an attack of melancholia with suicidal impulses, but its extent and duration are not easy to determine. Fox has been suspected of epilepsy; yet the truth in his case will be found hard to come by. There seems quite as much reason to suspect Swedenborg, of whom at least one convulsion is recorded. No one to-day can read the

"Spiritual Diary," without feeling a strong doubt as to the mental balance of the author. J. H. Linsley died insane; as also did F. Nietzsche and Pascal. The latter was entirely abnormal from childhood. Among Methodists, T. Payne, M. Joyce, and W. Jackson indicate an unbalanced condition by their narrated extravagances. Jackson had had severe blows on the head as a child; his document displays a wandering style. Joanna Southcott had a marked case of religious mania complicated by dropsy, which she persisted in considering a divine pregnancy.

John B. Gough [10] was a dipsomaniac, who struggled with his disease much as if it had been that personal demon which in truth it seemed to the "Monk of Evesham," one thousand years before. Morbid fear is a similar demon to André de Lorde. George Müller and Frederick Smith were vicious to the pathological extreme. The "De Profundis" of the gifted Oscar Wilde, with all its beauty and humility, cannot save its author from being charitably set among this group. A passion for sensationalism and for minor eccentricities is indicative of abnormality. It is shared by earlier, similar confessions, notably that of George Psalmanazar,[11] the impostor in the eighteenth century, and of W. H. Ireland,[12] the forger in the nineteenth.

The mention of Wilde brings us without further delay to the whole question of the criminal confession and its psychology. This is a subject with which, as a whole, the criminologist alone can deal; and therefore in this place it may be touched upon only in its relation to the religious confession. This relation is

curious and often suggestive. The paucity of such serious documents as come within the limitations imposed by this study, make it impossible to summon evidence enough to display this relation convincingly; the best one can do is merely to point here and there to certain material of comparison.

In the first place that extraordinary indifference and insensibility which is shown by the religious confessant toward his own pain and suffering, toward family ties and the claims of nature, is paralleled by the criminal confessant toward the subjects of his crime. Salimbene's indifference toward his aged father, Sainte-Chantal's toward her children, Guibert's mother toward her son, is really the same indifference which is displayed toward his victim by the Indian Thug,[13] to whom murder is religious; or by Laçenaire,[14] who observes of himself that he never pitied suffering. Secondly, one would do well to consider the high degree of introspection which the criminal records possess. Laçenaire's self-analysis is complete; so is that of Henri Charles,[15] the murderer of Mme. Gey at Sidi-Mabrouk; and that of George Simon,[16] a youth who killed his mother in Pennsylvania. The introspective qualities of Eugene Aram's [17] narrative interested all England: in it he denies the guilt he afterwards confessed. The famous widow Lafarge [18] (Marie Cappelle), whose guilt or innocence is even to-day a matter of doubt, fills two volumes of memoirs with introspective matter that proves little except that she was a neurotic and hysterical person.

Moreover, this degree of introspection is often accompanied with mystical and religious phenomena.

Henri Charles, for instance, after a violent revolution during puberty, had an upheaval from doubt, and then became extremely mystical, had visions, and loved the supernatural. Leave out the crime and there is much to connect this case with that of John Crook or John Bunyan. Mme. Lafarge and young Simon also appear to have had highly developed religious sentiments. In fact, so mystical and introspective are criminals as a class, that a book has been recently compiled in France entirely from material furnished by themselves.[19] Unfortunately, this material is not sufficiently accredited for use in these pages. Nor is it required, if the reader will but bear the facts just suggested in his mind, when he comes to the later discussion of the causes of emotional religious experience.

But there is one important group of records in which the criminal and the religious impulses seem to walk actually hand-in-hand, in a way that to modern ideas seems incredibly hideous and strange. This group is that of the witchcraft confessions of the Middle Ages. Nothing serves to show more significantly how far our ideals have travelled from those of the past, than the feeling which these trials and confessions rouse in our minds to-day. Pity and horror and repulsion are terms all too weak for its expression, when we see by this malady of the human mind such a man as Sir Matthew Hale brought down to the level of the African savage, screaming and dancing in the rites of Voodoo.

Were it possible to obtain a series of the original confessions of those unfortunates tried for witchcraft

during the Middle Ages,—a series extending through the centuries in almost unbroken sequence,—it would be easy to turn what is now matter of suggestion into matter of proof. Unfortunately, all influences have united to prevent these records from remaining in existence. The contagious character of this particular form of hysteria (which the Church dimly recognized without knowing the explanation), the revolting nature of the crimes confessed, and finally the arbitrary and often cruel decisions of the ecclesiastical courts, have all contributed as causes to have these records altered, edited, or destroyed. Thus one reads of confessions having existed of which no trace remains. Even so early as 1694, the Church was making anxious efforts to destroy all testimonies of non-accredited mystics, or of religious impostors, or of heretics, or of persons accused of witchcraft.[20] Among such records we read of the confession of Magdalena de la Cruz, an impostor who avowed her deceits, but was sentenced with leniency.[21] Dr. Lea gives a list of similar cases tried and punished by the Inquisition. A famous confession of sorcery is that of Jean de Vaux,[22] in 1598, in France; but no complete group of personal narratives belonging to this class is to be found until one reaches the witchcraft epidemic of the seventeenth century.

The horror which these confessions of possession and devil-worship inspired among their contemporaries, has hardly vanished on re-reading to-day, although it has shifted its ground. The judge presiding at the trial of the possessed nun, Marie de Sains (in 1613, at Yssel, in the Low Countries), declared

that in all his sixty-five years he had never heard a more atrocious catalogue of crimes. But an examination of the confession of Marie de Sains raises very different feelings to-day. The accused claims to have received the diabolical stigmata; and to have sacrificed "hundreds" of young infants at the Devil's call. Görres points out that such acts were highly difficult for a cloistered nun to perform without discovery; and also that there was no evidence that so many children had disappeared in the neighborhood.[23] It is doubtful if the judges even took the trouble to verify her statements by sending to see if such and such children had really been murdered at all.[24] Here seems more likely a case of perversion and hysteria, with criminal inclinations. The accused from the first had shown an evil disposition, and had not taken the veil of her own choice.

Stripped of all surrounding clouds of superstition, these cases furnish another witness to the sick nerves of the ancient world. The personal records of these hystericals fill us with that pity and horror which the healthy and sane feel for the sufferings of the unhealthy and the insane. Yet, when all is said, the spectacle presented by these court-rooms—the dignified judge stricken into horror by the ravings of mere vanity and hysteria—is a repulsive, even an indecent one. One is in the presence of a topsy-turvy, devil-ridden world, a world without logic, and smitten by superstition into an incoherency which deprives it of the power to reason. The nun Jeanne Féry, of Cambrai,[25] entreated to explain just how the Devil was to be worshipped, was listened to by learned

and mature men while she recited the details of a ritual, puerile and disgusting rather than blasphemous. The Devil had told her to do exactly the opposite of what religion commanded: she was to stand when she had previously been taught to kneel, say the Lord's Prayer backward, spit upon the Host, and so on. The horror of her judges, the efforts of priests and exorcists, drove the poor creature to attempt suicide; and thereafter, her mental disease progressing, she became melancholy and died an idiot. Even more pitiful was the figure of the nun Madeleine Bavent, of Louviers, because of her pathetic effort to explain and limit her own delusions. She insisted that she was by no means sure of the objective reality of what she had beheld at the Witches' Sabbat; using such phrases as "if these things really occurred."[26] Mental distress (she had been seduced by her confessor) had been the cause of the first attack. In the same convent at Louviers, the contagion became widespread, and another sufferer, Marie de Saint Sacrement, has left a similar, written confession.[27]

Contemporaneously with the outbreak of epidemic hysteria at Louviers, a similar epidemic occurred at the convent of Loudun, which, by reason of its notoriety has provided us with much typical material for analysis. We have the complete history of the nine possessed nuns at Loudun, whose ravings that he had bewitched them, sent to the stake their confessor, Urbain Grandier. Some years before (in 1610), the priest Louis Gauffridi had gone to his last account as the result of his infamous treatment of the twelve-year-old Magdalena de la Palude. The trial of

Gauffridi, so vividly recounted by Michelet,[28] does not, however, provide us with the personal records necessary to the present study; whereas, at Loudun, there are extant, not only the full confessions of the Mère Jeanne des Anges, in whom the malady centred, but also those of her exorcizer and fellow-sufferer, Père Surin.[29] The former autobiography has been edited by two French alienists, (with a preface by Charcot), who speak of its wealth of instructive detail; and who make entirely plain to the reader the cause and the progress of the writer's disease.[30]

The Mère Jeanne was not without strength of character, although naturally morbid and predisposed to hysteria. She is forty at the time this document was composed, but she gives some account of her youth (in which she does not spare herself) and of her entry into the religious life. Although intelligent and facile, she was vain and given to frivolity; and she mentions that from the age of fifteen her extravagances had worried her family. The vividness of her narrative—with its visions of lions and devils, the pell-mell of good and bad angels, the torment of unholy whispers in the night, those "désirs déréglées des choses deshonnestes," hold an intensity for us even when read in the light of our modern knowledge. Her director was the Père Surin, called the unfortunate "Man of God"; a youth of fragile health and austere practices, who fell a ready victim to the contagion. By exorcism he drove from the poor woman, in a series of violent convulsions, several of the demons by whom she believed herself to be possessed. The worst devil of them all, who called himself Isa-

caaron, now entered into the exorcizer, who had by this time become thoroughly unhinged. He in his turn began to have visions, torments, temptations, and convulsions, and these two unfortunates acted and reacted upon each other, to the point almost of frenzy.

After several years the Mère Jeanne recovered. The priest remained in a condition of complete melancholia until but a short time before he died. While the excitement was at its height, the pair made a sort of pilgrimage, during which they spread the contagion of their hysteria far and wide, and they report that in every town they visited, certain of the more weakly-minded had hysterical attacks, or convulsions, or were possessed by devils. The evidence contained in the Mère Jeanne's confession, even without the comment and the diagnosis of the modern specialist, is seen to be full, conclusive, and complete, from its beginning in sporadic erotic hysteria, to its savage progress and its contagious development.

The possession of the Mère Jeanne is of especial interest when we contrast its progress and development with similar conditions present in minds of a more robust calibre. Belief in devils and in their ability to attack and control human actions was, it must not be forgotten, by no means confined to the hysterical. It was, on the contrary, absolutely universal, the property alike of intellectual persons and of the truly and deeply religious. It was maintained by a judge like Sir Matthew Hale, by a lawyer like George Sinclar, by a mathematician like Cardan, and by a learned student like Meric Casaubon.[31] Luther, than whom no healthier mind ever existed, held it fully. He attributed all

thunderstorms to the direct agency of the Devil;[32] and he remarks that it was largely through fear of the Evil One that he became a monk.[33] Yet mark the situation, as depicted by his attitude and that of the "*possédées*" just analyzed! "On Good Friday last," remarks Luther, "I being in my chamber in fervent prayer . . . there suddenly appeared upon the wall a bright vision of our Saviour, with five wounds, steadfastly looking upon me as if it had been Christ himself corporally. At first sight I thought it had been some celestial revelation, but I reflected that it must needs be an illusion and juggling of the Devil, for Christ appeared to me in his word in a humbler form, therefore I spake to the vision thus—'Avoid thee, confounded Devil,'—whereupon the image vanished, clearly showing whence it came."[34]

A further anecdote, less well vouched for, is yet equally characteristic. "Another time in the night," writes Luther, "I heard him above my cell walking on the cloister, *but as I knew it was the Devil,* I paid no attention to him and went to sleep." However completely Luther may have believed in that mediæval grotesque, he had undoubtedly learned the one vital fact concerning him, namely, that he must be noticed in order to exist. To ignore the Devil, as Luther found, was to dispose of him altogether; for so sensitive is the Prince of Darkness, that he was never able to stand a slight. In the attention paid him by such confessants as Marie de Sains, or the Mère Jeanne, or Suso, or Mme. Guyon, he thrived apace, as we have read; but under such general contempt as Luther gave him, he could not have lived an hour. These

old-wives' tales should bring us more than a merely curious interest to-day, by teaching us that the vitality of all superstition lies wholly and solely in that mind by which it is infected—the will alone gives it life. Interesting is it also to see that what many of our mystical confessants would have accepted with rapture, as a visionary proof of heavenly favor, Luther considered an ignoble illusion and so dismissed it. Never was there a more complete manifestation of the subjective nature of these phenomena.

When Jonathan Edwards [35] became the historian of what is known as the "Great Revival" in New England, he described it as starting in 1735 from one small village, and thence spreading, "with fresh and extraordinary incomes of the Spirit," to the neighboring communities. So plain and vivid is the evidence of religious contagion in Edwards's narrative, that it is well-nigh impossible to believe his powerful mind did not recognize the fact. Who knows how his views might have shifted had he been able to read, as have we, the confessions of the Mère Jeanne, or of the other "*possédées*" of Loudun or of Louviers? Yet even to-day, the presence and the power of this force remain often undetermined. It has come to be understood in its extreme forms, where it is allied to hysteria or other nervous disorder; but as a factor in more normal instances, it is too frequently neglected or obscured.

Analysis of the religious revival and its attendant phenomena, belongs properly to a later section of this book,[36] where it will be found to bear an especial weight and significance. Its general data being his-

torical and impersonal, it cannot be placed in juxtaposition to the evidence furnished by the individual confessant. This evidence, furthermore, is not always easy to recognize. No one likes to think that the most sacred and moving influences in his life were the result of contagion; it is not an idea flattering to one's self-esteem. Therefore, he is apt to overlook such evidence to that effect as may exist, and to concentrate his attention, as we have seen the truly religious must, solely upon his individual phenomena. Even if the confessant acknowledges that the Holy Spirit is notably concerned with the welfare of a certain group of persons during a revival, yet he invariably believes that he himself is set apart to be an object of the Lord's particular solicitude. He never seems, to himself, to have fallen under the influence of direct contagion.

Cases where the subject became a member of a religious community during early childhood, indicate undoubtedly their submission to the contagion of surrounding influences. Particularly noticeable are those whose original character and temperament were not specially predisposed to a religious life, such as Dame Gertrude More, Angélique Arnauld, Teresa of Avila, Hildegarde of Bingen, Mechtilde of Hackeborn, Gertrude of Eisleben, Jeanne de S. M. Deleloe, Guibert de Nogent, Peter Favre, among Catholics; and Edmund Gosse among Dissenters. Salimbene, as a boy of twelve, underwent the contagion of that thirteenth-century revival known as the "Great Alleluia," and no tears shed by his old father could keep him from the monastery. The evangelist, Peter Cart-

wright, precedes the account of his own conversion by a description of the wave of religious feeling which swept the community where he lived. He notes, during one revival meeting, an epidemic of *"the jerks."* [37] These epidemics were especially influential upon the conversion of certain Mormon cases, such as Orson and Parley Pratt, and Benjamin Brown.

Direct contagion is easily traceable in modern documents. Peter Jones, an Indian brave, is stirred to unbecoming tears while attending a Methodist revival meeting. William Ashman had been unmoved for some years, until, when eleven years old, he attended a meeting along with many other children, during a season of general revival. All are melted and changed. Similarly, John Pawson is moved much beyond his wont by the contagion of the group of worshippers, with whom he joins in meeting and prayer. Christopher Hopper, noting the clamor made about religion among his friends, observes, "I made my bustle with the rest." He went to hear Wesley and Reeves, and was generally roused by the prevalent zeal to see the light and to preach. E. N. Kirk is worried because he seems to himself so little touched by a revival at Princeton, when he is seventeen. But he is so far affected as to take the Bible and Pilgrim's Progress and retire to his room, determined (on the advice of a pious friend) never to leave it, "save as a Christian or a corpse." In the same way, during a revival at Yale, does Gardiner Spring "wrestle with God." Camp-meeting contagion moves to swooning the frail and tuberculous Joseph Thomas. The modern student of religious psychology has come

more and more to take into account that important law which LeBon defines as "the mental unity of crowds." So recent a writer as Dr. Cutten [38] is careful to note the contagious nature of all emotional states; and in particular those of mysticism and of ecstasy.

When the procurable facts concerning the confessants' health, education, and heredity have been gathered together, it must be surely less difficult to elucidate his feelings on the subject of his religion. Just as the physician, ere he completes his examination, must needs inform himself of the patient's general health, habits, and history before the attack, so have we endeavored to inform ourselves. The advantage of this method (however tedious it may seem) lies in our ability to take hold of the mystical data by the proper end. No longer do these facts seem isolated or peculiar, but rather do they fit into a scheme of general history, and become component parts possessing a definite individuality. Thus we do not examine merely the visions of Loyola or Teresa, but also such facts in the history of these two persons as exist coincident with, and commenting upon, their mysticism. Not only is the conversion of Bunyan or Augustin made the subject of our study, but the causes leading to it, and the character which evolved it. The religious ideas of Swedenborg have much less significance alone than when they are taken in relation to his family history, education, and physical condition. Thus, the facts which are to follow, and in which these confessants believe lie their chief message and main value, cease to be bizarre and capricious phenomena, but instead become a part of the coherent miracle of human nature and human imagination.

VI

THE DATA ANALYZED: II

I. Early piety.
II. Late piety.
III. Conversion.
    (*a*) Methods.
    (*b*) Depression.
IV. The unpardonable sin.

VI

THE DATA ANALYZED: II

The confessants in whom piety was strongly marked in childhood are greatly in the majority; and there is no part of their records so interesting as that which tells of the sprouting of this seed. Those who underwent a subsequent relapse into indifference, are apt to point to these earlier inclinations as to the first manifestations of Grace. Others take them merely as proof of divine heritage; while there are some in whom the religious feeling progresses without break or reaction, from infantile emotion to mature devotion.

The attitude of certain cases toward their own childish sentiments is suggestive. Though Richard Baxter told lies and stole apples, yet, when "a little Boy in Coats," if he heard any one among his playmates use profane words, he would rebuke him. At seven, Thomas Boston was taking the Bible to bed with him; although he thinks this was done largely out of a spirit of curiosity. "I was of a sober and harmless deportment," he adds; "at no time vicious or roguish." He was a good-sized child when he set "to pray in earnest." It is interesting to read that his little son Thomas (*æt.* seven) "was found sensible of the stirrings of corruption in his heart," and had to be prayed over and wrestled with by his parents, in the manner

of those days. The entire family of the Gurneys of Earlham were religious self-analysts from infancy. At eleven, Louisa writes in her journal: "I had a cloud over me. . . . I am determined to be religious." Bishop Joseph Hall was deeply fervent as a tiny child. Hildegarde of Bingen, who saw a great light at three, offered herself to God at eight and took the vows. J. H. Newman took a childish delight in his Bible, though he had no formed convictions before he was fifteen. He had a firm belief in angels and in demons. His brother Francis began secret prayer at eleven years old. The gently pious Henry Alline "was very early moved upon by the spirit of God," and at eight grew terribly distressed about hell. Emanuel Swedenborg we know to have been middle-aged ere he became really concerned with the subject of religion; yet he remarks that from four to ten years his mind was engrossed with thoughts of God and salvation. John Eudes was early pious and became a novice at fourteen. J. de la Fontaine summoned his family to prayer at four. Augustin makes few comments on his infant piety, though many on his infant wickedness. "So small a boy, so great a sinner!" is his cry. But he avows that on falling seriously ill, he asked for baptism. At five or six years old, Bellarmin preached on Jesus' suffering. Annie Besant, whose shifts of creed are interesting, notes of her childhood: "I was the stuff of which fanatics are made, religious to the very finger-tips . . . I fasted and occasionally flagellated myself." Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe loved, when a baby, to play the nun. The picture of Robert Blair's ardent childish feeling has already been dwelt upon in another

book.[1] It is one of much beauty and pathos. At six, "the Lord awed me and began to catechize me"; and after an early religious crisis, he further says: "I durst never play upon the Lord's day." Charles Bray, the friend of George Eliot, turned early toward religion. However, his conversion was followed by a reaction which terminated in agnosticism. Says Thomas Chalkley: "Between eight and ten, the Lord began to work strongly on my mind, insomuch that I could not forbear reproving those lads who would take the name of God in their mouths in vain." Stephen Crisp, at nine or ten, "sought the power of God with great diligence and earnestness, with strong cries and tears." He worried much over "the lost state" of his playmates, and went to sermons as other children to sports and pastime. He was only twelve, when, in secret fields and unusual places, he poured out his complaints to the Lord. John Crook describes a similar state. "I had many exercises in my inward man," he writes of himself at ten or eleven, "and often prayed in bye-corners. . . . Strong combatings remained within me, which continued haunting of me many months." "In my very young years," George Fox beautifully writes, "I had a gravity and stayedness of mind and spirit not usual in children . . . when I came to eleven years of age I knew pureness and righteousness." He adds, with unusual candour in a person anxious to represent himself as a miserable sinner: "People had generally a love to me for my innocency and honesty." Edmund Gosse's history of a father and son gives an extraordinarily vivid and telling picture of exaggerated childish piety. He

is baptized a Plymouth Brother at ten, and during all his earlier years is wholly occupied with religious excitement. The after development of this case is toward free-thought. The abbot Guibert de Nogent inherited religious tendencies to mysticism; and is only eleven when he enters a monastery, full of remorse for his sins. Horrible dreams and visions of despair beset his youth thereafter, in the mediæval manner. Jeanne de la Mothe-Guyon was put in a convent at two and a half years. It seems more childish than pious that she loved "to hear of God, to be at Church, and drest in the habit of a little nun." The piety soon developed into an overcharged infantile fervor; she confessed at four, and loved, like Teresa, to play at martyrdom. Her devotion steadily progresses in fanaticism: at fifteen, she depicts herself as persecuted by every one for her zeal. This atmosphere of religious overstrain in childhood brings frequently a violent relapse long ere conversion: so it did to A. J. C. Hare. The Friends were almost without exception infant zealots, and none more so than Joseph Hoag. "Very early in life I was favored with Divine visitations," he writes, and from nine to twelve, "I had many clear openings." Another Quaker, Francis Howgill, from twelve read and meditated, decided that all sports and pastimes are vain, tried to convert his boy comrades. Lutfullah, the Mohammedan, knew his Koran at six, and by seven he was respected by all as a little priest. The mind of Dr. Henry More, when he went to Eton at thirteen, was preoccupied with speculations about hell and God. St. Patrick was a herd-boy in the fields when God's voice called him. Bishop

Symon Patrick's account of his childish "godly principles" is naïf. "I had an early sense of religion (blessed be God) imprinted on my mind, which was much increased by my attending to sermons. . . . Hearing a rigid sermon about reprobation of the greatest part of mankind, I remember well that when I was a little boy, I resolved if that were true I would never marry because most, if not all, my children might be damned." "Other deliverances I had in my very young years," he says, on recovering from an illness at twelve. Jane Pearson had a "godly sorrow" as a child, with deep sense of privation and emptiness. Walter Pringle prayed very early, acknowledging the Lord in lessons and in play. Salimbene's conversion was at twelve, but he gives no coherent account of his piety in childhood. M. A. Schimmelpenninck connects her early outbursts of fervent feeling with the state of her health. The Lord worked very early in Job Scott's heart; in meeting he had "serious impressions and contemplations"; also the heart of Oliver Sansom was similarly "broken and tendered." Inward fear so agitated Elizabeth Stirredge before she was ten, that she took no delight in the things of this world. H. Suso gives no details of his childhood, save that its piety was joyous. It is mostly from others that we have the charming stories of Teresa's childhood, and know that she early turned her eyes to divine things. Anna van Schurman was four when she was penetrated with joy at the religious instructions of her nurse. But her interests were chiefly intellectual and artistic until later. Isaac Williams in childhood was much affected by the transitory nature of things. Sentences

of Sherlock "On Death" haunted him like strains of music. Gentle John Woolman was troubled by the ill language of boy friends, and says: "Before I was seven, I began to be acquainted with the operations of Divine love." He is so tender of heart that when he killed a robin it marked an epoch in his life. Patrick Livingstone "was frightened out of sleep," and, like Charles Marshall, notes that he abhorred sin and loved godliness "at a very tender age." Edith Jefferis wept and was tendered in meeting at the age of six. Thomas Wilson and Mary Alexander showed piety when still extremely young; the last was "visited with the heart-tendering power of the Lord."

John Conran's first religious experience is as instructive as Robert Blair's with the milk-posset. "At thirteen," he writes, "in company with some of my school-fellows, I drank some sweet liquor . . . which overcame me. After I was in bed I felt close convictions take hold of me and make me sorrowful. These were . . . succeeded by great terrors of death. This dispensation lasted about fifteen minutes." These two cases form a suggestive instance of the way in which the pietist tends to look to metaphysical causes for the explanation of his facts, instead of to the physical causes. The readiness to do this is carried far beyond the mere effects of milk-punch or shrub, and accounts for many interesting statements of "misinterpreted observation." The Quaker John Churchman was overcome and tendered in meeting at eight years old; and at the same age Catherine Phillips was completely overwhelmed with her sense of guilt and sin toward the Holy

Ghost. Books on martyrs frightened this poor child terribly. In the same way was John Griffith favored with "heart-searching visitations of God's love," and remembered the effect on "my tender, weak mind." Mildred Ratcliff, at nine, had a dreadful dream of the Adversary to upset her nerves. Although Stephen Grellet had no instruction, yet he early showed his religious inclinations. The same piety, at the age of six to eight, is noted by John Wigham, Joseph Pike, Mary Dudley, S. Tucker, D. Stanton, Mary Hagger, and Anna Braithwaite, who considered meeting a privilege. At six, Henry Hull thinks his religious views were imperfect, though he was much impressed at meeting; and George Bewley was "sensible of inward reproof and sorrow," when he played too long. Ann Crowley, while yet young in years, remembered seasons of humiliation; and God visits John Gratton when he is a shepherd, and bids him leave his play with rude boy comrades. Samuel Neale wept and was tendered at a very early age, and all his childhood was grave and sedate. Thomas Story early inclined toward solitude and pious meditations. Ambrose Rigge was ten or twelve when his heart was touched "with a sense of my latter end." John Fothergill loved meeting when a little boy, until he took "a worldly turn."

Since information on this subject is, of course, the starting-point of almost every confessant, it necessarily follows that our data should be very abundant. To pass and re-pass it as we have done, may have the disadvantage of tediousness, but it is quite essential to its proper understanding. Only when a typical char-

acteristic can be as well understood by ten examples as by a hundred, are we warranted in making any selection; but where our study is of a condition, we are obliged to examine all of its component parts, that the charge of picking and choosing what is most representative or best fitted to our purpose may not be brought against us. On the question of childish piety, the Quakers, as we see, have furnished us with an enormous number of examples; it being in their opinion the especial manifestation of God's grace to that sect, that they should be as so many infant Samuels. These are in nowise so numerous among the Methodist and Congregational cases, who, on the contrary, are rather more apt to record sudden and unforeseen religious manifestations. Still, they are to be found if we look. A sense of death and judgment with other awful feelings, oppressed David Marks at four; and likewise, Luther Rice was a fervent and distressed infant. "From earliest days the Lord worked powerfully" on the mind of Thomas Lee. Richard Rodda was four when he felt the stirrings of grace, while to William Hunter these seemed the "sweet drawings of love." By Thomas Payne, the stirrings of God's love were noticed long ere ten, when he wished to be truly religious. "Awful thoughts of God" and "strong convictions" came during their infancy both to Peter Jaco and to Thomas Mitchell. Bird's-nesting on a Sunday brought an intense remorse to Joseph Travis, which started him in the way of religious thoughts. Lorenzo Dow describes a very typical childish state when he says that at three or four he fell into a muse about God, and asked about heaven and hell.

By ten years old he had begun to worry about death. Nor are we surprised to hear from John Allen that his serious thoughts, in childhood, were produced during thunderstorms or from hearing the passing-bell. Deeply serious children were Richard Whatcoat, George Shadford, George Story, and James Rogers. This last—poor baby!—at three, "on hearing a passing-bell or seeing a corpse [!] . . . became very thoughtful and asked pertinent questions about my future state." Both M. Joyce and John Furz chiefly enlarge upon the terrible consequences of their intense, childish fear. From six to fourteen, John Pritchard could weep and pray by the hour together, while at the same age William Black was troubled with the idea of his sinfulness. William Ashman, a child, heard Wesley preach and thought the end of the world was at hand. The Lord strove with him from four to five, but he was eleven before he was melted. One Sunday, hearing Revelations read, the boy John Nelson nearly had convulsions from terror. Mary Fletcher was wholly concerned with religious ideas from her earliest years, and at four, her mind was occupied with her eternal welfare. At the age of three to four, Peard Dickinson "was drawn out in prayer." Terror, as in so many cases, is the dominant thought of Joshua Marsden's infancy; while to William Neill, whose parents were American pioneers, fear of the Indian and of the Devil was synonymous. (This last case, it should be noted, however, does not state that this terror denoted any early religious stirrings.) Jotham Sewall, from three to six, is most interested in pious subjects. While playing in the fields, William Wilson was

brought into a strange amazement and asked: "How came I here; who made me?" This was followed "by an inward sense of sin, and he did pray much." James Melvill at eight to nine did pray and rebuke the profane. Oliver Taylor remembered how at six to seven "my thoughts were much on God, and my soul." No one can forget that Sainte-Chantal, an infant, would not be caressed by a heretic without weeping, while at five, she rebuked a doubter. J. J. Olier was a pious and studious boy, who loved the Virgin Mary. There was never a conscious moment when M. M. Alacoque was not pious. Sin early horrified her, and she vowed herself to chastity long ere she knew the meaning of the word. From her fourth year, she dwelt in a constant condition of religious fervor and excitement. Antoinette Bourignon, at four, expressed a wish to live "where all were good Christians," and was therefore mocked by her parents. Marie de l'Incarnation used to kiss the priest's garments as he passed along the street. She took much delight in repeating the name of Jesus. Othloh prayed to the Lord that he might escape the rod at school. Fanny Pittar was a fervent child; while Paul Löwengard, a sensitive and religious boy in a materialist family, suffered tortures of misunderstanding. Catherine of Siena we know to have been a little saint at six; and indeed, in the Middle Ages, the spontaneous bloom of piety in early childhood filled many a convent and determined the career of many a great mystic. Sister Thérèse, Carmelite, discussed matters of faith at three; her games were all taken from religion. She suffered intensely from scruples at thirteen, was a nun

at eighteen, and lived on this sinful earth but a few years thereafter. Mary of the Angels was only eight when she wept because she might not take the Eucharist; and she became a Carmelite at fifteen. Osanna Andreasi avows that Jesus appeared to her when she was six, in the guise of a charming playfellow. A. C. Emmerich was five or six when she had her first vision. Peter Favre, at seven, experienced periods of devotion, and at ten, longed for instruction. Jonathan Edwards writes: "I had a variety of concerns and exercises about my soul from my childhood . . . with . . . two remarkable seasons of awakening. . . . I used to pray five times a day in secret and spend much time in religious talk with the other boys." He adds: "I seemed in my element when engaged in religious duties."

Fräulein von Meysenbug was a devout child. The prophetess Joanna Southcott early grew in grace and fear of the Lord. At nine, John Trevor was very religious, very unsettled, very much afraid. The Moravians mentioned by Wesley were all in early childhood troubled and anxious about their souls. Henry Ward Beecher, though a good boy, fancied himself a great sinner; while the liquor question added to the religious anxieties of Granville Moody until he made a covenant with God. Jacob Knapp's mind "was early impressed with divine truth." He had seasons of prayer, and his mother's death when he was seventeen, was the final influence toward the ministry. F. Schleiermacher was very young when he worried about his soul, which gave him sleepless nights. This is followed at fourteen by a sceptical reaction. In the

case of William Plumer,[2] both the first feeling and the reaction therefrom are so intense as to cause a loathing of the subject for the rest of life. Gardiner Spring writes that he was a selfish and a wilful boy, yet not without serious impressions. His conscience was tender and he had seasons of depression. At ten he was deeply moved by a sister's death, though he relapsed afterwards. The Mormon Prophet Joseph Smith had no more childish piety than was aroused by an intense fear of the Indians. He is fourteen when he first had "serious reflections" during a time of religious excitement; but he held himself aloof from all parties. He inherited this independence of thought in regard to sect from his father and grandfather.

In contrast to the foregoing choir of infant angels, is a group of deeply moved persons whose sensitiveness to religion was but tardily awakened or not felt at all until the actual moment of conversion. Some of them are as striking as Loyola, whose own words declare that "until his twenty-sixth year he was given up to the vanities of this world"; and in this sentence he dismisses his unconverted youth. We know that John Wesley, serious and scholarly youth though he was, gave few signs of religious intensity of feeling before manhood. The same seems to have been the case with Swedenborg. Thomas Haliburton goes so far as to observe that he spent his first ten years without one rational thought! Bunyan "had few equals for cursing and lying." Though often terrified by fear of hell, yet real religious sentiment was lacking to his childhood. Whitefield's self-denunciation is even more violent: "I was froward from my mother's

womb. . . . If I trace myself from my cradle to my manhood I can see nothing in me but a fitness to be damned." At the same time, he imitated a preacher so well that at ten years old his talent for the pulpit was recognized. John Livingstone, the Scots preacher, was of a slow development in regard to the religious instinct, which lay dormant during college life, but gradually came to supersede his other interests. He never had a conversion, and was always an unemotional example. John Newton is so much impressed with his own wickedness that we are not surprised when he avows no serious feelings at all, till his change of heart as a young man. In much the same key, a more noteworthy man, Tolstoï, dwells rather on his youthful scepticism, and on the awakening of the sexual instinct, than upon any childish religious ideas. His disgust with himself begins very soon: "Je me dégoutai des hommes, je me dégoutai de moi-même"; and his piety is wholly an adult growth, passing through many crises ere he discovers that "la foi, c'est la force de la vie." Another Scot, James Fraser of Brae, says of his childhood: "My disposition was sullen and I loved not to be dawted . . . nor had I any wise tales like other children. . . . My temper was so peevish that I was no dawty," he insists; "only at school I learned well." He paints his sins in dark colors, and cannot seem to recall any childish piety. The only sentiment that Elizabeth Ashbridge can remember was "an awful regard for religion and religious people." The subject did not interest her for a long time, for she grew up "wild and airy." Count Schouvaloff, who turned Catholic,

owns that he was sceptical and revolutionary as a boy at school.

Although so many of our Quaker cases have been already mentioned upon other counts, yet there are a number who could look back to no saintly infancy. Such was Samuel Bownas, who until thirteen "had no taste of religion." Such also were Daniel Wheeler, Richard Davies, Richard Jordan, William Lewis (who was frivolous and read plays and novels), and William Evans, who as a child was "carnally inclined" and "found the society of religious people irksome." Whitefield's preaching roused the feelings of Joseph Oxley, who until then had had no pious inclinations whatever, and had stolen money from a servant. Very dreadful was the childhood of Frederick Smith, who at school became "a little monster of iniquity"; by nine years old knew every childish evil and never had had a serious impression. Few excelled him in vicious conduct from his fourteenth year till his conversion. Thomas Shillitoe's mind was unawakened till his sixteenth year; and till the same age, Jane Hoskins was far too cheerful and too fond of music and dancing; while Alexander Jaffray thinks he spent far too much time "in vanity and looseness." Among the Baptists, George Müller, Elias Smith, and J. H. Linsley can look back upon no serious religious inclinations during their childhood. In the Methodist group, the number who knew no piety until their conversion is large. It includes the names of John Prickard, John Pawson, Sampson Staniforth (who "hated religion" till nearly fourteen), and Thomas Olivers, who acknowledges that he practised when a boy to excel in

swearing, and was scarcely grown when he had a seduction on his conscience. Him also the thunders of Whitefield first stirred to a sense of guilt. William Capers was first moved at a camp-meeting, before which time he had no religious stirrings. Daniel Young, Duncan Wright, and Thomas Rankin, were indifferent as children. John Haime was a vicious youth, who cursed and lied, and was most miserable; while Thomas Walsh felt a marked indifference to religion, and, at eight, preferred his play and silly pleasures. Two further Methodist cases are those of John Murlin who, before the age of twenty, was an enemy to God and his soul; and Richard Williams, a surgeon, quite indifferent to religious matters until an illness with delirium so alarmed him as to precipitate a conversion.

Quaint Oliver Heywood describes how as a child he was "backward to good exercises and forward to sinful practices." E. N. Kirk is insensible to pious feelings all through childhood, and even through a revival at college so late as his eighteenth year. His was an unemotional nature. J. A. James notes "no decided religious feelings" either during boyhood or schooldays. Joseph Thomas felt no childish piety; and T. R. Gates, although his infant conscience remained serene, yet took no delight in prayer.

It is interesting to find that what the eighteenth century looked at askance as the domination of the old Adam, the nineteenth century calls "a normal childish indifference" to the subject! True it is that the line of the norm changes visibly from decade to decade. Orville Dewey notes this indifference until his college

years; while C. S. Spurgeon thinks that a similar lack in himself is due to a wicked neglect. He feels much safer when, as a youth, he had nothing before his eyes but his own guilt and came even to blasphemy and doubt. Billy Bray and Jerry McAuley, criminals and drunkards, can recall no uplifted feelings during their miserable and neglected childhood. Charles Simeon laments his irreligious boyhood. Thomas Scott took no interest in his own soul till sixteen, and then was moved chiefly through fear. Carré de Montgéron was a boy over-indulged and given to sensual pleasures. It took a carriage accident to alarm him as to his course.

The difficulty has already been noted of obtaining data from any mediæval cases, on such a point. They are apt to remain silent on all matters which appear trivial to them. Gertrude of Eisleben does remark that she was in her twenty-sixth year when the light came to her. Placed in a convent at five, however, she must have early submitted to the influence of her surroundings. Certainly Gertrude More, that merry, energetic, high-spirited, and what her director terms "extroverted," nature, was not early turned to spiritual matters, and found her convent yoke very grievous and intolerable. Sir Tobie Matthew was twenty-seven and on a trip to Italy when his interest in religion was roused, and he was led to Catholicism. Rulman Merswin, one of the Gottesfreunde, was a mature banker, whose childlessness caused him to turn his thoughts toward heaven. Rolle of Hampole writes that his youth was "fond and carnal—my young age unclean." D. Jarratt, H. Martyn, and

J. Lathrop awakened late to any marked religious feelings.

One or two cases remain to be mentioned of a type which, strictly speaking, lies outside of these foregoing examples. Helen Keller, for instance, shows that, with her, curiosity preceded the awakening of any special religious instinct. At ten, she asks who made her, where she came from, and why. Reverence is aroused much later. It is unfortunate that we have not similar cases to compare with this one, in order that we might see whether the deprivation of certain senses tends to deprive one also of those supposedly innate sentiments of reverence and love.

The philosopher Nietzsche should not be omitted, since he notes an almost unique condition. "Of actual religious difficulties," he asserts, "I have no experience, I have never known what it was to feel sinful." A less paradoxical nature, N. S. Shaler, is equally consistent, in that as a child he was never religious and after twelve he turned away from the whole subject. Hudson-Taylor was quite indifferent as a youth; and describes his sitting to read a certain tract "in an utterly unconcerned state of mind." The great rarity of these last two types is our excuse for mentioning them.

Long ere this, the student will have been satisfied that the characteristics leading toward the religious life tend to show themselves in the subject at an early age. Whether these be indicated by a heightened capacity for childish fervor, or an intensified susceptibility to childish terrors, they denote the presence in

that personality, of a peculiar sensitiveness. A few cases[3] have just been observed of a total aversion to religion in persons afterwards deeply religious, but they are so few as merely to accentuate the rule.

A sensitiveness to, and interest in, religious affairs, indicates to the subject himself that something stirs within his heart and imagination which is not shared by the generality of his companions. Once he observes this, and in his own opinion sets himself apart from others, he places himself immediately in a mental and an emotional isolation which allows a free play to all the succeeding phenomena. Thus freed from counteractions and retarding influences, the religious process develops rapidly, and consistently with those elements which are present in the nature of the person affected. Taken in conjunction with the foregoing data of health, heredity, and education, the persistency and the significance of this process begin to assume a definite character and a typical evolution. Step by step, the reader may follow this evolution by means of the facts and experiences furnished by the subjects themselves. He has already seen them as children, watched the shifts and turns of spiritual growth, the effect of education, the contagion of meetings and revivals. He is thus prepared to approach the intricate subject of Conversion.

The psychologists, who have recently begun to deal with the phenomena of the religious life, have devoted much space to that crisis known as conversion. They tend, not unnaturally, to treat it as an isolated moment in the history of the person, while many of them give but little space to the conditions preceding

and following it. The result is to force a wrong perspective on the reader, in his ideas of the rise and progress of this emotional crisis; which error has been increased by the use chiefly of the more typical and well-marked cases, many of whom—such as Paul, Augustin, or Fox—were distinguished by the gift of literary power.

There have not been wanting protests against this method. Dr. Watson disagrees with Professor James on this very matter;[4] since the author of the "Varieties of Religious Experience" relies wholly on the mystical type and on the individual expression. "We cannot get any fruitful results," says Dr. Watson, "by simply describing the experience of this or that individual in its isolation. To interpret the experience of the individual, we have to consider the spiritual medium in which he lives, and the stage in the progress as a whole, which he represents. For experience is essentially a process."[5]

Valuable words these, which this study must necessarily confirm, by insisting on the relation of the individual-experience to the group-experience, in all matters which come under the influence of the law of crowds.[6] For this reason, if for no other, so much of this work has been occupied with brief abstracts of the cases studied, in order that the reader may relate the conversion-phenomena of Fox to the Quaker group in general; that he may examine not Teresa alone, but the group of convent mystics; not Wesley alone, but the group of Methodists. The common characteristics of these groups will then become plain, together with the "spiritual medium" of each

case, and "the stage in the progress as a whole which he represents."

That religious experience is a process, must be steadfastly borne in mind in our contemplation of this body of facts. For how is it possible to study conversion, unless one has immediately before him all the facts concerning the converted; all that goes to make up what M. Anatole France has called "la vérité humaine"? Our purpose, indeed, lies embedded in these data. Not in theorizing as to what Teresa thought, nor what Augustin reasoned, nor what Maria d'Agréda imagined, will the truth be found to lie, but in trying to collate and to interpret the facts they tell us.

That we to-day have heightened the meaning of the term "conversion" and have attached emotional significance to it, no reader of the ancient records can doubt. In one of his dialogues Cæsarius of Heisterbach [7] (1225 A.D.) discusses the causes of conversion or leaving the world for the cloister, in a manner which shows that it held for him but the physical sense of "a turning-about." One was turned or converted to the monastic life, for all sorts of reasons wholly unconnected with religious emotion. To-day, the word seems to mean more nearly what the Southern negro calls "getting 'ligion"; for, beside the turning-away from the past, the soul of the converted person is supposed to be charged with a fresh and ardent energy for the future.

The common identity of the various mystical types has been sufficiently insisted upon in these pages. Therefore the grouping of our facts is not, as it may casually appear, capricious or fortuitous. It has

seemed more nearly accurate to classify them according to the character of the phenomena displayed, and to ignore for the moment a divergence of era or of race. Dr. Pratt [8] uses the classification "normal" and "abnormal," meaning by the first term that spontaneous union with a higher life which is gradually achieved and which endures; by the second, that sudden and mystical change which most of us know as conversion.

But, as has already been indicated, a special difficulty attaches to the terms "normal" and "abnormal" in this application. They are too shifting, and in the light of the facts even contradictory. Those religious experiences which are normal to the Guinea negro, would be highly abnormal to the Englishman of to-day. The standard, in fact, fluctuates even from group to group. For instance, if out of ninety Quaker cases less than twenty belong to Dr. Pratt's so-called normal or unemotional class, we are driven to the inference either that the whole Quaker movement was abnormal, which is false, or that the normal line has in this particular sect shifted to the mystical side. In truth, the idea that the normal is the self-contained, unemotional, yet serious, elevated, and ethical type—an idea so flattering to the Anglo-Saxon—will not stand the test of investigation. At no time in the world's history has the deep and quiet nature, coming gradually into union with the divine idea, been other than exceedingly rare. For such a condition presupposes a harmony between a man's idea and his convictions, a balance between his emotions and his intellect, which

is perforce but seldom met with among the sons of men. Never could it be called normal save perhaps in the sense of ideal. Let us put aside, then, any classification of the subject's experience as normal or abnormal, and turn our attention wholly to an examination of the facts manifested by the process.

The first indication of approaching change is manifested by a growing dissatisfaction with self, accompanied by depression of spirits and fear. That the subject has been from babyhood strong in a sense of pious reverence and the love of serious things, does not appear to mitigate for him the horrors of this depression. His melancholy has no proportion to his conduct; it is equally deep if he be sinless as Thérèse of the Holy Child, or if he be steeped in vice like George Müller or Frederick Smith. This is among the first symptoms of the dissociation of religious standards from conduct, which is so marked a characteristic in the person approaching conversion, and which indicates the completely emotional nature of the change. Under this strain the subject will excuse, nay, foster in himself, actions and attitudes the reverse of moral. He will banish cheerfulness, courage, and hope; he will neglect his health, his person, his business, and his human relations. He will speak of his brother with reprobation,[9] or regard a mother's[10] or a husband's death[11] as release from a bond or "impediment." Not only is he overwhelmed by a flood of selfish fear; but he is apparently deprived of any stimulus toward a return to healthier conditions.

The approach of this depression may be rapid or slow; it is characterized by its completeness and by its

intensity. Never can we forget Bunyan's terror and distress, wherein, for months, "I was overcome with despair of life." With Uriel d'Acosta it endured for several years; with Henry Alline, four years; with Stephen Crisp, six to eight years; Augustin and Woolman suffered a long time; and John Crook for five years was so troubled in mind that he believed he was possessed by the Devil, while he declares, "anguish and intolerable tribulation dwelt in my flesh." William Edmundson says he was much cast-down; C. G. Finney was in nervous anguish for months; and George Fox dwelt in despair and in solitude. With Al-Ghazzāli this melancholy terminated in a nervous prostration, during which he could neither speak nor digest his food. Cried poor Martin Luther, during this period: "I have often need in my tribulations, to talk even with a child, in order to expel such thoughts as the Devil possesses me with!" And, while tortured by doubts on his entering the cloister, he quieted himself by reading and annotating Augustin. Joseph Smith, who lived in what he called "the burnt-over district," so ravaged was it by religious epidemic, was fourteen when he became serious, and felt great uneasiness of mind. He grew troubled, read his Bible, was deeply moved and depressed, and retired to the woods to pray. His wretchedness lasted for more than a year. Lucy Smith, his mother, had an attack of nervous depression preceding a vision; her father, Solomon Mack, had been filled with religious gloom for years; and was seventy-six before he was really eased and converted. Mme. Guyon's depression had at least the one

amelioration that she did not at any time doubt her own piety or worthiness, and looked upon the feeling merely as a chastening from on high. This was also true in the case of A. C. Emmerich.

Joseph Hoag, at eighteen, was in terrible distress for months, which terminated in an acute condition of melancholy lasting fourteen days; F. Howgill fasted, prayed, and suffered terribly for four or five years, dissatisfied with all forms of religious doctrine. The melancholy conflicts which befell the saintly Henry More were so intense that they caused him to observe, "there is nothing more to be dreaded for a man." Depression followed Patricius for weeks while he tended cattle in the fields; Job Scott underwent alternate fits of gloom and dissipation, from puberty until about nineteen; Suso had no spiritual combats until after conversion, but his misery lasted with increasing power to the end, namely, thirty years. Teresa's period of depression must have been short. When she was about twenty years old, she speaks of the "cruel ennui" with which she entered the convent after an unhappy love-affair. In the curious and typical case of Tolstoï, the despair must have lasted for several years. At seventeen, the approach of conversion brought to Whitefield its load of fear and dread; "an inward darkness," he says, "overwhelmed my soul"; and for months he remained much terrified. The acute crisis caused an illness of six or seven weeks. During college, Thomas Boston had a "heavy time" of depression and nightmare, which, however, was brief. Gertrude of Eisleben declares that the trouble in her soul lasted for more than a month. For

nearly a year, Thomas Haliburton was grievously tormented, feared death, could not sleep, until after this time the agony died out. It is characteristic of Loyola that his distress did not begin till he was converted, and that it endured just so long as he continued his austerities and his ascetic life. His earlier religious feelings were all of peace and joy.

During three years, Rulman Merswin, then a man of forty-five, underwent "the pains of hell," as he calls them; including violent night-terrors and unspeakable melancholy. The admirable Richard Baxter passed through many a conflict, and owned to having "difficulties in his concernments" about many doctrines. Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe was so much cast down by her feelings of guilt and misunderstanding of spiritual things, that it took her a year to recover. Neither illness, which burnt him up with fever, nor his renunciation of the life of the intellect, nor his austerities in his desert hermitage, could quiet Jerome's anguish of heart for a long time. Pascal's conflict of soul brought on a dreadful insomnia, and aggravated his already weakened condition.

The curious temperament of Cardinal Newman knew no depression which is personal; he is troubled about the dogmas of the Church, but never as to his own destination. Swedenborg also appears to have had no personal depression of any duration. In John Wesley's nature, the energy of goodness is too high for depression to take a great hold; nevertheless he grew much worried as to his state, losing his tranquillity and optimism for some months. Angélique Arnauld,[12] abbess of Port-Royal, is one of those Catholic natures

for whom naught but gloom follows their first reception of "La Grâce." With her it lasted for years. The well-known modern conversion of Alphonse de Ratisbonne is sudden, and absolutely lacking in the usual preceding symptoms of melancholy. In this, the reader will note a resemblance to the famous case of Colonel James Gardiner—which, however, is not strictly autobiographical material. F. M. P. Liebermann notes an uneasiness of but a few weeks. T. W. Allies, like Newman, is not so much worried about believing in God, as about the Real Presence and the Monophysites, yet he notes a frightful depression, which study and travel for months fail to cure. The anchoress Juliana of Norwich lived at too early a date to tell us much about herself, but with what a vividness of phrase does she describe that "irkness of myself that unneth I could have patience to live"!

A. F. Ozanam had no rest by day or night for weeks, from "l'horreur des doutes qui ronge le cœur." The blessed Carlo da Sezze noticed in himself certain bouts of gloom and sorrow lasting at different periods in his life for several months. The Ursuline Marie de l'Incarnation felt the melancholy of her sinful state, but was calmed after confession. Baptiste Varani had no remission of misery upon her conversion; in fact, one black period lasted as long as two years. An Englishman, Charles Simeon, searched out his iniquities, remaining worried for three months. Catherine Phillips, a young Quaker, was so much affected by a sense of guilt that she concluded she had sinned against the Holy Ghost. "This," she writes, "affected my tender mind with sorrow and unutterable

distress." Her pillow was often watered with her tears; and she remained in this condition, "deeply broken" and mournful, for a space of eight years, or until she was twenty-two years old.

Among the foregoing examples have been cited certain of the more vivid and important members of the societies of Methodists and Friends. The following belong rather to the rank and file, although their cases are of significant interest.

From his twelfth to his eighteenth year the Quaker John Churchman was overcome with wretchedness and fear. "No tongue can express the anguish I felt, afraid to lie awake, and afraid to go to sleep." John Griffith, on the contrary, was not alarmed until about nineteen years of age, and passed gradually from the darkness to light, with no actual moment of change noted. William Savery is twenty-eight when he began to be troubled in mind. One evening "sitting . . . alone, great Horror and trouble seized me. I wept . . . and tasted the misery of fallen spirits . . . a clammy sweat covered me," etc. This agony was of comparatively short duration. The frightful melancholy and distress which attacked Samuel Neale, at seventeen, caused him "to be as one bereft of understanding," but this also lasted only a short time. The preaching of Whitefield produced in Joseph Oxley, hitherto a stranger to such emotions, an agony so terrible that he "cried and shrieked aloud." Conversion in this case followed speedily. Six years of solitary weeping and mourning, in sore conflicts of the spirit, was the lot of John Banks before he became "settled in the power of the Lord."

Great trouble of mind visited Christopher Story at eighteen, until his marriage brought him a year or two later under the influence of Friends. In the cases of P. Livingstone, M. Dudley, and C. Marshall, there is deep suffering. Thomas Story's agony preceding conversion was brief. John Gratton's grief caused him, while still almost a child, "to cry with strong cries unto the Lord," and he felt sorrowful, wept and mourned for many months. In the intervals he searched, unsuccessfully, for the truth. From sixteen to nineteen, Jane Hoskins was under a concern which caused her to lose much sleep, while she shed many tears. Myles Halhead, being about the age of thirty-eight years, sorrowed desperately for many days, took pleasure in nothing, "and in the Night-Season I could find no rest." John Pennyman traces the causes of his gloom to the execution of Charles I. God comforted him after about two years of depression. The darkness and discouragement of John Fothergill, lasted four years with some remissions; in Richard Jordan's case it lasted for several years. For experiences of utter agony and the sufferings of despair, the Methodist records give the most vivid accounts. John Nelson, for weeks, felt an awful dread; was hideously tormented by insomnia and the fear of devils, from which he would awake sweating and exhausted. John Haime for some days had no rest day or night: "I was afraid to shut my eyes lest I should awake in hell." He was pursued by frightful dreams, one night thought that the Devil was in his room, and "was as if my very body had been in fire." Mary Fletcher, at about ten years old, injures her health

with grieving. From seventeen to nineteen, Thomas Walsh grew wild and desperate from a sense of sin, often struck himself against the ground, tearing the hair from his head. Freeborn Garretson underwent three years of struggle and misery. Peard Dickinson at fifteen had an acute attack of depression and remorse, was incessantly pursued by guilty and horrible ideas, could not study, longed to die, had hideous dreams; but had outgrown the worst of this stage when at seventeen he fell under Wesley's influence. William Jackson was pierced by a service in the Methodist Chapel, and aroused to abandon drink. He wrestled, cried, groaned, and mourned "for a space," which he does not further define. Thomas Lee was despondent for nearly a year in unspeakable anguish. Richard Rodda spent two years seeking rest for his soul. For about five years, off and on, John Pawson had no peace, wept and cried aloud. William Hunter lived in terrible distress for many months, after his conscience had been "pierced as with a sword." In the cases of Thomas Olivers and Thomas Mitchell, this wretchedness lasted for six months, and in that of Peter Jaco for four months. Jacob Young and Joseph Travis, both American Methodists, were cast into the depths of self-horror for a briefer time and from attending revival meetings. The former was terribly afraid of Indians. B. Hibbard, a boy of twelve, began to have thoughts of hell when gazing at the fire. For three years thereafter he was horribly conscious of sin, and in great torment which caused insomnia. Lorenzo Dow is fourteen when in his despair he attempts suicide, dreams of devils and hears the screeches of the

damned; but the crisis does not seem to have been prolonged. On the other hand, we find William Capers distressed simply because he is *not* depressed. "I was conscious of no painful conviction of sin—of no godly sorrow." This lasts until his father, wrestling with his spirit, reduces him to tears. For some weeks, at fifteen, Daniel Young wept in solitude, and felt that he was hanging over the pit of hell. "Darkness and horror" overwhelm Benjamin Rhodes at nineteen and he falls into a horrible fit of despair. "At last," he cries, as if worn out with it, "the Lord heard." The testimony of Robert Wilkinson contains no dates nor note of time; it is but a record of horror and distraction. Thomas Ware's spirits were so low "that I was little better than a maniac!" A Methodist sermon struck Richard Whatcoat with a terrible fear of death and judgment, from which he obtained no relief day or night. This appears, from the cause of the narrative, to have endured for some weeks. Duncan Wright is affected by a fellow-soldier's influence, so that he was for a time utterly miserable and lost all taste for his former pleasures. In George Shadford's case, the misery is intermittent and much increased by a fever which fell on him. For three months, George Story felt darkness and horror, after having previously been so wretched that he was more like "an enraged wild beast than a rational creature." Between hearing two sermons of Whitefield, Thomas Rankin felt an inexpressible horror of mind. The friends of the young John Furz assure him that he is really good, yet for about two years he is in utter despair. He slept little because of his fear, wasted away, lost

appetite, and during one struggle with temptation is stricken senseless for hours. Matthias Joyce was on hell's brink for two years. Haunted day and night, his flesh would creep, and he very nearly went insane from fear and horror. The state of misery which affected John de la Fléchère is so unbearable that he declared he would rather go to hell. Peter Jones, an Indian Methodist, felt that his wretchedness was unbecoming a brave; it lasted all one night till his conversion at a dawn revival-meeting. For three weeks, Thomas Hanson was troubled with horrid suggestions, and became miserable beyond description. William Black seems to have felt "softening frames," as he puts it, during all his youth but at no one crisis. Although he spent his time piously from eleven to sixteen, yet William Ashman is then beset by gloom, which lasts for four years more. Neither does John Mason obtain a lasting peace after hearing Whitefield preach, until five years later. The immediate effect of the sermon had been to plunge him into gloom and to deprive him of appetite and sleep. In the same way Hanson's preaching upsets William Carvosso, causing his spirit to suffer inward struggles for many days. A. H. Francke, a German, was ordained a minister at the time he realized his entire unbelief. With his first sermon, the distress passed and he obtained peace. The Evangelist Gates tells of deep misery during his childhood and youth; its chief element seemed to be a fear of death, which induced despair, insomnia, horrid dreams, and thoughts of suicide. His recovery of tone was very gradual. Joseph Thomas, a tuberculous boy, praying alone in the woods, was horribly

afraid of the Devil. But his depression lasted only during the camp-meeting—forty-eight hours of fasting and excitement. He is far more fortunate than most, since he is settled in his mind at sixteen. John Murray, being naturally vivacious and cheerful, considered himself virtuous only when thoroughly depressed, and these depressions are but brief. For some weeks, Samuel Hopkins was overwhelmed with doubt and gloomy thoughts; while the Ranter, Joseph Salmon, declares that he was "struck dead to all my wonted enjoyments."

The Presbyterian records of soul-struggles are few. Among others, George Brysson thought God had loosed Satan to assault him, "with dreadful temptations and blasphemous suggestions, whereby I was almost driven to despair." For some years, his state was lamentable. Gardiner Spring, influenced by a general revival at Yale, shut himself up (like E. N. Kirk) to wrestle with God; and was greatly troubled during the conflict in his unsettled soul. Oliver Heywood says that he was "ready to roar out in the bitterness of my soul." Alexander Gordon for six months felt his mind in horrible darkness and was thought to be going mad. David Brainerd underwent the melancholy and despair suddenly, and it lasted for months. William Haslett has a horrible experience, but does not note its length. "It was eleven years," says William Wilson, after he "is frightened by a vision of death . . . until I won assurance of faith . . . and often I was much tossed with indwelling corruptions." The Baptist, Andrew Sherburne, compares his mind during two years or more, to a

troubled sea. L. Rice states that his distress of mind caused him to wake in extreme agony, and that he literally wept and wailed. Joanna Turner, from fourteen to seventeen, thought no greater sinner existed than herself. The statement of J. H. Linsley describes a condition of incredible anguish, lasting eleven months and bearing signs almost of mania. Visions of devils, horrors, cries of agony, and a dreadful burning of the soul, unite to overwhelm this unfortunate; who, if he but chanced to sleep, was sure to awaken, screaming. We know that the saintly John Tauler's depression beset him for over two years; and that John Calvin also felt this cloud, and for about the same period. Charles Bray observes that the time of religious unrest was "the most miserable years of my life"; and so wretched did the experience make William Plumer that he thereafter conceived an aversion, nay, a loathing, for religion. Spurgeon, the evangelist, having naught before his eyes but his own sins, felt horribly evil and utterly lost. Jerry McAuley and Billy Bray had probably more cause to be alarmed about their state than many others we have noted. The first was in prison when he underwent this fierce conflict; the last, distressed by Bunyan's visions of heaven and hell, believed himself tormented by an active personal devil, so that he cried for mercy all night. Thomas Scott found Law's "Serious Call" "a very uncomfortable book," and was affected by dread and disquiet for many years. Henry Ward Beecher thought of God as a sort of policeman lying in wait for him; he was very miserable. Hell seemed to yawn for Jacob Knapp, whose mental trouble af-

fected his health and generally upset him between seventeen and nineteen. A little black fiend squatting on the foot of Raoul Glaber's bed, caused that worldly-minded monk to rush into the chapel chilled with fear, remembering all his sins. A repetition of such a visitation led to his full conversion. Gloom overwhelmed the gentle sister Thérèse shortly after taking the veil.

Many austerities practised at the age of sixteen, soon brought upon Mary of the Angels melancholy, impure thoughts, and the assault of devils, who annoyed her by their cries and howls. The devils fought pell-mell around the poor Mère Jeanne des Anges, till Christ Himself spoke from the crucifix to save her. Maria d'Agréda experienced several attacks of gloom, and fell into deep horror, lasting for months at a time. Peter Favre went through a dreadful space of torment, scruple, and temptation, for four years or more. "Over and over again," writes John Trevor, "I wished I had never been born." David Nitschman fell into a dreadful blackness lasting a year; while another Moravian, Christian David, suffered so intensely that for a while he "came to loathe the very name of Christ."

The deeply religious feeling of Amiel could not avoid for him a perpetual discouragement and melancholy, which no conversion ever came to change. Angela da Foligno went through every typical mediæval torment. To the mind of Jonathan Edwards, "it was not proper to express that concern by the name of terror"; yet it brought him a great misery. Gertrude More felt her heart become "more hard to

good than ever was a stone''; while it took his wife's illness and death to shake the soul of Count Schouvaloff.[13]

Whatever may be the effect of this accumulation of data, it will at least serve to accentuate very sharply that dissociation of this religious process from usual standards of conduct, to which reference has just been made. With a misery so poignant and an absorption in it so complete, it follows that these cases cease to be interested in anything except themselves. In strongly marked attacks, the canons of ordinary behavior have no restraining power; while the disapproval of others simply adds to the burden and intensifies the egotism by the idea of martyrdom. M. M. Alacoque and Mme. Guyon did turn the other cheek, but they did it with an alacrity which must have been in itself exasperating. The insensibility to ethical ideas which these cases display has already been noted, and further examples are easily to be found.[14] Salimbene's abandonment of his old father, Sainte-Chantal's of her children, are instances of this insensibility, which will extend, at moments, to physical suffering of one's self or of others. The obligation to one's employer is felt no longer; the steadying effect of work is denied to the sufferer.[15] No entreaties, no upbraidings of friends or relatives, can suffice to turn him from his fixed despair.

Certain among the cases heighten this despair and give it a peculiarly terrible character by the addition of that obscure and dreadful idea known to them as the unpardonable sin. The list of unpardonable sin-

ners is not large; its conception required a vividness of imagination which is fortunately rare, since it seems to have more power to create suffering than any other similar idea in the world. The person thus tormenting himself often appears to the observer to have passed the boundaries of sanity, or, at the least, to have come under the domination of an *idée fixe*.

The whole conception of an unpardonable sin displays characteristics which have an especial significance for the later chapters of this book. The first is its entire lack of definiteness,—the doubt of what it is in the mind of the person who yet is quite sure that he has sinned it. Many confessants express this doubt in so many words. For instance, John Bunyan writes: "I wished to sin the sin against the Holy Ghost"; when he is not at all certain how this is to be accomplished. A dreadful feeling of guilt—and nothing else—caused Robert Wilkinson and Catherine Phillips to be sure they had committed this particular sin. J. Travis and J. Trevor are both exceedingly worried lest they should have sinned it unawares. Sampson Staniforth becomes convinced that he has done so; whereas Whitefield is horribly afraid of being afraid of this trespass. His undefined terror of the mere idea, which he saw as a sort of embodiment of Satan, whereat "great heavings went through me," is an accurate exemplification of Maudsley's general description: "The very mystery of that one stupendous sin, its vague and unknown nature, has an awful fascination for the imagination, which is held by it in a sort of cataleptic trance."[16] And trance, in truth, is apt to be the culmination of the attack.

One of the most vivid accounts of this experience occurs in Borrow's novel, "Lavengro."[17] The author puts it into the mouth of Peter Williams, the farmer; yet no one who reads it but will be certain it is autobiographical, that the experience was Borrow's own. Peter, a grown man, tells how at seven years old, he first heard there was such a sin. Thereafter, "he felt a strong inclination to commit it"; but terror restrained him. The impulse is described as capricious and intermittent; for weeks together it died away and left him in peace. Finally, out of childish bravado, he murmurs horrible words. As no lightning strikes him after the act, he is, if anything, relieved; but this relief is followed by a growing and creeping terror;—an overwhelming despair in the conviction that the sin is committed beyond recall. Years afterwards, this despair is still feeding upon his mind; and he is freed from it only when his wife, with tears, implores him to believe that such a sin was impossible to so young a child.

Peter, of course, does not repeat the words in which he thinks the sin took shape; but it is most often in some form of a curse that it is conceived by the illiterate. Says Margaret Lucas, a Friend, aged nineteen: "One night, as I lay in bed, on a sudden a voice as I thought audible and like my own, cursed the Lord and defied heaven, saying, 'Now am I damned, for I have committed the unpardonable sin.' I fell, from agony, into a complete perspiration, and the bed shook with my strong trembling." In the same way, Joseph Hoag was frightfully tempted, "to curse God, father, mother, and the Bible"; while to resist this

temptation nearly drove him insane. To the poor little nun Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe came "le penser de crâcher à la Sainte Hostie"; which thought, to a devout Catholic, would be almost an unpardonable sin in itself.

Here are examples sufficient to show the nature of this conception, whose very existence involves contradiction. It appears to have been largely a Christian invention; for Hebrew theology does not admit that any sin is unpardonable.[18] The doubt in the mind of the confessant as to the real nature of his trespass, seems less remarkable, however, when one notes how early such uncertainty existed; for the Fathers themselves are by no means unanimous as to the exact constitution of this sin. The Church defines it as "to deny from pure malice the Divine character of works manifestly Divine."[19] Thomas Aquinas held it to consist in direct insult to the Holy Ghost; while Augustin cannot believe it to be aught but final impenitence.[20] Since the doctrine of redemption would hardly seem to admit of so notable an exception, it follows that Augustin's is practically the only explanation of this curious dogma which is at all logically consistent. Interesting it is, therefore, to find that not this explanation, but something much more unreasoning and primitive, shows in the experiences just related. The confessants are all young—some are children—when they believe this sin to have been committed, moreover, not one of them is finally impenitent. It would seem as if such an obsession in their case almost denied the fundamental doctrine of salvation;—nor does it take the

brain of an Augustin to see that serious complications would result if the truth of such an idea were to be admitted. For if a child of seven, by ignorantly insulting the Holy Ghost, were to live his life in penitent expiation,—only to be damned eternally,—where, then, lay the value of the Redemption, or the glory of the Redeemer? Even the mediæval mind hesitated to allow doctrine so dangerous; particularly when it can be based only on a chance word of that Christ, whose law and whose promise was love.[21] The truth is that the unpardonable sin is not wholly a mediæval idea, but should be classed, rather, with that group of concepts which had lingered over from the past in the popular mind, to be developed and heightened by the mediæval imagination. All human terrors have, in fact, the deepest root and importance; their antiquity is proclaimed by their vague and unreasoning character; and we know that the fear of men belongs to the oldest part of the race. The confusion existing in the minds of the Fathers, when they tried to cast this particular fear into a dogma, testifies that they felt certain misgivings as to the rigid interpretation of the texts on which they based it; at the same time that they fully recognized the presence in the world of such an emotion and such a conception.

When a fact in human nature coexists with various and opposing explanations, it is safe to infer that the fact is very much older than the explanation. Yet we know that the unpardonable sin is not to be looked for among the Jewish origins of Christianity. Moreover, it is certainly striking to find that Dante's Inferno holds no circle for these sinners; that to the

poet, blasphemy is by no means the worst of offences nor does he mete out to it so heavy a punishment as to many other transgressions. Dante evidently cannot conceive of any sin, nor of any sinner, wholly incapable of pardon—and the absence of this sin to the scheme of the "Divina Commedia," is surely a proof of its absence to the whole fourteenth-century scheme of human error and penitence.

Yet the very visage, as it were, of the unpardonable sin, its bizarrerie, namelessness, and vivid qualities, belong to a savage past. What, then, may be our inference regarding it? Simply, that during the Middle Ages it had not yet differentiated itself and taken that particular and individual form with which we are later accustomed to identify it. Then, such a conception was still part of that group of terrors whose roots we now know to strike down into primitive and brute nature; such as the supernatural in all its shapes, diabolical possession, witchcraft, evil spells, and so forth. Its separation from and evolution out of this group, its development into a purely individual fear,—a horror personal and subjective,—is a proof of its relation to the phenomena of religious survival.

The place to discuss this phase of religious experience and its connection with the subject of survival, is one belonging properly to the later sections of this study; nor should the reader's attention be longer diverted from the main body of facts which he has just reviewed, and of which the unpardonable sin data form but part. The impression made by these facts as a whole, will be found to have been chiefly the result of their uniformity, their peculiarity, and their

intensity. It is by means of this very uniformity, intensity, and peculiarity, that these examples of religious depression have come to assume a significance which will eventually lead to better understanding of their origin.

VII

THE DATA ANALYZED: III

I. Conversion: Theory.
II. Conversion: suggestion in,
III. Conversion: the data of,
IV. Conversion: note on Paul's.
V. Conversion: doubtful examples.
VI. Reaction and relapse.
VII. "Covenanters with God."
VIII. Termination of the process.

VII

THE DATA ANALYZED: III

Before discussing the actual moment of conversion and its attendant phenomena, it may be well briefly to consider some of the more prevalent theories which attempt to explain these phenomena. The change which conversion causes in the individual has been of deep interest to psychologists for the past half-century, since it affords them certain uniform and salient means of approaching the difficult subject of personality. Conversion—be it religious or other—seems a valid instance of a sudden, violent change in the personality of the converted. What he was before he appears no longer; a whole new set of energies, of ideals, wishes, and powers, would seem to have sprung into existence. Hence the phrase in common use that he is a "new man." But this "new man" cannot spring out of nothing; he must have had some connection with that "old man" which, by the conversion, is cast aside. What, then, has actually taken place?

As is usual in all subjects where students have spent their energies in drawing conclusions without personally collecting data, what takes place has been ingeniously misconstrued. Various hypotheses have been formulated, much less according to the facts of the case than according to the preconceived belief of

the theorists. Typical among them is that interpretation well expressed by Harold Begbie in his vivid little books, "Souls in Action" and "Twiceborn Men." The author recites a number of conversions operated through the work of the London Mission; and from them draws the inference that "Christianity" is "the only force which can change a radically bad man into a radically good one." Not at all worried by such a contradiction in terms, this writer frankly looks toward Christianity to furnish an explanation of the phenomena it appears to cause.

When we turn elsewhere, however, we may find conversion somewhat metaphysically defined as "a disturbance of the equilibrium of the self, which results in the shifting of the field of consciousness from lower to higher levels . . . and the beginning of transcendence."[1] Here is one of those calmly *a priori* definitions which are at once the despair and the opportunity of the simple seeker for the truth. If the levels to which the field of consciousness shifted, during and after conversion, were higher levels, then this statement would have more validity; but unfortunately, except in rare instances, they are not. Such definitions arise naturally from the consideration of certain very special cases, and they are totally destroyed by any fair examination of *all* the facts.

A writer,[2] analyzing the case of Pascal, terms conversion "the restoration of equilibrium to a mind hitherto unbalanced"; which definition, if one inserts the word "temporary" before "restoration," might perhaps stand. It is not clarified further by this writer's comparison of the process to that of a snake

casting its skin;[3] or his talk about the "sudden emergence into consciousness of the subliminal or secondary self." Professor James[4] avoids definitions; discussing the whole subject in his especially felicitous manner combining good literature and sound psychology. Yet he also tends to regard as final, results given by a few selected cases and supported by the fundamentally unsound method of the "questionnaire." Still another writer suggests that the main factor in conversion is the religious emotion superseding and supplanting all emotion before given by sin or pleasure.[5] Thus the convert's energies find a new outlet, while his worldly interest and his appetite for sin are lessened. By tracing the whole process to an emotional source, and by showing that it is based on an integral emotional necessity, Dr. Cutten has furnished a valuable starting-point, and one which becomes more significant the deeper goes our investigation. The limits, however, of such an investigation do not stop at Christianity, as this writer would seem to think, if any vital results are to be achieved therein.

The above citations are sufficient to indicate the trend of modern theory. Such psychological doctrine as they rely upon for support has been already glanced at in an earlier section, but it is necessary to make some further enquiry here, if that question is to be answered as to what actually takes place during conversion.[6] Höffding defines psychology as a "Science of the Soul," and this definition, which later workers regard both as provisional and inadequate, serves to show what was the starting-point of the earlier investigator.

No doubt the reason why the subject failed to come under the general methods of science for so long a time, lay in the difficulty of making any progress through the usual means; namely, by any investigation into the brain and its functions during their normal activity. A physician tells us that "nothing is more undemonstrative to mere inspection than healthy brain-matter,"[7] and by study of the diseased brain alone was any progress made possible. But so soon as investigation into the normal brain processes had established the great truth that the brain was not an unit, then immediately a fresh set of difficulties presented themselves to the psychological investigator. He was brought face to face with the complex and bewildering problem of Personality, and the deeper he delved into this question, the more he attempted to solve it by the weapons of his logic and his imagination, the more quickly he appeared to arrive at what Sir William Hamilton terms "the inexplicability of ultimate facts." If the brain is not "a single organ working as an unit," then in what portion of it do those elements reside which make up our personality; what is this personality, and how does it account for the facts? When Mill said that "the phenomena of self and of memory are merely two sides of the same fact," he did not add that, whereas the brutes have memory, they appear to have but the faintest adumbration of what we call personality. The "wave-theory" of Professor James, which considers that each passing wave of consciousness is a part of that wave which preceded it, is open to other vital objections.[8]

From this chaotic borderland of theory one obtains finally two salient ideas:

That the central point of personality is self-consciousness, would seem to be no longer a matter of doubt; and that this personality, this Ego, whatever it be, is not an unit, not homogeneous, and not static, would seem to be equally matter of proof. Whether the elements which combined to produce it exist in a state of flux,[9] or whether, according to another theory, they are incessantly being dispersed and reassembled, as in sleep and waking, is of lesser importance, once the fact of the fundamental instability of their combination has been grasped. The laboratory experiment, the use of hypnosis, have provided many precise means of determining this instability, its degree and its limitations, other than could possibly be mentioned in this study; the main fact remains that it is so to be determined. And once this idea is formulated by the mind, it has advanced several paces nearer the answer to that question of what actually takes place.

If by an analogy taken from astronomy it could be brought closer to the imagination, Personality might be depicted as a nebula; of which the nuclear centre is Consciousness, while the power holding the atoms together, is Will. By such analogy it will readily be understood that should anything occur to loosen the grip of will, the atoms composing this unstable combination will no longer remain unified. Now, the various elements thus normally under control, the emotions, the imagination, the reason, and

so on, are present in different proportions in each individual. These proportions are the result of many influences, of which race, evolution, heredity, nutrition, social conditions, are probably the most significant; and the ratio of each to each other varies widely and is of the utmost importance. Any shifting of proportions must cause a tendency to readjustment in the entire mass.

This analogy is hardly complete, yet it will serve by permitting us to visualize what follows. In a full, normal, healthy personality, these elements are interfused so that they act as an unit upon surrounding circumstances. Anything which happens to alter the proportion of these elements, tends to diffuse the mass, and temporarily to disunite the combination forming the personality. When, so diffused, the nebula no longer whirls evenly, then the personality is said to be unbalanced; and when, through some other force, this diffused mass is again freshly charged by a current of will, it coalesces, it integrates, it moves evenly once more.

This metaphor is not so fantastic as it appears; for the sober treatises of science make a constant use of words and phrases based on similar conceptions. The terms commonly dealing with that portion of the consciousness which lies outside of the nucleus, show this. Dr. Pratt, for instance, names it the "feeling mass" or "the fringe of consciousness."[10] It is called by others the subconscious or extra-marginal self.[11] The incoherent character of this primal consciousness, even before it arrived at a stage of development whence it was enabled to produce ideas, is

spoken of as the result of evolution; and is seen at work in the embryo, the infant. As it draws together, as it becomes nucleated, definite, and effective, personality results.

But the primordial stuff of consciousness is not all used in the formation of this active nucleus. There is a residuum which lies outside, a loose, diffused "feeling mass" which serves to envelope, like some tenuous gas, the periphery of the nebula. Such matter will remain in this extra-marginal territory, unless some influence, acting to widen and agitate the whirl, will, for the time being, force the fringe within the range of the active nucleated centre of consciousness. Through the medium provided by religious confessions, the psychological process involved in such experiences is laid bare to us, so that we may visualize and understand the actual occurrence.

Personality, then, pictured as a nebula, with all its elements under the control of will, is thus seen moving through life, as we express it, "well-balanced" on its axis. A close study of its constitution would doubtless reveal (in those cases which come under our particular observation) that emotions preponderate in the mass; while its unity is delicately maintained, and under a certain amount of strain. At a given stage we mark the entrance of the destructive forces, placing the entire personality on the rack of intensity, fear, or doubt. Health is invariably injured, enormously affecting the balance, by causing the instability to become greater at one and the same moment that physical weakness loosens the centripetal force of the will. Immediately, the nebula is disunited

and diffused. The various elements are dispersed, naught moves harmoniously, a man is said to be at war with himself, and so in truth he is.

This stage has been concretely developed for the reader in the group of examples just reviewed under the heading "Depression." There are cases, of course, in which the dissociation becomes so complete that insanity or death is its only outcome. But in the vast majority of persons the condition is but temporary, following the indicated crises, and resulting from indicated conditions. It is apt to occur during puberty; for, although, from the ideal standpoint, youth should unfold symmetrically, harmoniously, and without crises, yet in actual life the very reverse is usually the case. After a lapse of time, varying widely in different instances, the disturbed elements of personality tend to seek readjustment to meet these new conditions. The fluctuations involved in this change, cause a tension exceedingly nervous and painful to the subject, already clouded by darkness and despair, and this tension is often depicted as a struggle, a conflict in which the different forces of personality are arrayed the one against the other.

It is customary to describe the termination of this conflict as a yielding-up of the will, but on examination the expression is found to be far from accurate. It is not the will which is yielded, but rather the various morbid obstructions to its harmonious action, which are overcome by a revival of that central force, heretofore weakened and ineffectual. It is the will's fresh assertion; its fresh energy to say, "I come, Lord!" or "Do as thou wilt"; which brings at length

peace to the sufferer. At once the jarring mass is integrated, the elements healthily coalesce; the subject would tell you he had "found peace"; that he was a new man, strengthened for a new life. By this, he really means that he is at last freed from all sensations save natural ones; that he is now no more conscious of the processes of his soul than he should be aware of the processes of his digestion; for, with the spiritual as with the physical nature, any consciousness of the machinery means that it is not running as it ought. The man is then "converted"; his wheel turns a new round. Reconstruction begins, and, weary of the tension of doubt, he readily submits to further peace-making influences.

The immediate cause of this healing and beneficent change has been defined by psychologists as a "yielding to suggestion," and in this phrase lies the crux of the whole matter. Granting that there is no objection to the image of personality as a nebula; or that the reader through this means has better visualized these obscure occurrences, long ere this he has realized that such an image offers no explanation of their cause. Informed that the reconstruction of this disunited mass of elements has been the work of an outside influence named "suggestion," his next question will naturally be to enquire what, in a psychological sense, is known about this suggestion?

"By suggestion," he is answered in the words of a modern investigator,[12] "is meant the intrusion into the mind of an idea, met with more or less opposition by the person, accepted uncritically at last; and realized unreflectively, almost automatically. By sug-

gestibility is meant that peculiar state of mind which is favorable to suggestion."

It is unnecessary for the purposes of this volume to enter deeply into the technique of suggestion, or to explain the experiments by which the facts have been attained. As regards the religious experience, the suggestion-theory has been advanced rather tentatively; due no doubt to the insufficiency of valid data, for which the questionnaire method is partially, at least, responsible. But the reader will have little difficulty in applying the generalizations just cited to the data in these pages, if he also bear in mind that "the first and general condition of normal suggestibility is fixation of the attention";[13] and that "*indirect* suggestion is often more effective than *direct* suggestion."[14]

Francis Galton,[15] trying some "experiments in the Human Faculty," proved the extreme susceptibility of our mental and nervous centres to suggestion. Among other experiments he sought "to evoke the commoner feelings of Insanity by investing everything I met with the attributes of a spy! It was long," he adds, "before the uncanny feeling thus aroused wore away." Almost every one of us has in his proper person undergone some such experience, and has realized the force on himself of a repeated idea. Books, plays, newspapers, all the influences of the world at large, will serve to bring it home to him, and to his daily life. Every parent makes conscious or unconscious use of suggestion in training children, in whom psychologists agree to find a degree of suggestibility almost equal to that which exists in hypnosis;[16] and over

whom the simplest idea may thus have an uncanny power.

The study of suggestion has been undertaken very largely through the examination of diseased nervous functions; and the French neurologists Charcot, Janet, and others, have done pioneer work along these lines. From their writings one may obtain some significant facts, highly illuminative of the confessant's state of mind during the conversion-crisis. M. Janet[17] it should be noted at the outset, has the medical-materialist view, which places all religious emotionalism definitely and finally in the realm of pathology. He observes the susceptibility of these cases to suggestion, also remarking that incipient hystericals "come out of the confessional calmed and cheered."[18] The further parallel between the states of mind in the subjects of M. Janet's study and our confessants of emotional religious experience, is very striking, and must not be overlooked, even if one does not wish to follow this medical-materialist reasoning all the way. For instance, M. Janet's cases also desire to place themselves under authority, and to have the simplest matters decided for them. There is complete apathy; often combined with that form of insensibility to emotions and to family ties, which is characteristic of certain confessants, to whom nothing counts beside the *idée fixe*.[19] M. Janet also points out that "a tendency to suggestion and to subconscious acts is the sign . . . of hysteria; and that the constitutional doubter is predisposed in this direction."[20] Such is the person who is incapable of even small decisions and whose whole life is rendered useless from his wavering. Com-

menting on the various "provocative agents" in these cases, among which he classes the period of puberty, improper nutrition depressing the nervous system, overwork, anxiety, or emotion, M. Janet [21] lays much emphasis on hereditary influences which dispose the mind to such tendencies; and which are frequently indicated in the records just reviewed.

Such work as this naturally tends to class mysticism with hysteria; and not the least of M. Janet's examples is Teresa,[22] whose "Autobiography" he regards much as Charcot that of the Mère Jeanne des Anges. A recent study of mysticism vigorously combats this attitude toward the great contemplatives; and in truth it is one which will find many antagonists.[23] The citations just made are not for the purpose of agreement, but rather to aid the reader in comprehending that power of suggestion which plays so vital a part in the drama of religious change.

Bearing these facts in mind, let us for an instant return to that image of personality, whirling its incoherent nebula of sensations and ideas through the universe, and readily susceptible to direct and indirect suggestions. Somewhat slowly at first, then more rapidly, the forces already analyzed tend to set up a disturbance and finally to produce disunion. The suggestion, which at a crisis serves to reanimate the weakened will and to reassemble the dispersed elements, is inevitably swift, sudden, and definite. In the sincere and full record, it is almost always traceable, so that one may put his finger upon it exactly, if one will. It charges into the mêlée, as it were, precisely at that moment when high nervous tension has

predisposed the imagination to abnormal sensitiveness and activity, and thus turns the fortunes of the day.

"Intensity of thought operating on intensity of feeling may elicit surprising illumination," is the penetrating remark of Sir Egerton Brydges;[24] and one cannot therefore be surprised at the effect which a powerful suggestion may have upon the mind. Necessarily is the field of consciousness during this period of tension occupied by the most fantastic and overcharged ideas. Excitability of the nerve-centres resulting, there may suddenly appear visual and auditory hallucinations of extraordinary vividness. Such phenomena will be found to bear a marked family likeness; and in most cases they are the *media* of the suggestion itself.

This is often conveyed to the sufferer by what seems to him a voice, sometimes issuing a command, such as "Tolle, lege!"[25] or, "Surrender, or thou shalt die!"[26] or, "Awake, sinner!"[27] or, "Go to Pennsylvania!"[28] or, "Take no care for thy business."[29] It may be in the form of consolation or reassurance: "Thy sins are forgiven thee";[30] or, "Fear not, oh, thou tossed!"[31] or, "Thou shalt walk with me in white."[32] It is often a question,—"Paul, Paul, why persecutest thou me?"[33] or, "Oh, sinner, did I suffer for thee?"[34] and it is at times an ejaculation, like "Helios!"[35] or, "Eternity, eternity, the endless term of long eternity!"[36] Plain, final statements, such as "Life and death consist in loving God,"[37] or, "It is finished,"[38] are very effective suggestions to a sensitive person. It is not forgotten that to Luther the

statement was simply, "the just shall live by faith."

If in the nature of a vision, this suggestion usually takes the form of the figure of Christ;[39] although often that of Mary,[40] and sometimes the Holy Child.[41] The dazzling lights[42] which accompany this crisis have been variously interpreted by the devout and by the neurologist; while monstrous and devilish visions[43] testify to the vivid imagination of the Middle Ages. When we remember Dr. Sidis's observation that "a familiar thing, in a strange abnormal position or shape, produces the most effective suggestion,"[44]— then many of these apparitions, such as Loyola's plectrum and the Crucifix of Colonel Gardiner, become the more readily comprehensible.

In giving this somewhat long introduction to the analysis of the cases themselves, we have a little departed from our original inductive plan. By so doing, however, we have but followed the injunction of no less a mind than that of Auguste Comte. "If it be true," said Comte, "that every theory must be based upon observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance, our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them, for the most part we could not even perceive them."[45] Dealing with data so chaotic and often so emotionally overcharged as that concerning conversion, a need of guidance becomes obvious. But the reader need now no longer be withheld from exercising his logical powers over the problem presented by the cases themselves.

"I was one night alone," says Henry Alline,[46] "pondering on my lost condition, when all of a sudden

I was surrounded with an uncommon light like a blaze of fire; I was plunged into keen despair, every power of my mind was strained with terror and surprise. . . .'' Visions of damnation, with tempting by beautiful fiends, followed: ''One midnight I was awaked out of sleep by a still, small voice. . . . I thought I saw a small body of light as plain as possible before me.'' Recurrences of a similar kind are many, and when at length he picks up his Bible and opens it at random, he is ''inexpressibly ravished.'' ''My whole soul,'' he declares, ''seemed filled with the Divine Being.''

Elizabeth Ashbridge, Quaker, thus describes ''the peculiar exercise'' which befell her at the fateful moment: ''I thought myself sitting by a fire, in company with several others, when there arose a thundergust, and a voice as loud as from a mighty trumpet pierced my ears with these words, 'Oh Eternity! Eternity, the endless term of long eternity!' '' Her heart is alarmed and melted by this manifestation.

Augustin's account is a world-possession. After he was ''sick and tormented,'' we hear of the agony, the storm, the healing outburst of tears, the inward voice bidding, ''Tolle, lege!'' of which he says: ''Nor could I ever remember to have heard the like,'' and at which ''all the gloom of doubt vanished away.'' In whatever connection it is regarded, the beauty and intensity of this record remain unsurpassed. Equally well known is Bunyan's narrative, wherein, during a game, ''a voice from heaven did suddenly fall into my soul.'' During prayer, he fancied the Devil pulled his clothes; but the moment which he called conversion, was followed by recurring clouds of darkness.

Peter Cartwright, the Evangelist, who does not mention any preceding melancholy, has a sudden and awful experience at the age of sixteen.[47] "It seemed to me," he writes, "all of a sudden my blood rushed to my head, my heart palpitated, in a few minutes I turned blind, an awful impression rested on my mind that death had come." The excitement following this condition was fostered by his pious mother; and he was not calmed until a voice called to him, "when out alone in the horse-lot."

The rare tract in which John Crook tells of his experiences is written in a style of extraordinary vividness. After his anguish and tribulation, one morning on a sudden there "sprang in me a voice, saying, 'Fear not, oh, thou tossed'; whereupon all was hushed and quieted within me. Here was such calm and stillness, I was filled with peace and joy, and there shone such an inward light that for the space of seven or eight days I walked as one taken from the earth." The revivalist, C. G. Finney, underwent a strange and oppressed feeling, as if he were about to die. On walking to his law office, an inward voice accosted him; and later, arising from prayer, and opening the door of his room, Jesus stood before him in the flesh. Both lights and voices beset George Fox, in the wilderness during his religious travail, much as the demons in form and sound beset Guibert de Nogent in his monastery. Luther was sitting in his cell, several years after his first depression, when he was struck by the words, "The just shall live by faith." Mme. Guyon is turned by hearing a voice which tells her she is the bride of God. This same idea we find

in many earlier cases of mystical women. Joseph Hoag had been in such a state that (he says) "my eyes looked ghastly," when his conversion came. "I laid down in weakness and heard as plain a whisper as ever I heard from a human being: 'Surrender—or you shall die and go to the place of everlasting torment!'" He could only whisper the Lord's Prayer, and the cloud was lifted. The conversion of St. Patrick is accompanied by the vision of the sun, whereat he cried, "Helios!"—but he also hears a voice when asleep in the wilderness. As Oliver Sansom, a Quaker, "lay in bed in the morning early, I heard as it were an audible voice which said unto me, 'Take no care for thy business.'" Suso has supernatural raptures and is caught up in ecstasy, during which what he saw and heard no tongue can tell. He had been a monk for five years before his conversion; and thereafter his visions were many, and progressed from those of beauty to those of horror. Although Teresa's visions and voices are many, they are not attached to any conversion in the ordinary sense; but came afterwards, and accompanied her progress along the way of mysticism and sanctity. "When I kneeled down," says Whitefield, "I felt great heavings in my body . . . sweat came through me"; Satan terrifies him, yet he observes that he had no visions, only the fear of them. The physical disturbances are as great as though the vision of the Lord had occurred.

Gertrude of Eisleben writes very beautifully about the circumstances of her conversion which began "sweetly and charmingly," she says, "by appeasing the trouble which thou hadst excited in my soul for

more than a month . . . on raising my head I beheld thee . . . under the form of a youth of sixteen years, beautiful and amiable.'' During a severe illness about this time, Jesus visits and consoles her, while she observes that he is wearing a necklace of gold and rose-color. It is interesting to find her declaring that *fear* was the first element of her conversion. Like the foregoing—like almost all, indeed, of the mediæval mystics—the conversion-visions of Ignatius Loyola are of a beautiful and ravishing kind. ''On a certain night, as he lay awake, he saw with open face the likeness of the blessèd Mother of God with her holy child Jesus,'' and from that moment felt all carnal desires vanish. Later on, the character of the phenomena changes much for the worse; serpents with eyes and strange demons replace the lovely picture of the mother and child. It is also the Holy Child in the mother's arms who smiled on Salimbene in the chapel. The abbot Othloh of St. Emmeran [48] in Regensburg was converted without long preliminary agony:— ''As he was sitting one day before the gates of the monastery,'' says the translator, ''reading his favorite author Lucan . . . a blast of hot wind . . . smote him three times,'' so ''violently that he took his book and retired within the guest-house.'' While he mused upon this circumstance, the account says that ''he felt himself seized by the grasp of a monster . . . and fell into the delirium of high fever.'' Othloh does not connect this occurrence with his soul's welfare until a week later, when, in the intervals of his malady, a mysterious form comes to his bedside and belabors him with a scourge. He needs a third warning, how-

ever, ere he can bring himself to abandon his Lucan and complete his conversion. Jerome was similarly accused in a dream of loving Cicero better than Christ.[49]

The conversion of Emanuel Swedenborg takes place in his middle age—at fifty-five years. It is accompanied by so many visions and voices that the exact moment is a little difficult to determine. The "Spiritual Diary" notes miraculous lights, words heard in the early morning, horrors, flames, and talks with spirits.

The mystic, John Tauler, one night in prayer hears a voice by his bodily ears whereat his senses leave him. When they return, he finds himself calm and peaceful, with fresh understanding.[50] In the famous case of Colonel James Gardiner, the subject saw "a visible representation of Christ on a cross surrounded by a glory while a voice cried, 'Oh, sinner, did I suffer for thee?'" He sunk down in his armchair, and remained for a long time insensible. All that Ephraim of Edessa[51] tells us in the metrical account of his conversion is that he had been quarrelsome and cruel to animals, but that a spirit came to him and his heart was touched. No doubt the moment was accompanied with a mystical manifestation, but we get no details; the early date alone makes the document worth noting. It is suggestive to contrast the account given by the Indian prophetess, Catherine Wabose, during a conversion prepared for by solitude and fasting. She saw many points of light, which seemed to approach and to prick her; she heard the god's voice and received a prophecy concerning her future son.

The anchoress Juliana has left a series of chaotic

revelations, much like Hildegarde's, which do not mark an exact conversion. Of this she did not seem to feel the need. They are mystical revelations from the beginning, which is so gradual that no moment's crisis or change is remarked. This is an especial characteristic of mediæval religious experience; though not universal. The visions which turned Carlo da Sezze was one of the Devil coming from hell. Jesus appeared to Baptiste Varani, as a handsome youth with curling hair and robed in white and gold, beseeching her to take the vows. God's voice speaking to her soul moved Antoinette Bourignon, when at eighteen she wept and prayed for guidance. The account of Joseph Smith, the Mormon, is as follows: "I kneeled down and began to offer up the desire of my heart to God. . . . I had scarcely done so when immediately I was seized upon by some power which utterly overcame me, and had such an astonishing influence over me as to blind my tongue so that I could not speak. Thick darkness gathered round me. . . . But exciting my powers to call upon God to deliver me . . . just at this moment of great alarm, I saw a pillar of light exactly over my head, above the brightness of the sun, which descended gradually until it fell upon me. . . . I found myself delivered from the enemy which held me bound." He then had a further vision of two bright personages standing in the air, one of which pointed to the other, saying: "This is my beloved Son, hear him!" A conversion followed; after which Smith fell, unconscious. He adds: "When the light had departed, I had no strength"; but he went home exultant and satisfied. The effect of the vision

was not only to reassure his faith, but it testified to the Lord's choice of him as Prophet. In his grandfather's case, the light had been a "fiery point"; and his aunt had been miraculously cured by a "bright" vision of the Saviour. Smith's case is thus found to be analogous to much more famous experiences.

Of Pascal's conversion we know only what was recorded upon the paper which he wore ever after about his neck. He had been in bad health for some years. One night, unable to sleep, he lay reading the Gospel of John. He writes these words: "Between 10.30 in the evening and 12.30—FIRE." Then he adds: "Certitude, peace and Joy—!" and again, "Joy!" and "Tears of Joy!" There is no accent more poignant in all religious literature than this brief note records.[52]

To the nun Osanna Andreasi, an angel showed the universe; while a voice within her heart uttered the words: "Life and Death consist in loving God." To the Ranter, Joseph Salmon, the voice said: "Arise and depart, for this is not your rest!" He adds, quaintly: "I was suddenly struck dead to all my wonted enjoyments. . . . When my three dayes or set time was expired, I begann to feele some quickening comforte within me . . . the gravestone was rolled away and I set at liberty from these deep and dark retires; out I came with a most serene and cheerful countenance into a most heavenly and divine enjoyment."

The words which conveyed a conviction of joy to J. Hudson-Taylor were, "It is finished"; in which the power of a suggestion is very plainly indicated. The Reverend Gardiner Spring, after much wrestling,

found "the Word precious and refreshing." Ubertino da Casale beheld in his sleep an "alarming vision of God," just before Angela of Foligno had shown him the true way; and writes: "All my lukewarmness of soul as well as my corporal infirmities disappeared." The famous dream of Jerome has already received our attention; we have noted that, when he is later accused by Rufinus of still reading, "my Tully," his defence is that he cannot be bound by a promise given in a dream! This conversion, therefore, is unusual in its effect on the mind of the converted subject. Rolle of Hampole beautifully describes his conversion in the chapel where he sat at prayer. He heard strains of music, and felt "a merry heat and unknown. . . . Forsooth," he continues, "my thought continually to mirth of song was changed." This lovely conjunction of piety and music was also felt by Jonathan Edwards, whose own tranquilly-joyful confidence in God's love is very different from the terror he felt obliged to preach to others. "To soliloquize in a singing voice," was his impulse and delight, and this brought about "a sweet complacency in God." One vision came to him in the woods. "The person of Christ," he writes, "appeared ineffably excellent"; and caused him to weep for joy.

Startling dreams and visions beset Joanna Southcott, who had one struggle with Satan lasting ten days, during which she was beaten black and blue ere she obtained peace. An illness due to meningitis caused many devils to torment poor little Sister Thérèse of the Holy Child; but a vision of the Virgin announced her recovery and conversion. A similar [53]

vision, emerging from a black cross in the Church of Araceli, brought about the very rapid conversion of the young Jew, Alphonse de Ratisbonne. The nun, Véronique Giuliani, seemed to think that she needed no conversion; for Christ himself offered her the chalice of the passion and crowned her with his crown of thorns. Carré de Montgéron was one of those converted at the tomb of the Archdeacon Paris. There were so many of these, and so much disturbance resulted, that the authorities were forced to close the cemetery to the crowds. Carré remained there, kneeling, for four hours. Maria d' Agréda was never converted; but she obtained relief from despair and temptations by writing down her visions. A. C. Emmerich also took the veil after a vision during which she, too, was crowned with thorns.

Rulman Merswin before conversion suffered "the pains of hell" for all of three years. "A great and superhuman joy" followed for a brief space. With Gertrude More, the struggle to renounce was long and bitter, until, as she writes, she was "almost desperate"; and it was made the harder for her by the unsympathetic and harsh treatment of her director. Under another guidance, "more by quietness than force," she found herself so calmed that she wondered. The influence of the director in these Catholic cases can hardly be overestimated, since the isolation and sensitiveness of these cloistered persons renders it of particular importance. We know the tragedy to which it led in the story of the priest Urbain Grandier and the nuns of Loudun; and it is a marked factor in the example of Jeanne de St. Mathieu Deleloe. Vowed to

the Blessed Virgin from her infancy, this girl of sixteen entered joyously upon her convent-life. Her happiness brings her a keen sense of God's love and favor; she sees the Holy Mother blessing her with a smile, and the mystery of the Trinity is revealed to her in a vision. But the convent-superior and her director both told her that she was presumptuous and tempted by the Devil; and at once the visions turned horrible, painful, and perverse. Assailed by temptations both carnal and blasphemous, she undergoes every emotion of horror and agony; is converted, and reconverted, amid relapses and diabolic visitations of a cruelly tormenting kind.

The reader has already observed that in the mediæval cases, the mystical and visionary manifestations are nearer to the normal life; and the conversion-crisis itself is less easily defined. How should Gertrude or Hildegarde or Mechtilde, come to regard the sights and sounds, with which their ecstasies were rewarded, as indicating any especial crisis? Most of their companions were similarly favored. The Holy Child himself gaily awoke the inmates of Mechtilde's convent at dawn; while seraphim waving lights preceded them into the chapel. Such frequent manifestation brought no feeling of crucial significance; and thus conversion in the meaning of new life there was not—all these emotions and their attendant phenomena were but stages in the *via mystica.*

Not so the conversions of the group next to be considered. To them, this mystical moment possessed every element of fear and of crisis, heightened by unexpectedness and bizarrerie. The seventeenth and

eighteenth century pietists were many degrees away from the mediæval mystics; upon the former already an active, material world impressed its complete objectivity, so that for them voices and visions and devils possessed additional horror beside the supernatural. They voice this horror by their intensity. One hears of Billy Bray shouting, "Come on, thou devil!" and afterwards dancing and leaping in praise of his victory. Equally vehement was Jerry McAuley when he seemed to feel a hand laid on his shoulder, and a voice assuring him of forgiveness. The evangelist Jacob Knapp felt himself actually to be sinking into hell when Jesus descended to save him. The visual and auditory manifestations of the Friends and Methodists partake in character of the stern sense of sin, prevailing among these groups. Thus, Margaret Lucas's account states that the truth seized upon her in a "lively" manner; after she had "cursed the Lord and defied Heaven" by a Voice which rung in her soul. Mildred Ratcliff was in meeting when she felt a hand laid on her shoulder, while a voice said: "Thou hast no business here." This marks the turning-point to a mind much exercised about the state of irreligion in France! To young Stephen Grellet, at twenty-two, "walking in the fields, my mind being under no sort of religious concern nor excitement, there came suddenly an awful voice proclaiming, 'Eternity, Eternity!'" The empty fields were the scene of many a conflict. Here Anna Braithwaite observed that "a flood of light seemed to shine on my understanding, . . . my heart was humbled."

Samuel Neale combated with the Devil until his shirt

was wringing wet. Two ploughmen, James Naylor and Myles Halhead, heard the voice, just as did Tolstoï's Levin, while at their work. The first says: "I rejoyced and obeyed." The other speaks of "this voice—this heavenly voice did make my heart leap with Joy!" Similarly, it is an intelligible voice, which causes Mary Hagger to kneel down under "a contriting impression." Thomas Story, a man who notes minutely every operation of mind and change of mood, is plunged in darkness, when he hears a voice within say, "Thy will be done," and immediately is calmed and relieved. Much more explicit is the voice to Jane Hoskins, for, during a sore fit of sickness, it says to her: "If I restore thee, go to Pennsylvania." Later on, after spending a penitential season with godly sorrow, it directs her to be obedient and she is once again eased. But when the voice bids her to speak in meeting, she resists, and is overwhelmed with horror until she yields.

A vision of a black man at the crisis, followed by dreams of him, directly caused the conversion of T. R. Gates. Dazzling lights add their warning. David Brainerd describes the warning influence as "a glory unspeakable!" On the contrary, Luther Rice feels as if descending into hell, and is quieted only by signing his name to a blank sheet of paper for God to fill up with his destiny. David Marks and Elias Smith were both stunned by bad falls in the woods, and immediately were possessed by the fear of hell. In both cases this is succeeded by a beautiful serenity; the latter felt it to so great an extent that he sang aloud. We have already mentioned the

visionary terrors which beset James H. Linsley just before conversion, in which infernal spirits and devil-tigers take part. The conversion itself was brought about by his cry, "Lord, I believe"—at which, in the twinkling of an eye, he is perfectly calm and joyful.

The visions in many Methodist cases are fantastic. That of John Haime names a "creature" flying over his head. Another, Thomas Payne, sees two beasts; one a large bear-like animal; when he called it Satan, and bade it go, it disappeared. The light which Mary Fletcher beholds, she describes rather as steady than dazzling; a voice whispers: "Thou shalt walk with me in white." John Furz feels a freezing cold run through his every vein, while he is kneeling in the garden overwhelmed with agonies of terror. It is a still, small voice which assures him of pardon, and immediately darkness turns to light and he obtains permanent relief.

The crucial suggestion may take various shapes. Although Richard Whatcoat was overwhelmed with darkness and could take no rest by day or night, yet one day, while reading, he fixes his attention on a certain verse, and the cloud rolls away. He then gets sleep, which he much needed. Upon B. Hibbard, Jesus appeared to look down compassionately, and he cried out: "Glory! Glory!" Light shone suddenly at midnight on Jacob Young, and he says: "I arose from the floor praising God." To Thomas Taylor, Christ appeared as if on the cross, with his vesture dipped in blood. Thomas Hanson writes that during prayer, "my heart, with a kind sweet struggle melted into the hand of God." It is in meeting that Thomas

Walsh was "pierced as with darts and arrows"; and there he is finally delivered and breaks out into tears of joy and love. John Prickard feels heaven in his heart; while Peter Jaco, during a solitary walk, was impressed with the suggestion that Jesus died for the vilest sinner, and at once his soul was filled with light and love.

The burden of Thomas Olivers falls from him upon the shining of a star. Thomas Lee says that "God broke in on my soul in a wonderful manner." Matthias Joyce has ever more horrors than peace; yet once during prayer he thinks that he is sanctified. While poor John Gratton was alone on the moor pulling heath, he felt something "swift and precious and knows it is the spirit." Thereupon, he has a vision of a people, "poor and despised, the Lord's own"; and at once joins the Quakers. William Williams was converted in meeting; and writes that it was indeed "an awfully solemn time."

An assurance of pardon is often the only suggestion that is needed to bring harmony once more to what Hamlet calls "this distracted globe"; but it is not always so. Fear is sometimes more powerful than forgiveness; and suggestion takes the form of a command. To Richard Rodda, it was declared, "Thy sins are forgiven thee." But the voice which comforted John Pawson was not so encouraging to Freeborn Garretson—it was an awful voice and cried: "Awake, sinner, for you are not prepared to die!" Such a voice also bids William Jackson give up everything but Christ. Matthew Arnold has made the vision of Sampson Staniforth the property of all literature. He is on

sentry-duty, when he kneels and prays, clouds open exceedingly bright, and he sees Christ upon the Cross. Lorenzo Dow avows that his manifestations have come to him in dreams; though these are dreams of hell, and so hideous that they caused him to cry out: "Lord, I give up, I submit, I yield!" So also Richard Williams, a surgeon, during a sudden delirium, suddenly screams: "Lord, I come!" and is immediately calmed. On the other hand, David Nitschman has only to say to himself: "I will suppose there be a God," whence he is immediately filled with a strange sweetness. Henry Ward Beecher's peace comes to his soul "like the bursting-forth of Spring." The Divine voice in "emphatic" accents moves Granville Moody. A conversion following the Holy Sacrament, is the experience of the modern nun, Mary of the Divine Heart, who, however, carefully specifies that the voice naming her "Spouse" was wholly "*interior.*"

The uniformity of effect in these cases will not have escaped the reader. Confirmation of their evidence is to be found in those lives and legends whose non-autobiographical character does not bring them, strictly speaking, within the scope of this book. Among these is that of Catherine of Genoa's conversion, as told in her "Vita" on familiar lines.[54] After intense distress for months, she told her sister that she felt disinclined to confession; but yielded to the other's advice and knelt before the priest. While in this position, she was penetrated by a feeling of all-purifying love, and in a transport, cried out to herself: "No more sins—no more sins!" Her health throughout all her life was subject to strange fluctuations; she felt con-

stantly as though she were burning up, and absorbed her food so rapidly that she could not get sufficient sustenance therefrom.

Long ere this, the reader will have commented upon a seeming omission; and in truth we must delay no further to examine what is probably the most important of all conversions—the conversion of Paul.[55] His experience, in the three accounts which remain to us, offers an apparent contradiction to the law which psychology has formulated for the government of such cases. For this reason, if for no other, Paul's case is the mainstay of those writers and preachers who hold that conversion is, in itself, proof of the existence of the supernatural. They point also in support of this belief to one or two other cases—to Augustin, for instance; but they rely on none with so much confidence as on that of Paul. Here is a case, they repeat, for which reason cannot account, nor can comparison explain. The subject is a young man of practical energy, neither humble nor illiterate, familiar with Greek philosophy, and already bestirring himself in the world of affairs. Moreover, his mind is filled with antagonism to Christianity; he is on his way from persecuting the Christians in one place to persecute them in another. His conversion occurs at midday; with no premonitory doubts or darkness. He is smitten without warning to the earth; God's voice in accusing question thunders in his ears; he rises a Christian, perhaps the greatest of Christians.

Now, the isolation of any fact in his experience from comparison with other facts, is enough at once for the subject to infer a miracle. To the savage, the first

white man he sees is a god; the first gun he hears fired is due to supernatural force. He has only to behold other white men, to hear other guns, and what was miraculous becomes without delay both natural and hostile. The system of scrupulous isolation has been applied for centuries to all events and persons mentioned in the Bible; and nowhere to more purpose than in the example of Paul. As an influence, it extends to modern times, to higher criticism, and to rationalistic interpretation. Thus, even Renan [56] is to be found attributing Paul's vision and the blinding light, to a thunderstorm and a simultaneous attack of ophthalmia. Any superficial comparison of Paul's conversion with other conversions, makes a thunderstorm hypothesis wholly superfluous. The vision of Jesus, the voice, the dazzling light, are characteristic of this type of conversion, indoors or out, storm or calm. Yet the great French critic is surely right when he insists that in the history of an epoch where only an *ensemble* can be certain,[57] where details must be more or less doubtful following the legendary nature of the documents,—then *hypothesis becomes indispensable.* In this particular instance, there is extant a sufficient body of material on which needful hypothesis may be based.

Paul was an essentially personal religious leader. From his speeches repeated in Acts,[58] from his letters, we obtain personal matter of incontestable authenticity. Omitting any references to the disputed Epistles,[59] there yet remains ample material for a picture of this man. Tradition describes Paul as slight and insignificant in appearance.[60] His constitution, though evidently wiry, was yet not healthy. On this fact he

dwells repeatedly, even alluding to chronic infirmity.[61] No doubt the reader will have suggested to him the physique and the endurance of Wesley; yet it must not be forgotten that Wesley's from the first was a nature distinctly non-mystical. Paul very positively assures us, on the contrary, that he was subject to visionary and mystical experiences.[62]

These facts show that there was nothing in Paul's character or constitution to remove him beyond the pale of comparison with other cases. That he was a zealous persecutor of Christians does not indicate any condition of mind unique in the history of conversion.[63] Alphonse de Ratisbonne, if not a persecutor of Catholics, was at least violently anti-Catholic at the moment when he was converted: Paul Löwengard was violently pro-Jewish at the moment he was turned from Judaism: Uriel d'Acosta experienced successive conversions always in a state of extreme antagonism to the faith he was about to adopt: and James Lackington, Richard Williams, and others, display similar attitudes. The essential condition is, not that a man shall be favorably inclined toward any form of religion, but simply that the subject of religion, *in se*, shall be uppermost in his mind, that his thoughts and actions shall be chiefly occupied with it. And this essential condition we see Paul eminently fulfils. It is the mass of emotion generated in a man which converts him, rather than the special form which that emotion causes his ideas to assume; since action and reaction follow one another in human thoughts as inevitably as they do in human affairs.

Paul, by his own account, was ripe for a reaction.[64]

His letters indicate that he was a man of warm heart and tender sympathies; and it is impossible that the misery caused by his own bigotry should not at moments have weighed upon him. If he does not distinctly say so, it is perhaps because, like many another convert and confessant, he allows his pre-converted state to loom very black, that his converted state may shine by comparison.[65]

But it is by no means certain that he does not indirectly say so; that he is so sure of himself as his commentators would have us believe. They have made very much of Paul's confidence; his certainty that he was right in his persecution of the Christians. This is their entire foundation for the assumption that his conversion was *sui generis,* because there was no previous state of doubt, no darkness to be dispelled, no melancholy to be lifted. None of your predisposing causes existed in this case, they argue; only the hand of God could smite the scoffer, in his mid-career, as Paul was smitten.

Well, there is probably no need to repeat that the *character* of Paul, as it is revealed to us in his letters, is that of a zealot,—a fanatic, if one will, but one with a warm and tender heart. The evidence of character, therefore, is strong for a reaction, ere yet he started on his memorable journey to Damascus. Moreover, what are we to understand by that phrase which the voice uttered immediately after the accusing question? "It is hard for thee," so the text runs, "to kick against the pricks."[66]

Renan[67] explains the phrase as meaning Paul's unwillingness; he is an ox forced forward, willy-nilly,

by his Master's goad. Students have found that the words "to kick against the goad," came from a proverb then in common use. But in this connection they surely have also a metaphorical significance; what can they mean if not the "goad" of conscience? "It is hard for thee to kick against thy conscience—thy struggle is over—" says the voice, just as it said, "Surrender!" to Joseph Hoag; or, "Thy will be done!" to Thomas Story, or to another, "I have given thee the victory." In more general terms, the straining doubt of self, which filled Paul's mind when he set forth upon a task which moved him with increasing distaste and horror, suddenly resolved into a definite shape, with the appeal and the suggestion of a turn to Christianity. The first suggestion puts him definitely in the wrong by a question he cannot answer, for he knew not why he persecuted Jesus. The second suggestion sweeps away forever all obstructions to the new current of energy, to the new faith, by showing him that he cannot resist, that he must go forward upon a new path, spurred by that force within of which he knows not, the power of his own character, of his own genius. As for the other phenomena of this conversion; comparison, as we have seen, does away with the need of any naturalistic explanation, such as Renan's, of the ophthalmia and the thunderstorm.[68] Similar cases are to be found in our list where the subject was not in an Arabian desert at noon. Paul's after experiences, the healing visit of Ananias, all link him to that group to whom the vision and the voice bring conversion, but a complete peace and assurance do not come till a few days later.

The subsequent progress of Paul's religious feeling, the development of his character, follow the leading of his energetic will. He is one of those in whom the newly generated force becomes at once objective. His organizing genius seeks a suitable outlet; and like Augustin, like Wesley, his personal problem once settled, it does not rise again, and he turns his mind to other things. Thus, one reads little further about his personal experiences; his letters draw upon the past only during his concern to make his belief prevail.[69] It is interesting to find that from repetition his account of the heavenly voice and its command grows elaborate and detailed. He believes that it commands him to do this and that; and, as he tells Agrippa, he was "not disobedient unto the heavenly vision." Very shortly after his conversion, indeed, Paul ceased to tread any longer upon the "mystical way"; and that he began to concern himself more with the welfare of the souls of others than with his own soul, is a fact to which we owe the establishment of Christianity.

Comparative study thus destroys the theory that Paul's experience was unique. He is linked by it to many an ardent and devout soul. Analysis of his narrative disposes also of the idea that the vision operated upon a sceptical mind. "La condition du miracle," says Renan, "c'est la crédulité du témoin."[70] True it is in every sense that no miracle is possible without faith; and the case of Paul is no exception. His *mind* may not have been prepared, yet his emotions were. He may not himself have been conscious how much the fortitude of Christian victims had affected him toward their leader; yet he was so affected.

Full of doubt, of wonder, of dismay, of self-loathing, these conflicting sensations pricked his soul until he could resist no longer; the voice spoke; he listened and obeyed.

Paul's value as a character is not lessened when he is found to be one of a group. As a human being he is subject to human law; and nothing can be gained by trying to place his case beyond that law. To a broad mind, the beauty of human achievement is not clouded when it is found to be the result of order and of nature. Paul's work stands out as great, and as loyal a work, as though it were just what he believed it to be. If one of a group, then they are, indeed, a steadfast and a splendid band who lead humanity, having him at their head.

The present writer's view of the meaning of the words, "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks," is not without support from Pauline scholars. Rendall [71] says of the phrase: "This throws an interesting light on the state of Saul's mind before conversion: it seems he was already stifling conscientious doubts and scruples." The same explanation is furnished by Sadler,[72] and by Campbell,[73] who adds: "Conscience was at work . . . he was kicking against conviction." Pfleiderer [74] declares plainly that the goad was the painful doubt which Paul felt as to this persecution of the Christians. In "St. Paul," [75] by the Reverend J. R. Cohn, the writer thinks that a purely psychological explanation of Paul's change will ever remain unsatisfactory, but that the "goad" [76] doubtless referred to the influence of God upon Paul's pre-converted mind, the urging him forward, as it were, against his will.

On the other hand, Meyer[77] says, very positively: "The conversion of Saul does not appear, on an accurate consideration of the three narratives," which agree in their main points, to have had "the way psychologically prepared for it by scruples of conscience as to his persecuting proceedings"; and this startling assertion is capped by the additional remark that in view of Paul's entirely pure character such scruples are extremely improbable!

Doubt of one's own conduct would not seem to our ethical ideas, to interfere with essential purity of motive; but this view of Meyer's is shared by Wrede,[78] and substantially by Dr. Lumby,[79] the editor of the Cambridge Bible. The latter will not allow the "*pricks*" to have been those of conscience. Both Cloag[80] and Conybeare and Howson,[81] interpret the "goad" expression as in the nature of a threat or warning, "Take care, Paul! lest worse befall thee"—and so forth.

Neither McGiffert[82] nor Sabatier[83] in treating of Paul's experience, make any especial reference to the phrase in question. Neither does Harnack,[84] although he adds the powerful weight of his assurance to the trustworthiness and authenticity of the entire narrative. He says[85] that Paul was really blind, but gave the incident a religious significance. Harnack omits any account of the conversion proper, which is treated fully by McGiffert and by Sabatier. The former remarks that Paul saw his own conversion as a sudden, abrupt, and unheralded event; which state, adds Dr. McGiffert,[86] is psychologically inconceivable. That this commentator should ignore the very words

which furnish the key-note to the riddle, is perhaps less surprising when we find him observing "that Paul gives *no* detailed account of his conversion!"

In very truth, the tendency of the human intellect to look for the complex, the tortuous, and the artificial explanation, in place of the simple and natural explanation, of human words or experiences, is nowhere so marked as in Biblical exegesis. It is to be found on all sides, among the orthodox and the heterodox, the emotionalist and the rationalist. McGiffert can say in face of Acts IX, XXI, XXVI, that Paul gave *no* detailed account of his conversion; Cloag can say that the vision near Damascus was "a strong proof of the divinity of Christianity"; from the opposite viewpoint, Renan offers us an extraordinarily apt conjunction of ophthalmia, with a thunderstorm; Binet-Sanglé formulates for Paul an elaborate diagnosis of epilepsy, and Sabatier actually doubts whether Paul ever took the vision itself other than symbolically! With the theories of the medical-materialist in general we have to do more fully elsewhere,—in their extreme form they jump at conclusions even more wildly than do the early Fathers, —but an attitude of mind, such as is shown by Sabatier, simply causes in the reader a paralysis of wonder. That any one could so misread the character of Paul—essentially direct, forceful, energetic, and objective—is even more remarkable than the deliberate ignoring of his plain, reiterated statement: "Have I not *seen* Jesus Christ, our Lord?"[87] This is the same influence which we have seen at work upon Augustin, declaring that he did not do what he expressly

states he did. To take as symbolism Paul's simple convincing narrative of what he saw and felt and did, is to accomplish a feat of mental gymnastics even greater than would be required to believe that Bacon wrote Shakspere: it is to make riddles where none exist. There is to Sabatier an "obscure enigma" in the whole of Paul's experience, caused by the slight variations in the three accounts; but what in truth is more natural, more simple, more human and convincing, than just such variations?[88] Far more suspicious would it seem were these three accounts found to be, word for word, identical, when we know Paul described his experiences more than once, and to more than one audience. What is more natural than his introduction into it, as an explanation, of the ancient Hebrew proverb of the ox and the goad, to describe his own bitter attempt to escape the perpetual challenge of his conscience?

It is natural that the more striking mystical phenomena of the religious life should be recorded with more detail than is given to the non-mystical. For a certain number of persons the readjustment is gradual, the clouds slowly disperse. There is another group among whom the actual moment of their conversion is hardly to be distinguished from among a series of similar slight crises—no one especially marked or noteworthy. There are men like Wesley, to whom the process is fulfilled in a space of calm; men like Calvin, who obtain peace gradually, but after a conflict "*non sine gemitu ac lacrymis.*" The thunders of many a sermon have served to precipitate

the crucial instant for the attentive hearer. The stillness of meeting has brought it upon as many others. The glories of sunset, the pure emptiness of dawn, the rage of a storm at sea, has each in turn been the scene of a crisis. Books, and not always great books, have had their effect. A pamphlet in a workingman's cottage called "The Plain Man's Pathway to Heaven" eased the torment of poor John Bunyan. A little volume called "The Flowers of the Saints" turned the thoughts of the wounded Loyola from knightly deeds to heaven. The influence of Law's "Serious Call" upon eighteenth century England, is incalculable; it stands behind the whole Evangelical movement, and many an one beside Thomas Scott found it "a very uncomfortable book." An emotional and creative imagination, on the other hand, may be so possessed by the spectacle of life itself as to find men's problems much more poignant than men's creations. Upon reading Tolstoï's "Confessions," no one can fail to be struck with the fact that books meant comparatively little to him. Similarly, in the world of religious thoughts, tremendous as was the effect of Augustin and of à Kempis, of Law and of Bunyan, yet we find religious movements and religious bodies unaffected as a whole by any reading. Out of the journals of fifty-three members of the Society of Friends, not five owed their conversion, or backsliding, or change of thought, to the direct influence of any book whatever. It was rather the voice of Fox or of Whitefield, or the personal exhortation of those "ancient servants of Christ," John Audland, Stephen Crisp, or John Woolman. Although in

the religious struggle it is often a book which first turns the confessant to the way of peace, yet we look in vain among the Quaker records for any such acknowledgment. The phrases they use are wholly other; solitude tells upon this one, a friend's sudden illness or sudden death on that;[89] in the pregnant stillness of meeting, God's voice is heard to speak; discussion and prayer with devout companions follow; then, perhaps by means of a "lively preacher," the heart is "broken and tendered" and the impression completed. The circumstance is more noteworthy in regard to Friends than it is with the other bodies of which it is also characteristic, since they are the nearer to our day, and to the day of print. Moreover, they do not lack literature, they have their apologists; but Barclay's "Apology" seems to have been read after the turning-point oftener than before it was reached. The conversion itself is almost never accompanied by the reading of any religious volume save the Bible, and, curiously enough, the latter seems rather to perplex than to calm the travailing spirit until the full conversion is accomplished. Some persons acknowledge frankly that they cannot tell just when they were converted; they know only that they have been. And this brings us at once to the point of questioning their belief.

The subject of reaction and relapse, of the duration of the emotional process and its final termination, has received little attention at the hands of the student. What follows *after* conversion? We know what should follow if the result is all that the subject expects—if it be a veritable crisis.

Peace, permanent and helpful, new activities, the world wearing a new face, the life of the spirit vigorous and benign, these are what one should look for. Perhaps the ideal result is well expressed by Luther, who writes of his religious feeling very simply, but very deeply. "I," he says, "out of my own experience am able to witness that Jesus Christ is the true God. I know full well what the name of Jesus has done for me. I have often been so near death that I thought verily now must I die—because I taught His word . . . but always He mercifully put life into me and refreshed and comforted me."[90] These words are all that the convert could ask for; and yet how few can, after their "turning-about," truly repeat them! If this conversion means all that the suffering subject expects from it,—if the misery, the torment, the hellish sights and sounds, the dread, the sleeplessness, the wasting-away, are but his payment for peace or security, then the record should read of durable benefit and health.

The advocates of mysticism make much out of the tokens of ecstasy and joy belonging to that state; and never tire of quoting the raptures of the saint. If we would be fair, we must not ignore them. The real beauty of Jonathan Edwards's exaltation; Suso's "flame of fire which made his heart all burning with intense love"; the "inexpressible ravishment of Henry Alline"; the "merry heat and unknown" of Rolle, and his prayer turning into music; Salimbene's and David Nitschman's sense of great sweetness—all these feelings are very real, and in true contrast with the pre-converted state of gloom and sin.[91]

Another type of joy is furnished by such cases of misinterpreted observation as Robert Blair's "joy that was unspeakable and glorious" after partaking of the milk-posset. Nor is modern science willing to accept as due to spiritual causes that outbreak of sexual feeling among the cloistered women of the Middle Ages, which led so often to their speaking of their Lord in the most extraordinary terms. Christ's "familiar interviews" with Marie de l'Incarnation, his "incredible intimacy" with Gertrude of Eisleben; his various "espousals" with Teresa, Mary of the Angels, Maria d'Agréda, Angela da Foligno, Mary of the Divine Heart, Antoinette Bourignon—are not nowadays to be attributed to mere symbolistic extravagances of phrase. In the cases of A. C. Emmerich, "qui osa lutter avec Dieu," writes her naïf director, "dans un langage dont la sainte et amoureuse folie aurait pu blesser les oreilles profanes"; or Baptista Vernazza, who longed "to devour God"; or Antoinette Bourignon, who felt that her soul had become entirely a part of the Divine; the sexual idea has assumed a character of such excessive egotism as to become wholly unbalanced. Knowing what we know, can a mystical advocate confidently uphold today, as advisable or praiseworthy, such raptures as these?

But of course it is never the mystic who doubts his own extreme favor with the higher powers;[92] and it is not for the converted to doubt the fact of the conversion. Yet Augustin himself wrote "that the love of God is acquired by knowledge of the senses, and by the exercise of reason." Jonathan Edwards,[93]

with all his credulity, expressed the same doubt. "There have, indeed," he writes, "been some few instances of impressions on persons' imaginations that have been something mysterious to me . . . for, though it has been exceeding evident . . . that they had indeed a great sense of the spiritual excellency of divine things, yet I have not been able to satisfy myself whether these imaginary ideas have been more than could naturally arise from their spiritual sense of things."

Certain cases record this phase of feeling. James Fraser of Brae observes that he was constantly expecting more extraordinary effects and influences from his conversion than actually happened to him. James Lackington comments on his several conversions in the words: "Nothing is more common than to see mankind run from one extreme to the other, which was my case." The saintly John Livingstone does not remember that he had any especial moment of conversion, "or that I was much cast down or lift up." It is interesting that his worst attack of terror at the wrath of God should be in his sleep, and that, though it seemed unbearable, he did not awaken: "I sleeped 'til the morning." The soul of Thomas Mitchell, he writes, was "simply set at liberty." Thomas Rutherford says that the divine power which moved him had about it "nothing terrible or alarming . . . but . . . at once solemnized, composed and elevated the faculties of my soul." There are a number of persons among the Friends, who, after a struggle, simply observe that they became "settled in the power of the Lord."[94] Unquestionably, Martin Luther was also

thus "settled"; he laid claim to no revelations, but once certain of his path, pursued it, putting the whole weight of his robust and powerful personality against existing abuse. He is careful to the very end to say that he was "not an heretic but a schismatic." John Wesley cannot note any actual moment of victory. "His heart is warmed" during a certain prayer-meeting, and the crisis *seems* over. It took David Marks eighteen months to be sure of conversion; Bishop Ashbel Green is doubtful whether his own sanctification was ever complete. E. N. Kirk remarks that the phenomena attending his crisis included a light which, he thinks, superstition would have made more of than he does. John Angell James had "no pungent conviction . . . no great and rapid transitions of feeling." The "saving change" which overtook Samuel Hopkins he was long in recognizing as conversion; yet finally concludes it must have been. B. Hibbard doubts if the experience through which he passed really was conversion; and so does William Capers. It was during an illness that Christian David became convinced his sins were forgiven, but he does not know any more than just the fact. In the same manner Count Schouvaloff changes his faith; and Samuel Neale, a Quaker, believes firmly in a gradual process of conversion.

These instances are sufficient to show that in many cases the security attained by conversion is but a relative term. Spiritual, like worldly, crises may diffuse themselves over a long period of time, so that only upon looking back can one estimate the distance he has travelled.

From the confessants' own accounts many of the reactions following conversion are as violent as though no conversion had ever taken place. To repeat here the names of all who fall back into despair, after they believe their peace and pardon have been won, would be to reprint practically the entire case-list—so universal is the experience. Jacob Knapp, the Baptist preacher, insisted for this reason on frequent re-conversion. Full examination into this question of relapse tends to throw a new light upon the whole subject.

In the first place, it will be noticed that among most of the earlier mystics, conversion is rather the starting-point of their agony than its culmination. With Teresa, Suso, Rulman Merswin, Angela da Foligno, Jeanne de St. Mathieu Deleloe, Mesdames Guyon and Chantal, Mary of the Divine Heart, Antoinette Bourignon, Ubertino da Casale, Jerome—the progress is steady, *after* their conversion, toward periods of darkness, horror, and despair. Some of these examples (or at least so many of them as are cloistered, or recluse) seem in their proper persons to bear out that penetrating observation of Luther that "The human heart is like a mill-stone in a mill, when you put wheat under it, it turns and grinds and bruises the wheat to flour; if you put no wheat, it still grinds on, but then 'tis itself it grinds and wears away!" [95]

It is after she received the "*coup de la Grâce*" that the young abbess Angélique Arnauld was plunged into terror. "How many woes," cries Bishop Anselm

in his "Oratio Meditativo," "and woes on the heel of woes! . . . Shudder, oh, my soul, and faint, my mind, and break, my heart! Whither dost thou thrust me, oh, my sin, whither dost thou drive me, oh, my God?" J. J. Olier, during the latter part of his life, had a dark period of shame and depression, quite as though conversion were not. John Newton passed from "an awfully mad career" into exaggerated asceticism, not once but many times. Carlo da Sezze, long after his saintly convictions had received assurance from on high, had violent reactions. One attack of melancholy and doubt lasted for months. Many such dark times fell upon Marie de l'Incarnation. Baptiste Varani had demoniac temptations producing black horrors of despair for as long as two years on a stretch; and Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe for more than a year. Abbot Othloh has many relapses. On the other hand, M. M. Alacoque, like A. C. Emmerich, has no reactions, no doubts; her assurance is so complete that it gives the effect of complacency, and, indeed, her attitude toward her Lord is that of chief sultana.

Later instances of reaction are as striking. James Fraser of Brae has one very black relapse, during which he almost doubts God's existence. Thomas Haliburton's revulsion of feeling brings him very low. The clouds which hang over the spirits of Fox and Bunyan are thick, indeed, and last longer than do the bursts of sunshine. Joseph Hoag observes that he was all his life subject to frightful reaction and depression. James Lackington's and Loménie de Brienne's relapses followed regularly upon their con-

versions. Thomas Boston has as many relapses as moments of peace. M. A. Schimmelpenninck, in a violent relapse, shrank from all religious thoughts and ideas, both with distaste and from exhaustion. Job Scott underwent many "discouragements and heavy exercises." E. Stirredge remained a deeply sorrowful woman, who never seems to have felt any happiness from her conversion. J. Blanco White is another person whose peace is but brief, whose dejection is constant; so also is Isaac Williams, the friend of Newman and Keble. John Haime and John Nelson backslide into frightful, maniacal periods of gloom and horror. In fact, nearly all of the early Methodist cases have reactions of peculiar violence. Thérèse of the Holy Child, although even her director termed her sinless, experienced dreadful aridity and gloom after taking the veil, until her early death. Charles Marshall experienced violent reactions and struggles with the enemy. Peter Favre notes heavy relapses and was much afflicted, until "divers pious motions" revived him. John Trevor, like Uriel d'Acosta, constantly turns hither and yon, eager to obtain the peace which his conversion did not bring. Jerry McAuley experienced several conversions with relapses between. David Nitschman's recurrences of doubt were cured only by his delivering himself "formally," as he put it, into God's hands, whence he knew peace. Much the same experience befell Samuel Neale. Dame Gertrude More's relapse was far harder for her to bear than her pre-converted ignorance had been, and Hildegarde of Bingen writes poignantly of the shadows in her saintly life. Uber-

tino da Casale (who identified himself so closely with the Holy Family, that he writes he dined with them every Wednesday, and spent the night!) yet backslides dreadfully during a visit to Paris, and is only recalled to Grace by the influence of Angela da Foligno. Joseph Salmon, the Ranter, thinks that the Lord purposely sent Satan to assault and test him after his conversion-vision of heaven. Hudson-Taylor experienced painful deadness of soul, after obtaining his first assurance of salvation. Black reactions troubled Gardiner Spring; while George Brysson was often worried by the enemy. A greater man than all, Jerome, describes his desert sufferings as a series of perpetual relapses into sin, and reconquerings of grace. To John Croker (Friend) reaction came like "a cloud of thick darkness"; and Joseph Pike was "plunged in inexpressible sorrow by the Lord's withdrawal" after his first conversion. Joseph Smith's reaction took the form of drunkenness and other vices; which did not prevent his having a second dazzling white vision of a personage, "whose visage," he writes, "was truly like lightning"; and from whom he received the revelation of the Sacred Books, the breast-plate, etc. His vices of sensuality, his coarseness, and his egotism, follow him to the end of his life; yet never shook the faith of his followers.

Another form in the development of this emotion after conversion is shown by that group who became "covenanters with God." Their reaction-periods are dissolved by this practice, by which the needed suggestion may be repeated as often as necessary. Thomas Boston makes his first "solemn covenant" un-

der a tree in the orchard, but on his ordination he draws up a regular instrument in which he terms himself "an heir of hell and wrath," to which he signs his name. Similarly, Thomas Haliburton makes a covenant at eighteen, which tranquillizes him for the time; he repeats it after a period of scientific doubt and wretchedness; but the peace which it procures him is not final. Luther Rice underwent a falling-back so intense that he felt as if he were descending into hell. This frightened him with the fear of losing his mind, so he signed his name to a blank sheet of paper, that God might fill it up with his destiny. The submission of this act brought happiness and peace. An attack of smallpox caused Samuel Neale to enter into a covenant of this kind, and, that he broke it, caused him great agony of mind a few years later. A chance sermon impressed Joanna Turner with the idea that Christ had died for *her* and was *her* Saviour; so she made a covenant with him, and signed it. Though this idea quieted her, it was only for a time. William Wilson during his conflict makes several different covenants with God. A covenant with God, which is frequently renewed, is the means taken by Dr. Theophilus Lobb, to preserve himself from the assaults of some "horrid and violent temptations," the nature of which, however, he does not tell us. Joseph Lathrop, on ordination, solemnly covenants with and dedicates himself to God. Sometimes these instruments are in the nature of regular contracts, in which Christ is the party of the second part. We find this in the case of George Bewly, who, after an illness during which the tempter

fearfully attacked him, "covenanted with God for a return of health," and was tranquillized by this idea. This last name is that of a Friend—the only one in this group, for the more subjective character of the Quaker religious tenets made these objective methods distasteful to them on the whole. They frequently dedicate their lives and thoughts to Heaven, but they do not usually sign covenants any more than they would take oaths. It is scarcely fair to include among these examples of "covenanters with God" that of John B. Gough, whose act of signing the total abstinence pledge caused him to break off the habit of drink, but his is an interesting case. The effect of a contract on these minds is steady and helpful. In Gough's case, it aided him to break the evil habit; and, despite relapses, had the beneficial result of showing him that it could be broken; in the other cases it seems to clarify their relations with the Deity and to make their new life more definite. Neither the covenant nor its formal delivery has ever prevented the reaction.

In the light of these after conditions, undoubtedly the significance of conversion becomes minimized. Its exterior effect cannot be denied:—a man turns Christian and becomes Bishop of Hippo;[96] or becomes a Friend[97] and preaches Quakerism; or from a quiet Church of England vicar,[98] sets forth as a travelling evangelist. But the progress of the emotion in his soul is not greatly different in respect of ebb and flow, of action and reaction. Growing older, the subject's feeling upon all matters must become less keen; his life will run in a more regular

groove. Yet neither the elderly nor the secure, nor the successful person, can always look forward to tranquillity of religious feeling, without oscillation. There are cases in which Satan appears to triumph at the very deathbed of the converted. J. H. Linsley underwent thick spiritual darkness at his life's end. The Devil sorely tempted John Prickard at the last. Upon J. J. Olier falls such a period of gloom and misery, as also on the saintly nuns Marie de l'Incarnation and Baptiste Varani. During her last illness Catherine of Siena is seized by the Devil; and writes: "I circled around the chapel like a person in spasms." Margaret Lucas and C. Marshall, both Friends, are deeply wretched and anxious just before death.

On the other hand, M. M. Alacoque never seems to have felt a reaction. Swedenborg grew wonderfully calm after several frenzied conversion-crises. The change in John Newton was absolute; he felt no temptations thereafter. M. de Marsay grew serene; the hysterical Père Surin recovered his balance and died in peace. G. Müller is so very sure of grace that he hardly left off sinning himself ere he started to teach others the true way. Thomas Lee, Sampson Staniforth, and Thomas Olivers remain quiet and happy. So does Alexander Mather, once he leaves off baking on a Sunday. A permanent peace comes to George Story; no doubtful seasons trouble Thomas Rutherford; and Thomas Tennant remains tranquil. Gentle Charles Wesley lived in peace and fervor and died without excitement or anxiety.

The constitution of the nebula—to return for an

instant to our earlier metaphor—remains the principal factor in the termination of the religious process. Its elements may have been so much disturbed that they never wholly coalesce again. Or they may find, by rearrangement and readjustment, new and permanent stability. The rise and development of emotional religious experience as a process, is surely indicated in either outcome.

Somewhat has our investigation been hampered by the purpose underlying most of these documents. Since they are intended to depict only one stage in the life of the writer, they are apt to come to an end after conversion, changing merely into journals of work. The Quaker records practically all terminate at the point when the writers decide to become preachers of that faith. Wesley asked of the Methodists that they conduct their narratives to the moment of their joining the Society. Only from those rare and scattered cases, where the autobiographical intention causes the writer to trace for us the whole progress of his experience, are we able to obtain glimpses of its final manifestations.

To many persons the need for telling all these things, ceases the very moment they can point to authority accepted, a standard unfurled. Converts like Paul, like Newman; or in lesser instances, like Thomas W. Allies, Alphonse de Ratisbonne, Paul Löwengard, have no interior history once they have *parti pris*. They are content to become part of a system and to be absorbed, like single drops, into an ocean of similar histories. Therefore they tell less of their gloom and reaction, their doubt and despair,

since these appear to them no longer so important. Their narratives cease on that moment when they see, as it were, the New Jerusalem secure within their grasp; and we are not always able to learn whether that glory remains attainable till the end, or whether, like the mirage, it vanishes, leaving them once more alone in the desert of despair.

VIII

MYSTICISM AND ITS INTERPRETATION

I. Introductory.
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IV. "Divine union."
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VIII

MYSTICISM AND ITS INTERPRETATION

But what of those who believe that they have passed the gates, who, for one ineffable moment,—if for one only—have become inmates of that heavenly city? The situation in which they find themselves is one of the most complex in human experience, and presents one of the oldest and the least understood of all human problems. Mysticism as a subject is full of difficulties, and difficulties relate to its every part, —to the documents, to the data, and to the theories which obtain in regard to both of these. Around the figures of those men and women, who, in Dante's phrase, "approached the end of all desires,"[1] there has grown up a confusing and obscuring cloud of conjecture, which to the Middle Ages took the place of poetry. "Every one of these saints," writes Milman, "had his life of wonder . . . the legend of his virtues . . . to his votaries a sort of secondary gospel wrought into belief by the constant iteration of names and events."[2]

Such legendary narrative often usurped the place of folk- or fairy-tale; it fed the fancy of a world which had lost the dryad and the dragon, from which the centaur and the winged horse had fled. Miracle and

marvel, the essential food of human imagination, thus took on a new form and became associated with the rapid growth of individualism. It is this which the colder mind of to-day, seeking for explanations, must not forget—that here in the lives and legends of the earlier mystics fancy and religion interplay, as in the imagination of a child, and that of such, in soberest truth, is the kingdom of heaven.

So long as mankind accepted the saint without question,—or at least set him aside in a separate mental compartment, water-tight from any scientific criticism or investigation,—then his religion, "self-wrought-out, self-disciplined, self-matured, with nothing necessarily intermediate between the grace of God and the soul of man,"[8] seemed both natural and adequate. It was as much and as fitting a part of his legendary equipment as the fairy's wings, or the magician's wand. Only when he came to be considered in the light of a real man, when this delicate and decorative figure, glowing as with all the lovely hues of Italian painting, was lifted down from his carved and gilded triptych to be set beside other men, did the ideas he stood for seem also to be part of legend. Examined nearly, they had the thinness of legend, and the color of legend, and the vagueness of legend. With infinite sadness and care, it has been the task of science to unwrap these glittering, cloudy tissues of poetry and myth, to lay bare the hearts and bodies of men and women like ourselves. Where the mystic stood in ecstasy, crying out that he saw heights and depths vouchsafed to no other eyes, science is now at hand to chill him with a generalization.

It is forced to remind him of the truth "that every emotion attracts those ideas and images which nourish it, and repels those which do not"; [4] and that all emotion tends rather to obscurity than to clearness of mental vision. While at the same time, it has turned to ask of this human being, called mystic, certain definite, vital, and far-reaching questions.

Science enquires, for instance, What manner of man is this, who claims to stand at the gates of the unknown? What warrant does he give for the certainty of his dream? For this sureness, this certainty, is the mystic's predominant characteristic; however timid before, once his feet are on the mystical way, his confidence in himself becomes absolute. The manifestations of grace in his case may take forms wholly new, but that it *is* grace, he is entirely sure. He knows that for him, individually, the secret places have been opened; to him, individually, the hidden truths have been revealed.

> "O world invisible," he sings, "we view thee,
> O world intangible, we touch thee,
> O world unknowable, we know thee,
> Inapprehensible, we clutch thee!" [5]

It is chiefly this certitude of the mystic that has caused the attention of science to be directed upon him. Science is necessarily doubtful of all certainty and suspicious of the certain. But the mystic's conviction, his fixity of gaze, his unwavering acceptance of his own position toward the unknown, has served to overawe the world for centuries, and in itself has caused the whole subject to be placed beyond the sphere of criticism. Is it still so placed?

What, in fact, is our attitude toward the saint today? A survey of his position is proper at the outset of this enquiry.

The mystic is most often the religious confessant, and it is moreover upon the religious confession that our knowledge of mysticism as a state practically rests. A survey of the whole field of records would seem, therefore, to be prerequisite to any comprehension of the subject. Yet up to the present time such a survey has not been attempted; and the means of studying mysticism, from whatever standpoint, has been from quintessential types alone. It does not need the student familiar with modern methods of comparative study to see the difficulties to which the older plan gives rise. Chief among them is the necessarily theoretical and *a priori* attitude, taken by a writer whenever he cannot work from the facts.

Books written according to this method are by no means old books, for all important work on the subject is recent. Much of it, indeed, is so recent, that it escapes the austere limitations laid upon such investigation by the scientific tendencies of the nineteenth century, and partakes of the reactionary, emotional influences of the twentieth. These influences are to be observed permeating a work so well known as Professor James's widely read "Varieties of Religious Experience," as well as the books following it.[6] Practically all of these studies have their foundation in Görres's "La Mystique Divine, Naturelle et Diabolique"; which, though sprung from a devout mind, yet shows by its care and method the influences of the earlier scientific tendency.

A glance at some of the theories contained in these works is essential to our purpose (which, the reader has not forgotten, is a study of the *facts*), because the ideas they propagate are widely disseminated, and are frequently accepted and quoted without any reference to these same inconvenient facts, or to the assertions of the mystics themselves. The volumes to which we allude do not by any means confine themselves to personal statements of the mystics, nor to their personal phenomena; and it must be clearly understood that into their writers' more general and abstract theories, this work cannot follow them. The relation of mysticism to self-study, with the personal revelations of the mystic, are our sole concern at present; our appeal must needs be in, through, and by the *facts* themselves. Practically all works on theoretical mysticism display a tendency on the part of their authors to turn in thought from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, from the physical to the metaphysical. Such manner they appear to take for granted; to wrench, as it were, the natural point of view violently over to the side of the philosophical abstraction, and to expect their reader to do the same. It is extraordinary, that no one seems able to handle this topic, and yet remain intelligible. The approach of this angel is enough to trouble the waters of many "a well of English undefiled." When it even affects Emerson, one will surely feel less anger than pity for the verbal contortions of the Baron von Hügel. Even so graceful a writer as Mr. Edmund Gardner[7] defines mysticism as "the love-illumined quest of the soul to unite herself (!) with the supra-

sensible—with the absolute—with that which is''!—speaks of ''*seeing* Eternity,'' and uses, as final, the citation, ''the flight of the alone to the Alone''![8]

Now, it is never easy to force one's self into an abstract view of matters which, after all, are mostly concrete. Nor is the difficulty eased in regard to such specimens of logic as Miss Underhill's reference to the fasting of Catherine of Genoa[9] (of which more anon); or that of von Hügel, who, while he writes in English, yet never ceases to think in German. The mists close thick about the student, helplessly befogged in a land, where, after all, he should be able to take hold of particular statements, and acts, and events. For there is no necessary obscurity in the study of a person's withdrawal ''from the outward to the inner world, from God in the works of nature to God in his workings on the soul of man.''[10] It is not a question of the matter of men's speculation and the method of men's thought, but simply of what certain persons have felt and stated, have said and done. There is evidence to summon, to sift, and to classify; all we have known or can know about the subject lies in this evidence. The validity of such evidence is, therefore, the starting-point of the whole investigation; not the transcendental theories which have been used to shroud and becloud the subject. What care we whether sanctification precedes unification or follows it, until we know on what actual occurrences these terms are founded? How can we define the ''awareness of a relation with God''[11] unless we know the mystic's reason for believing that he is conscious of such a relation? How do we know that such and

such a saint experienced such and such feelings, until we have examined his own statements? Mysticism may be cleared of vagueness if one wishes, but only by reducing it to the simplest comprehensible terms.

What we do know is that, for centuries past, persons have lived, called mystics by reason of their supposed hold on hidden things; who have laid claim to special truths vouchsafed to them, individually, and in a particular manner. The existence of these persons and of this assumption on their part is, strictly speaking, all that we really know, outside of what they themselves have communicated in writing or to their disciples. The manner in which truth is communicated to these subjects has been described, both by themselves and others, as entirely outside, and independent of, the normal, natural manner of its communication—and it is, therefore, properly designated as abnormal or as supernatural, and has been so called by the world at large.

The student to-day is surely entitled to ask further questions, before he can accept these assumptions. What sort of persons are these? What sort of truth has been so revealed to them? What is the evidence that they have been so distinguished, and in what ways do they differ from himself?

Any creed claiming a mystical foundation must base itself on the assumption that the founder thereof, be he Paul or Mahomet, Fox or Swedenborg, received in some manner a truth which the rest of the world had not, and which, therefore, he was to preach and reveal. This idea forms a comparatively simple approach to any enquiry into the personal elements of

mysticism. "When a man refers to inward feelings and experiences," says Coleridge,[12] "of which mankind at large are not conscious, as evidences of the truth of any opinion, such a man I call a mystic: and the grounding of any theory or belief on accidents and anomalies of individual sensations or fancies . . . I name mysticism."

The usual way of studying these "anomalies of individual sensations" is, first, to assume that they exist; second, to assume that this existence is "a sort of undifferentiated consciousness,"[13] only to be described in abstract terms; and third, to assume that such sensations necessarily involve "the perception of higher reality."[14] To this chain of assumptions the modern investigator generally adds some references to the better-known psychological phenomena, as emphasized in the cases of the greater contemplatives; cites Teresa, Loyola, Mme. Guyon, and Suso; and then readily launches upon a thoroughly abstract discussion of his thoroughly *a priori* theories. Most of these discussions appear to require but the thinnest possible substratum of fact. Von Hügel's two stout volumes on the subject of Catherine of Genoa, have for their entire foundation but the "Vita" and a few letters of her own and her disciples.

The present section is but a sincere attempt to examine into the foundation of these elaborate theories; with reference to what the mystics have really said, and what they have really done. It is evident at the outset that one must approach them from a point of view removed as far as possible from their

own. To this end the classification of the data they give concerning themselves, must be accompanied by a rigid elimination of their own terms in describing it. The terminology of mysticism has been largely responsible for the prevailing confusion about the subject; for the average reader may watch the saint pass from the *via purgativa* and the *via passiva*, to the *via illuminativa* and be lost in the ecstasies of the *via unitiva*,[15] yet never be a whit the wiser. Translate the mystic's premises into simpler terms, and it appears to be that he feels he has attained truth through means other than those provided by the senses. Moreover, the fact that truth is to be so attained, constitutes to him a sufficient proof of the existence of a transcendental state, and thus of the transcendental world. "And if any have been so happy," remarks Sir Thomas Browne, not without irony, "as truly to understand Christian annihilation, ecstasies, exolution, liquefaction, transformation, the kiss of the spouse, gustation of God and ingression into the divine shadow,—they have already had a handsome anticipation of heaven!"[16]

One does not wish to fall into the attitude which Professor James deprecates in the medical materialist, "that of discrediting states of mind, for which we have an antipathy."[17] Our endeavor should rather be to understand them. Yet surely it is always permissible to question any assumption, nor can it be wrong to subject a claim so vital to the same rigid scrutiny which one would feel in honor bound obliged to accord any other claim equally

wide in its effect on human life and ideals. Science has an inalienable right of examination into this as into all other evidence of truth.

The first principle of such an examination must be to reach back to the words and statements of the mystics themselves; since the instant these reach the hand of the theorist, they tend to undergo the most unforeseen and extraordinary transformations. As an example, let us turn to the question of the fasting of Catherine of Genoa, of which mention has already been made. Says Miss Underhill:[18] "It is an historical fact, unusually well-attested by contemporary evidence and quite outside the sphere of hagiographic romance that . . . Catherine of Genoa lived . . . for constantly repeated periods of many weeks without any other food than the consecrated Host received at Holy Communion"; during which periods she conducted the management of her hospital with every evidence of health. This would seem to be a sober yet striking statement of fact. The hypercritical might perhaps question the value of any contemporary evidence upon such a subject; but most of us would accept it without demur. The writer founds it upon Von Hügel's elaborate analysis of Catherine's "Vita"; with which it may be profitably compared. And what does such comparison reveal? In the first place, that the very "Vita" which is used as a warrant for this statement is considered, even by its editor, as lying well *within* rather than *without* "the sphere of hagiographic romance."[19] Secondly, that Catherine's fasts were not absolute, since the saint drank often of salt-water and of wine;

while she also partook "a small amount of solid food which *at times* she was able to retain"![20]

The reader has scarcely recovered from the shock of this decided modification of Miss Underhill's sentence about "constantly repeated periods of many weeks without *any other* food" than the Host, when he reads further in the "Vita" that Catherine's health, even through this limited fasting, was so much affected, that in the year 1496 she abandoned the practice altogether, and even took food on the regular fast-days! Is it any wonder that a rooted and grounded distrust is the first sentiment aroused by any study of works on mysticism? Is it any wonder that one finds it necessary to refer only to the facts furnished by the mystic himself? Cases might be multiplied indefinitely in which the whole superstructure of theory has been raised on a similar foundation of misunderstanding. The reader will not have forgotten the literature of Paul's conversion.[21] Wherever the subject opens into the unknown, there will be found present an apparent tendency in the human mind to distort, to qualify, or to misinterpret the phenomena it observes.

Therefore, however limited, however scanty, the data yielded by authentic first-hand records, give at least some solid ground beneath the worker's feet. True, the field is greatly narrowed whenever such limitations are imposed upon it. Very many great mystics have left no such material: the world has relied wholly upon others for its knowledge of them.[22] Who can pass to-day upon the correctness of such knowledge? To this essential nature of the facts, what they

are and what they indicate, we shall, of course, return. Our concern at the moment lies with certain prevalent theories of mysticism, which, it is evident, occupy themselves far less with fact than might be wished. These theories try to substantiate the mystic's claim to the extra-sensual reception of truth; and offer various metaphysical or philosophical explanations.

In contradistinction to this view, will be found the group of rationalists, mostly French, who place the whole matter sweepingly in the realm of pathology.[23] Their claims require a separate discussion; but the influence of William James, who had as harsh an estimate of their ideas as Görres himself, writing before 1836, could have had, has caused them to give way, temporarily at least, before the metaphysical battalions. Miss Underhill's book [24] stands well in the forefront of these latter, and gives, perhaps, as clear an exposition of their point of view as is possible in the nature of things, and in the style of the writer.

"That which our religious and ethical teachers were wont to call mere emotion," says this writer, "is now acknowledged to be of the primal stuff of consciousness. . . . Thought is but its servant." She develops Pascal's observation: ". . . 'The heart has its reasons which the mind knows not of.' . . . At the touch of passion doors fly open which logic has battered on in vain." Although this author thus places religion beyond the realm of the intellect, yet she paradoxically desires to formulate an intellectual system of mysticism. At the same time she holds the terms and symbols of psychology quite insufficient to handle the mystic life. Theories of the subconscious are

to her mind but shadowy and tentative in contrast with the certainty of the saints. "They, too, were aware that in normal men the spiritual sense lies below the threshold of consciousness."[25] An insistence that the mystical way is the way of reality and truth; that the mystic, like genius, is beyond the law; that mysticism is the more direct method of reaching toward "the ideally normal state of man's development"—forms the main thesis of her argument. "The mystic belongs," she further remarks, "to the unsolved problems of humanity";[26] and for our full and proper comprehension "the mystics need to be removed both from the sphere of marvel and that of disease."

In treating the mystic as a genius, Miss Underhill, of course, is not alone. In his introduction, Dr. Jones[27] repeats the same idea when he prefers "to dwell on the tremendous service of the mystics." He does not define these services, nor specify the attained truths, beyond likening their effect to that of great poetry or great music; but to his mind apparently they form a "vital and dynamic religion."

Putting aside for the moment any consideration of the psychical phenomena of this state and their effect on the mystic, in order to regard the question of results, the honest and untranscendental mind is at once struck by their amazing *paucity*. If we were asked to define genius as broadly as may be, most of us undoubtedly would insist on the idea of *creativeness:* it is the creative power of a genius which is prerequisite to our placing him in that class. Whatever be our theory of genius, we have no doubt whatever that its result is creation. In the light of re-

sult, in the light of creation, how scanty is the achievement of the mystic, compared with the poet, the artist, or the musician! If he does receive truth, as we do not, how little has he contributed to the world's stock of ideas! Moreover, if we regard him more nearly, will it not be often found that the mystic has accomplished his task rather in spite of, than by reason of, his mysticism? The work of Paul, for instance, was done well after his mystical period was ended; he speaks of it as past.[28] It is his power of organization, his eloquence, his dogmatic intellect, which disseminated Christianity, not the fact that he beheld a vision. All Loyola's great constructive task was started well after his mystical experiences were over. So was it likewise with Luther, who believed he had had these experiences, if to us he seems hardly the mystic at all. When George Fox began to preach, his visions and voices grew far less marked than when he wandered on the lonely moors. While religious experience, while mysticism, may be purely emotional, yet the creative faculty must needs involve the intellect, which will immediately act as a solvent to any state of pure emotionalism. The great mystic may not, of course, be aware of the fact, but the process which in his soul was started at the touch of intense emotion, tends to decline the moment he summons his intellect to act on the suggestion. It has been seen how Catherine of Genoa found that her trances, induced by fasting, interfered with her labors in the hospital. Although Delacroix acknowledges in Teresa,[29] "l'état de névrosisme grave," yet he notes that her life was by no means wholly absorbed in the condi-

tions superinduced by ecstasy. Another writer observes of the same case, that she "has a marvellous way of keeping separate the various actions of the soul and of observing their effects . . . her autobiography is one of the chief authorities upon which religious sentiment is based . . . while her self-analysis is well on the way to becoming actual psychology." [30] And yet the mystical system, evolved as the result of all this, has for its aim but "quiescence, emptiness of soul, darkened consciousness, and the suspension of the natural understanding!" [30] Surely, genius is not quiescence but activity; it is not emptiness but fulness; the consciousness not darkened but brightened, the understanding not suspended but vivified and heightened.

The names just mentioned are important names, their owners would have been personages in any walk of life. When one regards the cluster of the lesser mystics, then the facts grow more and more suggestive, and what they suggest is not genius. Delacroix [31] comments on Mme. Guyon's mysticism having caused her "une singulière impuissance intellectuelle," and cites her words, "Je deviens toute stupide." "Grace à Dieu," remarks A. C. Emmerich, "je n'ai presque jamais rien lu." One cannot forget the automatic stupidity of M. M. Alacoque, who continued to stand at the convent gate to keep the pigs out of the garden, long after the same animals had been made into sausages.[32] Maria d'Agréda blessed God that she was considered mentally weak; and Joanna Southcott is humbly proud of her own dulness in affairs worldly. Such incidents and attitudes as

these do not indicate the presence of genius, with its rich creative activity, its rich energy, its rich sympathy with all forms of life.[33] Of course, it is not for one instant denied that many types of genius are accompanied by a certain degree of mysticism; it is only questioned whether this mysticism is a vital factor. In literature, for instance, there is a tendency to attribute to mysticism much that is properly due only to forces literary and personal. Without the literary gift, what influence can the mystic leave behind him? Who, nowadays, reads Maria d'Agréda? Is it not those portions of the work of Augustin, or of Teresa, which breathe of human sympathy and human ideals, which have survived their mystical outpourings?

Literature is not, many will reply, a fair test; the writer is essentially self-conscious, and the need of expression stands in his path, forcing him to crystallize those emotions which are intended to remain delicately floating and evanescent. Perhaps; certainly the true mystic regarded literature often in the nature of a snare.[34] Great contemplatives have died wholly sterile, and their heritage of truth has died with them.

That the truth seems so to die, is contradictory to the idea that mysticism is a form of genius; if genius be the means of preserving truth to mankind. If that truth be closely examined which the mystic claims to have received in a special and individual manner, it will invariably be found to refer only to the *mystic* himself. It is *he*, no other, who experienced ecstasy or unification, or who espouses Christ, or who

beholds heaven or hell. The whole mystical scheme is profoundly, nay, even necessarily, egotistical, as Dean Milman says of "The Imitation of Christ": [35] "It begins in self . . . terminates in self." As such it must be regarded rather as an artificial, abnormal condition, than, as Miss Underhill would have it, "an ideally normal state of man's development."

So much for the question of results due to mysticism. Our theorists greatly object, as we have already seen, to the pathological view of this state taken by the medical-materialist. The great contemplatives, in their opinion, "are almost always persons of robust intelligence and marked practical and intellectual ability." [36] Miss Underhill admits they suffer often from bad physical health; and that this characteristic does produce "inexplicable modifications of the physical organism"; but she refuses to connect it with hysteria, because "the mono-ideism of the mystic is rational, while that of the hysteric patient is invariably irrational." [37]

In that debatable land, where science still struggles to define for us the limits of mental health and disease, the question of rationality and irrationality becomes one of those fluctuating problems which are apt to be settled by each person according to his personal temperament and training. The sentence just cited gives it shape in its most perplexing form. Why is one and the same *idée fixe* to be termed rational in one case and irrational in another? Why is the hysterical patient who refuses to take a bath irrational, while Juliana of Norwich and Lyduine of Schiedam, in their saintly filth, are rational? Can any unbiased mind

call rational the "mono-ideism" of A. C. Emmerich, of M. M. Alacoque, of Suso, of Baptista Vernazza, of Antoinette Bourignon? Even contemporary judgments spoke of the "ravings" of Hildegarde, of Joanna Southcott, and of Maria d'Agréda. The physical condition is not, as Miss Underhill seems to think, mere accident or mere coincidence; our examples collected under that head will be found to point fixedly in one direction.

Von Hügel,[38] discussing this question, goes even further than Professor James's somewhat tentative suggestion, and thus warns the reader: "Never forget that physical health is not the true end of human life . . . the true question here is not whether such a type of life as we are considering exacts a serious physical tribute or not, but whether the specifically human effects and fruits of that life are worth the cost." No doubt this were well to remember in an age which tends to make mere health somewhat of a fetich; but the very query brings us once more face to face with the unanswerable request for results. Where in the mystic life do we find "those specifically human effects and fruits"? The genius has always his message, be he Christ or Cæsar, but what truth has the minor mystic learned to teach his kind?

The truth most often claimed, which most commentators and historians accept without cavil, or question, or even investigation, relates to what is known as unification;—i.e., the union of the soul with the Divine. That such an union is possible has been the primary assumption of all mystics. On this assumption has been founded in the past such systems as those

of Bonaventura and the Victorines; in the present, such compromises as that of Professor William James. It is used, moreover, to explain a great many phenomena; it has never received serious criticism even at materialist hands. That Man is in essence Divine; that he can at moments return to and become one with Divinity, is an idea deeply rooted in the human imagination.

Were this book to be a history of mysticism (and the subject still awaits some rational and sympathetic mind), it would be interesting to trace this idea of Divine union, from its primitive sources. We see it first in those days when half-savage man conceived his own deification during his lifetime as quite possible, and his immediate deification after his death as the only rational theory of immortality. Those were the days when God walked with Adam in the cool of the evening, and their souls were not so far apart as our conceptions make them appear to-day. Christianity would seem to have taken the idea chiefly from Plotinus, who laid definite claim to having achieved such union more than once.[39] Elaborated in the system of Dionysius the Areopagite, this initial conception of the soul's return to, and absorption in, the Divine, became connected with those complicated theories of the celestial hierarchy, which served to bring heaven so near to the Middle Ages. The classical ethnologists now regard this conception simply as the attempt of minds of a higher development to account for the prevalent beliefs, carried on from their stage of earlier savagery. "Spiritual beings swarming through the atmosphere we breathe,"[40] is the theory by which a

mind like that of Dionysius would fain explain the shreds and patches of earlier animistic beliefs, still clinging alike to the imaginations of the unlettered and the lettered. Similar ideas prevail to-day in the South Sea Islands, where the native holds the world to be crowded with spirits. That characteristic effort to formulate, to systematize those mystical ideas which men found hanging, as it were, in the air beside them during the first Christian centuries, is repeated by Dionysius. From the Divine union of Plotinus to the conception of an angelic host, was but a step, and a step which made it fairly easy to hold that any human soul, under certain conditions, might attain to a species of deification. Men thus gradually came to believe in the flattering notion of their own (if momentary) divinity; and they continued to hold it despite the protests of common sense. Martin Luther cried out in his vehement way, "that the mystical divinity of Dionysius is a fable and a lie!"[41]—but he stood well-nigh alone in this opinion. The mediæval world clung closely to the idea of an ineffable moment, during which the soul cast off all earthly trammels and became absolutely a part of the essence of God.

Now, when we try to discover to-day exactly what this idea meant to the mystic himself—how it affected him—how he knew, to put it bluntly, that he had attained to such an union, a clamor of voices arises from the past, and no clear utterance save one. Without the voice of Augustin, indeed, it would be almost impossible for us to conceive how the mediæval mind was ever able even to try to systematize the indescribable. Dante,[42] it is true, insisted on the reality of

the intellect's "passing beyond human measure"; and adds, that if the "Scripture suffice not the invidious, let them read Richard of St. Victor, Bernard and Augustin, and they will not grudge assent." Personally, however, Dante seems to have confused the idea of religious ecstasy with that of poetic inspiration, which he naturally felt to be for him the true expression of the Divine idea. The mystical attitude is displayed more typically by Richard of St. Victor, in whose effort to explain it may be noted the germ of many a modern theoretical weakness. "When by excess of mind," he writes,[43] "we are rapt above or within ourselves into the contemplation of divine things, not only are we straightway oblivious of things external but also of all that passes in us. . . . And therefore when we return to ourselves from that state of exaltation we cannot by any means recall to our memory those things which we have erst seen above ourselves. We see, as it were, in a veil and in the midst of a cloud. . . . In wondrous fashion, remembering we do not remember, . . . seeing we do not behold . . . and understanding we do not penetrate."

This is the type of mystical writing whose influence in the past over a certain kind of mind, was almost hypnotic. It appears to tell so much; and, of course, realizing the date of its composition, it must be acknowledged as an admirable attempt at the descriptive psychology of inner experience. Yet, when examined by the quiet eye of common sense, Richard's statement is merely that, during ecstasy, the mind neither formulates any thoughts, nor the memory

recalls any experiences. The contemplator, really, neither perceives aught, nor understands aught, nor remembers aught, of his experiences; he knows only that he has been "away." Surely this conception is more elastic than that of Hugh of St. Victor, who had defined it as spiritual marriage, in which "the Bridegroom is God and the Bride is the Soul."[44] The various systems of "grades and steps" by which the mediæval formalist tried to satisfy his intellect, leads the modern student no nearer truth than this simple statement of the mystic that his soul had been "away."

Let the reader carry in his mind, for a little, this one idea,—that the mediæval mind believed the soul might be away, and might return. It will be found to have a significance for him to-day, which it did not possess for the Victorines. Let him add to it, if he will, a paragraph from the "Confessions," in which Augustin, at the height of his genius, laid the foundation for ten centuries of mysticism,—and he will possess in his own memory, the key to this entire kingdom. Charged with poetry, Augustin's words are lucidity itself; and they convey a deep perception of an important psychological truth, qualified, limited, defined, as truth must be.

Says the saint:[45] "If to any the tumult of the flesh were hushed, hushed the images of earth, and waters and air, hushed also the poles of heaven, yea, the very soul be hushed to herself, and by not thinking on self, surmount self, hushed all dreams and imaginary revelations, every tongue and every sign, . . . if then, . . . He alone speak . . . not through any tongue of flesh,

nor angel's voice, nor sound of thunder, nor in the dark riddle of a similitude, . . . but we might hear His very self without these (as we two now strained ourselves and in swift thought touched on that Eternal Wisdom which abideth over all);—could this be continued on, and other visions of a kind far unlike be withdrawn, and this one ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its beholder amid these inward joys, so that life might be forever like that one moment of understanding which now we sighed after; were not *this:* 'Enter into the joy of thy Lord'?"

After all the frantic jargon of the transcendentalist,—what an accent, what words, are these! The accurate self-observation which led Augustin to formulate such questions is the result of his peculiarly introspective genius; but he never forgets that they are questions, and that he asks them of himself. The mediæval world forgot that Augustin said "*If,*" and "*Were* not this?"; but, seizing upon the suggestion that described so profound a truth of human feeling, it omitted the limitations which Augustin had been so careful to retain. In another work,[46] he observes, with equal caution, that "Certain great and incomparable souls whom we believe to have seen and to see these things, have told as much as they judge meet to be told." Here are sentences which stand close to our modern point of view in their careful moderation; and the interpretation, which for centuries the world of transcendental thought chose to make of them, are only another warrant for a return to the original statement.

Upon these paragraphs, supplemented by the half-

legendary experiences of the Neo-Platonist Plotinus, elaborated and confused by the Areopagite, the entire structure of mediæval mysticism is founded; they are the real gates to the *Via Mystica.* Upon these great "ifs" of Augustin,—*if* the tumult of the flesh were hushed, and *if* we could hear God's voice,—and *if* his word continued on and blotted out all else, —and *if* all life might be like that one "moment of understanding,"—the imagination of the Middle Ages built a new heaven and a new hell. The effect of this idea on the simple mind was no deeper than on the powerful mind. Systematized by Bonaventura and the St. Victors, carried to extravagant excess by Mechtilde or Catherine of Siena, this initial "if" of Augustin contains the real phenomenon of mysticism.

It is the world's ready response to this somewhat complex suggestion that holds the real miracle. If Plotinus felt the characteristic certitude of the mystical subject, surely we see here that Augustin did not! Yet he is made by most writers to father the whole body of mystical phenomena,—visions, voices, ecstasies,—with never so much as a hint of an "*if.*"

The experiences of the mystics, as a body, did not come under observation till less than a century ago. One would naturally have supposed that the first step would be the examination of the evidence at hand. But even to-day, and by the writers under present discussion, the primary assumption of the mystic is not so much as questioned. It is taken for granted that the mystical experience is, for instance, productive of truth; yet we have seen that, when unwrapped from its verbal tissues, Richard of St. Vic-

tor's statement is only that his soul at moments was "away." This is no very striking result, when compared to the inferences drawn by Victorine commentators, but it is exceedingly typical. That quiet eye of common sense, before whose gaze many theories must needs evaporate, when turned upon the mystic, will see a monstrous heap of such theories, piled upon a very small substratum of fact. What results will it discover in other mystical phenomena? Our modern theorists accept the visions and voices, but find them hard to explain. Miss Underhill, calling the subject "the eternal battleground,"[47] thinks both sides extreme, and favors a symbolistic interpretation.[48] At times, according to her view, the visionary experiences may become pathological, or neurotic, and when this occurs, then they express "merely exhaustion or temporary loss of balance." To the latter condition belong the personal self-glorification of Angela da Foligno;[49] while Loyola's vision of the plectrum was of the high symbolic type.[50]

It has ever been characteristic of a certain type of theorist, that he starts by ignoring the proposition that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other. How is the adherent of pure symbolism to differentiate between those manifestations by visions and voices which came from the mystic's higher power; and those which proceed from his loss of balance? Naturally, they become classified according to the critic's own beliefs and imagination, just as Luther classified his vision as from the Devil. One may decide, for instance, that the "spiritual marriage" of Gertrude of Eisleben was symbolistic; another, that

that of Angela da Foligno proceeded from hysteria. As the mystical subject herself is never in the least doubtful as to the source of her experiences, and as these experiences, when compared, will be found to resemble one another to the smallest particular, no desire for compromise can make it a reasonable proceeding to exalt the one and to condemn the other, while we have the identical evidence—or lack of evidence—in regard to both.

"In persons of mystical genius," explains Miss Underhill, "the qualities which the stress of normal life tends to keep below the threshold of consciousness, are of enormous strength. . . . They develop unchecked until a point is reached . . . at which they break their bonds and emerge into the conscious field; either temporarily dominating the subject, as in ecstasy, or permanently transmuting the old self, as in the unitive life." [51]

Our comment upon this passage is but to return once again to that collection of facts relating to relapse and reaction, which occupy so many pages of this volume. These will be seen to have an especial bearing on the progressive states of emotion of the mystic; and to throw a new light on that permanent transmutation of the self, of which Miss Underhill speaks so confidently. Is there any actual record of even one such permanent transmutation? Are there not, even among those souls whose essential spirituality is exalted to the highest point,—whose general plane seems to differ from our own,—are there not always periods of relapse, of reaction, of aridity, of withdrawal from God? So keenly are these states of reaction felt by the

greater mystics, that it is of them John of the Cross would speak when he uses the phrase "the Dark Night of the Soul." If the mystical way be, indeed, a way of ascent, then the language used by the pilgrims themselves to describe the oscillation of their state is of extraordinary vividness, and by no means confident or assured. This oscillation is described as an unspeakable agony of pain mental and physical; Canon Vaughan [52] gives a series of cited phrases to denote it, which are in themselves very striking. Teresa's is the most moderate; she calls it simply the "gran pena" which accompanied and preceded the mystical state. "This pain is the 'pressura interna' of Tauler; the 'horribile et indicibile tormentum' of Catherine of Genoa; the 'purgatory' of Thomas à Jesu; the 'languor infernalis' of Harphius; the 'terribile martyrium' of Maria Vela the Cistercian; the 'divisio naturæ ac spiritus' of Barbanson; the 'privation worse than hell' of Angela da Foligno." Some of these epithets, notably that of Barbanson, are most suggestive, and we shall have cause to remember them later. But the whole question of the soul's ascent to higher levels assumes a very different aspect when these periods of conflict and relapse are examined. That moment of unity with God, which is the highest pinnacle of this condition, is very transient compared with the oscillations which may reach up to it, and whether one can reasonably—I do not say logically—term such a moment a permanent transmutation, is a matter of serious doubt. Delacroix [53] points out the need of differentiating between the passive mystic and him who conquers souls; and gives an interesting defini-

tion of mysticism as "un certain état d'exaltation, qui abroge le sentiment du Moi ordinaire."[54] Although he does not ignore the presence of the "peine extatique"[55] of Teresa, or the "mort mystique" of Mme. Guyon, yet he does not lend them any especial emphasis by criticism. That ecstatic moment, which is the mystic's highest aim and achievement, plays so small a part, in time, in his whole progress, that there is no evidence whatever it can possibly "abroge le sentiment du Moi ordinaire." On the contrary, the words and actions of the mystic during every age show that the necessary occupation with his own feelings and ideas has served to increase and to enlarge the Ego, to make the "Moi" wholly disproportionate. In fact, the extent and profundity of the mystical egotism is another argument for refusing to class it with genius. Genius is frequently egotistic, but egotism is not its end and aim, as it is always the end and aim of mysticism. The mystic may scourge and trample on the physical self, but it is always for the purpose of exalting and indulging what he holds to be his higher self.

The self-importance aroused by this attitude is limitless. Ubertino da Casale regarded himself as on the most intimate terms with the Holy Family, and often as the "brother" of Christ. Angela da Foligno says that Christ told her he loved her better than any woman in the vale of Spoleto. The words of this passage are fatuous almost beyond belief: "Then He began to say to me the words that follow, to provoke me to love Him; O my sweet daughter! O my daughter, my temple! O my daughter, my delight!

Love me, because thou art much loved by Me. And often did He say to me: O my daughter, My sweet Spouse! And He added in an underbreath, I love thee more than any other woman in the valley of Spoleto."[56] To amuse and to delight Gertrude of Eisleben, He sang duets with her "in a tender and harmonious voice." The same saint writes of their "incredible intimacy"; and here, as in later passages of Angela da Foligno, the reader is revolted by their sensuality. When Sister Thérèse of the Holy Child,[57] learned the name which had been given her in religion, she took it for "a delicate attention of the adorable Child!" Jesus told Osanna Andreasi that he would himself teach her to be a little saint. In the diary of Marie de l'Incarnation there is such an entry as "entretien familier avec J.—C."; and during such interviews she makes use of a sort of pious baby-talk, like a saintly Tillie Slowboy. The famous Beata di Piedrahita, Dr. Lea tells us, upheld her claim to Divine powers by declaring that Christ was often with her, and even that she herself was Christ.[58] Mary of the Divine Heart (who died in 1899) heard the voice saying: "You will be the Spouse of my heart."

It is needless once more to single out those persons who were regarded, as they thought, by the Devil in the light of almost equal foes; nor to repeat that the attitude toward God of M. M. Alacoque, Baptiste Varani, A. C. Emmerich, was that of a favorite sultana. Moreover, that ineffable instant of union with the Divine, is usually expressed in terms exalting the mystic rather than his Deity. "I ate and drank of God," observes Baptista Vernazza; and

again, "God wished to devour Me entirely!" He assured Angela da Foligno: "All the Saints of Paradise have for thee a special love, and I shall join thee to their company."[59] "There was nothing between God and my soul," remarks the complacent Antoinette Bourignon; and just in this same manner boasts Joseph Smith, the Mormon: "God is my right-hand man!"[60]

All this may be, and has been, variously regarded; it may be considered as mediæval naïveté; or as sexual excitement; or as megalomania from paresis; but whatever the explanation, such attitudes cannot be held to imply any abrogation of the Ego. Such an idea was not present in the minds of any of the great ascetics; for their self-importance was carried much further than simply into accidental practice; it was a dogma; so preached and taught. We, who read these instances with mingled feelings of incredulity and disgust, must not forget that occupation with one's own soul was the essential duty, the only possible means of salvation. Thomas à Kempis insists on it;[61] Luis of Granada, that saintly youth too pure-minded to gaze upon his own mother, warns the neophyte of the dangers in wishing to do good to others.[62] The honest mind finds it hard to accept a scheme so supremely selfish in the light of "an ideally-normal state of man's development"; and ere the world as a whole can ever so accept it, there needs full justification through the achievement of the highest creative truth.

Objection to mysticism as an "ideally-normal state," and questioning of the truth so acquired, is nearly as old as Christianity. Under certain circumstances, this

objection has at times taken so definite a form, that even the great leader and whilom mystic, Loyola, expressed very vigorous doubts; and sought to substitute the rule of obedience to defined authority. Dr. Lea,[63] with that simple appeal to historical facts which he can make so distinguished, has pointed out some of the dangers which beset "the perilous paths of superhuman ecstasy" in the past, and which it were well not wholly to forget in the latitudinarianism of the present. Spain was long free from mystical tendencies, and, when they began to appear, the Church made systematic efforts to uproot them. This was necessary for self-preservation, as has already been noted; but Dr. Lea [64] makes it very striking when he shows that for one Teresa, one John of the Cross, there existed hundreds of self-deluded *illuminati,* who differed from them only as failure differs from success. These were regarded as a direct menace to the Church, and came under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition.

As early as 1616,[65] theologians decided that special revelations from on high were no proof of sanctity; and the trials of the mystics F. Ortiz and Maria Cazalla, settled in the negative their claims to be under special guidance, and exempt from the general rules laid down for the use of sinners. The persecution and torture of these unfortunates came as the result of their assertions. Epidemics of a mystical character, such as that in the convent of Placido in 1630,[66] and at Louviers and Loudun,[67] some years later, were handled with like severity. They concern us here only as they prove the existence of contemporary doubt. Even in the ages of credulity, the human in-

tellect raised itself at moments above the level of superstition to ask these *illuminati,* as we ask them, for results. Where, asked the Church, are the creations of your genius, what are the truths of your revelation? When the claimant chanced to be a creature of convincing mental powers joined to a magnetic personality, his superiority was immediately accepted as proof of his Divine favor. If he displayed no such qualities, then the reverence due a saint turned speedily into the horror due an heretic. "The Church," says Dr. Lea, "was in the unfortunate position of being committed to the belief in special manifestations of supernatural power, while it was confessedly unable to determine whether they came from heaven or hell. This had long been recognized as one of the most treacherous pit-falls. . . . As early as the twelfth century, Richard of St. Victor warns his disciples to beware of it, and Aquinas points out that trances may come from God, from the demon, or from bodily affections." John Gerson endeavored to meet this danger by forming a set of diagnostic rules; John of Avila added his warning against delusion; while the historian comments that all this confusion was "merely another instance of the failure of humanity in its efforts to interpret the Infinite."[68] It is only to-day that scholars seem confident of their interpretation, that they accord the mystics a complete credulity and acceptation such as they never received in the past. For all of ten centuries, the mind of the Church is seen to fluctuate between the state of credulity and the struggle against it; between fear and knowledge.

Fluctuations between these opposite points of view often lasted long after the subject was in his grave. The revelations of Maria d'Agréda, which had for title "The Mystic City of God," were placed on the Index in 1681, taken off in 1686, condemned in France by the Sorbonne in 1696, and finally allowed to circulate among the faithful in 1716, "thus furnishing," comments Dr. Lea, "another example of the difficulty of differentiating between sanctity and heresy."[69] Even the Inquisition itself grew, to use the same historian's phrase, "rationalistic in its treatment of these cases";[70] for in the eighteenth century, it sent one case to an insane asylum, and in 1817, ordered yet another to obtain medical advice. The Middle Ages, in the person of St. Bonaventura, may even be found commenting on a certain passage from Richard of St. Victor—where he describes the highest grade of Divine love as producing an apparent idiocy.[71] The very conjunction of these terms denotes that the mediæval mind had not lost the power of judgment by comparison. And if this be true, surely the mind of the twentieth century has an equal right to ask for definite results before rendering a final verdict.

The modern theorist, therefore, has not aided us to understand this complex and delicate subject; he has rather confused than cleared it. On the one hand, his reverence, on the other, his contempt, for what he finds incomprehensible, places him at a disadvantage toward his subject and thus toward his reader. The latter, if he would know anything of the mystic, must shut his

ears to the clamor of theory and open them only to the voices from the past, as contained in the documents of spiritual history and autobiography.

That the Church was originally rich in the documents of mystical confession—particularly those addressed to the spiritual director and bequeathed to him after death—admits of no possible doubt: the marvel is that so few, comparatively speaking, are extant in their integrity. For this result, it would seem that the standard of biography the Church has chosen to adopt must be responsible; otherwise weeks of careful search among the wonderful indices of the great and lesser Bollandists, must have yielded a larger number of valid examples.

The feeling that it is necessary to publish a religious confession intact, is extremely modern. Moreover, it is a scientific feeling, and springs from a sense of scientific obligation. The Church has never felt it; by the nature of things never could feel it. Even to-day she rather prefers that the devout should peruse his Augustin in a carefully edited little volume with most of its frank humanity omitted. The faithful are not forbidden to read the full edition of the confessions of any saint; but the book which is placed within their easy reach is not the full edition. The Church's authority, in this regard as in others, exerts itself to suppress individualism and to maintain a due attitude of reverence. The mystic is the supreme individualist, and for this reason the Church has for centuries looked upon him askance. Her attitude resembles that of the colonel of a regiment who should

find that one of his privates claimed to be in receipt of special orders from the commander-in-chief, transmitted to him individually, and outside of the ordinary channels. Such presumptuous zeal comes near to mutiny; thus the Church has tended to treat as mutineers such bodies as the Jansenists, such individuals as Mme. Guyon. For every mystic she has canonized, she has silenced ten.[72]

In the preface to the Works of John of the Cross, the learned translator remarks that he has altered the words of the saint "en adoucissant les propositions un peu dures, en tempérant celles qui sont trop subtiles et trop métaphysiques";[73] and this same idea is carried further in an approbatory letter from the University of Alcala, which declares that in the works of this saint "naught has been found contrary to the Catholic Faith." "In fact," proceeds the letter, "all these works are valuable both for good morals, and to govern spiritually inclined persons, and to disengage them from any illusions which they may suffer if they make too much of their state of visions and revelations."[74] John of Avila warns his pious reader in positive terms against dangerous illusions, or the desire of things singular and supernatural, as denoting a spirit of wicked pride and curiosity. Many passages of a similar kind might be cited to show that the Church felt herself fully justified in editing, excising, and freely altering the works of all mystics, whether great or small, which came into her possession.[75]

This custom has naturally increased the difficulties of the lay investigator. True, some of the saints have

been great figures, whose records meant so much to the world at large that they outlived and escaped this discipline, but these are few. Pious exhortation and pious comparison being the ideal of these biographers, the *facts* about the subject are considered of relatively small importance. No attempt is made to verify legend, or to substantiate miracle; the narratives of contemporary witnesses are not questioned; and usually the bull of canonization will be printed as the single "pièce justificative." Where an actual autobiography exists, it has been so transposed, or so incorporated into the text, as to nullify its value.[76] Even the Bollandists, the splendor of whose biographical achievement dazzles the humble-minded,—even these great historians seem to have no feeling whatever for the necessity of shifting the legend from the facts.

Many of the earlier French and Italians suffer editing at the most incompetent hands. When the editor is more capable, his insistence on his subject's sanctity under all circumstances may stand wholly in the way of accuracy. Augustin[77] suffers from this attitude, when his plain statement of his sins is blandly misinterpreted as the exaggeration due to his saintly humility. It is even more irritating in the biographer of Mme. de Chantal,[78] when that saintly lady abandoned the duties of her houseful of children for the more exciting transports of the cloister.

Moreover, this method—or rather this lack of method—has worked a more serious injury still, by depriving history of the elucidation possible only through the study of defined groups. Isolated and

edited in the manner we have just described, these records cease to reflect each other. No group-sentiment is preserved, no group-characteristics are manifested. "Sans doute," observes a recent biographer, "rien ne ressemble à une vie de saint comme une autre vie de saint"; [79] yet there are diversities caused by race and by development which it would have been worth our while to determine. To be deprived of this matter over so long a period is a misfortune, and one which has served to narrow the field of investigation in a very hampering manner. This is probably the cause why the psychologists—of whatever camp—base their conclusions on the data obtained from three or four cases only, Teresa oftenest, or Suso, or Mme. Guyon. Comparison by means of groups is denied them.

Yet, however the lives of the saints resemble one another, it grows more and more evident that one cannot fairly estimate sanctity by considering one or two great individuals. The documents remaining may be all too few, but they are at least enough to demonstrate the futility of any such attempt. Take the cases of Teresa and Loyola, for example. Teresa had an organizing mind, she was an efficient, vigorous, and intelligent woman. Loyola had an organizing mind, he was a soldier, a courtier, and a practical man. Yet if one were to use these two cases on which to build a general theory of sanctity, how far would he wander from the truth! One critic of this subject lays emphasis on the presence in the mystic's heart of what he names "vital sanctity" [80] rather than on any manifestations of special phenomena. This term is rather too vague to be convincing. On the other

hand, Delacroix appears to think that mysticism may be adequately studied only from the examples of the great mystics, just because their constructive genius separates them definitely from all cases suffering a neuropathical stigma. Theory here, as elsewhere on this question, is decidedly *a priori*.

It were well to pause and consider the document itself, rather than its critics. The general impression it has left upon the mind has been accurately drawn by Delacroix.[81] "Les mystiques," he writes, "n'écrivent leur vie qu'à une époque où ils sont déjà avancés dans les voies intérieures. . . . Les documents qu'ils nous donnent ont le caractère de souvenirs et de mémoires, beaucoup plus que celui de journal ou de notes. . . . Si disposées que soient les mystiques à l'observation intérieure et à l'analyse personnelle, l'idée du document scientifique leur est tout-à-fait étrangère. Ils écrivent, soit sur un ordre intérieur, soit sur l'ordre d'un directeur. Du plus, au moment qu'ils écrivent . . . ils ont déjà l'idée du caractère de ces états, . . . l'idée d'une suite, d'un progrès." [82] The significance of this conception of a progressive state to the mystic, has already been mentioned and will be later dealt with. As an idea it had much influence upon their presentation of their material, as upon their interpretation of it. From the mediæval cases we cannot expect to gain such classified and detailed information as the Quakers, under very different influences, felt it necessary to leave in their testimonies; and the lack of all group-characteristics is more serious still. From the scanty and cloudy records of the early Middle Ages, much of

value may yet be drawn; and it is possible therein to trace the beginning of certain tendencies, which were to have no small share in the development of men's thought.

The earliest important personal documents of the mystical type are the revelations to saints and cloistered persons in the Middle Ages, which precede, by several centuries, those confessions of the Gottesfreunde, whose fragments form what is probably the earliest mystical group. These revelations, although submitting to all the influences of contagion and much affecting one another's style, lack that central idea which is necessary to bind a group together. They concern matters of varying importance, and are scattered throughout the countries and cloisters of Europe. In most cases they are dictated by the seer to a scribe, or monastic clerk, or a director, who writes down in labored Latin their prophecies and visions of heaven and of hell.[83]

Such are the records left by Gertrude of Eisleben and Mechtilde, by Hildegarde of Bingen and her friend Elizabeth of Schönau; by Brigitte of Sweden, Catherine of Bologna, and Françoise Romaine; by Gerlac Petersen, the anchoress Juliana of Norwich, and the anonymous monk of Evesham.

Among these, that of Hildegarde is the only record which contributes detailed personal matter of any real value. This extraordinary woman includes much of her youthful history, and is particular about such details as her age at different crises, in a manner unknown to the others. Of the Gottesfreunde records which follow and are intimately connected with the

revelations, we possess but few full documents,—the autobiographies of Merswin and Suso, Tauler's letters and sermons, the journals of Margaret and Christina Ebnerin. These are sufficient to give a vivid picture of their quaint and sensitive piety; but whatever introspective tendency they display is overborne by the desire to speak of things revealed.

The vividness with which these long-ago mystics describe their religious experiences, is to us, to-day, the most striking feature of their records. The other world appears to them with all the details of color and form that may be suggested by their mediæval feeling for decoration. Thus Baptiste Varani describes Christ as a handsome youth, dressed in white and gold, and with curly hair, and Angela da Foligno saw him a handsome boy, magnificently adorned.[84] Jesus seemed like his "own brother" to Ubertino da Casale, who likewise identified himself with the persons and events of the New Testament. Their visions are personal, objective, and picturesque, to a degree amazing and naïf; they are also, as Tylor [85] observes, strikingly wanting in originality: "The stiff Madonnas, with their crowns and petticoats, still transfer themselves from the pictures on cottage walls to appear in spiritual personality to peasant visionaries, as the saints who stood in vision before the ecstatic monks of old were to be known by their conventional pictorial attributes." [86] The reader has already sufficient warrant for the application of the above passage, in the sections of this book devoted to the description of those phenomena. Some of the more vivid strikingly confirm the imitative tendencies here noticed. Says

Mechtilde, for example: "On Esto Mihi Sunday she heard the beloved of her soul, Jesus, saying to her in the sweet whisper of love, 'Wilt thou abide with me on the mountain, these forty days and nights?' And the soul, 'Oh, gladly, my Lord!' . . . Then he showed her a high mountain, of wondrous greatness . . . having seven steps by which it was ascended, and seven fountains. And, taking her up, He came to the first step, which was the step of humility"; [87] and so on, through a long vision describing the ascent.

Mr. Edmund Gardner (from whose sympathetic translation the above is condensed) remarks on its resemblance to the Dantean hill of Purgatory; but in truth this analogy of a mountain, with steps up thereto, is made use of by the mystics with zealous and untiring banality. The steps—whether three, or seven, or nine—are to be read of in Dionysius,[88] in the St. Victors, and in St. Bonaventura, while they are reiterated, with but trifling variations, in the revelations of later visionaries, like Angela da Foligno, Juliana of Norwich, Teresa, and Maria d'Agréda. This sheer, mechanical repetition of an idea, or, more accurately, of a metaphor, is surely unlike the fertility of genius, whose touch revivifies the outworn. The mechanical reiteration, moreover, is not confined to style and image, for it extends to the things seen, as well as to the manner of telling about them. Moreover, the contents of these revelations differ little—indeed, surprisingly little—from the later Methodist or Quaker examples. The sense of personality is hardly keener, although the details are more picturesque. A mediæval Catholic case is not apt to undergo the

same pre-converted progress, his whole religious life dates rather from that day on which he takes the vows. His attitude toward fundamental questions holds an assurance which the Dissenter could never hope to feel. Yet, on the whole, the similarity of these instances is far more remarkable than the diversity. The fourteenth-century nun is emotionally stirred and troubled by certain symbols of her faith, exactly as the Quaker is moved by and toward the figures of his. M. M. Alacoque felt a piercing flame at the thought of the order of the Visitation; while Thomas Laythe fasted for a fortnight on account of "weights and exercises" which the idea of the Quakers brought upon him. John Gratton is moved "toward a people poor and despised, the Lord's own"; Carlo da Sezze was especially stirred by the idea of the Sacred Heart; and so on.[89]

What differences here exist result largely from a totally different attitude in the audiences which surround the actors in the drama. The entire problem of the action and reaction of the writer and his public, of the actor and his audience, has an especial significance in regard to the situation of the mediæval religious. However one may estimate this attitude, he cannot ignore it: whether it be regarded in the light of faith or in the light of credulity, it becomes an important factor in all secluded communities. Whatever the feeling of the Church at large,—and we have seen it was by no means always one of sympathy,—yet the mediæval mystic played his part before an audience generally predisposed to belief. To what extent this belief stimulated the chief performer and

excited him to further efforts, can be judged when it is compared with the very different attitude existing to-day. Renan's observation that miracle is conditioned on the credulity of the witness,[90] would seem to be confirmed whatever the conditions.

A recent writer comments on this fact in a few sentences relating to instances of conversion in prison;[91] and it is true of the entire world to-day. Where the audience used to be benign, now, it is hostile; where it was reverent, now, it is charged with suspicion. The line of the norm meanwhile has so shifted that what seemed health to the thirteenth century, appears disease to the twentieth.

Personal opinion as to the value of this change may differ, but whether one believes it to be for good or ill, one cannot deny that it is responsible for an alteration of tone in the literature of religious experience, and also, no doubt, for a certain loss in authority and in distinction.[92] Whereas he once looked down upon an awestricken world, the mystic now must look askance, often defiantly, upon a jeering and a sceptical world. This lack of sympathy has survived even the emotional reactions of the last quarter-century, and is now common to the majority of people, irrespective of creed. Whether to-day a man's belief be Catholic, Protestant, or rationalistic, he will agree to regard with extreme suspicion any person laying claim to supernatural revelations or experiences. It thus becomes all the more necessary to handle the data of mysticism with caution and with sympathy, since the easiest manner to dispose of it, is thought by many to be the medical-materialistic. At no time is

it possible without strain to hold the mind open to what these mystics think; indeed, as was said at the outset of this enquiry, the difficulties in respect to theory and in respect to documents, are not less when we come to the data. Yet these data must be examined if the reader is to lay any foundation in his own mind for a conclusion on the subject. Most of the psychological phenomena attendant upon the *via mystica,* have already received attention in the section upon conversion, where they are grouped in order to elucidate that crisis. It has been made plain that in an ardent and sensitive person, such a crisis is invariably, if but temporarily, mystical. In the life of the true mystic, however, these phenomena develop, showing a progression which must be taken into account, and which has a typical and effective result upon the personality of the subject. Most studies of mysticism, whatever their theory, have confined themselves to the higher examples of this type, using them, as Von Hügel does Catherine of Genoa, both as a text and as a commentary. For this reason they have failed to draw certain highly obvious inferences.

It is impossible, of course, even for these writers to overlook the more striking conclusions reached by modern science; and thus Miss Underhill [93] makes note of the self-hypnotization of Jacob Boehme "gazing fixedly at the pewter dish reflected in the sunshine," and Loyola, seated in meditation before running water;—but she makes no real study, no thorough investigation of the instances of "misinterpreted observation." In truth, any such study would serve to

create insuperable difficulties in the way of founding and maintaining any philosophical theory of mysticism.

There is nothing in the entire field of religious investigation more startling than the comparisons which are furnished by savages, in regard to mystical phenomena. They will give pause even to the most conventional mind. If he reads that "the Zulu convert in a mood of heightened religious excitement will behold a snake with great eyes and very fearful; a leopard creeping stealthily; an enemy approaching with his long assegai";[94] what comparisons are suggested by the testimony of Loyola, or Dr. Pordage, or Mme. Guyon, or the Mère Jeanne des Anges? "Thus the visionary temptations of the Hindu ascetic and the mediæval saint are happening in our own day."[95] We read that the North American Indian fasts to produce a similar effect, whether by vision or dream; and according to the character of the vision makes his various decisions. Some of these decisions relate to his private affairs, and some to the ceremonies then in progress and which the fast has preceded.[96] The case of Catherine Wabose, the Indian already noted, is a vivid confirmation of these instances. She says particularly that during her fast and vigil she kept expecting visions, and it was not long ere she was gratified. "Any state of the body," observes the physiologist Müller,[97] "expected with a certain confidence, is prone to ensue"; and this follows not only in cases of savage religion, but even where religion itself is not the superinducing cause.

John Beaumont[98] quotes from Dion Cassius who

avows that he had been divinely commanded to write his history. Beaumont himself had visions and heard tinkling bells, but no religious ideas attached to them. Herbert of Cherbury [99] received a sign, on the occasion of completing a book whose tenets were considered dangerous to Christianity. Philo Judæus similarly alludes to his Dæmon; and Cardan is equally plain. Louis Claude de St. Martin associated his phenomenal revelations with philosophy. Less harmless a person, Henri Charles, the murderer of Mme. Gey, at Sidi-Mabrouk, in Algeria, observes that, after certain upheavals in his faith, he turned extremely mystical and had visions of trees and of peasants' cottages. "I had begun," he writes in his "Memorial," "to love the supernatural." [100] These cases are merely mentioned by way of corrective to the general impression, fostered by so many of the theories now in vogue, that mysticism and mystical phenomena in themselves argue a high degree of religious or of moral development. As a matter of fact, nothing could be further from the truth, as is shown by such narratives as that of Marie de Sains, or the Mère Jeanne des Anges, or any others among the confessions of diabolical possession. Here the whole range of mystical experiences is seen displayed, but with a contrary significance. Visions, voices, conversations with the demon, "diabolical" instead of "divine" espousals; such a duplication worried the mediæval conscience exceedingly. It might worry ours if the student to-day were really disposed, as the theorists desire, to look upon this condition as an "ideally normal" state.

Instead, the facts dispose him to look upon it as a

very artificial and abnormal condition. The facts show that a predisposition to mysticism does not involve either mental ability, normal excellence, or even religious motives. Religious emotion may, indeed, be the most frequent starting-point for the mystical phenomena; but it is by no means a necessary antecedent, and the state takes its rise, in some cases, from purely physical and nervous conditions (such as occur during puberty), and may receive no religious color until later. It may be primarily religious; and it may be secondarily religious; but there is no valid burden of proof, if one examines the facts *in toto,* that it is necessarily *religious* at all.

"When the body is systematically weakened by fastings and vigils," remarks Dr. Lea,[101] "spiritual exaltation is readily induced in certain natures by continued mental concentration." And the cause may be what the human imagination wills.

The section on "Conversion" furnishes a large number of examples of the forms which this spiritual exaltation may assume. These forms do not differ among mystics, but the progression of the mystical state is important and must not be forgotten. The sudden and transient outbreak of psychological phenomena superinduced in most persons by the excitement and strain of conversion, is very different from that progress along the way, which distinguishes the saints and the great contemplatives. Moreover, this progression presents some suggestive features. For instance, Hildegarde of Bingen, who began to see visions and great lights at three years old, and continued to do so until she was seventy, penetratingly,

observes the difference between the mild beauty of the earlier visions, concealed by her and taken symbolically, and the bizarre prophecies which, an old woman, she writes to Bernard of Clairvaux. With Suso, the progression is even more strikingly and vividly depicted; and it was also in the experience of Jerome. This passing from visionary experiences of a helpful to those of a horrible kind, may be noted also in Guibert, Othloh, Antoinette Bourignon, Angélique Arnauld, de Marsay and Mme. Guyon—it is an especial characteristic of the earlier mysticism. Angela da Foligno became a recluse after the death of her husband and sons. At the "Fourteenth Spiritual Step," her visions, sparing before, grew frequent, and were supplemented by dreams. Her bodily sufferings and soul-torments were incessant thereafter.[102] Jeanne de St. M. Delel e at first revolted against convent-rule. Soon, however, she came to love solitude and silence; and then began to hear interior words, to be comforted by the Lord, who showed her the mysteries of the Faith. Her health, never strong, suffered from the seclusion; yet she thinks she would have remained humbly happy in the favor of God, but for the doubts of her superior, who tries to mortify and humiliate her in every way. Up to this time, her visions had been of a gentle and reassuring character, but under the suspicion of presumption they became painful, horrible, and perverse. This influence of suggestion by others upon the character of the psychological phenomena of the mystics, has rarely been pointed out by students of these manifestations. The same effect is to be noted in the "Apology" of Dame Gertrude

More, who was "perplexed and tossed with a thousand imaginations and overwhelmed with miseries—yea, almost desperate"—from the unwise advice of her director. She went to another priest, "and found myself in fifteen days so quieted that I wondered." The effect of the hysterical Père Surin upon the hysterical Sœur Jeanne des Anges, is a striking example of this personal influence. It is strongly suggested, also, in the documents left by the Gottesfreunde, in Germany, who vitally affected one another.[103] According to the doubt, however, as to whether the mysterious Friend of God in the Oberland, who in turn harrowed the souls of John Tauler, Rulman Merswin, Margaret Ebnerin, and others, was a real person or a symbolical figure, this case cannot be given as conclusive. Richard Rolle, the hermit of Hampole, says of the spiritual life, "the process truly, as I will show, solitary life behooves me to preach." Maligned by slanderers after his conversion, he wandered from cell to cell in search of peace, always hearing heavenly music and saying quaintly: "Forsooth my thought continually to mirth of song was changed." This expression by Rolle of the mystical life in terms of music, is original with him and very lovely: it seems to have lasted all his days and to have been the main form in which the love of God took meaning to his mind. Rolle gives us no further details; but a similar progressive spiritual experience befell Jonathan Edwards. The nun Véronique Giuliani does not give the starting-point of her progressive mysticism. Christ crowned her with thorns during prayer, and the pain remained about her brows, more or less, for twelve

years. In another vision the Child pierces her with a golden staff, and, touching the place with her handkerchief, she sees it spotted with blood. Mary of the Angels, Carmelite, had a deep sense of piety, but again personal influence, in the shape of a kind, sensible priest, curbed her childish morbidity. It is unfortunately suggested to her that the grief which she felt on parting with her family to take the veil (she is only fifteen), is the Devil's work; thus leading her to begin the practice of dreadful austerities, which plunge her into gloom and despair. The reader's attention has already been called to an idiosyncrasy of the Evil One that the more one noticed his attacks, the more furious they grew; and that in the few—painfully few—cases in which they were ignored altogether, they vanished with a remarkable rapidity.[104] Mary of the Angels noticed them even at their tentative stage; the assaults grew violent and well-nigh physical, taking chiefly the form of giving her hideous, impure thoughts, while devils annoyed her when at prayer by their cries and howls. In the more modern case of another Carmelite, Thérèse of the Holy Child, the confessant was one of five sisters who all became nuns. Her innocence was so great that on taking the veil at eighteen, her director told her she had never mortally sinned. Yet a terrible reaction of gloom at once beset her. Her death, at twenty-five, of consumption, put a period to what was a nearly perfect type of the mystical progress. A longer development in A. C. Emmerich carries us through all the childish visions (at six she beheld the Creation and the fall of man) into the later periods of horror, when she could not eat,

and during which she developed the stigmata. Her visions and ecstasies were frequent, much resembling those of Maria d'Agréda. In her last illness we have read how her complacency passed the bounds, so that even her director had his doubts. The famous abbess whom she resembled gives full account of her own mystical progress, describing how phantoms beset her in the shape of wild beasts; how she suffered during prayer, and how horror drove her nearly into open blasphemy. "A light soft and clear" she declared accompanied her visions, wherein she beheld the life of the Virgin Mary. She especially observes that writing calmed her. The nun Osanna Andreasi (who, by the way, was thought by her parents to be epileptic) tells us that at six years old the Child Jesus appeared to her, and, describing to her his love for children, avowed that he would teach her how to become a saint. Later, an angel led her to behold the universe under the law of God. A modern case, Mary of the Divine Heart, began by holding intimate talks with Christ, "all interior"; but these were soon followed by the customary dreadful glooms and violent periods of despair. Illustrations drawn from English dissenters further elucidate the progressive nature of the mystical process. Joanna Southcott, who began with startling dreams and visions, rapidly came to closer grips with Satan; and in one conflict, lasting for ten days, she was beaten black and blue. The same progression is found in the Mormon examples. Joseph Smith, at the first, claimed only to be a mouthpiece, a mere receiver of revelations; but he is soon a seer, and a crystal-gazer, an occultist, faith-healer, and a caster-out

of devils. Those fights with the Devil told by Mormon elders, read much like Joanna Southcott's, Guibert de Nogent's mother's, or the abbot Othloh's. In Joanna's case ill-health and hysteria seem a definite cause; while the example of "misinterpreted observation," i. e., dropsy instead of divine pregnancy which ended both her Divine claims and her life, would be grotesque were it not so pathetic.

Alice Hayes, Quaker, resembles Mme. Guyon in her interior progress and her outward persecutions; and Joseph Hoag, also a Friend, experienced as many visions, reactions, and progressive mystical phenomena as ever did Suso or Teresa. Other marked instances of Quaker mysticism may be found in the cases of Margaret Lucas and of Samuel Neale. The custom of the Friends, to turn immediately upon conversion to a career of active ministry and service, makes the mystical examples rarer than among the mediæval hermits or the monastic cases. Yet no one can read their testimonies without being convinced that the progressive condition is identical, though it is one which needs the seclusion, the asceticism, and the regimen of the cloister, to develop fully and characteristically.

To pass final judgment upon the facts, may be wisely left to the open-minded student of human nature. The review of these testimonies should give him at least a foundation for his decision. He may not be able to formulate any explanation of the state of mystical progression, whose votaries have for so many centuries played their parts before the audience of the world. Mysticism may speak to him of

various influences; being a term so wide that he may not desire to restrict it to the narrow field of personal experience. It may mean to him more what it meant to Augustin or to Amiel—the delicate response of human emotion to the appeal of the vastness and mystery of the universe. "I will pass then beyond this power of my nature also, rising by degrees unto Him who made me. . . . See, I am mounting up through my mind towards thee who abidest above me . . ."[105] is the cry of the genius-mystic.

To-day, one is apt to forget that it is genius which feels this exultation. The judgment of the reader here is asked simply on the one limited and much-misunderstood field of personal experience, and upon the theorists thereof. It is for him to say, when he looks at A. C. Emmerich, M. de Marsay, Antoinette Bourignon, whether "the mono-ideism of the mystic is rational." Such examples as Père Surin, Joanna Southcott, Joseph Smith, Maria d'Agréda, Osanna Andreasi, M. M. Alacoque, Mère Jeanne des Anges, Thérèse of the Holy Child, may assist him to decide whether it is true that "the mystics are almost always persons of robust intelligence and marked practical and intellectual ability." Survey of the records as they stand may lead him to question further whether the mystical way is, truly, the way of higher life, and if that state be in truth a state of ideally normal development. To readjust his attitude, he has only to consider such undeniable facts as the lack of creation from these so-called creators; the paucity of truth obtained for the world by those who claim that they reach it at its Divine source; and the dissociation

of ethical standards from religious standards which is the fundamental characteristic of mysticism. Further, it is made plain that the world's reverence for these mystics has been due primarily to centuries of misinterpreted observation of the phenomena of mysticism. Once understood, how changed perforce would be the conclusions of the very subject himself! Would Robert Blair,[106] saintly man, have considered himself divinely converted if he had realized the strength of that wine in the milk-posset? Reason has caused from time to time strong reactions in favor of such understanding; but the natural inclination to consider a thing important in proportion as it appears obscure, has prevented such reaction from being carried sufficiently far. At the moment, the "will to believe" that this state, since it exists, is one of value and meaning, is very strong. A mystical wind is just now sweeping over the fields of thought. Many follow the example of the director of Mary of the Angels and cure by command. It were well, in view of prevalent ideas, that we examine and reëxamine—not the generalizations, but the *facts*, the specific, particular, and concrete *facts*, on which all valid theory must necessarily be based. The verdict, then, when soberly and thoughtfully rendered, will have the weight of an induction.

It is time to speak a word of warning in the ears of those to whom criticism and history afford unfamiliar methods by which to achieve results. This book is not one of philosophical speculation, nor of metaphysical theory. Neither is it a psychological study of re-

ligious experience, so much as an examination of the material available for such a study. Rather it is an attempt, through classification and analysis, to determine what the data in the case of individual religious experience really are, and what, if any, conclusions may be logically drawn from them. For, if no logical conclusions may be so drawn, it is at least a gain in honesty to face and acknowledge the fact. This acknowledgment in itself will have a quality of novelty, since it has been almost a tradition to take conclusions on this subject for granted. Very modern, indeed, is the student who pauses to ask if a valid induction can be made on the subject of religion. More recent still is he who endeavors to bring the chaotic and heterogeneous material furnished by antiquity, by history, and by literature within the reach of scientific method. Rightly or wrongly, men have pointed to these instances, and made use of them in order to reach certain conclusions, ever since Job's friends gathered to condole with him on his many misfortunes. The experiences themselves have remained little altered by the centuries; but our interpretation of them changes almost with each generation. Maudsley [107] has made note of the indisputable fact that truth obtained through ecstasy always resulted in confirming the views of the subject. If a Christian, his "reason-transcending truths" were always Christian in their significance; but if a Brahman, they were Brahman. Thus, an Unitarian's visions differed from those of a Trinitarian, Teresa's from Swedenborg's, and so forth. The process must be limited and governed by the predisposition of the subject's mind,

which does not affect the simple essential nature and identity of these experiences. It is fair to use the Book of Job as a case in point, even though we know it to be complex in form, and often theological in intention. What happened to Eliphaz the Temanite, seven hundred years before Christ, seems perfectly familiar to us to-day, yet we do not draw the same conclusions which he drew from that occurrence.

"In thoughts from the vision of the night, when deep sleep
falleth on men,
Fear came upon me, and trembling, which made all my
bones to shake.
Then a spirit passed before my face; and the hair of my
flesh stood up;
It stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof;
An image was before mine eyes, there was silence, and I
heard a voice, saying,
Shall mortal man be more just than God?
Shall a man be more pure than his maker?" [108]

This revelation forms the starting-point of a doctrine of consolation, placed by the speaker in the mouth of the vision for the sake of its greater authority. It is nearly twenty-five hundred years since the words were written which are put into the mouth of this character, yet their accent of vivid personal experience is the accent of yesterday. Keen and full of terror was that moment to the writer, were he really Eliphaz or another. But the instant he turns from describing the vision, and his feelings when it befell, to repeating the words he thinks it said, and the doctrinal conclusion he believes it reached,—that instant our conviction ceases. We perceive an intel-

lectual idea superimposed on an emotional experience; and we recognize therein a common fallacy of human reasoning. For, to rely on that fundamental law, the identity of our common nature, and on all the valid records of psychological experience, does not mean that we are to accept the conclusions of the subjects as we accept their data. It means, in fact, just the contrary; for their conclusions tend to be wrong, if for no other reason than because the experience is their own. We find them, for instance, attributing to the revelation their own ideas of intellectual quality subtly elaborated. The mind of Eliphaz conceived a certain doctrine, the imagination of Eliphaz beheld a vision—and the two are by him linked together without hesitation. A similar elaboration is to be observed in the case of Paul;[109] who asked, in his first narrative, "What shall I do, Lord? And the Lord said unto me, Arise, and go into Damascus; and there it shall be told thee of all things which are appointed for thee to do." This is a simple and direct command; but in the second narrative observe how it becomes elaborated and detailed.

"But rise, and stand upon thy feet: for I have appeared unto thee for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness both of these things which thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee;

"Delivering thee from the people, and from the Gentiles, unto whom now I send thee,

"To open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inherit-

ance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me.'' [110]

In this speech the Lord not only seems to tell Paul why he appeared to him and that he will reappear, but also describes what Paul must do, and what the Gentiles are going to do, along the line of certain doctrines notably Pauline. Far easier were it to accept Renan's explanation of the ophthalmia and the thunderstorm, than to accept Paul's inference as to the full, doctrinal meaning of his vision. We feel that he simply places his own doctrines in the vision's mouth, just as did Eliphaz, and drew similar quite unwarranted conclusions from the experience. A cruder case of this tendency is shown by Joseph Smith, whose visionary revelations, first wholly general and spiritual, become progressively detailed according to his particular needs.[111]

Misinterpreted observation is frequently responsible for erroneous inferences of this kind. It surprises us to-day to read Jonathan Edwards's naïf remark, that, during the Great Awakening, ''God has in many respects gone much beyond his usual and ordinary way.'' [112] Edwards gives also an instance of Satan's raging, and God's withdrawal, in the suicide of a worthy person, ''who,'' he then adds, ''was of a family that are exceedingly prone to the disease of melancholy, and his mother was killed with it.'' [113] The pages of this book have already been crowded with similar minor misinterpretations. Blair's ecstasy following the milk-posset,[114] and John Conran's conversion after the ''sweet liquor called shrub'' [115] are sincere examples. Colonel Gardiner's vision, following

the fall from his horse, is evidently another. Various saintly and cloistered women draw what seems to our minds unwarranted conclusions on the subject of their relations toward God; and the reader's own experience will furnish him with other instances. It must not be forgotten that Luther thought his "bright vision" to be the Devil's work.

To suspect the conclusion, while respecting the information of the subject, becomes a necessary canon for this study. Man is never more egotistical than when under the stress of a religious upheaval. The disorganized Ego tends to force itself perpetually upon the attention, just as a disorganized digestion would. A man cannot forget himself; and in proportion as he becomes important to himself, he becomes important (in his own mind) to the powers of Good and Evil, to Satan and to God. Each narrative must be sifted of this element and the bare occurrences subtracted, before they can be profitably used as matter of comparison. In the proper interpretation of these experiences lies all their validity for us. Then, if we are not to accept the subject's inference as to his own magnitude in the sight of God, if the facts seem not to warrant us in accepting the verdict of the critic who would class him with genius,—what conclusion are we to reach? Must we be forced to take the attitude of the medical-materialist—and finally dispose of the whole matter by shifting it to the realm of pathology? Must we hereafter think of Paul as an epileptoid, and of Teresa as an hysterical? Must we set them in the same class as Joseph Smith and Joanna Southcott?

It were useless to deny that the French school has much weight on its side—and to many the solution of disease appears the simplest solution.[116] The arguments from hysteria, the arguments from insanity, tend to develop striking analogies in certain directions, and some of our cases would seem to come very close to them. But here again it must not be forgotten, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other. Were our cases all Père Surins or Jeannes des Anges, or Sainte-Chantals, or John Crooks, or M. M. Alacoques or Joseph Smiths, we could hardly escape the reasoning of the medical-materialist. The point is that they are not. The same differences and difficulties of degree obtain here. Just so long as one can point to Augustin, to Paul, to Teresa, to Wesley, to Loyola, one cannot in justice nor in common sense set down the forces which underlay their religious experience to the manifestation of disease. On the contrary, just so long as one can point to the many contemplatives of the type of Maria d'Agréda, or Joanna Southcott, one cannot in justice nor in common sense set down the forces which underlay their religious experience to the manifestation of genius, or to an "ideally normal" development. The one link which binds these dissimilar personalities is the presence of this religious manifestation. That they hold this experience in common over the centuries, should, of course, be a vitally suggestive fact for the theorist, yet it must not cause him to rush into too-hasty generalization.

The tendency of the modern student to use only the more striking instances and individualities in support

of his special tenets, has been largely responsible for his attitude. Such an one founds a whole theory of mysticism, for instance, in two volumes, upon the single case of Catherine of Genoa;[117] and it is, to our thinking, exactly as if he wrote of the elephant, and confined his observations to the King of Burmah's celebrated cream-colored specimen; or as if he based his study of twins exclusively upon the pair known as the Siamese. It is in the study of the mean, rather than in that of the extremes, that the truth will be found to lie; and this is even more exactly the case in regard to an investigation which deals with human beings.

Yet the reader is standing ready to remind us that what is not health must be disease, and *vice versa.* Perhaps; so long as we insist on applying terms of this character to the subject rather than those more flexible. There are conditions in our lives which cannot be accurately described either as health or as disease. Pregnancy, for instance, properly to be defined only by the term *process,* may become normal or pathological according to the heredity and constitution of the subject, her nutrition, and the accidents which may affect its course. It is suggestive to us here, simply because of the conjunction of this process with a *result.*

Thus are we again confronted with that question of result, which we persist in thinking is the very heart of the matter. All the pathological theories of genius collapse utterly when they reach this same point—*the result.* All the "ideally normal" theories of mysticism collapse utterly when they reach this point

—*the result.* The discussion of Shelley's degeneracy, and the possible epilepsy of Cæsar and Richelieu, come to nothing, when one faces the irrefragable result of their creative intellectual power. That exultant cry of the mystic that he—he only—has grasped the divine truth—fails wholly when one asks him for a result, which is but Nothingness. The medical-materialist has not been able to produce from his sanatorium or *maison de santé,* any work of creative genius; nor can the mystical theorist show to our satisfaction that the saint has made any plainer to us a single one of life's great mysteries. "No psychological meaning," asserts Dr. Hirsch, "can be attached to the word genius. . . . All men of genius possess common traits, *but they are not traits characteristic of genius.*" [118] When this is remembered, and also that "in psychology, every man is species *sui generis,*" a great point will have been gained for our better interpretation of the phenomena under consideration.

It is evident that, by reason of their fixed character, the terms "health" and "disease" should be finally eliminated from this discussion. Too long has the reader been held within the limitations they impose upon his mind. Rather would one substitute the idea of *process,* and define the emotional religious experience as a process which develops in many of us and to which all of us are more or less innately subject. This development has been seen to be various, changing with the character of the person and with the influences surrounding him. At the beginning, it is governed by certain fixed conditions, which have been found to vary practically not at all in different

countries and races, nor during the progress of the ages. By means of these fixed conditions alone has it been possible to study the process, as one may study anything that is stable and defined. They are classified for the purpose of this work under one head, whereas the manifestations of the process, when in being, fall properly under another classification. The object of such classification is merely to separate the inducing conditions surrounding the process, from the process itself,—a differentiation which is almost never made by the subject, nor by those immediately in touch with him. Their tendency to ignore the favoring, antecedent conditions of his experience, has been perpetuated in the work even of serious scientific analysts, who fail for this reason to see the saint and his situation as they really are. Thus, the Church's interpretation of Augustin's religious experience has been fluctuating and fallacious for centuries; thus, Mme. Guyon has never been properly understood; thus, Guibert's heredity—so striking an influence!—is ignored; and the suggestive development of natures like Loyola and Teresa is passed over, or treated as if it were wholly homogeneous.

When we have determined that this form of experience is in the nature of a process, we would seem merely to have shifted the difficulty, and not to have done it away; to have changed the terms, yet not have explained their meaning. The ordinary person may not be obliged to have what actually occurs pointed out to him—but he will yet ask why and wherefore. Why does the nature of this or that person change so entirely that for the time being it is unrecognizable?

Wherefore these exaggerated terrors, this unbalanced sensitiveness, this exaltation, this uplifted passion? Something has set up a disuniting force within what we have chosen in these pages to call the nebula of Personality, and Something, after a troublous lapse of time, causes it healthily to integrate once more. Such, in brief, is the process with which most of us are familiar under the title of emotional religious experience. To what is this process due? What causes it? The world has had but one coherent answer to these questions: "It is due to the spontaneous upspringing of our religious instinct."

We have said that this is not a work of speculation —yet speculation of a sort there must be in every work which attempts to relate the facts it has analyzed to universal underlying conditions. The particular concrete example must be governed by broad and general conditions of evolution. Speculation, therefore, in the classic sense, forms a necessary part of every historical and scientific theory. Fortunately, in this case, the pathway appears to emerge on one of the highways of the intellect, whereon it has trodden without ceasing, almost from the first moment that it walked alone. Religion, however studied, has been a subject contemplated from the dawn of intellectual life. And from the very dawn, this same answer about religious instinct, under its varying forms, has been made without ceasing to the dissatisfied investigator.

Moreover, it has been made from very different points of view, it has tended to be the common and universal assumption underlying every species of

argument. That a religious instinct exists, that its presence in the nature of the savage accounts for his primitive fears, and for his primitive worship,—this has been the theory alike of the divine and the layman, of the metaphysician and of the scientist. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, this assumption was the meeting-ground of minds totally dissimilar—here the Deist joined with the Catholic, here a Rousseau could meet in agreement both with a Bossuet and a Voltaire. However variously these opposing views may have accounted for the presence of this religious instinct or sentiment, they all unite in taking its existence for granted. Advancing science, clearing away in its progress the veils which hung over our conceptions of fundamental states, seemed to bring us nearer to an understanding of them. Ethnology and anthropology, in recent investigations, appeared to confirm this assumption. Historians of religion, taking up the work at the point where the anthropologist lets it drop, also appear to add confirmation, even from antagonistic camps. Psychology, recently stepping forward with its first pretensions to be an exact science, does not appear to differ in most of its conclusions from the conclusions of the anthropologist or of the historian.

The means used by the anthropologist are exact and complete; their foundation is the firm and rigid basis of physical law. The means used by the historian have limits more flexible—yet, if he disregards, as he seems to-day bound to do, the regions of myth and legend, his foundations are equally solid and incontrovertible. To the anthropologist, the presence

of a so-called religious instinct is a sufficient answer to a certain question, and a sufficient explanation of a certain stage in the intellectual evolution of Man. Without it, his chain lacks its strongest links of connection. The historian, in his turn, beholds people moving in masses over the face of the globe, constructing, destroying, building, warring, at the touch of huge forces, among which religious sentiment is ever one of the most vital.

But modern psychology has had to rely for its investigations upon the questionnaire; and it may be permitted us to doubt if this means can ever be successfully used to obtain the more stable materials of science. Reasons have already been cited in these pages for considering the questionnaire as a method fundamentally unsound; and thus for our disagreement, *in toto,* with any results obtained by its use. William James, evidently feeling this, tried to widen the field of evidence; but the physical difficulties in his way—and they are undeniable—threw him back upon it at the last, with the result of minimizing the effect of his otherwise striking volume. In his hand and in that of his followers, the questionnaire appeared to fall into confirmation with theories assuming *a priori* the existence of a primal religious instinct. Does the spontaneous religious confession—a document owing its very existence to the influences making for sincerity—does it confirm the results of the questionnaire?

This task must be ours, and the student will surely not be impatient with such discussions as are necessary fully to accomplish that object.

IX

THE RELIGIOUS INSTINCT: I

I. The Document as literature; subjectivity; the Book of Job.

II. Growth of religious sentiment.

III. General comparisons between savage and modern mystical phenomena.

IV. Fasting; intoxication; wandering of the soul; ecstasy; memory and vision; heaven and hell.

V. Sanctity; spirit-world; faery and angel visions; exorcism.

VI. Vows and covenants.

VII. The saints; the voice; size of the soul; the dæmon.

VIII. Magic; stigmata; mystical flight; fetich and fetich-worship.

IX

THE RELIGIOUS INSTINCT: I

The fundamental difference between the spontaneous confession and the confession drawn from the answers to a questionnaire, lies in the fact that the former is a literary production amenable to the influences controlling literary movements, and so indicating the general conditions existing at the time of its composition, as well as the particular conditions obtaining in the mind of its author. Being the result of a direct impulse to express the more important of one's ideas and feelings, these ideas and feelings tend to maintain a natural relation the one to the other; while the "autobiographical intention" operates to preserve sincerity and to keep a proper proportion between the various parts of the narrative. Thus the very spontaneity of the record lends it value.

If the document be literary, it is manifest that the broader tendencies of literature must not be overlooked. The opening chapters of this book endeavored to trace these underlying tendencies as they affected the minds from which such records took their rise. The rite of public confession has been examined in this connection, while the formal discipline effected by the body of Christian apologetics was not without importance. To the generally subjective and introspective trend of the world's slowly maturing thought, full con-

sideration was accorded before the contents of the documents in question and the evidence they contained, claimed the reader's attention. If a return upon the broad influences for the moment appears necessary, it is because whatever affects the form and genesis of a document, obviously shapes the matter thereof; and no discussion of evidence is useful without comprehension of its origin. To understand the origin, to gauge the validity, of this evidence, to determine its bearing upon the problem before us,—let us recall at what stage in the history of thought the confessant made his entry into literature, as the foremost exponent of the subjective movement, and of what is now termed the personal note.

In a former volume, the writer [1] touched on the historical beginnings of individualism, as affecting the production of all types of autobiographical writing. In the religious confession this individualism took its first and simplest form. So soon as what we call authorship became possible, and a man was able publicly to claim his own compositions, then at once he desired a further personal expression and affirmation. Religious feeling went hand-in-hand with literary feeling to seek this affirmation. Both had risen from a crowd-sentiment, were made possible by the existence of a crowd-sentiment. "It is surely susceptible of proof," says a recent writer,[2] "that institutional religion came before personal piety, and that the great emotional and consolatory utterances which spring from individual experiences could not be made until the community, in choral and ritual, formed its dialect of worship and supplication and praise." This

dialect, then, shaped our present religious conceptions; and one may mark the individual rising first above his group as he came to seek some definition of the unknown forces about him in the universe.

If no pretence can be made at setting a date for this event,—one of the vital crises in the history of thought,—yet the archives of literature show us where the personal note was first sounded, long ere the Christian era.[3] The ancient poetical drama of Job relates a type of experience familiar to-day and startling in its vividness. The manner of Job's complaint and the degree of introspection with which it was accompanied, show an individuality already marked, an Ego already emphasized. The single voice is here uplifted above the chorus, giving words to its personal sense of protest and revolt.

"Surely, I would speak to the Almighty and I desire to reason with God,"[4] is the demand, and it denotes a mental state eras beyond the communal stage. In the words, "Make me to know my transgression and my sin," lies full appreciation of what the Friends call "bearing testimony," linked with great wonder at the miracle of Self, a new and intolerable sensation.

"If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me; if I say I am perfect, it shall also prove me perverse. Though I were perfect, yet would I not know my soul: I would despise my life,"[5] he cries, in a sort of exasperation; while his humility and his submission both partake of this same bewilderment. "Therefore have I uttered that I understood not, things too wonderful for me, which I knew not."[6]

This expressed wonder at life and at self, is the wonder of a time when natural laws were in no sense understood, when man was still amazed that cold was cold, or that hot was hot, or that he should feel and act as he felt and acted.[7] The first religious phenomena observed by him were necessarily isolated, nor would he be apt to relate them to any other set of phenomena. Comte notes, in this connection, that the mind "must have attained to a refined state of meditation before it could be astonished at its own acts—reflecting upon itself a speculative activity which must be at first incited by the external world."[8]

Job's perplexity comes to us from the cloudland at the beginning of things, and marks an advance in intellectual growth. There had been dim centuries when the savage progressed no further than to marvel, vaguely, at the world around him, and to deify what he felt to be beyond his grasp. But for a strange law of intellectual curiosity, which ordains that no human creature shall rest content with mere wonder, he might yet have remained ignorant and marvelling. Man, however, when once he starts to investigate, is deterred by no peril, even of death. Like the child in Maeterlinck's fairy-tale, he must needs open every door in the palace of night;[9] for this curiosity is incessantly fed by those forces of Faith and of Will, which drive him to the task.

Wholly untrained, at the outset he saw little; he possessed scanty powers of observation and none of self-observation; unable to comprehend, he could neither relate nor compare what he actually saw. These faculties developed slowly, and certainly did

not keep pace with memory. Hence the lack of method in early self-study, the omission, the vagueness, the misinterpretation. Hence the sterile self-observation of the Neo-Platonists, for instance, leading only to the fresh wonder of mysticism.

The present study finds an especial significance in the Book of Job, that landmark in the history of religion. Here the individual makes his first appearance, lifts his voice to protest the weight of his own experience. Here the reader may see wonder become curiosity, and curiosity become investigation. Here he may observe reaction, pressure of the outside world, timid friends with their accusation (since grown classic) of intellectual arrogance; and finally capitulation, with honor, to the Terror of the Unknown. It is true that Job is an isolated instance, just as Augustin is an isolated instance. Yet any piece of literature becomes necessarily a focus of tentative ideas. The self-study in Job indicates the stage that was reached at the time of its composition, even if his conclusion does not differ from the submissive adoration which was murmured all around him. "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee, wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes."[10] Nothing novel in this conclusion, for the tortured soul of the twentieth century! "There is only one thing for me now," writes Oscar Wilde, "absolute humility."[11]

Thus the final conclusion of the confession is the same after two thousand years; emotionally, at least, it has not changed through all the shifting of opinions and circumstances. But (as has been already sug-

gested) emotional influences are by no means the only influences at work upon the evolution of the religious idea. Intellectual currents may flow with, or against, the emotional currents, affecting the movement of the whole stream. Self-understanding, in itself, must have tended to heighten the forces productive of the mental condition called, by us Belief. Bagehot points out that "What we term Belief holds both an emotional and an intellectual element, Assent and Conviction. . . . The power of an idea to cause conviction depends much on its clearness and intensity first of all. . . . Truth has nothing to do with it, since men may hold it on opposite sides of the same question. . . . The interestingness of the idea counts, but it loses its power to convict in proportion as it may lose any of its clearness or its intensity." [12]

Bearing these words in mind, the evolution of belief-processes in the intelligence of primitive and semi-savage man, becomes comprehensible. To him most ideas were clear, most were intense, all must have been interesting. His beliefs were based on the simple operation of natural cause and effect—that rain came from the clouds, that it chilled the body and was dried by the sunshine; that to go without food permitted a man to see the faces and hear the voices of his gods. Convictions of this nature, derived from means purely logical, grew intensely strong, and in time this strong feeling lent itself to convictions whose foundations were decidedly less logical. Habits of conviction, induced by observation of natural laws, developed a receptive state of mind,—and one which tended to grow receptive without discrimination as to matters

lying properly outside the sphere of natural law. This intensity of conviction was readily applied to ideas, to imaginative and anthropomorphic conceptions, to the causes which men were obliged to invent as well as to those of which they knew. In such manner there was developed the same habit of taking natural logic for granted, and acting on it, as may be seen to-day in many intelligent children, whose action thereupon will so often have disastrous results. For primitive man there existed no corrective civilization, to tell him that he must not believe everything he thought he saw. Not only did he so believe, but he began also to communicate this powerful conviction to all those new images which the fascinating process of self-observation caused him to behold, rising like delicate and evanescent bubbles from the depths to the surface of consciousness. Among these, no doubt the larger number dealt with the supernatural, and took anthropomorphic shapes. The further operation of this primitive logic was responsible in great measure for the fetich and fetich-worship, whereby life and vital influence were attributed to inanimate objects and symbols. Gradually, the ritual of ancient religions grew up to satisfy primitive man's sense of what was fitting and reasonable in the way of rite and sacrifice.

Psychologically, at least, we can understand to-day exactly how the religion of rites and sacrifices was the natural outcome of primitive logic, the natural and fitting expression of this rudimentary sense for cause and effect. Introspection, or self-observation, bore its share in the evolution of ritual, because everything one noticed about oneself tended at first to

make one's religious ideas more definitely anthropomorphic. No less is it true, however, that continued self-observation inevitably leads the observer away from the religion of act and deed alone,—it tends rather toward philosophy and toward mysticism. The elementary introspection, which at first may have encouraged the formal rite, soon began to alter and to develop men's standards of personal conduct. He who looked steadfastly within, soon found that for him it was not enough to offer sacrifice, to keep feast and fast, to join in ritual and choral dance,—what he felt within himself was not a whit assuaged by these. His discontent is poignantly and beautifully expressed by Christ, in passages hungrily seized on by the waiting world.

"For I say unto you, that except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven."[13] And again, "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith."[14]

The deepening sense that there were "weightier matters" heightened the emotional need of maturing humanity; while the ancient dissociation between religion and conduct—a dissociation, as we shall see later, having a real foundation in human psychology—made the ancient cults and practices comparatively useless to aid that man who had begun to "look within" and to be ashamed at what he saw. The world's desire was now for something more significant than the mere performance of the

proper act in the proper way. Just before the Christian era this need was crucial, for men's ideas and ideals had outgrown the standards set by the early religions of cult. These creeds had long ceased to satisfy the learned or the cultured, for to such minds philosophy itself will often furnish both the material and the motive-power of religion. Therefore, the important point is, not that Socrates, or Seneca, or Marcus Aurelius, had outgrown their country's faith, but that the people as a whole had outgrown it. The poor, the untaught, the despised, also were beginning to "look within," in the vague hope that there they might behold something more divine than those gross gods who reared their misshapen heads into the Eastern sunshine. And they did find something more divine; pity, and charity, the desire to help one another and to pardon one another; movements, exquisite and struggling within them, of a something they had ignored and which now they came to call the Soul.

Self-study will be found to lie at the very root of the causes making for the swift spread of Christianity. Historians have failed to dwell upon the influence of the subjective tendency on Christian origins, probably because it is hardly capable of proof. It must be felt as an atmosphere, rather than beheld as a condition. An earlier chapter noted this trend in the last stand made by paganism, and showed how in the later Alexandrian school, during the second to the fourth century, subjectivity will be found at the bottom of Neo-Platonic and other non-Christian doctrines. Plotinus, Porphyry, and later, Iamblichus, made constant use of introspection to express their

philosophical-mystical system, if without permanent effect.

The success of Christianity has been variously attributed, but historians are at least united in the opinion that pagan doctrines had ceased to satisfy the world. In pre-Christian days, the masses followed perfunctorily decaying superstitions sprung from their earlier beliefs.[15] Scholars emphasize the prevailing aridity of these beliefs, the moral unrest which caused men to seize with enthusiasm upon a fresh, vital, and subjective faith. In its simpler form, Christianity appealed directly to the emotions, to the newly aroused ethical sense of humbler folk, and of those who wondered at the changes taking place within themselves.

Here is no place to linger on the fact of those philosophic alterations in structure which were later to adapt Christian doctrines to the requirements of the more sophisticated intellects of the age. It is now generally accepted that Paul is responsible for them, as for their promulgation. Such changes, however, were founded upon an emotional condition; and this fact our present data show to be as true of each individual case to-day, as it was during the first and second centuries.

Boissier,[16] discussing this subject, remarks that every intellectual advance is followed by an emotional reaction. For the Romans, the death of their barbarous polytheism was a great advance, but it left them without any emotional faith; hence a natural relapse into mysticism. Isis and Mithras, and many

other Eastern gods, had their votaries, and their little day of fashionable success in Imperial Rome.[17] But neither Isis nor Mithras could satisfy, as Christ satisfied, the need of the people for higher standards of conduct. It was the combination he offered of mystical rewards and satisfactions, together with an available working plan of human brotherhood, and human interest, which, charged with emotional beauty and intensity, moved the entire world. Nor must it be supposed that the first Christian doctrines were necessarily above the heads of the crowd to whom they were addressed. Renan comments on the fact that, side by side with barren cults, human nobility was everywhere manifest, that moral ideas were everywhere in a state of activity and ferment, and that it was the change in the moral standards of the peasant which helped to kill the ancient polytheism.[18]

The vitality of paganism must not be underestimated; its struggle to exist has been the theme of many an historian.[19] The change was an internal change; not the doctrine so much as the person was unfit. Pagan objectivity no longer seemed religious to a man beginning to study himself; and this shift in idea may be observed in numberless ways. The contest between Paul and James, called the brother of Christ, over the significance of the rite of circumcision, displays the old and the new forces simultaneously contending in the midst of the first small group of Christians. To James's mind the rite is still preëminent—the uncircumcised cannot be received

into the Church. To Paul's mind,—though he will not have his disciples forget their Jewish heritage,[20] —faith is still, and ever will be, above the law.

"O foolish Galatians," he cries in one of his greatest letters,[21] "received ye the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?" And he reiterates, throughout the epistle, that those who are once freed by the spirit, shall not again fall into bondage through observance. If the reactionary wishes of the elder Apostle had prevailed in this contest, the spread of Christ's teaching must have been much retarded. Humanity, arrived at a new stage of individualism, had found therein a creed in which themselves, their needs and aspirations, partook of greater importance since they held they were in truth the children of God.

Subjectivity of thought, which both affected and was affected by the growth of Christian tenets, was not long in finding expression through literature. A literary form became, as it were, technically suggested and supplied by the Church; the ancient rite of public confession, yielding to the individualistic tendencies of the times, gave way to private confession. The classic apologists, exercising every mental and emotional faculty in controversy and exegesis, further influenced this form by the heat of their personal convictions. To describe, to differentiate what we believe, by making an appeal, first, to the doctrine itself, second, to authority, third, to individual experience, is a process perfectly familiar to most of us, both in its inception and in its order. The child and the savage follow, almost mechanically, this same order

in their reasoning: "I believe this—first, because it is good to believe, beautiful and satisfying;—second, because my parents, and the doctors of my tribe so teach me,—third, because it makes me feel such and such emotions, or because I see and hear such and such visions and voices."

The "Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum" had threshed most vigorously the grain of belief from the surrounding straw, and thus prepared the way for that great exemplar of the third stage—Augustin—to make his supreme personal appeal. His "Confessions" fused these elements into one flawless and incomparable crystal for all time. With the achievement of a single masterpiece, any literary form becomes literature. Through Augustin, the confession takes it proper place, assuming familiar shapes, pointing to classical examples, and sheltering diverse types and schools. Thereafter, the matter changes little; the method, with practice, and under the tutelage of science, has grown more balanced and detailed. The self-student is to-day more apt; he understands better what he sees; more important still, he misinterprets his observations rather less. On the other hand, he is much further from the sources of that pure emotion, his guiding vision has dimmed. If Christianity were an emotional reaction, then it would seem as though the first impetus of that emotion, as emotion, were spent. With the possibility or desirability of its recrudescence, we have not here to do,—since our present concern is but to determine some of the problems contained in the evidence it furnishes.

To deal at any length with the different aspects of

religious origins, would be to lead the reader far from the theme of the present study. Volumes are required to discuss any one of the many complex and disputed questions involved in the study of religion. Save where they touch the subject in hand, for us they but becloud the issue. We must not step aside from the narrow path whereon our feet are set, to lose our way in that vast wilderness of theory. The reader must not look for more than a brief mention of such "august things," and that only where they press upon the confines of this essay.

Following hard on the history of these documents, should be an effort to relate the manifestations of individual, personal sentiment which they contain, to the mass-sentiment, and when this is accomplished, it may perchance be somewhat easier to consider their evidence in the light of a general theory of religion.

The impulse from which these confessions spring is individual, spontaneous, and inevitable, and made its appearance at a comparatively late stage in the history of human ideas. Slowly this idea had grown out of the abysmal fear and the propitiation of what was feared, into a concomitant state of ritual and hierarchy, bound up with the formation of a national existence. As the tribe became a nation, as the scattered nomad elements fused and cohered until they built and fought as one, religion was, of course, among the most powerful of the formative influences at work upon them. Yet it is needful to repeat—because it is so often forgotten—that this religious sentiment, with its patriotic connotations, is by no means identical with

what we now call religious sentiment. Much more has it the significance of a convention; and it bound men together by the chain of traditional convention. Says a recent writer:[22] "With the Romans religion was not a personal matter . . . because the very concept of personality was in its infancy. There was no individual initiative or volition. . . . The fulfilment of his duty to his gods was a normal and natural function of his life. . . . If one had spoken to a Roman in the fourth century, or even in the third century before Christ, concerning the soul, its sinfulness, and its need of salvation . . . the person addressed would not have understood what it was all about."[23] The Roman, in Professor Carter's phrase, "had not the consciousness of an individual soul." One has only to stop and consider what part this conception of the individual soul plays in religious ideas to-day, to realize the difference in this so-called religious sentiment. If it can be compared to anything in modern life, it would not be religion at all, but rather our modern code of manners or our modern standards of civilized behavior. Infringement of its decrees bore the stigma of eccentricity along with that of impiety. A man of a certain class to-day might readily break the Ten Commandments, when there is no temptation strong enough to make him wear informal dress on a formal occasion. It were far easier for such an one to outrage the moral code than the conventional, to commit a sin rather than an act which he would consider as unfitting, or as not customary. Similar feeling is represented in the Chinese religion; which has been described as a "set of acts properly and exactly done;

the proper person sacrificing always to the proper object in the proper way.'' [24]

Religious feeling to-day is bound up with the consciousness of an individual soul. Its source is the fresh emotional power roused by Christianity, and applied to a whole group of emotions which were primarily concerned with a very different set of ideas. All those feelings which to-day are wrapt up in mystical conceptions, in the more ancient, abysmal times, were connected with the idea of magic, and fear of the unknown. If expressed in any definite form at all, these experiences and feelings which we consider as purely individual, were then communal, or, if single, then the person holding them bore to the rest of his tribe the relation of priest, or medicine-man. That this identical attitude lingered over into the Middle Ages, is to be read in diverse manners; it will be found permeating the witch-trials,[25] the trials before the Inquisition, the private letters and journals of saints and savants.

The creed of convention—under many forms—sufficed the world until a period relatively late in history. With the decline in its power came the rise in individualism, and the demand for a fresh inspiration. No longer satisfied in the performance of the proper act in the proper manner, men received from advancing civilization a stimulus in ideals. A higher sense of personal responsibility, born of a deeper self-knowledge, both demanded and aroused a more intimate religious sentiment, and thus religion began to be associated with conduct. Scholars have suggested that the stages in the development of religion follow hard

upon the stages in the evolution of human society, passing from the savage or material state to a national or tribe-sentiment, and thence, with the rise of the individual, differentiating into many heterogeneous forms. From the national sentiment is formed a priesthood to aid the preservation of the national life. This stage is clearly marked in the Pentateuch, where religion and patriotism seem one. But a priesthood may mean tyranny, and tyranny breeds revolt. Individual protest not only weakened the power of the hierarchy, but came to form a new conception of religion, as a personal affair; and as religion grows personal and mystical, it tends away from ritual and cult. This cycle may be seen in India. Out of the early tenets of the Vedic faith was evolved an elaborate ritual and a vast and complex hierarchy. This, in turn, gave way before the rise of mystic and ascetic practices, which, by their excessive individualism, led to the rejection of almost all rites, and in some cases even to the rejection of the gods themselves.[26]

With the mystical stage, religious self-study is intimately connected. Starting from a mystical impulse, intensified and heightened in all mystical reactions, it may be influenced to a marked extent by scientific knowledge and method, yet its source is ever that same spring of emotion from which mysticism also takes its rise. Oddly enough, scholars have practically ignored the inter-relation of mysticism and introspection, an inter-relation which, in certain ways, is peculiarly significant. For the data of the introspective record are largely mystical data, the states it depicts are largely mystical states.[27] Moreover, the

confession shows a suggestive sympathy for these states, an inclination to describe them; while, at the same time, it manifests a significant tendency to isolate them from the other operations of the mind, as sprung from wholly different causes. When these conditions are weighed and measured, one is roused to consider what real reason exists, after all, to put these depicted states in the same class with the opinions concerning God, revelation, and duty, which are quietly and intelligently formed by the sensible, unemotional person. Is he really justified in supposing that the one is an intensification of the other? Have this emotional state and this intellectual state necessarily a common source? They have always been classed together, because they concern the same subject. We use the word "religion" to cover both. Yet the forces combining in human psychology are infinitely complex and intricate, and tend to differentiate more widely, the nearer we regard them. All the world has been struck by the bizarre contrast in manifestations, which, it was taught, came from one and the same instinct. Psychologists attribute these variations to temperament,—yet some among them are by no means convinced that the high seriousness of a Renan or a Spencer, the dogmatic formalism of a Newman, the naïf anthropomorphism of Mechtilde or Gertrude, the energy of Wesley, the passivity of Mme. Guyon, the joyous exaltation of Suso or Rolle, the dread and horror of Linsley or Whitefield, are all exhibitions of the same force.

The above examples are selected from within the confines of Christianity: when one attempts a selec-

tion from the world at large, the variations appear even more extraordinary. It is to this religious instinct we have been told to look for an explanation alike of the Buddhist's tenderness to life, and of the Thug's indifference to murder; of the war-lust of the Mohammedan, and of Christ's "Thou shalt not kill."

To the reflective mind these paradoxes constitute, in Hume's phrase, "a complete enigma"; and one which is not solved by any study of the individual and his variations. Indeed, we see much to make us echo the words of Sir Thomas Browne, that "Men have lost their reason in nothing so much as their religion."[28] Paradoxes in human nature, however, are only the result of our inadequacy in trying to explain what is not yet fully understood. Hume felt this paradox to be an insuperable barrier to the mind. "No theological absurdities so glaring," he writes, "that they have not sometimes been embraced by men of the greatest and most cultivated understanding. No religious precepts so rigorous that they have not been adopted by the most voluptuous and abandoned of men."[29] Bewilderment is the outcome of any attempt to reconcile these contrasts, and few of us are able to follow Hume's advice and to make our escape into the calmer regions of philosophy.

So long as we insist on regarding the so-called religious instinct as an unit,—these fundamental problems show no signs of solution. Yet the moment one ceases so to regard them, a fresh group of problems arises out of the débris. Philosophers have been extremely reluctant to decide upon a further differentiation. No longer is Comte permitted his solution of the three

stages of humanity, "the theological, or fictitious, the metaphysical or transitional, and the positive, or scientific," by which, he declared, each one of us became "a theologian in childhood, a metaphysician in youth, and a natural philosopher in his manhood."[30] Comte laid more stress on the value of the first, or theological conceptions, since he considered that they afforded a means of escape from the vicious circle of primitive philosophy. His utilitarian point of view was confirmed by the apparent suitability of these conceptions to human development, and the stimulus to irksome labor offered by a system of rewards and punishments.[31] There is yet another explanation offered us by theorists who place intellectual curiosity at the root of religious instinct, thus emphasizing the intellectual character of its origin. It is epitomized simply, "as something that promised to explain the world to Man, and to explain him to himself."[32]

Another group seeks the source of all these feelings in worship, in adoration of the powers of nature and the heavenly powers;[33] again suggesting an emotional origin. The difficulty of reconciling the phenomena is, of course, no new difficulty, and so acute a modern as M. Reinach warns against confounding such totally different conceptions as religion and religious sentiment, as he distinguishes them.[34] The first is defined as formal religion springing from that mass of primitive scruples regarding *totems* and *tabus*. The second, or religious sentiment, is rather man's attitude toward the unknown supernatural forces in the universe.[35] Seeing in all religions "the infinitely curious products of man's imagination and man's reason in

its infancy," Reinach concludes by looking toward ethnological and anthropological research to account for them.

By accepting the truth that the sources of the religious instinct are not one, but many, that he who displays emotional manifestations of its activity has no necessary kinship with another in whom such manifestations are intellectual, much will have been gained. Our spontaneous—one had almost said classic—intolerance with each other's beliefs, may be better understood. Risen out of a deep-seated and innate perception that religious feelings have not always an identical psychological source, this impatience may at times indicate that these sources are positively antagonistic. For, if we examine the history of our mental growth, we cannot fail to note that the rate at which our various faculties evolve is not necessarily equal, any more than their material is necessarily homogeneous. The complexity of our personal evolution is the *raison d'être* of our so-called inconsistency. A man's intellect may have reached to a high degree of evolution, while his emotional equipment yet lags centuries behind. One faculty may be forced in its unfolding, while another may be stunted, or warped, or atrophied. Thus men of commanding intelligence have acted, at crises, like savages; and men of the roughest stamp have displayed the most sensitive perceptions. The dual, or multiple, sources of the so-called religious instinct, slowly developing in the individual into faculties both various and opposing, cause the personal phenomena with which he is at moments confronted, and which

at no time has he been able to understand. The very fact that he cannot understand them, lends them potency and dignity, and this potency and dignity cling around the whole subject from early times. The modern student is affected by this atmosphere, which appears to him to furnish warrant for the mystical point of view.

When we look more nearly at the course of human ideas, we see that this fallacy of the single religious instinct lies at the root of many important misunderstandings. Emotional experiences of any sort are seldom satisfactorily accounted for to the intellect; although religion has made the effort to control and systematize them by the formulation of dogma. The history of sect lies in the result of this effort. At moments (and crucial moments) it has been successful to a high degree, but it is a success not to be sustained, since the vitality of any dogma inevitably sets in motion the forces tending toward its own destruction.

Many volumes cannot suffice to deal adequately with these complexities; at present our interest must remain with the emotional factors. Hume commented on man's anthropomorphic tendency in such matters; but it is only since Hume's day that any detailed study of this tendency has been made possible.[36] Investigation into the life, customs, folk-lore, and psychology of savage peoples, by means of the new sciences of ethnology and anthropology, has provided us with a better means of understanding our past selves. It has shown that if evolution has carried us beyond the folk of the jungle and the wild, our heritage yet remains

the same as theirs. We are taught to realize not only that what savages are, we ourselves have been, but also that under certain influences we may even become as savages again. Myth, legend, fairy-lore, may all have importance when pressed into the service of the anthropologist. His theories have so far been broadly general, but every day adds to the material at his disposal, and by means of this material his work will be found to cast much light upon our present problems. The special relation of anthropological and ethnological material, to the material of this study, forms the final and not the least important section of our task.

We have endeavored to give the student a proper preparation in order that he may grasp the full significance of ethnological comparison. Having followed the development of the religious self-study in literature, together with the main psychological influences controlling it and its data, we are better able to observe the important parallels and to draw the requisite conclusions. We look abroad upon the general scientific achievements in this field, and connect those minor fluctuations on which his gaze has been concentrated with the large movements of universal law.

During the last half-century, the ethnologist has provided us with a new means of accomplishing this end. In his treatise—now become classic—on "Primitive Culture," Dr. Tylor demonstrates the remaining links between the remote and the visible past. Custom and folk-lore, which are examined by him with a masterly fulness, are shown to retain these links

when any individual development may have broken them. Through this mass of material his own theories on the subject of animism take shape in a manner deeply convincing. Tylor, of course, does not attempt to carry them into the ages where they might be confirmed from one's own reading or experience. Later investigation, however, may lead us to this confirmation, by causing us to mark the effect of the data furnished by the confessant, on the theory of animism. Laid side by side, the savage and the civilized examples are, indeed, striking, not because they differ so much, but because they differ so little.

Dr. Tylor[37] alludes to "that vast quiet change," which has overtaken the educated world; and in support of his words points to the disappearance of Fetichism, Demonology, Idolatry, from the societies of men. No thoughtful person would willingly dissent from such authority; yet the student of the records of confessions finds it set at naught upon every other page. A new and startling turn is thereby lent to this investigation. If the evidence contributed by the confessant appears to contradict the statement of a "vast quiet change" in the world's history, by what means does it do so? And what is the full import of such a contradiction?

In making any attempt to answer these questions, the reader will not have forgotten that the Introduction to this work warned him of its inductive plan. The chapters devoted to the analysis of the data, therefore, must needs provide him with a means of reply. When he recalls their contents, one fact will remain clear, namely—that among all the mystical phe-

nomena which they describe, there is none peculiar to Christianity. It will also be shown that there is none which may not also be found among men in a savage and semi-savage state.[38]

Such an assertion is not made without due appreciation of what is involved; and thus it is advisable to go more into detail than at first sight appears proportionate. This is the very crux of our theme; here are comparisons which must be made under the reader's own eye. There may be little new in the idea that Christianity, plus civilization, has literally brought nothing into man's emotional religious experience which he did not possess before, yet one has only to lay the savage examples beside the serried ranks of confessants, and it will be brought home to the mind with an overwhelming freshness and force. The essence of emotional religion (which for the object of the present enquiry we have just agreed to differentiate from those processes evolving intellectual belief), the stuff of this feeling, has not changed since man went out from his cave to slay the sabre-toothed tiger, and to adore the stars of heaven. Terror and adoration filled him then; and to that same terror and adoration he now gives alien names.

It is true, that then he was able to observe cause and effect, with that natural, spontaneous logic, which it was one of the direct results of Christianity to destroy, and which he has not yet reconquered. Thus, the North American Indian, noting the result wrought upon his imagination by fasting, deliberately practised it with that end in view.[39] Having observed that the gods revealed themselves to him whose hunt was

unsuccessful, and whose belt was tightly drawn against the pangs of hunger, he required that the education of his tribal seer or medicine-man should be founded on fasting.[40] This is the statement of Chingwauk, the Algonquin chief; and also of Catherine Wabose, the Ojibway prophetess. In North Queensland, the seer starves himself for three or four days, or until he sees a spirit.[41] The priests of the Gold-Coast negroes are well aware that an empty stomach produces hallucinations. Hence persons who desire to consult the gods are enjoined to fast, while, at times, drugs also are administered.[42] If the Mussulman of Morocco wishes to raise a *djinn,* he retires for twelve days into a desert place to fast, purifying himself by bathing, while he burns perfumes and recites incantations. After a time, a huge dragon will appear to him; and if he is not frightened, it will be followed by other visions.[43] In neighboring localities, the process is varied by the neophyte repeating a single chapter of the Koran one thousand and one times.[44] Similar practices are mentioned by Tylor, who adds that, as late as the Greeks, the Pythia of Delphi fasted to obtain inspiration.[45] King Saul, we read, was weak from fasting during his visit to the Witch of Endor; nor are we surprised at the success of her enchantments in raising Samuel's spirit, when it is remembered that Saul had been subject to a very definite form of melancholia, with delusions.[46] So early as the story of Saul, there is thus a manifest attempt to ignore fasting as the *cause* of vision. By Christian times it was ignored altogether, though practised yet more frequently. When it is stated that

the Bogomils[47] fasted until they beheld the Trinity, a modern investigator sees in this observation but proof of the doubling or tripling effect of hallucination, a stage perfectly familiar to an intoxicated person. The saints and mystics of the Middle Ages were equally subject to the effects of fasting, but to them it seemed only a means of subduing the flesh, of releasing the spirit. Jerome, in his "Letters," remarks that excessive fasting impaired the faculties of many saintly hermits;[48] and this acknowledgment shows an attitude differing from that he displayed when a greater zeal and heat somewhat modified his natural shrewdness. Teresa, watching and fasting in her incense-filled chapel, does not attribute the ensuing visions to either of these circumstances. Loyola did not connect his abstinence and great physical weakness with that apparition "of a serpent shining with what looked like eyes, hanging in the air beside him," or with the later vision of "a triple plectrum." To such as these a fast was simply one of the means of preparation for such experiences, while to think it *the* cause would be an infinite dishonor to the spirit.

The influence of Christian doctrines in leading the mind away from logical inference, may also be noticed when comparing Christian records with savage customs concerning the production of visions by the use of drugs or wine. Thus, the Winnebago tribes and the Celebs of Guyana,[49] were accustomed to undergo exciting conditions much resembling the camp-meetings described by such participants as Peter Cartwright, Billy Bray, Daniel Young, C. G. Finney, and

several individuals among the Mormons. Two conversions on our lists were the direct result of intoxication;[50] but, of course, they are not so acknowledged. Delirium from fever is responsible for several other examples, who were equally bent upon ascribing them to a supernatural cause. Various writers upon mystical compromise dwell enthusiastically on what they consider to be the great and essential differences between such cases as these and the savage examples; but an honest mind finds it impossible altogether to ignore the fundamental proposition that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.

"The joy that was unspeakable and glorious" which exalted Robert Blair, after the milk-posset; the "terror of death" which copious draughts "of a sweet liquor called shrub" roused in the lad, John Conran, were paralleled without the slightest hesitation by the American Indian, by the Parsee, by the Hindu priest, who used the same means for the deliberate purpose of exciting just such sensations and their accompanying visions.[51] The mediæval Christian had forgotten the practice of inducing religious ecstasy by swoon, or convulsion, or fever; which belonged originally to savagery.[52]

Those phenomena of ecstasy, to which consideration has been given in other sections of this book, are supplemented by the data of the anthropologist in a manner very striking. Particularly do such data comment on the belief that ecstasy was "a wandering of the other Self, or Soul," which, upon its return to the body, could tell of its adventures.[53] The belief that the soul could leave the body involved the belief

in its separate existence; and, though the development of an individual soul-consciousness is late in human evolution,[54] yet this special form must have been influenced, if not fed, by contact with the beliefs of peoples still in the savage and primitive state.

The Australian natives[55] hold that the soul quits the body during sleep; while the Arab regards its absence as a great danger, never awakening a sleeper without an invocation to God to recall the errant soul.[56] The Eskimo thinks that his spirit goes a-hunting while he lies asleep or in a trance.[57] If the soul of the Solomon Islander fails to return by morning, the man dies; but on reaching the mouth of Panoi, or Hades, the soul may be "hustled back" by the other ghosts and so returned to the sleeper or sick person.[58] Tylor cited the Dyaks, the Zulu, the Khond, and the Turanian, as holding similar beliefs; and takes occasion to compare them with the later cases of Socrates and Jerome Cardan.[59] Noting the popular expression of "beside one's self" as "crystallizing this idea in language," he adds, "that the mere evolution of the idea of the soul from a concrete, substantial image of the person (*eidolon*) to the tenuous, spiritualized abstraction used at present, is the result of gradual development from the conception of primitive, savage animism."[60]

That early and deeply rooted conviction that the soul could leave its owner, has a vital bearing on the present discussion. In all the words and works of the mystics its persistence is revealed. Whatever meanings the theorist has attached to these words and works, whatever transcendental web he has tried to

spin from them,—when all the threads are carefully unwound, this one fact alone will be found lying at the heart. The early mystic is impregnated with this conviction of the wandering soul; it underlies his experience; it is the real basis of his belief in mysticism. If we turn to the great passages upon which mysticism is founded, what do we find? Richard of St. Victor's famous statement is on close analysis, seen to be only this,—that he believed his soul could be "away." Augustin's reliance is, after all, but upon that great "*if*" the soul might be "away." The texts cited by Dante, in the letter to Can Grande, serve to show his appreciation of the fact that the soul can be "away." "It seems to the ecstatic," writes Teresa, "that he is transported to a region wholly different from that where we find ourselves ordinarily."[61] And if we ask them to define, to separate, and determine this conviction, what is their response? One and all, without a single important exception, dwell on the significant fact that their soul may not remember what has happened to it during its absence. Paul, even, "heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter."[62] Angela da Foligno says, "I know not how to speak of it, nor to offer any similitude."[63] This failure of memory is not capricious and accidental; it is a fundamental characteristic of the mystical experience, and taken by the subject to be the confirmation of its Divine nature. The conclusion is thus forced upon one that the whole structure of mediæval mysticism is erected upon this underlying, primitive, and animistic belief, that the mystic thus unconsciously repeats and confirms the

savage idea. The Eskimo, the Zulu, the Dyak priest, does not expect to remember what happened to his soul when it went away. But the mystic is naïvely astonished that he should not remember, and immediately concludes that this is because of the inconceivable splendor of what he beheld in Paradise. "For the comprehension of these things," writes Dante, "it must be understood that when the human intellect is exalted in this life . . . it is exalted to such a degree that after its return the memory waxeth feeble, because it hath transcended human bounds." [64] Dante was undoubtedly familiar with Richard of St. Victor, whose remark is, "that we cannot by any means recall to our memory those things which we have erst seen above ourselves." Teresa accounted for this fact by observing that in a state of ecstasy, God draws the soul to himself, but not the faculties of memory and understanding. She further compares the ecstatic condition to that of a person half-awake. John of the Cross declares that this loss of memory during ecstasy is a proof of its Divine character, as well as a warning to men to waste no time on the cultivation of a faculty so little god-like as their useless memory.[65]

One hardly expects the savage to reason respecting his simple, elementary beliefs; but the conspicuous failure of men highly developed, to do so, is one of the reminders of the complexity of our evolution. To the savage, dreams became confounded with memories, and if no dream told him what had befallen his absent spirit, then he simply did not look for any further news of its wanderings. Mediæval

Christianity, on the other hand, not satisfied with the dream-interpretation, yet by no means rejecting it, proceeded to make for itself fresh mystery out of the fact of not remembering what had never happened. To our irreverent and direct logic of to-day, the explanation is so simple that one is almost ashamed to offer it, as savoring of banality. But to make the plain inference that one could not recall what had happened to him when asleep, or entranced, only because there was really nothing to recall, was an impossibility to the mind of the Middle Ages.

The mystic easily supplemented his vague and cloudy dream-recollections with inventions, the creations of a powerful imagination colored by his anthropomorphic inheritance. From Hildegarde of Bingen to Swedenborg and Joseph Smith, the entire group of so-called revelations is the literary result of this tendency. All these seers and visionaries felt that the soul was at times "away," and so felt because such a belief has its root in the primeval depths of emotional existence. Naturally it followed, for them, that since the soul can leave the body, it has a separate being,—a separate identity. Thus the situation of the mediæval or modern visionary becomes closely linked to that of the savage visionary. Gertrude of Eisleben, Teresa, Maria d'Agréda, stretched stiff and entranced before their awestricken followers, were not there—in the rigid body—they were "away." They were traversing the height of heaven or the depth of hell; after a while they would return, vaguely to hint at what they had seen. For many centuries the hints have been identical, and when developed subsequently, the

details have been similar.[66] This bulk of repeated experience formed, gradually but surely, a general impression, on which in time was built a resultant dogma.

"The experience of man," writes a modern ethnologist, "is gained from oft-repeated impressions. It is one of the fundamental laws of psychology that the repetition of mental processes increases the facility with which these processes are performed and decreases the degree of consciousness that accompanies them. This law expresses the well-known phenomena of habit . . . If a stimulus has often produced a certain emotion, it will tend to reproduce it every time."[67] No generalization could describe more accurately the progress of the phenomena of ecstasy and trance. Their subjects found these states occurring with an ever-increasing facility. Repetition, decreasing the degree of consciousness by which such phenomena were accompanied, assisted to induce that very disuniting process, which operated upon personality as the result of a new, disintegrating force. Repetition, developing the power of the association of ideas, developing the imagination along lines of fear and horror, elaborated the first and simpler ideas into images incredibly hideous and terrible. The fiend became a familiar house-mate to the anchorite;[68] evil came to possess a vitality and animation all its own. That "hell-vision," tormenting the confessant in all its dreadful imagery of fire and torture, had grown far more vivid than ever was the savage idea of an Otherworld. It has been remarked that in Celtic countries the place after death was one of rest and

peace, until Christianized into a heaven and a hell.[69] The Huron and the Hindu Otherworld was but a milder hell, and the legend of descent into it was revived by Christian dogmatists.[70] Thus did Christianity, in Tylor's phrase, "borrow details from the religions it abolished."[71] Thus did the Christian confessant repeat, with a new accent of intensity, emotions rooted within him, centuries before the Christian era. Thus, from the simple, savage observation that the soul apparently left the body in sleep or trance, there was evolved that vast, cloudy, and perplexing structure of mediæval mysticism.

"To follow the course of animism on from its more primitive stages," proceeds Tylor, "is to account for much of mediæval and modern opinion, whose meaning and reason could hardly be comprehended without the aid of a development-theory of culture, taking in the various processes of new formation, abolition, survival, and revival."[72] Investigation into the data of the individual confirms these words, both in general outline and in particular detail. Much more than opinion will be found to be accounted for by careful comparative study. How enlightening to any view of the mediæval mystic it is to read that the Mohammedan distinguishes between the saint and the sorcerer, only when the miracles performed by the first have a moral aim! In other respects, he considers them the same; and certain Islamic doctors even go so far as to deny the reality of sorcery, holding it but a sort of saintship gone wrong.[73] The sanctity of these medicine-men renders them in a measure fatal;—their bodies are held to be full of poison and perilous

forces;—"nouvelle preuve," observes the collector of these superstitions, "du caractère équivoque des choses sacrées." [74]

This likeness between Christian and Mussulman holy man, between hermit and marabout, vouches for the persistence in human nature of impulses which were long antecedent to opinion. There is little need to repeat those examples which crowd the pages of the anthropologist, carrying this truth into further minuteness of detail. Examples are drawn from savage times of beliefs which remained "in fullest vigour through the classic world," and which to-day are in full vigor among the natives of the Congo.[75] The nymph and dryad of the Greek, or the lares of the Roman, would arouse no surprise in the Eskimo, or the African negro, who knows that rivers, wells, and trees have each their "kra," or indwelling spirit.[76]

The Pythia of Delphi has abandoned her classic shrine, but the same god to-day speaks to his votaries through the foaming and convulsions of the medicine-man in the African jungles,[77] and the poor savage is lent a touch of dignity by the mere possibility of this comparison. The peasant-belief in a cottage-faëry,[78] in a Brownie, or a Kobold, seems to be an attenuation of the ancient belief in an attendant or household-spirit. The patron-saints of Peter Favre, of Thérèse of the Holy Child, or of Carlo da Sezze, who watched over them in their daily lives, at once become figures more comprehensible, imaginatively complete, and ready to receive the decorative treatment by which the Italian painters gave them a new immortality. The child-mind of the world delighted

in delicate picturings of these beloved, sacred figures. How often do the visions—in their decorative quality—remind us of the visions of faëry! Gertrude of Eisleben makes note of the Saviour's garland, and his gold-embroidered tunic. The blue robe of the Virgin is the blue of the sky. To a child, is not a faëry-vision always crystal-clear and glittering? And the Lord appeared to Teresa, white as snow and clear as crystal.[79] If only in our imaginations, our childhood yet remains with us.

Alas, that it remains with us not only in these charming ways; for we are often closer to the Gold-Coast negro than we should like to think. When the director of Mary of the Angels "commanded" her disease to disappear, psychologists tell us that he made use of the power of suggestion upon a highly sensitive subject. Ethnologists add, that this priest stood in the same relation to the suffering mystic as the Zulu medicine-man toward his patient, when he exorcized the evil spirit believed to cause the disease.[80] The rite is derived from those cloudy ages when all ills were ascribed to the action on our bodies of an evil demon;[81] nor does the reader need to be reminded that exorcism is frequently mentioned both in the Old and the New Testaments. Hysteria and epilepsy were maladies lending themselves readily to the explanation of demoniacal possession; and against these attacks exorcism continued to be constantly and professionally practised until late in the seventeenth century. Comparative study is here peculiarly suggestive. Among the Melanesians, a witch-doctor will call upon the sufferer by name, and the

demon, with a strange voice, will answer;—"It is not he, it is I!" [82] So the Père Surin—unfortunate "man of God"—interrogated the possessed Jeanne des Anges, and the fiend, replying, named himself, Isacaaron. The miserable nuns of Loudun and Louviers are described as undergoing the identical experience of the Zulu, the Basuto, and the Patagonian.

"During the early centuries of Christianity," comments Tylor, "demoniacal possession becomes peculiarly conspicuous . . . because a period of intense religious excitement brought it more than usually into requisition." [83] To this prevalence and its significance, we shall again return; at the moment we shall but emphasize the periodical nature of the possession-delusion, and the accompanying rite of exorcism.

Says a keen student: "Beliefs change, but rites persist, as the fossil shell serves to date for us the geological epoch." [84] Lest we be at any time tempted to glory in the so-called freedom from these superstitions, let us further examine the history of this especial delusion.

Lecky observes that "From the time of Justin Martyr, for about two centuries, there is not a single Christian writer who does not solemnly and explicitly assert the reality and frequent employment of this power." [85] It was specifically connected with the entire system of miracles, so influential over the Christian convert's mind.[86] The letters and treatises of the Fathers are filled with narratives of the casting-out of devils; while a few centuries later, Guibert, Othloh, Glaber, Luther, testify to the vivid existence of such beliefs. Still later come the Salem

and the Scottish witch-trials, through which this grotesque horror is carried into our own country and almost to our own day.[87]

Nor has our own day escaped this savage phenomenon. The history of the Mormon performances at Kirtland and in New-York State, is striking when the surroundings and native characters are considered. "In April, 1830," says the official chronicle, "the devil was cast out of Newell Knight, by Joseph Smith, Sr. . . . This was the first miracle done in this church."[88] Smith's account is detailed, and unhesitating. "I went, and found him suffering very much in his mind, and his body acted upon in a very strange manner, his visage and limbs distorted and twisted in every shape possible to imagine. . . . I succeeded in getting hold of him by the hand, when almost immediately he spoke to me, and with very great earnestness required of me that I should cast the devil out of him. . . . I rebuked the devil, and commanded him in the name of Jesus Christ to depart from him, when immediately Newell spoke out and said that he saw the devil leave him and vanish from his sight." On cross-examination as to the fiend's appearance, Knight admitted that the image was hallucinatory; "a spiritual sight, and spiritually discerned."[89]

Hysterical epidemic soon followed scenes like these. Delirium, with outbreaks of "the jerks" and the "shakes," ran riot through these communities. The point of view of the individual sufferer, under such influences, relapsed at once to the savage, or semi-savage, level; and in these hard-headed American

pioneers, we can find no jot of resemblance to ourselves.[90] Writes Elder Kimball in his journal: "I . . . could distinctly see the evil spirits, who foamed and gnashed their teeth upon us. We gazed upon them about an hour and a half." Elder Hyde fought a host of demons who nearly choked him to death, and describes[91] the conflict in terms which would have been wholly comprehensible to Guibert de Nogent, or Jeanne des Anges, or poor little Marie de S. Sacrement, or Jeanne Féry.[92] In 1844, in Virginia, the Mormon elders contended with a crowd of evil spirits for the possession of three young girls, alternately exorcising and re-exorcising these demons, until becoming exhausted. In another case, the exorcists were themselves attacked, just as Père Surin had been. Similar outbreaks of demoniacal possession and the effort to control it by exorcism, are noted in Switzerland as late as 1861,[93] and in China even later.[94]

When the confessant "makes vows," offers propitiatory sacrifice, or concludes a "covenant with God" by which his agony and distress are relieved, he but blindly follows in the tread of his savage ancestor, who, like the Bodo or Congo chieftain, tried to "buy off" the hostile spirits.[95] A higher form of this practice will be found among the early Romans and Jews. Sacrifice was recommended to Job as a means of atonement for his revolt; but the literature of sacrifice is too full to be dealt with in this place. In Rome, "A prayer was a vow (*votum*) in return for certain specified services to be rendered. Were they

rendered, man was *'compos voti*—bound to perform what he had promised. Were they not rendered, the contract was void. Sometimes in a crisis the god was bound in advance by a *devotio*, or sacrifice. The priest held the position of legal intermediary.''[96]

The attitude of the Christian confessant toward his Saviour is less presuming in its form; we shall see if it actually lacked presumption. One case ''directly covenanted with God for a return of health.'' In several others, the mere expectation of tranquillity to be secured by such a covenant was sufficient to secure it; further evidence, if need be, of the power of suggestion. Although God is not directly stated to be the party of the second part, yet he was considered as bound by the contract in question.[97]

Any attempt at comparative study of primitive and modern mystical phenomena, and the beliefs derived therefrom, will be incomplete without a comparative examination of the primitive and the modern sacred personality. The change in attitude toward such personalities has been fundamental, yet its evolution is traceable from the primitive to the mediæval times. Mediæval opinion—our confessants tell us—regarded the hysterical as divine, the idiot as sacred. To-day the tendency is exactly opposite; many regard the divine as only hysterical, and the saint as a harmless sort of idiot. The Middle Ages set aside for saintship those individuals displaying abnormal mental signs; just as the Zulu to-day selects his priest.[98] Among the Patagonians, epileptics are immediately chosen for magicians; while the Siberians destine

children prone to convulsions to be brought up in the sacred profession.[99] Nor can the mystic claim a mental superiority over these cases; whatever their disciples may claim for them. The blessed M. M. Alacoque could take care of herself in the world much less well than any Zulu witch-doctor that we have ever read of. A former section has already made note of the complacent mental inferiority of such famous examples as Mme. Guyon, A. C. Emmerich, Maria d'Agréda, Joanna Southcott, Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet; while even Teresa, Loyola, and Richard of St. Victor,—great intellects all three,—considered the ideal state as one much closer to pure idiocy than they could ever hope to attain. Their views indicate the still-dominant influence of the old belief in the sacredness of the fool.

When one reads of certain early hermits, and later Quakers; of Juliana of Norwich, or of Suso, or of Angela da Foligno; one knows that the Patagonian priest, or the Algerian marabout, would not have found them at all surprising or uncongenial. By systematically de-rationalizing himself, man produces pretty much the same results whatever his country, or his previous degree of civilization.[100] Plotinus's union with the Divine differs comparatively little, after all, from the attempt of Amiel to "possess God." With the savage, the semi-savage, the mediæval or the modern mystic, the abnormal still remains the proof of the supernatural, still retains its sacred character. This feeling is carried into various minor phenomena of the mystical experience. That Voice,—sometimes called of God, sometimes of the departed,—the Voice

which commanded Fox or Augustin or Swedenborg or Smith, speaks the same messages in the ear of the Malay, the Algonquin, or the New Zealander; and is by him described as "a low mutter, a murmur, or a whistle."[101] Among the Abipones the hissing of little ducks which fly at night is taken for the voices of the dead.[102] The Maori priest may hear the voice of the ghostly visitant, and comprehend its message, though to another it seems only the low sound of wind passing through trees.[103] Tylor likens this sound in its quality to the voices of the dead in Homer, where it becomes "a thin murmur or twitter."[104] Shakspere wrote that "the sheeted dead did squeak and gibber in the Roman streets."[105] "The still, small voice" of Scripture embodied the experience of the whole listening world.

Personal testimony heightens for the student the significant quality and timbre of the Voice. All ears have heard, all nations have described it. Mahomet asks to be delivered "from the whisperer who slily withdraweth."[106] This has further interest in connection with the idea that "the language of demons is also a low whistle or a mutter, and that devils generally speak low and confusedly."[107] Jerome Cardan heard the sound differently at different times; on one important occasion it came to him muffled, "like one afar off, confessing to a priest."[108] To express the idea of tenuity or bird-like quality, the Hebrew term is "Bätkol," or "daughter of a Voice." This well defines the curious attribute of the sound, that "it murmured like a dove."[109] The American Indian felt it to resemble a cricket, rather than a bird.[110] Ancient

Hebrew writings tell that the holy Elisha ben Abuya heard the Voice "chirping" behind the temple. Who can forget the intensity of the prophet's phrase when he says that "thy Voice shall whisper out of the dust?"[111] while many examples may be cited from the Bible and the Talmud, in support of its peculiar and characteristic timbre. Cardan held the old belief that this Voice belonged to a personal dæmon, and mentions it frequently. With him it was wont to grow "to a tumult of voices"; just as among the Jews it would become a hum or reverberation. "Seek unto them," says the prophet, "that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep and that mutter."[112] The Voice is not always low, though it is always shrill; at times it is very loud. To the Friend Elizabeth Ashbridge, it came "as from a trumpet"; while to Henry Alline, it was "still and small, through my whole soul." To Joseph Smith it gave a call, from a distance. R. Wilkinson heard "a dreadful sound in his ears, which he thought was the adversary." Augustin remarks that he "never remembered to have heard anything at all like it." Joseph Hoag heard "as plain a whisper as ever I heard from a human being."[113]

There would be interesting speculation for the medical-materialist in linking this typical Voice with the equally typical noises present in cases of aural catarrh.[114] These are reported as "ranging from simple, pulsating murmurs to thundering noises, or reports like the shot of pistol or cannon. In many cases they are of a whistling or singing character. . . . They may be constant, intermittent, or recur-

rent." The writer doubts whether they "ever assume the form of spoken language"; suggesting that "those who seem to hear voices and to receive messages and revelations, probably have a central lesion of the cortex."[115] The occurrence would seem too general and too widespread for this latter explanation always to prevail; but, perhaps, the medical means of deciding this fact are not sufficient at the present time. Cases of cortical lesion would surely present certain definite, pathological symptoms; whereas the Voice occurs frequently under conditions fairly normal, or those but temporarily abnormal. A more natural condition would be that ignorant humanity, finding no explanation of his head-noises other than the anthropomorphic explanation which he was accustomed to attach to most things, took them to mean the flattering attention of his god or spirit. Sooner or later, this explanation would receive an apparent ratification from some comrade in the tribe whose cortical lesion led him to amplify and formulate words for the Voice. The evolution of the central fact of interior whispering, into that Voice which has murmured or thundered down the ages, might be therefore attributable, as so much else in our past, to mere "misinterpreted observation." That efforts have been made for a true explanation is shown in a comment made by Burton, in the "Anatomy of Melancholy," when he is dealing with the delusions caused by echoes. "Theophilus (in Galen) thought he heard musick, from vapours which made his ears sound"; [116] writes this trenchant observer. The quality, the timbre of the Voice, due always, however

accounted for, to identical causes, would thus remain characteristic.

The persistence of primitive conceptions, which rest unchanged throughout the ingenious misinterpretation of the centuries, is one of the most interesting of our mental phenomena. Their original connections are often but dimly grasped by us now, if they are grasped at all. Who can say if the thinness and delicacy of the Voice, whose peculiar timbre has just been emphasized, may not have had an effect—by simple, logical inference—on the early conceptions of the soul, its appearance and characteristics? Tylor makes no comment on the relation between the primitive idea of the smallness of the soul, and the thinness of its voice; but the idea of it as a miniature replica of the body, as a mannikin, is strangely far-reaching.[117]

The Port-Lincoln blacks say the soul is so small it could pass through a chink,—and hover at the tops of the trees. It was about the size of a small child.[118] Certain Eskimos hold it to be no larger than a hand or a finger; while the Angmagsaliks describe it as "a tiny man, the size of a sparrow."[119] J. G. Frazer notes that it is regarded as a dwarf, unanimously, by all primitive peoples. In the Egyptian frescoes, as later, in the Italian (Orcagna), it is pictured as half life-size, often winged, or bird-like, floating over the head of its proprietor.[120] What later generations took for naïveté of drawing in these pictures, is seen to be really the accurate presentation of a prevailing idea. Careful tracing of this conception leads to its final connection with that group of

ideas, sprung from animism, imagining a guardian or household spirit. Thus, the souls of the dead are, in their main characteristics, quite indistinguishable from the beings known to us to-day as fairies. They are light, flitting, delicate, and capricious, often malignant; like the *banshees* of Ireland, or the *zombis* of Martinique.[121] This being, protean under the imaginations of men, is sometimes the attendant spirit, or dæmon, or genius; while later it becomes the guardian angel of the Middle Ages. Socrates and Philo, Brutus and Cardan, are holding no strange beliefs, but merely sharing the popular ideas of their day.[122] No whit does their conception differ from that of the Carib, or the Mongol, or the Tasmanian native.

Speculation as to the nature of these details is not, however, merely of a curious interest; it is with matter of broader analogy that we have to deal. So rich is the corroborative evidence among modern examples, as among savage cases, that it becomes difficult not to overweight the page. Individual cases demonstrate the practical identity of savage and civilized mystical phenomena. To deny it, is to close one's eyes to fact; to shut one's mind to logic. The Khonds of Arissa, the negroes of Guinea, the aborigines of America and Australia, are aided or tormented by crowds of good or evil spirits, which beset their path precisely as angels and demons beset the path of Teresa, of Jeanne des Anges, of Jeanne de St. Mathieu Deleloe, of Othloh, of Raoul Glaber, of Mme. Guyon, of Swedenborg, of Joseph Smith. Vivid testimony to the belief in *incubi* and *succubi* will be found in the witch-trials of the seventeenth century, the selfsame belief pre-

vailing among the natives of Samoa, of the Antilles, or of New Zealand.[123] Apparitions, whether of persons, white and glittering, of fiery pillars, or clouds, or points,[124] is no more a Christian belief than the guardian-angel, or the "Voice of God," are Christian beliefs. The Christian took them where he found them, in the hearts and imaginations of the simple and the humble, of folk yet close to primitive feeling, and adapted them to his needs and to the needs of his new faith.

The confessant may have evolved beyond the savage in the matter of magical rites; although one no sooner makes such a statement than he is shaken by reading in the newspaper that an entire community in the State of Pennsylvania has been terrorized by the appearance of a gigantic "hexe" (witch) cat,—killed finally by a silver bullet; or that some railroad has been disappointed in the results given by certain "dowsers" or diviners, which it employed to "dowse" for water. The visual and auditory phenomena which the confessant experiences, is associated to-day with another set of ideas; these have grown more complex and are at work, moreover, upon organizations far more complex and far more sensitive. Deeper and more profound is the resultant disintegration; but we who read must not forget that it is this result and not the original cause which has changed. Is it possible to read, comparatively, the experiences narrated by Suso, Hoag, Linsley, Gratton, Jaco, Blair, Boston, Swedenborg, Smith, Lobb, Richard Rolle, Juliana of Norwich, Antoinette Bourignon, Carré de Montgéron, George Fox (to name but

few),—and not feel a deepening conviction of their essentially savage character?

The hyper-suggestibility among moderns has been alleged as the special inducing cause of the intensity of their experience. At ceremonies of initiation a similar suggestibility governs the Australian, who thus readily beholds strange visions.[125] His medicine-man keeps aloof from the tribe, practises asceticism, and is as wild in speech and look as any Thebaïd hermit. When about to assume his sacred function, he goes alone to the mouth of a certain cave, where he fasts and prays, until a spirit comes and pierces his tongue with a long spear.[126] This wound (it is photographed as a deep hole in the forepart of the tongue) is scarcely healed when he returns to the tribe; nor could the investigator discover that he ever after acknowledged it to have been made by himself or by a comrade. On the contrary, he persisted in saying and in believing it to be the work of a spirit. Our modern attitude is contemptuous of this credulity; yet much in this whole experience suggests the phenomenon of the stigmata. Görres notes that both the desire to possess these wounds and the expectation of possessing them preceded their appearance in the hands and side of the subject,[127] and cites the instances of Véronique Giuliani, Margaret Ebnerin, Liduine, Jeanne de Jesu Maria, and others. Naturally we tend to believe more in our own medicine-men than in those of the Australian bushman, yet in examining the evidence of saintliness it were well to remember that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.

In his chapters on "Mystical Flight," Görres records the sensations of the saint as being rapidly and dizzily whirled through the air.[128] Several confessants support this description; and it has received much attention from medical and psychological authorities. This is hardly the place to enumerate their theories, which connect it either with reaction from a state of trance, or with definite epileptic seizure. The anthropologist succeeds in convincing us that the so-called mystical flight is not alone the property of the Christian mystic; for it is claimed also by the Buddhist, the Brahman, the Neo-Platonist;—and that, in fact, belief in it is common to ascetics of all nations.[129]

Those fatal and sacred properties which savage imaginations attached to the fetich, seem to place this idea as far from the world of the Sistine Madonna as the custom of eating raw meat. Many confessants record such belief in full activity, and no farther than our own times. The book of Mormon refers to "the stone called Gazelem" (*sic*) which Joseph Smith carried in his pocket, and by whose aid he was able to induce a slightly hypnoid state in the gazer. From the description of this sacred "peep-stone," it appears to have been nothing more nor less than the broken prism of an old-fashioned lustre chandelier![130] In other records will be found mention of sacred medals and pictures;[131] Pascal carried his amulet around his neck; and so this most savage of all aboriginal notions manifests, in an hundred different ways, its extraordinary persistency. To sum up; not only the savage and the mediæval, but the savage and

the modern religious experience, are in reality so close, that the mind trained in the search for truth will find the differences between them far fewer than the resemblances.

X

THE RELIGIOUS INSTINCT: II

I. The Middle Ages; survivals.
II. Revivals; witchcraft.
III. Revival in the individual.
IV. Explanation of phenomena; the "B-region"; Tabu and the Unpardonable Sin.
V. Religion a collective term.
VI. Recapitulation; conclusion.

X

THE RELIGIOUS INSTINCT: II

THE comparisons contained in the foregoing section have been made for a definite purpose and in the interest of a definite aim. That the cited experiences, one and all, have their origin deep in primal emotion, would seem indisputable, nor is it unreasonable to claim for them a distinct, emotional source. True, religion is more complex to-day, and its influence over modern life is wider and more various; yet this fact should not hide for us its emotional origin. If this sentiment was not always what it is to-day, neither were we always what we are to-day; the change is not the result of any one belief, it is the result of a gradual maturity of the human mind.

"In the life of the rudest savage, religious belief is associated with intense emotion, with awful reverence, with agonizing terror, with rapt ecstasy, when sense and thought utterly transcend the common level of daily life."[1] Thus writes the anthropologist;—and when we read his words, many of us feel a gentle glow of superiority, so sure we are that our ideals have grown to a higher stature, to a nobler beauty. There are many ways in which we have grown, indeed; and yet the final impression made by

reading any history of morals is, after all, not that Christianity has had so much influence upon the world's conduct, but that it has had so little.[2] No historian can make the Middle Ages other than repulsive; a dark, cruel, sick, savage period, a fruitful soil for emotional survivals.

As the term "survival" was introduced into the world of anthropological research by Tylor, in his "Primitive Culture," his definition thereof shall serve us here. "These are processes," he writes, "customs, opinions, and so forth, which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had their original home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older condition of culture, out of which a newer has been evolved."[3] When one carries this definition a little further, out of the sphere of custom and habit, into that of emotion and feeling, one will be obliged to modify it considerably. Habit alone, for instance, is not sufficient to account for survival in the field of emotion, and does not as a matter of fact so carry it on. As Tylor's whole book shows, emotional survivals are almost always the result of special conditions, preserving certain feelings or ideas as it were artificially, and storing them up in the imaginations and hearts of a community, or a nation. These surviving feelings or ideas after a time drop out of active and conscious life; no longer used, they become passive, latent in the community; they resemble the seeds of certain plants, which lie unsuspected in the earth until the time has come for them to sprout once more. As we shall see later, this re-

crudescence may be so active and vehement that it deserves the name "revival"; by which term Tylor defines the survival sprung to activity, under the influence and the pressure of special conditions.

When we come to consider religious survivals in particular, the question of the surrounding conditions has a vital importance; and a glance at the first ten centuries of the Christian era will go far toward explaining the presence of some characteristic phenomena of survival. The conditions prevalent during the Middle Ages are owing to the passing of the ancient, to the rise of the modern, world. Such conditions united to favor emotional outbreaks by presenting the combination of great unrest and great excitement, acting on the lowered vitality of a world exhausted by famine and by war. The vigorous paganism of the past was dead, and the barbarian invasions swarmed upon those races who were striving to revive and to re-make life. Fear and Famine were the nurses of our modern civilization; and the tales they told made so deep a mark upon men's minds that fragments of them linger here and there to this day. The religion of the masses was as irreligious as it was possible to be;[4] as irreligious as religion sprung from emotional survival seems at first bound to be. It had little connection with conduct; it was founded upon terror, upon egotism, upon hysteria; it shows mankind at the cry of "Sauve qui peut!" running pell-mell from the hobgoblins itself had created. Noting the monstrous growth of superstition, the profane and absurd stories which cling around the worship of the Virgin, Hallam cannot

refrain from commenting on the irreligious nature of this so-called religion; and wondering "if an entire absence of all religion might not have been less harmful, on the whole."[5] This is much from an historian who fails to see that these manifestations have sprung from a different source than the manifestations which have aided the world in its ethical advance.

The one thing known about the religious experience, is that its occurrence is invariably due to a combination of lowered vitality plus emotional excitement. Individual cases have shown this condition repeated over and over again; and certain religious movements, near to our own day, convince us yet again of its efficacy. Lowered vitality plus emotional excitement had a share of responsibility for the great dissenting movement of the eighteenth century in England; in our own land the sectarian agitation, the Great Revival,[6] the springing-up of all types of extravagant belief, the Restorationists, the Shakers, the Latter-Day Saints, the Dunkards, down to the Christian Scientists, will all, if their origin be carefully examined, be found to have similar conditions as their inducing cause.

In the early Middle Ages, such conditions were fulfilled, not merely for scattered individuals, nor isolated groups, but for humanity at large. Primitive feeling held an unchecked sway over the masses; while the effect of Christianity, with its strong emotional appeal, was to heighten and to intensify all primitive feeling; to act as stimulus to the emotional side of religion. For many centuries previously, emotional faith had appeared to weaken and to ebb.

Philosophy had failed, by reason of its intellectual demand, to formulate a creed for the humble. Christianity gave both an impetus and a voice to the forces slumbering then, as now, in the very being of the race. It released and directed a body of sentiments by whose aid alone man could advance in his evolution. But at the same time, along with these primitive emotional forces there were aroused and set into action other forces just as primitive, but by no means as beneficent, which are indissolubly bound up with the life of the emotions. Many of these forces are present, but are no longer constant in their operation upon the human mind; they may be summoned into activity only by special influences and under special conditions. Perhaps they may be best described by the term "vestigiary."

Working together with active forces, these vestigiary forces have helped in furthering the spread of Christianity. Our examples have shown how they made their appearance in the doctrines of Christian belief, and in what ways they have been incorporated with these doctrines. Much of this incorporation was done later, when the Fathers made their ingenious attempt to account for all things according to a strictly Christian interpretation;—but much also was present at the very beginning, for which only vestigiary remains can account. Because we see in the Golden Rule, in Christ's ideal of brotherhood, a flattering evidence of development from the abysmal state of cruelty and brute force,—because these divine things are to be found in his teaching, we must not forget the vestigiary savage

conceptions therein, reward and punishment, hell and heaven, vision, and magical power and exorcism. Because a new ethical need and a new ideal caused man to accept this purer faith, does not mean that he had utterly cast aside his savage emotional traditions. On the contrary, the first effect of Christianity was to re-vitalize these.

The anthropologist tells us that this nucleus of vestigiary emotion—this terror and worship of the unknown spirits which is called "animism"—had become, in those cloudy ages when it was not vestigiary but active, the seat and source of the religious sentiment. Later formalistic tendencies, the influence of a priestly hierarchy, intent on "performing the proper act in the proper way," somewhat suppressed these animistic feelings, causing them to play less part than they had played previously in the national life and religion of men. History is one long struggle between these tendencies, now the one, now the other, predominating; now the hierarchy crushing the people, now the prophet stimulating them to protest afresh. Under the spur of Christ's personality, and his sensitive relation of all feeling to conduct and ideals, this nucleus of ancient, primitive forces, developed a sudden and overmastering vitality. In proportion as the Son of Man was real to men, so his influence revived and strengthened their capacity for emotion. He taught them the beauty of feeling, the value of feeling, the essential need of feeling; and thus was evolved a whole group of emotions, which before had been but rudimentary. They spring up and flower, changing the entire aspect of the earth to

men; who had not noticed how the seeds had lain hid in these barren places. When one reads Augustin's "Confessions," he may behold the unfolding and the flowering of this garden of the Soul.

Founded upon and rooted in primal emotion, the religious experiences contained in the documents of confession, must be finally dissociated from the processes connected with the formation of intellectual opinion. As their genesis is different, so is their evolution. They are intimately related to, if not actually a part of, the mystical tendency. Many of these examples might be best described as depicting a condition of temporary mysticism accompanying and following change of belief. This body of experience, presenting the various phases of Depression, Conversion, and Reaction, is but the repeated individual expression of forces which were yet more active and dominating in primitive man. Under the gradual movement of modern life, many of these forces have, no doubt, been largely outgrown. Cold and dead in some persons, in others we find them present, but latent, and, as it were, vestigiary. These forces thus remain in most modern individuals only as survivals.

Although all survivals are not religious, yet the question of survival and revival has an especial bearing on all manifestations of religion. Ritual in itself has been observed to be a great fossilizer of survivals; the amber which has preserved many early religious ideas. "La persistance du rite est la raison des survivances," says Doutté, speaking of the survival in Mussulman festival and folk-lore.[7]

It is to the outworn custom one must look for traces of ancient survivals, many of which are, even in this latter age, deeply embedded in the very foundations of our complex civilization. The revival, however, is by no means to be closely compared with a fossil. It occurs where the survival has received the impulse of life; it is a nucleus, a centre of energy, whether benignant or malignant, wholly changing and dominating the subject. This revival most frequently occurs in crowds, where the stimulus of contagion is added to the other stimuli, with powerful effect; but it is not infrequently to be found in sporadic, isolated, and individual cases, cases which often are the furthest removed from the possibility of contagion. Tylor mentions, though only in passing, certain instances of this individual revival, and observes that it follows the same course as does the crowd-revival.[8]

Before considering the examples of revival in the individual, let us pause to survey the course of those crowd-revivals whose influence on history has made them more familiar to our minds. So marked is their trail that even those of us who fail to comprehend their psychology are willing to accept them as a sufficient excuse for many amazing aberrations, for many startling events. To enumerate and analyze them would lead far from the present task, but their origin must not be forgotten in its direct bearing on our enquiry.

"As men's minds change in progressing culture, old customs and opinions fade gradually in the new and uncongenial atmosphere, or pass into states more congruous with the new life around them. . . .

Studying with a wide view the course of human opinion, we may now and then trace on from the very turning-point the change from passive survival into active revival. Some well-known belief or custom has for centuries shown symptoms of decay . . . it bursts forth again with a vigor often as marvellous as it is unhealthy."[9] Should the reader desire confirmation of this passage, let him return to the chapters on "Data," of this book, and read once more the documents relating to witchcraft. He will appreciate that each intellectual advance has been followed by an emotional reaction of equal sweep, during one of which, fostered by certain special tendencies latent in Christianity itself, the savage survival of witchcraft leapt into vivid and malign activity. As an epidemic, witchcraft had been chronic among the lower races and is still chronic among them. To us, as the anthropologist remarks, "its main interest lies in the extent and accuracy with which the theory of survival explains it."[10] The main idea of witchcraft is savage; all the rites connected with it are savage. Various minor fluctuations of this revival carry down to our own day its degrading and evil influence. The Mormon outbreak,—the outbreak of demoniacal possession in Switzerland in 1861,—the outbreak of Spiritualism in the eighties,[11]—all will be found to exhibit the same typical savage characteristics, symptoms, and progress.

Any relation of the individual confessant to these groups, and his classification among the data of savage survival, are not the work of theory, they are the work of the confessant himself. As one reads of his

personal conflict, in volume after volume, this conclusion is not fortuitous, it is inevitable. Only the clerical eye could have failed to see where he belonged and to place him there years ago. His own heartrending description of his feelings, his intensity, particularity, and vividness of imaginative conception,—these lend us the light wherewith to understand him. In every word he utters, he paints for us the progress of his savage revival. In every word he utters, he makes plain to us the nature of his monstrous and pathetic delusion. For, what seems to him Divine, what seems to him to be the work of God, or the Voice of God, or the God-designed means for his arrival at ultimate security and salvation, we now know to be in its origins something wholly and grotesquely different, something linked not with the higher, but with the lower, issues of man's nature; something connected not with what we human creatures have become, but with what we once were, æons since; something hideously close to that other savage revival of witchcraft, sprung from brute cruelty and terror.

Let us examine further into the literature of the witch-confession, in order both to connect it with the data of religious confession and to draw comparisons between these two survivals. By the light of the law of association of ideas many of the incidents in the witch-testimonies take on a fresh significance. Certain among them illuminate, in a striking manner, much that has seemed hitherto incredibly bizarre to our civilized intelligence.

The unfortunates on trial for the crime of witch-

craft make many references to the so-called "Witches' Sabbat." Whether in Scotland or in France,—whether in the thirteenth or the seventeenth century, these references are identical, and are equally suggestive of savagery. The dress, indecent and fantastic, of the participants, the drum-beat summoning the assembly to the woods at night, the devil-worship and the frantic dance, the cannibal sacrifice, followed by an indescribable orgy,—all these things are read by the modern student under his quiet lamp, while he shudders at the perversity of the human imagination. To his mind, such conceptions bespeak a sort of wicked lunacy.[12] But let him turn to the sober narrative of the African traveller, and he will find the same festival set down therein, in cold print, as an everyday incident of aboriginal life. Stripped of all connection with our Occidental Devil (for no savage mind had ever the genius to create that figure!), the ritual of this feast is not changed in a single detail.[13] Yesterday, to-day, to-morrow,—the drums beat, the Congo villagers, smeared with paint, gather in the forest for a debauch, to which not one of the most hideous fancies of the Middle Ages will be found lacking. There follows the natural question, How came the Middle Ages to know about such things?

Ages since, such customs had faded from the lives of European nations.[14] There are traces of them to be found in ancient Eastern creeds; the frenzy of the Mænads had a similar origin; but they must long have been but matter of vestigiary memory. Yet, since the word "vestige" means a track or footprint, it may be accurately employed in showing the tracks

left in men's imaginations by the vanished customs of their tribal period. Under the spur of sharp terror,—and terror of the Unknown,—that faded, but not obliterated memory of the aboriginal orgy, began to revive, stimulated into a show of life and color. Out of the black pit of the past arose these ugly and tormenting images, crowding to perplex a poor, unbalanced creature under the menace of death. Perhaps the tale of some traveller at the village inn had been enough to start the train of ideas—to stir and animate these latent associations. The folk-lore of little communities, the stories told by father to son, by mother to daughter, is the amber which has enfolded and preserved these survivals; until that moment, when, under favorable conditions, they were to burst forth into vigorous and unhealthy activity.

"There are no pages of European history more filled with horror," says Dr. Lea, "than those which record the witch-madness of three centuries."[15] This "disease of the imagination" was heightened and stimulated by persecution; details which had been but cloudy, became, under cross-examination, full and horrible; the torture of the accused produced fresh material at each step, which each further case assimilated and amplified. The psychology of the witch-confessant shows a progressive state of hysterical fear and of imaginative nervous delusion. The details gained upon cross-examination of these cases, became more and more dreadful as the cross-examination progressed;[16] as the unfortunate turned, step by step, back to his aboriginal condition, these vestigiary

memories, revived and stimulated under the pressure of terror, soon reduced the poor creature to the level of the sheer brute. Torture always succeeded in producing the answers desired by the torturers, answers apparently confirming their belief. Leading questions led to uniform replies, and thus "a tolerably coherent formula was developed to which all witches were expected to conform."[17] At times, the confessions were truthful accounts of illusions really entertained, and thus are comparable to the visions of the mystics.[18] More often, they were the mere result of the torture applied to produce them. Dr. Lea is of the opinion that in some cases the imaginations of the Witches' Sabbat were evoked as a relief from the subject's sordid poverty, or to account to himself for excesses of temperament which had no other outlet.[19] However this may be, it is indisputable that many old beliefs and folk-tales were seized upon and incorporated into these delusions, forming a repository of elder, half-forgotten superstitions. The ancient pagan idea of night-riders; the Norse "trolla-thing," or nocturnal gathering of witches, to dance upon the first of May, becomes, by a slow and portentous growth, connected with the idea of a pact with Satan, and so grew to the Witches' Sabbat of the fourteenth century.[20] "Common to the superstitions of many races," writes Dr. Lea, "its origin cannot be definitely assigned to any"; and he observes that both the Church and the law were at a loss to account for the wide prevalence of the belief, and for the marked similarity in its fea-

tures.[21] Details varied little; human sacrifice and cannibalism were the main rites asserted, delusions eagerly confessed, and persisted in to the stake.[22]

The account given by Dr. Lea of the witch-trials under the Inquisition, at the time the epidemic was at its height, furnishes the most complete and striking confirmation of its connection with savage revival. The personal influences, the psychological influences, the physical influences, all made for this revival and its effect upon the mind of the individual. Confession was to be exacted by torture, mental and physical, and every possible means was used to entrap the unfortunate or obstinate subject. His situation, therefore, was entirely favorable to the florescence of the revival in his personality. He needed only the spur of terror for his passive survivals to spring into active revival. He did not need knowledge of aboriginal customs; the knowledge was in his blood; it was naturally evoked by a certain train of ideas, under a certain nervous stimulus. With real savages he was not in contact, unless it should be with Irish traditions; while of that aboriginal feast which is the prototype of the Sabbat, he had never even heard. The Middle Ages could know nothing of the Australian bushman, or of the African negro. Books were few; and most of the people affected by the revival could not read. All the beliefs and customs connected with witchcraft and magic sprang from, and have remained with, the peasant, part of an inheritance which he has not yet outgrown.

The hysterical on trial for her life must immediately have become the unconscious focus, for a

revival of these conceptions. She, her judges, and her audience were for the time being swayed by a wave of primordial terror. Such reasoning powers as they possessed were submerged by a flood of racial feelings and recollections. The confessants themselves bear witness to this state, in no uncertain language. Madeleine Bavent, describing the incidents at the Witches' Sabbat, repeats that she cannot be sure what she beheld while there. It is remembered as in a cloud.[23] Like Richard of St. Victor, she does not plead this vagueness as evidence in her favor; she merely makes note of it; to us, it is a proof that the whole experience belonged to what James calls so aptly the "B-region"[24] of her consciousness. Neither do the Mormon elders attribute to any psychological influence the extraordinary behavior of some of their converts during the revivals at Kirtland, in Ohio. The young men and women would imitate the scalping and whooping of the Indians; would try to speak in the various Indian dialects; would be, writes one of the elders, "completely metamorphosed into Indians."[25] The fear and horror of Red Men was not so far, perhaps, from these unfortunates, as the fear and horror of devils from the witch-confessant; but at Kirtland it was, at least, just as unnecessary, just as markedly the result of pure revival; sprung from the "B-region" of consciousness. "This B-region," writes the psychologist, ". . . is obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent, and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inac-

tive memories, and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations come from it. It is the source of our dreams and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and . . . it is also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion.'' [26]

Although the conclusions of William James are not those of the present investigation, yet one must not underestimate the service he has rendered by so clear a definition of this extra-marginal portion of our consciousness. The data of the emotional religious experience have their origin in this region, from which all survivals take their rise. Holy saint and hysterical nun are alike in this, that the disturbance which has been caused in the ''B-region'' by the rise and domination of some survival, has, in them, preoccupied and possessed the entire personality, to the total exclusion of all those factors which make for the normal life of human beings. Under pressure, that which existed in the beginning but as a passive, latent survival, has become an active revival, has pressed forward upon what James calls ''the full, sun-lit consciousness''; until it alters and clouds the latter beyond recognition.

Surely, it is natural that human creatures, finding these strange ideas rising out of themselves, should try to explain them, should try to relate them to some unknown fact. The more healthy-minded tend to link them with everything they dis-

like and cannot understand. Thus, the early Christians came to be accused of various practices having their origin in savage survival; thus, in the Olympian hand of a Goethe, the *Walpurgis-nacht* superstition became a symbol of man's lower nature. To us, these beliefs furnish clear evidence of their common source, and more than that, their particular character points to that source in primitive savage animism.

The individual, as an exponent of the phenomena of revival, has been little studied up to the present time. Tylor notes Swedenborg as having been intensely animistic, both in doctrine and personality.[27] "Mrs. Piper, the medium," writes Andrew Lang, "exhibits a survival, or recrudescence of savage phenomena."[28] The data collected in the foregoing chapter on heredity, health, and early piety, are gathered from many persons predestined, mentally and nervously, to be the subject for such revival. Many an one has found himself suddenly quite helpless in the grip of terrors and agonies risen to confront him out of the very depths of his nature. These are horrors, hydra-headed, uncontrollable, perverse, made of the naked stuff of the cave-man. No wonder that the humble and ignorant—the John Bunyans and John Crooks, the David Halls and Joseph Smiths, and Joanna Southcotts of this world—are smitten by them. Moreover, there is good reason why such as these are especially prone to be the subject of revival. "The primitive Aryan," Dr. Frazer reminds us, "in all that regards his mental fibre and texture is not extinct. He is among us to this day. The great intellectual and moral forces which have revolutionized

the educated world, have scarcely affected the peasant. In his inmost beliefs he is what his forefathers were."[29] With the peasant, the belief and practice based on the higher animism remain existent as ancestral relics,—as vestigiary, passive survivals.

The startling effect of the whole series of experiences to the individual, is thus in a manner explained. The confessant reiterates the novelty, the strangeness of his feeling, the well-nigh indescribable character of his suffering. It is not matter of his immediate knowledge, it is something *from outside*. It is striking, bizarre, fantastically new, much as to our eyes those first, fossil shapes of the great saurians seemed altogether new, and for the same reason. The average person, living his peaceful, civilized life, and conscious of no hoofed satyrs rising to torment him out of his savage past, will argue that evolution has rid him of all these barbarities. True it is that many of them do appear to be on the wane. During the Middle Ages, the witchcraft revival attacked all persons without discrimination. Such superstitions are fewer to-day. The power of suggestion in controlling them is man's most civilizing influence. But so long as men are men, so long will they be liable, under given conditions, to recurrence of these revivals, if often under new forms. The fact that at the moment the number of individuals undergoing the particular revival involved in emotional religious experience, is fewer than in the past, is no argument for its eventual disappearance. Almost any one can recall in his acquaintance some person who has been completely, if temporarily, altered by some new belief, some one who

has made an emotional turn to Christian Science, or some other sect, and who has but given a new name to this age-long experience.

The average person may look in vain for any tokens of its existence within himself. But let those given conditions occur,—let the process once start,—let the force of emotion, like a hidden spring, release the passive survival so that it grows to active revival,—then the mental law of association between ideas may be counted upon to do the rest. He who began with mere depression, dissatisfaction, and preoccupation with self, is like to go on to torments, to horrors, to abnormalities of thought and behavior, to visions and voices, to ecstasies and trances; he will be changed beyond his own power of recognition. "My visage altered," says Thomas Laythe, "so that my friends were alarmed." Myles Halhead's wife remonstrates with him on his changed appearance and behavior. Thomas Ware seemed little better than a maniac. George Story appeared to himself actually more like a beast than a rational creature. The friends of Alexander Gordon, and of Mary Fletcher, were much worried by their looks. On every hand, the families of the confessants testify to the extraordinary, and in most cases deteriorating, effect of the experience. For generations their remonstrance has been made to stand as persecution by the world or the Devil, and it mattered little if it were the plea of Salimbene's father, or the impatient protest of some employer of Methodist or Quaker,—all were set aside in the same category.

Nervous contagion and epidemic hysteria no doubt aided the development of the conversion-process to-

ward its typical crisis. Fantastic ideas, before undreamt-of, often take complete hold on the subject's mind. In the witch-trials one may read accounts of devil-worship or the Witches' Sabbat,—accounts detailed in their brutal obscenity,—from the lips of delicate, cloistered women or of innocent girls. No wonder that diabolical possession was the only rational explanation to their audiences of such horrors. Belief in a Devil had at least this advantage, it threw all responsibility for the results of a disturbance into the "B-region" where it seemed to belong, ridding poor humanity of the burden. It is well for us to remember and repeat,—in case we should ever come to grips with these things,—that, under normal conditions, these feelings should not be brought into the light at all, for they belong to those obscurely registered impressions which are a part of our animal inheritance.

An answer may be here suggested to some of the questions which were asked at the outset of this enquiry. That disintegrating force, which we have seen to operate so disastrously upon personality, is generated by a spontaneous revival, in the individual, of vestigiary, savage animism. Sprung into action as the result of certain given conditions, this revival starts upon its regular progress that process known as emotional religious experience, manifested in the three phases of Depression, Conversion, and Reaction. For this process, under whatever variations, the animistic revival is completely responsible. Different sections of the present study have been devoted to analyzing

the predisposing conditions and immediate causes of such revival; while others show why the merely pathological or medical-materialist theory is unable to explain it, and why the mystical-compromise theory is unable to explain it. Once set in action, this influx of animistic emotions and impulses,—simply founded on Fear and Worship of what is unknown—operates as a disrupting agency upon the subject's personality, and causes an acute distress until its course is run; or until peace returns through the medium of direct, psychological suggestion. Why suggestion has this power at the crisis, science has not yet made clear to us; the condition of the subject appears to predispose him to a high degree of suggestibility at such a time. There are cases in which the coalescence altogether fails to take place; when, instead of steady progress toward a mystical or semi-mystical culmination, followed in due course by a return to normal conditions, the process assumes proportions properly termed pathological, and the personality of the subject remains disrupted (or, as we commonly say, unbalanced) for the rest of his life. Unquestionably, there is justice in the observation that this state is in itself prone to foster any latent nervous or mental disease. This does not mean, however, that it is in itself to be classed as disease, any more than our vestigiary physical remains are to be classed as deformities.

When we come to look upon this process as vestigiary, it is evident that it must not be looked on either as an "ideally-normal" condition, or as a purely pathological condition. It is a process strictly natural, as natural, let us say, as fear of the dark,

as natural as little else about us is natural. Belonging to that group of primitive instincts which man has tended but imperceptibly to outgrow, its sudden development unsettles the balance which civilization has had such difficulty in maintaining. When these hidden sluice-gates open in the depths of being, there are dangers for all our higher qualities in the rise of that dark and secret flood. The great contemplatives and mystics, whose lives have presented the seeming paradox of activity, both mundane and supra-mundane, have been able to hold it in check, so that their creative and intellectual centres were not thereby submerged. Need we add that such ability belongs only to the rarest type of genius?

Science is more or less ignorant of the special causes which unite to produce this outbreak of animism in the individual; but it shows from the data that a prerequisite is the lowering of the vital forces. This lowering results most often from the approach of puberty, with depressing social surroundings, poverty, vice, infirmity, or ill-health, as contributing causes. When these conditions have been fulfilled to an extent affecting society at large (as in the Middle Ages, or in the United States just after the War of Independence), there results a general outbreak of animistic revivals of all sorts. Individuals of robust vitality may be found among our examples, who suddenly, after serious illness or strain, find themselves confronted with this experience, almost invariably heralded by preliminary depression, restlessness, and fear about self. Where these individual cases, at this critical moment, come into contact with crowd-revivals and their conta-

gion, the process is naturally heightened and hastened. The savage origin of the savage manifestations prevalent in crowd-revivals has been sufficiently insisted upon in these pages; to the student of Mormonism, of the Evangelical movement, of the Great Revival, their abysmal source is marked as plainly as that of witchcraft in the past.

"C'est le propre des états de l'âme," writes Renan, "où naissent l'extase et les apparitions, d'être contagieux. L'histoire de toutes les grandes crises religieuses prouve que ces sortes de visions se communiquent, dans une assemblée des personnes remplies de mêmes croyances."[30] The history given by Jonathan Edwards, in his "Narrative," already mentioned in these pages, becomes a notable confirmation of the theory of savage revival. Starting in a small New England village in 1735, the so-called "Great Revival" spread, "with fresh and extraordinary incomes of the spirit," to the neighboring towns, causing widespread religious excitement. The initial suggestion, according to Edwards, was due to "an apprehension that the world was near to its end, which," he naïvely adds, "was altogether false."[31] Here was evidently another manifestation of that spontaneous Fear, which has been responsible for so many an emotional outbreak in human history.[32] Direct nervous contagion had its share, for Edwards notes the suicide of an unfortunate during this period, which became the starting-point for an epidemic of suicide. Conditions are here depicted all the more striking because of the "misinterpreted observation" through which they have been preserved. That New

England farmer, urged by the blind forces in his being to cringe, terror-stricken, before an angry Deity, seems to fall back many centuries into savagery.

The reader must not infer that only among the simple and the credulous are these forces to be found at work. Were this true, they would have far less importance. On the contrary savage survivals lie close about the lives of the most fastidious and complex of men. Each one of us, in fact, might exclaim with the poet:—

> "Within my blood my ancient kindred spoke,
> Grotesque and monstrous voices, heard afar
> Down ocean caves when behemoth awoke." [33]

And yet how few of us realize that these voices *are* "grotesque and monstrous"—how many of us, with the pathetic misinterpretation of the past, have connected them

> "with that far-off divine event,
> To which the whole creation moves!"

If we will but set them in their proper place, much that seemed uncomfortably fantastic about them will be explained; much that seemed unreasonable will seem so no longer. The remains of fetichism in the churches will seem as natural to us as the remains of fetichism in every nursery.[34] Man will no longer hold God responsible for that mass of fancies, lingering over from abysmal days in the "B-region" of his fellow-creatures. He will understand why religious concepts are attached to all sorts of material objects by the imaginations of the devout; why spe-

cial devotions to special dogmas have served to arouse and to feed all forms of animistic survival.[35] The Incarnation and the Passion, the Sacred Heart and the Holy Sacrament, awakened in the imaginations of Peter Favre, of Carlo da Sezze, of M. M. Alacoque, and Baptiste Varani, typical emotions leaving no doubt as to their animistic origin. A leaden medal to Alphonse de Ratisbonne, a fragment of prism from an old-fashioned lustre chandelier to Joseph Smith, partook of a sacred character, wholly animistic both in its sources and manifestations.

The theory of animistic revival fully accounts for all the more perplexing features of the religious experience. The destructive effect of the process on the subject's creative energies is thus seen to be the natural result of its origin. The black despair, the "rending and tearing," the "aridity," the paralysis of the springs of effort,—these have appeared inexplicable and contradictory, even to those who believe the process to be in the nature of a new birth. The apparent dissociation of the feelings aroused by this process from all current standards of morality, has raised a doubt in the mind of many eminent religious leaders, and one which the involved contradiction alone forbade them to express. This dissociation will be noticed both in general and in particular. The influence on its votaries of a wave of emotional religious revival is far oftener lowering than it is uplifting. Nothing could be more immoral or irreligious in its tone than Mormonism, with its prophet's drunkenness, its licensed sensuality, its frenzy of superstition, unless, perhaps, it be the polytheistic Christianity

of the Middle Ages, of which Hallam expresses such doubts.

Why a person in the act of "getting religion" should immediately develop an abnormal egotism,[36] melancholy and gloom;[37] with marked indifference to another's feelings,[38] and insensibility to other claims and wishes;[39] should become an ungrateful child,[40] an unkind brother,[41] a neglectful parent,[42]—and all to please his God,—this has been one of the paradoxes. By other paradoxes, no less startling, has the Christian dogmatist endeavored to account for them; while the conflict between our human and our religious duties has for centuries tormented the unhappy race of the conscientious. That this conflict is not exaggerated, the confessants themselves bear witness;—it has been the sharpest scourge in the hand of so-called piety. When poor little Jeanne de St. M. Deleloe became a novice at sixteen, she attributes her grief at leaving home to the Devil's work.

The virtues of self-absorption are dwelt upon in a manner highly suggestive. Examples have already been quoted. When her husband died, Mme. Guyon hastened to praise God that he had broken her bonds. The mother of Guibert de Nogent left her delicate boy alone in the world while she sought salvation in the cloister. Thérèse of the Holy Child was the fifth sister to take the veil, thereby leaving empty her old father's house. "Religion," comments William James, "is a monumental chapter in the history of human egotism!"

Obviously, these ideas of duty are not our ideas; in our eyes, they appear rather to suggest a doc-

trine of "Sauve qui peut!" Sprung from animism, this manifestation of selfish terror becomes a natural result, founded on a certain logical basis. We are shocked to-day when we hear of such instances, but most of us regard them as exceptional. What we have utterly failed to recognize is that such egotism is fundamental, nay, even essential. Similar insensibility is manifest in all cases of animistic revival; it is not fortuitous or accidental, it is symptomatic and characteristic. It is the one constant factor, among the many variable factors, of this experience. Its presence constitutes an unfailing token of the animistic revival. The gloom, the aridity, the suffering of the subject, are the natural outcome of the struggle between brute, selfish terror and any of his higher ideals and feelings which evolution may have developed. During such a conflict the Ego forces itself on the attention of the subject, and acquires an exaggerated importance in his eyes. Hence his cry, hence his terror, hence his protest that he had better lose the whole world than his own soul. Recognition of this condition resulted in the dogmatic teaching of egotism. The mediæval mind was given to formulæ, while the mere existence of these facts was warrant for the fathers to nail them fast to some text. The hardest task of the last century has been to draw many of these nails, which fasten the right facts to the wrong explanations. Mediævalism was not content to acknowledge this fundamental, animistic selfishness as selfishness, but must adopt and preach it. Peter of Alcantara warns against "the indiscreet zeal of trying to do good to others."[43] John of

Avila, counselling the neophyte to forget national and family duties for those duties so-called, of heaven, adds a chapter "On the Vanity of Good Works." These he finds full of danger, since they tend to interest one in this world instead of in the next![44] Milman observes, in comment: "Christianity, to be herself again, must not merely shake off indignantly the barbarism, the vices, but even the virtues of monastic, of Latin Christianity."[45] The further comment made by science will be to the effect that Christianity was most herself, in those days when all her standards and most of her ideals were the standards and the ideals resulting from the influence of animistic revival.[46]

The characteristics of the animistic revival are at all times and under all circumstances so definite, so recognizable, that it is no wonder the Middle Ages should attach to them a supernatural cause, or should distort their effects into a form of ethical code. Most of these effects we should not to-day dare to term virtues. We realize their brute nature, their origin in a time when religion and conduct were separate, dissociated ideas. Many of the qualities vaunted in the mediæval religious life, are now known to have sprung from the day when man trembled he knew not why, and adored he knew not what,—and their presence is as plain as such another survival as the child's fear of the dark, and to be accounted for in the same way.

When such revival is in progress there ensues a temporarily disintegrating effect upon the morals and philosophy of the subject. It could hardly be

otherwise when one realizes the potency of the forces generated and the instability of the material upon which they operate. The excitement sets up currents and counter-currents, actions and reactions. Civilization does not, as some of our novelists would have it, fall from the shoulders like a discarded garment at the first touch of any passion. Hereditary self-control, hereditary balance and reason, and sense of duty, do not resign their empire without a struggle with this antagonist, risen, in Stevenson's apt phrase, "out of the slime of the pit." It is this age-long conflict between Man as he is and Man as he used to be,—to describe which writers have exhausted their vocabulary of poignant and pathetic words,—that has caused more than half the misery of the world.

The mystic himself has had, at moments, a realization of this truth. Barbanson depicted his agony in the phrase, "divisio naturæ ac spiritus." To more than one sufferer under the torture of that peculiarly horrible survival, the Unpardonable Sin, there has come the gleam of a feeling that, after all, what he suffers is an anomaly in the teaching of one so gentle as Jesus of Nazareth,—that his despair must have grown up from a deeper root than the mere suggestion in a text. Suggestion it is, but far more in the nature of primordial suggestion. The paragraphs dealing with the origin of the Unpardonable Sin have already connected it with other concepts having their source in primitive Fear. Its qualities of intensity, peculiarity, and vagueness of definition support this relation; while it was shown that the confusion among the Fathers respecting its nature was as striking as their

unanimous recognition of its prevalence and power. They did not, of course, relate it to the act of nameless impiety lying at the root of the idea of primitive tabu, which few savage tribes are without. It remains for the modern student to see in these two conceptions —the breaking of the primitive tabu, and the Unpardonable Sin—a strong family resemblance. The latter would seem only readily explained if we see it in the light of a survival of the former. The tabu has all the equivocal characteristics of danger and fatality which hung about sacred things to the primitive mind. Among the Greeks tabu is simply the Forbidden, the Thing Feared.[47] Breach of tabu meant defilement, until expiated with blood. It is just as vague, and no more definite, than the Unpardonable Sin to the sinner who thinks he has committed it, knowing not what it is. Among the Boloki, to break the tabu was to bring a curse, or even death to the breaker.[48] Hebrew tradition makes no mention of any specific unpardonable offence; but in their complicated system of tabus, purification was demanded even by a trifling breach. All these tabus mingle, in a manner extremely suggestive, the idea of holiness with that of danger.[49]

No doubt the Fear, inherent in the aboriginal tabu, has remained inherent in this later conception, out of which all the specific cause for Fear had vanished long ago. In sacredness, potency, vagueness, and fatal mysteriousness, the Unpardonable Sin is to the modern confessant what the breach of tabu is to the Congo savage, nor is it lacking in that sense of infection, which served to heighten in both instances the wretchedness of the sinner. Fear is the main constit-

uent of all survivals; and where this Fear becomes active, its malignant influence over some young life is preserved for us in numberless volumes of pious autobiography.

Striking as it seems, this particular instance is but a side-issue in the main psychological conflict. That such conflict is universal, that all men pass within danger of it, that youth itself is inextricably bound up with the forces which produce it,—is the fact sufficient to confirm any theory of its innate, primordial origin.

The reader may impatiently retort that this is not what he means by religion. Many persons strongly object to being linked with the Bunyans or the Teresas of this world. They would insist that the religious experience, due to an individual revival of savage animism, is not the only sense in which we use that term. True; and yet little has been accomplished by the present investigation unless it has made plain that the current terms used in treating this subject are far too loose for our current knowledge of it to admit. If the emotional religious experience be truly the result of a revival of savage animism; then one of the questions asked at the outset of this study has been in a measure determined. The mystical states which form the essence of this experience are *not* merely intensified states of intellectual opinion and belief. Their genesis is other, their evolution is other. That high seriousness respecting life and its duties, which to some—to many—of us to-day constitutes vital religion, is not the product of animistic survivals.

May it not even be said to oppose their growth? Such feelings, such standards, surely interfere with, and impede emotional revivals, because they belong to the fabric of civilization which has covered and changed the primitive man in his nakedness. They spring from what we have made of ourselves; not from what we were made. The sources of this high seriousness are intellectual, and so far as it is possible to tell, they appear to be directly antagonistic to the development of emotional experience. The whole body of intellectual and abstract conceptions has been introduced much later into the scheme of man's evolution.[50] If classification be made easier thereby, our intellectualized beliefs may be placed in this late period; while the emotional experience goes back to that original. These are the twin streams which have fed and fertilized the soil of man's religious life; and once we see these currents as two, we readily agree with the psychologist "that the word religion cannot stand for any single principle or essence,"[51] but that it must be used as a *collective* term. Moreover, the direct testimony of the data at hand confirms this view. Manifestations so conflicting, so contradictory, must needs have more than one source. That man who is habitually guided by his intellect will suffer partially, or transiently, or not at all from any animistic revival. For this reason he is apt to deny its existence, or to scorn it as pathological if he admit it at all. That man, on the other hand, who is habitually guided by feeling and imagination, will undergo, while in the grasp of this revival, passions so furious, terrors so intense, joys so exalted and transcending, that he will

look upon the doubter of these experiences as either a dullard or a madman.

Should it occur to these subjects that both may be religious, then they frequently rush to the conclusion that both are affected by the same force, differing only in its degree of intensity. Each would resent the imputation that he is any less religious than the other; each would exclude the other, if he could, from the realm of religion; failing this, their only refuge has been a destructive latitudinarianism. Differentiation of terms is the first and the most necessary step toward clearing up these obscurities. Method and classification should be the second, though even more important. Method will reach the inference that the so-called religious instinct cannot be held as singly responsible for all the various and complex manifestations hitherto grouped under this one head. If it be the cause of one type of phenomena, then it is precluded from being responsible for the other,—and *vice versa*. If by religion there be meant a group of experiences and resultant phenomena having their origin in animistic revival,—such as form the material of the present study,—then the experience running counter to these may not be called religion.

The time has come to bring the reader face to face with the questions asked in the Introduction, and to decide whether this examination has in any way helped him to resolve them. The survey at least should have enabled him to discriminate more successfully between the various forms of data. "An autobiography," says Emerson, "should be a book of answers from one in-

dividual to the many questions of the time";[52] and when a fellow-creature, in the pages of a confession, tells of the forces which create, and of the forces which destroy, the reader knows which of them are physical, and what they mean, which are mystical, and what they mean, which are literary and social, and what they also mean. Instincts, thoughts, and emotions are laid bare to him; he is no longer deceived by individual variation, nor by misinterpreted observation. His recognition and comprehension of the different factors will be rapid and complete.

And with understanding will come a greater tolerance,—one might even say a greater reverence. No longer will he place everything which is not his ideal of health sweepingly in the realm of disease. Neither will he longer conceive that his God is a God despising the divine medium of natural law. When he comes to feel and to perceive this law, moving to its fulfilment in his own obscurest processes exactly as it moves throughout the universe, shaping worlds out of nebulæ,—then the frantic running to-and-fro of little men, shouting their jargon of judgment and revelation, upholding or condemning one another, will no longer even make him angry. "We will not attack you as Voltaire did," he will exclaim in the famous words of Morley; "we will not exterminate you, we shall explain you. History will place your dogma in its class, above or below a hundred competing dogmas, exactly as the naturalist classifies his species. From being a conviction it will sink to a curiosity; from being the guide to millions of human lives it will dwindle down to a chapter in a book."[53]

If he desire to formulate a reply to the searching queries of science, the data of the confessant have furnished him with the means of meeting them on new ground, and with fresh suggestions. He now sees and can describe the manifestations in the individual of the force which is known as religion. He recognizes it by the uniformity and universality of its symptoms;—he concludes that this very uniformity and universality are our strongest witnesses to its reality; the evidence can almost be made to prove itself. A steady recurrence of the same indications, under different conditions of time and place and nationality, is proof sufficient of their foundation in an actual process.[54]

Just as we recognize through its typical effects the presence of the force called electricity, so we recognize by its typical effects the presence of the emotional religious experience. But when we seek its further relations, in order to complete our induction, we are checked by the confused voices of philosophy disputing on the question of definition. Turning to science, therefore, it has seemed as though the work of the anthropologist came nearest to providing us with vital comparisons and suggestions. Our conclusion that the "experiences" of the type herein classified are due to animistic revival, acting counter to the later-developed intellectual and social elements of Personality, with a result temporarily or permanently disintegrating, is a conclusion very far from the flattering theories of the mystical compromiser, at present so much in vogue. This conclusion contradicts such theories through the confessant's own testimony, by

showing that the peace, the joy, the reunion, are but the evanescent effects of psychological suggestion. The evidence proves that a conversion-crisis rarely establishes Personality on any higher level than before, and that it is never without a reaction, during which the subject has to suffer further crises of doubt and gloom. The records show that whenever the conversion appears to be the means of opening new channels to the energy of the subject, it does so through his impulse toward *work* of some kind, or by bringing him into contact with some sectarian activity. If his religious crisis leads him to take up teaching or preaching or organizing, then his level as an individual may truly be raised; but such elevation cannot be called the effect of the conversion; *it is rather the effect of the subsequent work.* If the subject's emotional experience does not lead him in the direction of new work (and there are many cases where it does not), then the last state of this man is infinitely worse than his first.[55] The reader will have become convinced that in most natures a religious conversion no more changes the original elements of good and evil in the subject than a wave changes the constituency of the water through which it moves. We have enveloped this crisis in a cloud of our own anthropomorphic beliefs: we have attached to it the idea of God, conquering the demon, entering into and calming the troubled soul. Man has affixed a religious significance to this age-long, evolutionary conflict, because only a religious significance seemed fitted to express its extraordinary poignancy.

Thus are we brought—if unwillingly—to that ultimate question;—one which will always be asked, and to which no answer, while men are what they are, can ever be accepted as final. Do we find in these experiences any proof of the religious instinct? For more than three thousand years, men have trembled and adored after this fashion; what should it prove to us to-day?

We have seen what it seemed to prove in the past. God's word was not, we remember, in the thunder, nor yet in the lightning; and we are now asking one another if it is in "the still, small voice." Amid the clamor of contending theories, science knows only that she must walk austerely, that she must not assume *a priori* supernatural causes for natural, physical effects. If it is to animistic revival we are to look for proof of a religious instinct, then we must further differentiate the ideas dealing with non-anthropomorphic, ethical conceptions, which many of us include under the same head. These terms, after all, are but the symbols of the forces by whose aid man continues to evolve. We name and re-name them; in essence they remain the same. "Tous les symboles qui servent à donner une forme au sentiment religieux sont incomplets, et leur sort est d'être rejétés les uns après les autres." [56]

As we reject these symbols the one after the other, instinctively we choose symbols of a higher character to succeed them; and to this instinct we may safely confide the evolution of our religious ideals. When men came to understand that visions and voices, terrors and trances, belong to their "ancient kindred,"

their lower, not their higher selves, then men were plagued by them no longer; those symbols passed, and were rejected.

For the work of the courageous rationalist—who to-day is the only idealist—is but begun. Three centuries ago, wise and good judges, under the grip of a savage survival, put their innocent fellow-men to a cruel death, on no evidence save that of raving hysteria.[57] Less than a century since, and the incredibly grotesque and brutish conception of a personal Devil, was allowed to torment the sleep of little children and to insult the eternal face of things. It would be hard to find a single intelligent family submitting to that horror to-day. Two hundred years ago, a callous, organized selfishness was preached as the highest life a person could live. To-day, no creed, no church, puts the career of passive egotism before that of active social service. It has slipped into its proper sphere, and the churches now give emphasis and precedence to the religious orders working for others. A hundred years hence, and we may confidently hope that the relation borne by the imaginings of the mystic to our life and ideals, shall be set into the same category as the demon-possession of the nuns of Louviers or Loudun. The symbols pass; they are rejected the one after the other.

Whatever the religious symbols of the future, at least they will not be those of the past; they will not be founded on savage survivals. The religion they form will not permit its votaries to write, as did the honest Scot of a saintly philosopher, that "this atheist should have been rightly named Maledictus, and not

Benedictus Spinoza!''[58] Religious doctrine will not be founded on horror, but on beauty; not on fear, but on security; not on wild revelations to a few, but on hope and constructive ethics to the many. It will teach its followers, through science, how better to fight the battle with their brute selves. It will bid them shut their ears and ignore—as Luther ignored the Devil—all those mutterings of what they once were. We, who have hung, like Dante over the Inferno, until our ears shrink from the ''high shrieks'' and the ''voices shrill and stifled''; we can but hope for, and believe in, the swift passing of our outworn symbols. No one who reads these records of suffering but feels his soul purged by pity and terror,—pity to see his fellow-man clinging to these rejected symbols, terror to see him struggling with the slime of the pit, and knowing not with what he strives!

THE END

NOTES

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. *Advancement of Learning*, p. 78.
2. G. B. Cutten, *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, p. 5.
3. *L'Esprit des Lois*, préface.
4. E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, p. 26.
5. Ferrero, *Characters and Events in Roman History*, p. 33.
6. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 3.
7. Such as the Records of Friends, or Methodists, or Port-Royalists.
8. *Port-Royal*, vol. VI, p. 245.
9. Ernest Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, vol. II, p. 6.
10. Cf. the intellectual freedom of Manu or of Confucius (in *Sacred Books of the East*) with such Christian writings as the *Imitation of Christ*.
11. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, Boston, 1909.
12. E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, p. 2.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
14. Jevons, *Introduction to the Study of Religion*, p. 3.
15. R. W. Emerson, *Society and Solitude*, "Books," p. 195.
16. Matthew Arnold, *Empedocles on Ætna*.
17. *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 153.
18. E. Delacroix, *Étude sur l'histoire du Mysticisme*, p. 5.
19. "Pour les âmes profondes et rêveuses, pour les intelligences délicates et attentives."
20. Cf. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

CHAPTER II

1. *Across the Plains* (*Pulvis et Umbra*), p. 294.
2. Budge, *Book of the Dead*, p. 190.
3. Budge, *Book of the Dead*, Papyrus of Nu.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
5. Morris Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 313–320; "confession during a special penitential season," p. 326. Sayce, *Religion of Babylonia*, p. 418.
6. Westermarck, *Origin of Moral Ideas*, vol. I, p. 84.
7. Sacred Books of the East, Buhler, *Laws of Manu*, XI, p. 229. Cf. Frazer, *Taboo*, pp. 214–215.
8. Satapatha-Brahmana, *Vedas*, p. 397.
9. Sacred Books of the East, *Ibid.* I, p. 261; cf. also the Kullavagga, XX, p. 122.
10. Allan Menzies, *History of Religion*, p. 376.
11. Epistle of James, V, 16.
12. Allan Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 323.
13. Plutarch, *Apothegms*, "On Lysander" (Bohn).
14. "The Confessional is a Tribunal." Schieler-Heuser, *Theory and Practice of the Confessional*, 1906.
15. *Jewish Encyclopædia*, art., "Confession."
16. F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic and Morals*, p. 321.
17. Proverbs, XXVIII, 13; Acts, XIX, 18; John, I, 19.
18. H. C. Lea, *History of Auricular Confession*, vol. I, p. 8.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
21. F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Morals and Magic*, p. 321; H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*, p. 174.
22. See Père Duchesne, *Histoire Ancienne de l'Église.*
23. H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 81, *et seq.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 173–75.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 11 (note).
27. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 277.
28. S. Reinach, *Orpheus*, p. 290.
29. H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 13.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
31. *History of the Holy Mar-Ephrem*, 378 A.D., in Syriac. See Schaff's *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. XIII, *Ephraim Syrus.*
32. H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 362.
33. *Ibid.*, and also p. 171.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 219–21; and see Epistle of James, v, 16.
36. *Testament of Ignatius Loyola*, p. 42 (Burns and Oates).
37. See Bibliography of Cases.
38. Görres, *Mystique Divine*, vol. II, pp. 176, 178.
39. George Eliot, *Romola*, vol. I, p. 142.
40. H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 347; "amara, festina, integra, et frequens."
41. See Cardan, *De Vita propria liber.*
42. Schaff's *Ante-Nicene Fathers* (trans. by Rev. J. G. Pilkington, M.A.); *Prolegomena.*
43. *Confessions*, book I, chaps. VI–X.
44. *Ibid.*, book II, chaps. II–X; chaps. X–XVII.
45. *Ibid.*, book III, chap. I.
46. Shelley's Letters. (Ingpen Collection.)
47. *Confessions* (Pusey's translation), book X, chaps. XXXI–XXXVII.
48. See Cardan, Bibliography of Cases.
49. See Wilde, Bibliography of Cases.
50. As books XI and XII.
51. *Confessions* (Pusey), book V, p. 79.
52. Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 110.
53. Augustin's *Confessions*, book. X, chap. III.
54. C. A. Sainte-Beuve, *Port-Royal.*
55. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
56. *Lettere Familiari*, IV, 1.
57. Petrarch (Robinson and Rolfe), pp. 313 *ff.*
58. Petrarch, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–17.
59. E. B. Browning, *Sonnets from the Portuguese.*
60. Petrarch, *op. cit.*, p. 402.
61. H. C. Lea, *History of Auricular Confession*, vol. I.
62. It may profitably be noted, in this connection, that Luther's objection to confession was based on its tendency to found religion on Fear. Against this bondage he wrote his "Christian Liberty." Personally the practice aroused his contempt. "There was such a running to confession—they were never satisfied," he notes in his *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), p. 161.
63. *Macbeth.*
64. W. Hirsch, *Genius and Degeneration*, p. 44.

65. See H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*
66. See Abélard, Cardan, in Bibliography of Cases.
67. See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, chap. II.
68. See *The Gadfly*, by Mrs. Voynich; or *The Silence of Dean Maitland*, by Maxwell Grey.
69. *Confessions of an Opium-Eater*, p. 114.
70. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 462–64.
71. William James, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 267–69; cf. F. Max Müller, *Science of Thought*, pp. 29–84; 551.
72. See Bibliography of Cases.
73. F. Max Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–57; 85–86.
74. Cf. such self-studies as Solomon Maimon's *Autobiography;* De Quincey's *Confessions;* Rousseau's; and many others.
75. Hawthorne, *The Marble Faun*, p. 144.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 141
77. Cf. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, chap. II.
78. By Marie Bashkirtsev, preface to her *Mémoires.*
79. *Society and Solitude*, p. 7.
80. Essay on *John Bunyan.*
81. See Bibliography of Cases.
82. See Bibliography of Cases.
83. See Bibliography of Cases.
84. Shelley's *Letters*, Ingpen Collection, vol. I, p. 77.
85. Morley's *Life of Rousseau.*
86. S. Mechtildis, *Liber Specialis Gratiæ*, III, 51.
87. Born, 1462; died, 1525; see Symonds's *Italian Renaissance*, vol. V, p. 461; see also *Pietro Pomponazzi*, by A. H. Douglas.
88. London, 1910.
89. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art., "Apologetics."
90. Cf. Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. II, p. 102.
91. See also A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 331–34.
92. *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum, secundi sæculi.*
93. The first noteworthy apologist is named Quadratus, who lived and wrote under the reign of Hadrian. His work is lost, while that of his contemporary Aristides

has been found and is edited by J. Rendal Harris. The attempt of both was to interest the emperor in Christianity. Later apologies, many of which remain to us, are those of Pamphilus, Justin Martyr, Rufinus, Jerome, Athenagoras of Athens, Theophilus of Antioch, Melito of Sardis, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and Tertullian. To these should be added the *Contra Gentes* of Athanasius, and the writings of Arnobius, Eusebius of Cæsarea, and Cyril of Alexandria. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 353; E. Renan, *L'Église Chrétienne*, p. 40; *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art., "Apologetics"; also cf. Milman's *History of Latin Christianity*.

94. Schaff's *Nicene Fathers; Works* of Jerome, Apologies I, II; *Works* of Rufinus, vol. VI.
95. Jerome *Works*, Letter to Eustochium.
96. Schaff, *op. cit.*, vol. VI.
97. *Ibid.*, *St. John Chrysostom.*
98. Schaff's *Nicene and Ante-Nicene Fathers*, *op. cit.* *Works* of Justin Martyr; *Shepherd of Hermas*, etc.
99. *Confessions* (Pusey), books IV, V, X, etc.
100. Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis;* translated by Thomas Taylor.
101. *Works* of Philo (Bohn), vol. II, pp. 50, and 388.
102. It must not be forgotten, in reference to the above statement, that the meaning attached to the so-called Dæmon of Socrates has not been exactly determined by scholars. While certain among them hold his remarks to refer to a tutelary genius, as Philo does, others believe Socrates to have been merely ironical; while others still hold the idea to have been the legendary contribution of his admirers. (Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. II; cf. Grote, *History of Greece*, etc., vol. VI, pp. 99 *et seq.* Jowett's *Plato*, Apology 30, 40, *et seq.*)
103. Schaff, *op. cit.*, *Life of Ephraim Syrus.*
104. St. Patrick, A.D., 469.
105. Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, t. 51; A.D. 463.
106. *Ibid.*, t. 59; A.D. 461.

107. *Ibid.*, t. 101.
108. *Ibid.*, t. 121; A.D. 869.
109. *Ibid.*, t. 121.
110. *Ibid.*, t. 144, liber v, ep. 2 (A.D. 1000–1072); translated by H. O. Taylor, in *The Mediæval Mind*, vol. I, pp. 265–66.
111. *Life of St. Anselm*, by Rule.
112. Chronique de 1047, in Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir.*
113. See Marcus Dod's *Forerunners of Dante*, for narratives of descent into hell.
114. *Historia Calamitatum.*
115. *Vie de*, par lui-même (1053–1124).
116. Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, t. 188.
117. *Ibid.*, t. 175; cf. also Joachim da Flore.
118. H. O. Taylor, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 488–89.
119. Known as St. Bonaventura. H. O. Taylor, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 413–14.
120. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 227.
121. Berti, *Giordano Bruno, Sua Vita e Sua Dottrina.*
122. *Apologia di Lorenzino.* (*Raccolta* di A. d'Ancona.)
123. *Apology for the Life of Colley Cibber* (1757).
124. *Apologia pro Vita Sua.*
125. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 332 *ff.*
126. Lodge, *Works of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. VI, pp. 456 *ff.*
127. Père Duchesne, *Histoire Ancienne de L'Église*, vol. I, p. 213.
128. Cf. Barclay's *Apology*, in the case of the Society of Friends.
129. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 332 *ff.*

CHAPTER III

1. J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address, *Works*, vol. IV, p. 356.
2. F. Max Müller, Sacred Books of the East, *Laws of Manu*, 1, 11.
3. *Charmides* (Jowett).
4. *Phædrus* (Jowett).
5. See also Plato's introduction to the *Dialogues.*

6. *Alcibiades* (Jowett).
7. E. Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, vol. I, p. 211.
8. Hierocles, commentary on the *Carmina Aurea* of Pythagoras. See Jeremy Taylor, *Holy Living and Dying*, vol. II, p. 56.
9. *Marius the Epicurean*, vol. II, p. 192.
10. Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, p. 115.
11. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, p. 430.
12. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 92.
13. *Encycl. Brit.*, art., "Sophists"; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. I, pp. 45 *ff.*
14. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 318.
15. *Primitive Culture*, pp. 497 *ff.*
16. Grote's defence will not have been forgotten, but modern scholars seem to have reacted from it. *History of Greece*, vol. VI, chap. LXVII, and p. 99. See also *Encycl. Brit.*, art., "*Sophists*"; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, pp. 453 *ff.*; Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 90.
17. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, Boston, 1909.
18. Auguste Comte, *Philosophie Positive*, p. 33 (trans. by Martineau).
19. *Ibid.*
20. Cf. J. G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge;* F. W. Schelling, *Transcendental Idealism;* I. Kant, *Dreams of a Ghost-Seer*, etc.
21. Scaramelli, S. J., *Directorium Asceticum*, vol. I, pp. 334 *ff.*: cf. also H. C. Lea, *History of Auricular Confession*, vol. I, pp. 196–97.
22. *Benjamin minor*, cap. LXXV (trans. by Edmund Gardner, in *Dante and the Mystics*, pp. 166–67).
23. Jeremy Taylor, *Holy Living and Dying*, vol. II, pp. 53 *ff.*
24. Schaff, *Nicene Fathers, Life of Ephraim.*
25. H. C. Lea, *History of Auricular Confession*, p. 185; also Scaramelli, *Directorium Asceticum.*
26. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
27. Schaff, *Nicene Fathers;* St. Jerome's *Letters*, etc.

28. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, pp. 497 *ff.*
29. C. A. Sainte-Beuve, *Port-Royal*, vol. II, p. 396; also, *Pascal*, by St. Cyres.
30. D. G. Brinton, *The Religious Sentiment*, p. 81.
31. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 192.
32. L. A. Seneca, *Works and Life*, by Justus Lipsius (trans. by Lodge).
33. M. A. Antoninus, *Meditations* (trans. by Long), book I, 17; book IV, 23.
34. Epictetus, *Discourses* (trans. by Long), p. 81.
35. *Life of Plotinus; Works* (trans. by Thomas Taylor), and *Viti Plotini.*
36. *Ibid.*, introduction to *Life of Plotinus*, by Porphyry.
37. Iamblichus, *De Mysteriis* (translated by Thomas Taylor).
38. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 276–79.
39. Otto Weininger, *Sex and Character*, p. 127.
40. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will.*
41. See also Morris Jastrow, *The Liver as the Seat of the Soul.*
42. E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, pp. 77 and 207.
43. See Thomas à Kempis, *Imitation of Christ;* and Milman's comment in *History of Latin Christianity*, vol. VIII, p. 301.
44. William James, *Principles of Psychology*, first two chapters. (For an explanation suited to laymen, see Thomson, *Brains and Personality*, p. 36.)
45. *Ibid.*, cf. also *Encycl. Brit.*, "Broca" and "Aphasia."
46. *Ibid.*
47. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, preface.
48. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 220–22.
49. Jean-Paul Richter, *Memoirs.*
50. Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 130.
51. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 304–07.
52. See Edmund Gardner, *Dante and the Mystics*, pp. 173–74; translation of *De Contemplatione*, in Richard of St. Victor's *Benjamin major*, I, 5.
53. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Dreams of a Ghost-Seer.*
54. Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 132.

55. Cited by P. Bourget in the Preface to *La Barricade.*
56. Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 165; also, William James, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 185.
57. Morton Prince, in a *Symposium on the Subconscious*, pp. 92 and 95.
58. Cf. J. G. Fichte (trans. by Rand).
59. William James, *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 292, 297.
60. Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, p. 266.
61. E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, pp. 305–08.
62. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 81, 419, Appendix; (cf. idea defined and expressed by Herbert Spencer).
63. G. J. Romanes, *Diary*, in 2 vols.
64. R. Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode.*
65. A. d'Ancona, *Raccolta di Autobiografie*, Prefazione.
66. Mention should be made of the psychological journal of Maine de Biran, who, influenced by the ideas of Condillac, endeavored, though unsuccessfully, to note his own mental processes. The attempt had its effect on later English minds and tenets.
67. Descartes; born in 1596, in Touraine.
68. Al-Ghazzāli; born in 1058; died in 1111 A.D.
69. Dominico Berti, *Giordano Bruno; Sua Vita, e Sua Dottrina.*
70. *Ibid.*, *Constituto:* "Io sono pronto a dar conto di me."
71. L. Barbier de Meynard, *Al-Gazali, Le Préservatif de l'Erreur.*
72. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*
73. English translation by Claude Field, in the convenient little volume of the *Wisdom of the East* series, pp. 10–14.
74. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
75. R. Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode; Works*, vol. 123.
76. *Discours*, vol. I, p. 125.
77. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 130.
78. Claude Field, *Al-Ghazzāli*, p. 57.
79. Descartes, *Discours*, p. 132.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–40.
81. Cf. A. H. Douglas, *Pietro Pomponazzi.*

82. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 344 *ff.*
83. Born, 1462; died, 1524.
84. A. H. Douglas, *Pietro Pomponazzi*, pp. 286 *ff.*
85. A. H. Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 281.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.
87. Cf. also A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 360–65.
88. R. Descartes, *Discours*, *Works*, vol. I, pp. 158–59.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 475.
90. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 437, 447 *ff.*
91. J. J. Rousseau, *Confessions*, p. 1.
92. See Caird, *Philosophy of Kant.*
93. Cf. *Dreams of a Ghost-Seer.*
94. Cf. Buchner, *Kant's Educational Theory*, pp. 230–34.
95. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 630.
96. J. G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge* (Rand's translation, p. 490; also chap. II, p. 10).
97. *Ibid.*, p. 502.
98. J. G. Fichte, *Destination of Man*, p. 10.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 14 (condensed).
100. F. W. Schelling, *Transcendental Idealism.*
101. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.*
102. F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo.*
103. Such as Wilhelm Krug, d. 1842; Sören Kierkegaard: (also *Life of Krug*, by G. Brandès), 1893.
104. Burckhardt, *History of the Italian Renaissance*, vol. II, p. 36.
105. Dante's *Eleven Letters* (Latham), Letter XI.
106. Trans. by D. G. Rossetti.
107. Petrarch (Robinson and Rolfe), p. 17.
108. *Ibid.*, trans. on pp. 59–60 *ff.*
109. Four groups are published under the titles respectively of *Lettere Familiari*, *Senili*, *Varie* and *Sine Titulo.*
110. *Let. Fam.* XIII, 7.
111. *Petrarch's Secret* (trans. by W. H. Draper).
112. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

115. *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 84–85.
117. *Vita di Benvenuto Cellini*, 1571.
118. *Vita di Girolamo Cardano*, 1576.
119. William Boulting, *Eneas Sylvius*, p. 91.
120. *Ibid.*, pp. 149–50.
121. C. A. Sainte-Beuve, *Port-Royal.*
122. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 362.
123. Sir Thomas Browne. See Bibliography of Cases.
124. See Bibliography of Cases, J. J. Rousseau.
125. *Confessions*, vol. I. "Au moins je suis autre."
126. John Morley, *Rousseau*, vol. II, p. 303.
127. Jerome Cardan, died in 1576. (See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, chap. VII.)
128. See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 29–30.
129. *Obermann*, edited by George Sand, 1804.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
131. A. de Musset, *La Confession d'un Enfant de Siècle.*
132. *Life*, by Moore, *Journals and Memoranda.*
133. *Byron*, by John Morley, *Miscellanies*, vol. I.
134. *Life*, by Thomas Moore, *Works*, vol. IV, p. 128.
135. *Ibid.*, pp. 270, 328.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
137. *Letters of P. B. Shelley* (Ingpen Collection).
138. E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, p. 352.
139. *The Browning Letters*, vol. I, p. 43.
140. *Journals*, vol. I, p. 360.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
142. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–41.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
144. *Ibid.*, pp. 361–68.
145. Translated by Mary A. Ward.
146. It appeared first in 1882.
147. *De Vita propria liber.*
148. Wenceslas, in *La Cousine Bette.*
149. William James, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 185.
150. *The Gurneys of Earlham*, by A. J. C. Hare, 2 vols.
151. *De Profundis*, p. 63.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
154. *La Cousine Bette.*
155. *De Profundis*, p. 28.

CHAPTER IV

1. William Morris, *The Earthly Paradise.*
2. See Augustin, Wesley, Calvin.
3. See Bunyan, John Nelson, E. Swedenborg.
4. See Gertrude More, Rolle of Hampole, Paul Löwengard.
5. See Methodist cases; and H. Alline, J. Linsley.
6. Cf. J. Trevor, Martin Luther, and others.
7. Jesus.
8. Buddha.
9. Fox.
10. Swedenborg.
11. Jesus.
12. Buddha.
13. Paul.
14. The Epistles of Paul; Martin Luther's *Table-Talk* and *Letters.*
15. Wesley's *Journal.*
16. See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 171–83.
17. By Gustave LeBon, in *La Foule.*
18. C. A. Sainte-Beuve, *Port-Royal*, pp. 416–18.
19. See Rousseau, M. Bashkirtsev, O. Wilde.
20. Anatole France, *Jeanne d'Arc*, Appendix.
21. Jackson's *Lives of Early Methodist Preachers*, Preface.
22. Born in 1620.
23. See Bibliography of Cases, John Bunyan.
24. See Bibliography of Cases: George Shadford, M. Joyce, Thomas Olivers, John Pritchard, John Murlin, George Whitefield.
25. See on this point Amelia M. Gummere, *The Quaker.*
26. See Bibliography of Cases, John Gratton.
27. See Bibliography of Cases, Joseph Hoag.
28. This is often denied: the reader is referred to the cases themselves.
29. See Bibliography of Cases, George Fox.

30. See Bibliography of Cases: Robert Wilkinson, Lorenzo Dow, Daniel Young, Thomas Ware.
31. Sampson Staniforth.
32. Thomas Taylor.
33. Mary Fletcher.
34. Thomas Payne.
35. John Haime.
36. Freeborn Garretson, Richard Rodda.
37. See Bibliography of Cases.
38. See John Wesley's *Journal.*
39. See Jackson's *Lives.*
40. See Jackson's *Lives.*
41. *Journal.*
42. See Bibliography of Cases.
43. *Works,* vol. III.
44. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism,* pp. 39–40.
45. *Ibid.,* p. 45.
46. *Ibid.,* p. 46.
47. See B. Brown, P. Pratt, Brigham Young, and his brother Lorenzo.
48. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism,* p. 177.
49. Book of Mormon, pp. 588–90; Riley, *op. cit.,* p. 166.
50. *Memoirs,* p. 133.
51. See *The Gurneys of Earlham,* vol. I, p. 333.
52. *Confessions,* book IX.
53. *Hydriotaphia,* p. 5.
54. Henri-Frédéric Amiel, *Journal.*
55. *Confessions:* "I conceived that I should be too unhappy were I deprived of the embracements of a woman." (See also Eneas Sylvius, *Letters.*)
56. *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), p. 152.
57. *Confessions of an Opium-Eater,* Preface.
58. See Bibliography of Cases, narrative of George Müller.
59. A. Pope: Preface to his *Collected Works.*
60. Thomas De Quincey, *Confessions of an Opium-Eater.*
61. For analysis see A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography.*
62. *Ibid.*

63. See Bibliography of Cases: André de Lorde, Preface.
64. See *Confession of a Neurasthenic.*
65. In Nicholson's *Phil. Journal*, vol. 15 (Hibbert, *Philosophy of Apparitions*).
66. *Ibid.*, Hibbert, *Philosophy of Apparitions*, p. 95.
67. *A collection of modern relations of matters-of-fact concerning witches*, edited by Justice Matthew Hale.
68. *De Vita propria liber.*
69. John Beaumont (1732), *A Treatise of Spirits*, p. 221.
70. Cf. the experiences of J. G. Fleay, sent by him to Herbert Spencer, and quoted in *Principles of Sociology*, 1, 2, Appendix.
71. See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, p. 7.
72. *Ibid.* See Babbage.
73. *Ibid.* J. A. Symonds, etc.
74. Grasset, *Le Demi-fou*, p. 257.
75. See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, p. 39.
76. In Hibbert's *Philosophy of Apparitions.*
77. Preface to *Lettres à une Inconnue.*
78. By E. Caird, *supra.*

CHAPTER V

1. H. Delacroix, *Étude sur l'histoire du Mysticisme*, p. x.
2. See Edmund Gosse, *Father and Son;* H. Spencer, etc.
3. *The Three Tabernacles.*
4. Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, t. 170, "Opusculum de conversione sua."
5. *Acta; Vita; Scivias seu Visiones* (all in Migne); also Père Chamonal, *Vie de Ste. Hildegarde.*
6. *Histoire de France*, vol. VI, Introduction.
7. H. Vaughan,, *Hours with the Mystics.*
8. For this and following names see Bibliography of Cases.
9. Curtis, *Some Roads to Rome in America.*
10. Dr. Leuba gives a number of drunkards' conversions; and James quotes that of S. H. Hadley (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 201).

11. See A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 71, 72.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
13. See *History and Practice of Thugs*, London, 1851.
14. See H. B. Irving, *French Criminals in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 4–5.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
16. Bibliography of Cases, *Public Ledger*, Philadelphia.
17. Newgate Calendar.
18. *Mémoire.* See Bibliography of Cases.
19. *Les Criminels peints par eux-mêmes.* Hesse, 1911.
20. H. C. Lea, *Chapters from Religious History of Spain*, p. 381.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
22. *Gesta Pontificium Leodeinsum* (1616), and Görres, *Myst. Divine et Diabolique*, vol. v, pp. 444–50.
23. *Myst. Divine et Diabolique*, vol. v, p. 374.
24. Cf. trial of Major Weir and his sister, in which both confessed to crimes that they could not possibly have committed. See George Sinclar, *Satan's Invisible World Discovered*, 1685. Both Weirs were evidently insane, but were put cruelly to death.
25. Görres, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–55.
26. Boisroger, *La Piété Affligée*, Rome, 1652; also Görres, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 226–42.
27. Görres, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
28. Michelet, *Histoire de France*, vol. II, pp. 306–30; see also *La Cadrière*, by the same author.
29. "L'homme de Dieu" in Lettre à Père Attichy, 1635.
30. Drs. Lègue and La Tourette, *La Possession de la Mère Jeanne.*
31. By even John Wesley; see *Journal*, vol. I.
32. *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), pp. 246–47.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 263.
35. *Narrative of Surprising Conversions*, *Works*, vol. III, pp. 233–40.
36. See *infra*, "The Religious Instinct," chaps. IX and X.
37. P. Cartwright, *Autobiography*, pp. 48–50; see Bibliography of Cases.

38. G. B. Cutten, *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, pp. 38–39.

CHAPTER VI

1. A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 250–51.
2. Also of Th. Jouffroy as a case of "counter-conversion."
3. See Bibliography of Cases: T. Haliburton, J. Newton, Frederick Smith, T. Walsh, R. Williams, Carré de Montgéron, J. Lathrop, B. Bray, J. McAuley.
4. Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 157.
5. *Ibid.*
6. G. LeBon, *La Foule.*
7. Translated by G. C. Coulton, in *A Medieval Garner.*
8. C. Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 223.
9. Francis Newman.
10. Angela da Foligno.
11. Mme. Guyon.
12. Sainte-Beuve, *Port-Royal*, p. 84, *et seq.*
13. To these cases add Father Gratry, quoted by James in *Varieties of Religious Experience.*
14. Cf. also Lacenaire.
15. See Bibliography of Cases: James Naylor, Myles Halhead, Joanna Southcott.
16. *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings*, p. 234.
17. Cf. pp. 395 *ff.*
18. *Jewish Encyclopædia*, art., "Sin."
19. *Catholic Encyclopædia*, art., "Holy Ghost."
20. Martin Luther's views were the same as Augustin's (*Table-Talk*, Hazlitt, pp. 111 *ff.*).
21. Matt. XII, 22–32; Mark III, 22–30; Luke XII, 10.

CHAPTER VII

1. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 213.
2. St. Cyres, *Pascal*, p. 193.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
4. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, chaps. IX, X.

5. G. B. Cutten, *Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, p. 252.
6. *Ante*, "Introspection."
7. W. H. Thomson, *Brain and Personality*, pp. 37–38.
8. Boris Sidis, *Suggestion*, chap. 19.
9. Cf. William James, *Principles of Psychology;* see chaps. I, II.
10. Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, pp. 16, 17, 18.
11. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 231–33.
12. Boris Sidis, *Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 15.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
15. F. Galton, *Memories of My Life*, pp. 276–77.
16. Cf. G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence.*
17. Pierre Janet, *The Mental State of Hystericals*, p. 153.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
19. See Bibliography of Cases: Ste.-Chantal, Angela da Foligno, etc.
20. Janet, *The Mental State of Hystericals*, p. 276.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 527.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
23. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism.*
24. E. Brydges, *Autobiography*, vol. I, p. 390.
25. Augustin.
26. Joseph Hoag.
27. Freeborn Garretson.
28. Jane Hoskins.
29. Oliver Sansom.
30. Jerry McAuley and John Furz.
31. John Crook.
32. Mary Fletcher.
33. St. Paul.
34. Colonel James Gardiner.
35. Patrick.
36. Elizabeth Ashbridge and Stephen Grellet.
37. Osanna Andreasi.
38. J. Hudson-Taylor.
39. C. G. Finney, Gertrude of Eisleben, Baptiste Varani, S. Staniforth, Thomas Taylor, Jonathan Edwards, etc.

40. Loyola, A. de Ratisbonne.
41. Salimbene, Osanna Andreasi.
42. Pascal, H. Alline, A. Braithwaite.
43. Raoul Glaber, Othloh.
44. B. Sidis, *Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 43.
45. A. Comte, *Philosophie Positive*, Introduction, p. 37.
46. See Bibliography of Cases for this and all following names.
47. Peter Cartwright's experience is similar to that of S. H. Bradley (quoted by James, in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 261), who, aged fourteen, had a vision of the Saviour. Nine years later, after a revival-meeting, he has a violent attack of palpitations of the heart, during which he feels "a fresh influx of Divine love."
48. Migne, t. 146 (trans. by Howland).
49. Letter to Eustochium (Schaff; *op. cit.*).
50. A non-autobiographical record in Hibbert, *Philosophy of Apparitions*.
51. The authenticity of this *Testamentum* is in dispute.
52. Cf. Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXIII, 140:—

"Se non che la mia mente fu percossa
da un fulgore, in che sua voglia venne."

53. Cf. the vision of a Raphael Madonna in full colors which appeared on his awakening to J. E. Fleay, and cf. also a "bright vision" of Christ, which Luther interpreted as an illusion of the Devil.
54. F. von Hügel, *Mystical Element of Religion*, vol. I, p. 105.
55. Acts, IX, XXII, XXVI.
56. E. Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. 181.
57. *Ibid.*, *Introduction*, pp. VI, VII.
58. Acts XXII, XXVI.
59. Hebrews; Ephesians; Timothy; Titus.
60. E. Renan, *Les Apôtres*, pp. 170–71.
61. 2 Cor. X, 10; XI, 30; and IV, 13.
62. 2 Cor. XII, 1–7.
63. See Bibliography of Cases.

64. 1 Cor. III, 2; IV, 14; XIII; 2 Cor. VII, 13, 16; X, 9.
65. Cf. Augustin, Müller, Loyola, etc.
66. Acts XXVI, 14.
67. E. Renan, *Les Apôtres*, pp. 179–83.
68. Cf. P. Cartwright, C. J. Finney, Othloh, H. Alline, J. Hoskins, Colonel Gardiner, etc., etc.
69. Cf. Acts XXVI, with IX and XXII.
70. E. Renan, *Les Apôtres*, Introduction, p. xliv.
71. *The Acts of the Apostles in Greek and English*, p. 337.
72. *Commentary on Acts*, p. 169.
73. *Paul the Mystic*, p. 55.
74. *Hibbert Lectures*, "Paul," pp. 34–35.
75. "Paul," p. 67.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
77. *Commentary on the Acts* (Gloag's trans.), p. 183.
78. *Paul.*
79. *Acts*, p. 347.
80. *Commentary on Acts.*
81. *Life and Epistles of Paul.*
82. *The Apostolic Age*, p. 121.
83. *The Apostle Paul*, pp. 63–67.
84. *The Acts.*
85. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
86. *The Apostolic Age*, p. 119.
87. 1 Cor. IX, 1; Gal. I, 12.
88. See Tylor, *Primitive Culture.*
89. Cf. also Count Schouvaloff.
90. *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), p. 77.
91. See Bibliography of Cases, also add the joy mentioned by Rev. Jonathan Edwards, and that of Stephen H. Bradley (both in James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*).
92. As, for instance, Ubertino da Casale, who calls Jesus his "brother."
93. J. Edwards, *Narrative of Surprising Conversions; Works*, vol. III, p. 259.
94. John Banks, Christopher Story, etc.
95. *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), p. 175.
96. Augustin.

97. Fox.
98. Wesley.

CHAPTER VIII

1. *Paradiso* XXXIII, 46.
2. *History of Latin Christianity*, vol. VIII, p. 217.
3. Milman, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, p. 404.
4. Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, vol. II, p. 45.
5. Francis Thompson, *Poems.*
6. Such as: F. von Hügel, *Mystical Element of Religion.* E. Underhill, *Mysticism.* Rufus Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion.* E. Lehmann, *Mysticism in Heathendom and Christianity*, etc.
7. *Dante and the Mystics*, p. 26.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
9. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 70–72.
10. Milman, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, p. 240.
11. R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, p. xv.
12. S. T. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, vol. I, p. 307.
13. R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, p. xxi.
14. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 62–63.
15. These terms were apparently the invention of Dionysius the Areopagite.
16. *Urn-Burial*, p. 71.
17. W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 14–15.
18. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 70–71.
19. F. von Hügel, *Mystical Element of Religion*, vol. I, p. 135.
20. One might profitably compare the statement of Benjamin Brown, the Mormon elder, in his *Testimonies for the Truth*, that during a protracted camp-meeting his mind was so absorbed in Spiritual things, he ate or drank "scarcely anything" for a fortnight, during which the Lord sustained him.
21. Cf. Paul.
22. Thus there must be excluded from further use in these pages, the cases of the Catherines of Genoa and of Siena; MM. de' Pazzi, Bernard of Clairvaux, and

Francis of Assisi. The legend by Thomas of Celano, exquisite as it is, cannot be serviceable here.

23. Such are Pierre Janet, Grasset, Th. Ribot, E. Delacroix, etc.
24. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 57.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
27. R. M. Jones, *Studies in Christian Mysticism*, p. xxxvi.
28. 2 Cor. xii, 1–7.
29. Delacroix, *Étude sur l'Histoire du Mysticisme.*
30. E. Lehmann, *Mysticism in Heathendom and Christianity*, pp. 232–33.
31. E. Delacroix, *Étude sur l'Histoire du Mysticisme.*
32. There is a certain interest for us in the fact that whereas Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, started out by priding himself on his ignorance and illiteracy, just as did these earlier cases; yet, later, he claimed for himself all the knowledge in the world; said that he "could read Greek as fast as a horse could run"; knew Egyptian hieroglyphics, and so on. In other words, he felt it necessary to keep apace with his followers, who were not mediæval disciples, but nineteenth-century Americans.
33. Lecky (*European Morals*, vol. ii, pp. 114 *ff.*) points out the disfavor in which the ascetics held any intellectual occupation.
34. Cf. Guibert, Jerome, Othloh.
35. *History of Latin Christianity*, vol. viii, p. 301.
36. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 70–71.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.
38. F. von Hügel, *Mystical Element of Religion*, vol. ii, p. 32.
39. *In Life*, by Porphyry (trans. by Thomas Taylor).
40. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii, pp. 187–88.
41. *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), p. 4.
42. In a letter to Can Grande. (See Latham, *Dante's Eleven Letters*, cited by Edmund Gardner, *Dante and the Mystics*, p. 32.)

43. Translated by Edmund Gardner, *op. cit., Ibid.*, pp. 178–79. Cf. Angela da Foligno, *Book of Visions*, pp. 36, 37, 74, 98.
44. Edmund Gardner, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–59.
45. *Confessions* (Pusey), book IX.
46. *De Quantitate Animæ*, translated by Edmund Gardner, in *Dante and the Mystics*, p. 46.
47. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 318.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
49. See Bibliography of Cases, A. da Foligno.
50. See Bibliography of Cases, Loyola.
51. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 457.
52. Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. II, p. 357 (note). (Gives further the years of suffering before the ecstatic stage was reached, of certain other saints and hermits. These correspond to the data furnished under "Depression.")
53. E. Delacroix, *Étude sur l'Histoire du Mysticisme*, p. 131.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
56. *Book of Visions and Instructions*, p. 57.
57. She died in 1896.
58. *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, p. 6.
59. *Book of Visions and Instructions*, p. 68.
60. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism*, p. 183.
61. Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, vol. VIII, p. 301.
62. Lea, *Chapters on the Religious History of Spain*, pp. 240–41.
63. *Ibid.*, "Mystics and Illuminati," p. 214.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 215–16.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 246–48.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 309–17.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 426 (note). The one at Quesnoy la Conte, in Flanders, in 1491 lasted seven years.
68. *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, pp. 4–6.
69. H. C. Lea, *History of the Inquisition*, vol. IV, pp. 39–40.

70. *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 80.
71. H. C. Lea, *Chapters from the Religious History of Spain*, p. 227 (note).
72. See S. Reinach, *Orpheus*, p. 390.
73. Migne, *Teresa*, vol. III, pp. 366–68.
74. Migne, vol. IV, p. 496.
75. See Maria d'Agréda, *La Cité de Dieu.*
76. See Carlo da Sezze, Baptiste Varani, Marie de l'Incarnation, etc.
77. St. Augustin (Poujoulat).
78. *Sainte-Chantal*, par l'abbé Bougaud. 2 vols.
79. E. Gérard-Gailly, *Bussy-Rabutin*, p. 17.
80. Henri Joly, *Psychology of the Saints.*
81. E. Delacroix, *L'Étude sur l'Histoire du Mysticisme*, p. 13.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 348–49.
83. For mediæval narratives of descent into hell, the reader is referred to Marcus Dod's *The Forerunners of Dante*, where a list of them, with analyses, is given. Although many of them are written in the first person, they contain no important matter relating to the writer.
84. *Book of Visions and Instructions*, p. 145.
85. *Primitive Culture*, vol. I.
86. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 307.
87. *Liber Specialis Gratiæ*, I, 19 [translated by E. Gardner, in *Dante and the Mystics*, pp. 284 *ff.*].
88. *Mystica Theologia*, Prologus.
89. See Bibliography of Cases.
90. Cf. Renan *Les Apôtres* Introduction.
91. "Prison-Life as I found it." *Century*, September, 1910, vol. LXXX, p. 1105: "Service was held every Sunday, the Protestant and Catholic chaplains alternating, and was non-sectarian in character. It consisted of prayers, hymns, musical numbers, and a sermon, and was decidedly perfunctory. In fact, a prisoner who makes a parade of his religion is regarded with suspicion not only by his mates, but also by the officials. This is a

natural result of many cases of insanity preceded by religious hysteria."

92. The reader is referred to the *History of the Mormons*, by Linn, and also to Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism*. Here he will see that the attitude of the audience had a markedly deteriorating influence upon the character and the teachings of Joseph Smith. Whereas he had begun as a credulous, simple, and awestricken lad, he speedily degenerated into more sensational methods to impress and hold his followers. If they seem amazingly credulous to *us*—they often seemed stiff-necked to *him*.
93. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 69.
94. Callaway, *Religion of the Amazulu*, p. 246 (cited by Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 194).
95. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
96. Narrative of Nicholas Perrot, in E. H. Blair's *Indian Tribes*, vol. I, pp. 50–51. Cf. also Alice H. Fletcher's *Handbook of American Indians*.
97. Cited by D. E. Brinton, *The Religious Sentiment*, p. 130.
98. J. Beaumont, *A Treatise of Spirits*, p. 221.
99. See *Autobiography*.
100. See also A. R. Burr, *The Autobiography*, pp. 254–55, for further cases of non-religious conversion. Petrarch's change is intellectual, but as it was brought about by the influence of Augustin, it is probably to be termed religious: but it was "Amor" and not "La Grâce" which caused Dante's heart to cry out, "Incipit Vita Nuova!"
101. H. C. Lea, *Chapters from the Religious History of Spain*, p. 213.
102. As we have already noted, they alternated with the most violent joys, and a self-complacency beyond all measure.
103. Dr. Lea (*History of the Inquisition*, vol. II, p. 364) comments on the semi-Hindu asceticism "in the practices of the Gottesfreunde, which drew them down to the level of the Indian Yogi."

104. See Martin Luther's *Table-Talk* (Hazlitt), p. 104 (anecdote already cited).
105. Augustin, *Confessions* (Pusey), book x; cf. book ix.
106. Cf. Bibliography of Cases.
107. H. Maudsley, *Natural Causes*, p. 271 *ff.* Cf. with Joseph Smith's *Vision of Moroni.*
108. Job iv, 12–17.
109. Acts xxii, 10.
110. Acts xxvi, 16, 17, 18.
111. Linn, *History of the Church*, vol. i; Revelation i–vi.
112. *Narrative of the Great Revival, Works*, vol. iii, p. 239.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
114. See Bibliography of Cases.
115. See Bibliography of Cases.
116. Contained chiefly in P. Janet, *Mental State of Hystericals;* Grasset, *Le Demi-Fou;* Binet-Sanglé, *Variétés des Types Dévot*, etc.
117. F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion.*
118. W. Hirsch, *Genius and Degeneration*, p. 69.

CHAPTER IX

1. *The Autobiography*, p. 34.
2. Francis B. Gummere, *Democracy and Poetry*, p. 284.
3. Scholars estimate the date of Job variously, as from 1000 to 400 years before Christ. The writer wishes it to be understood that she uses the following quotations in a literary sense. The fact that the consensus of modern opinion lends to Job a sceptical and protestant, rather than a pious, significance, does not alter its importance to the present enquiry. Nor does it much matter that the passages are differently distributed, and that the *dramatis personæ* are not altogether what we used to think.
4. Job xiii, 3.
5. *Ibid.*, ix, 20, 21.
6. *Ibid.*, xlii, 3.

7. Jevons, *Introduction to the Study of Religion*, pp. 18–19.
8. Comte, *Philosophie Positive* (Martineau's trans.), p. 523.
9. M. Maeterlinck, *L'Oiseau Bleu*, Acte III.
10. Job XLII, 5–6.
11. *De Profundis.*
12. W. Bagehot. *Literary Studies*, vol. II, p. 412.
13. Matt. V, 20.
14. Matt. XXIII, 23.
15. For the discussion of this question see Eduard Meyer, *History of Antiquity*, and E. Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses Origines.*
16. Gaston Boissier, *La Religion Romaine.*
17. Jesse B. Carter, *Religious Life in Ancient Rome*, chap. III.
18. E. Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. 328.
19. Notably by S. Dill, *Roman Society;* see also Jesse B. Carter, *op. cit.*
20. 1 Cor. V, 1–7.
21. Gal. III.
22. J. B. Carter, *Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, p. 9.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.
24. Allan Menzies, *History of Religion*, p. 114.
25. H. C. Lea, *op. cit.*
26. A. Menzies, *History of Religion*, p. 323.
27. Cf. Augustin, the St. Victors.
28. *Hydriotaphia*, p. 51.
29. *Natural History of Religion, Works*, vol. II, p. 397.
30. A. Comte, *Philosophie Positive* (Martineau trans.), pp. 26–27.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
32. A. Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
33. Such as Hartmann and Pfleiderer, *q. v.*
34. *Orpheus*, pp. 2–3.
35. *Ibid.*, p. VII.
36. By the work of J. G. Frazer, Herbert Spencer, and E. B. Tylor; supplemented by special monographs such as those of Franz Boas, A. E. Crawford, and others.
37. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 180.

38. See F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits*, pp. 20 and 32, for striking instances wherein the savage has borrowed from the Christian.
39. Nicholas Perrot, *Narrative of American Indians.* (See E. H. Blair's *Indian Tribes*, and *Fletcher's Handbook of American Indians.*)
40. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 410–12.
41. N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, pp. 205–6.
42. A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples of the Gold-Coast*, p. 150 (note).
43. E. Doutté, *Magie et Religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, pp. 91–92.
44. Klunzinger, *Upper Egypt* (cited by Maudsley, in *Natural Causes*, p. 181).
45. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 414. ("The Malay warrior; the Zulu, and the Abipone of Hayti fast at intervals. A Hindu king, after three days' fast beheld Siva," etc.)
46. 2 Sam. XXVIII, 20–24.
47. *Encycl. Brit.*, art., "Asceticism."
48. Schaff, vol. VI, letter CXXX.
49. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 419.
50. See Bibliography of Cases: Blair, Conran.
51. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 418; also Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, Q, p. 239.
52. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II. Cf. Othloh, R. Williams, Colonel Gardiner.
53. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, Q. pp. 146–48; vol. I, 2W, p. 789.
54. J. B. Carter, *Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, p. 72.
55. N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia.*
56. E. Doutté, *Magie et Religion*, p. 396.
57. F. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, p. 258.
58. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, pp. 266 *ff*. Haddon, *The Papuans*, see Torres Straits Reports, vol. I, p. 252.
59. *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 439; cf. Philo-Judæus; also Weeks, *Among Congo Cannibals*, notes same idea among the Boloki: among the Kaffirs who held the Soul was connected with their shadow, Dudley Kidd, *The Essential Kaffir*, p. 83.

60. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 498–50.
61. Görres, *Mystique Divine*, vol. II, p. 139.
62. 2 Cor. XII, 4.
63. *Book of Visions and Instructions*, pp. 36–37, and 67.
64. Letter XI (Latham); also cf. Angela da Foligno, *Book of Visions and Instructions.*
65. Migne, *Way of Mt. Carmel*, *Œuvres de Térèse*, vol. III.
66. To show this tendency in operation the reader is referred to the three narratives of Paul's conversion.
67. F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 103.
68. See Bibliography of Cases: Jeanne des Anges, Raoul Glaber, Teresa, Mme. Guyon, etc.
69. Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries*, pp. 354–56; also Wood-Martin, *Elder Faiths of Ireland.*
70. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 79 (note).
71. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 93.
72. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 109.
73. E. Doutté, *Magie et Rel.*, pp. 338 *ff.*
74. *Ibid.*, p. 494.
75. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 138.
76. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, p. 225; and A. B. Ellis, *Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 21 *ff.;* Hose and McDougall, *Pagan Tribes of Borneo.*
77. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 138 *ff.*
78. Wentz, *Fairy-Faith.*
79. Görres, vol. II, p. 141.
80. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 125 *ff.*
81. See Hose and McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo.*
82. Codrington, p. 220.
83. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, 139.
84. Doutté, *Magie et Rel.*, p. 602.
85. Lecky, *Europ. Morals*, vol. I, p. 381.
86. Lea, *Hist. of Inquis.*, vol. III, p. 381, names Origen, Gregory the Great, S. Equitius (who acted as an exorcist), Cæsarius of Heisterbach, and Thomas of Cantimpré, as sharing to the full the belief in demonology and its subsidiary beliefs. "The blessed Reichelm of Schöngan, about 1270, claimed to behold crowds of spirits under numberless forms."

87. It will not do to forget that the intellectual Wesley acted as exorcist on more than one occasion. (See Journal, I, Oct.) He expelled the demon from a convulsed young woman, who insisted that Satan "was let loose."
88. I. W. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism*, pp. 258–59.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
90. Cited by Riley, *op. cit.*, p. 277 (note).
91. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism*, p. 277.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 280; and p. 281.
93. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 141 (note).
94. Nevius, *Demon Possession in China.*
95. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 130 *ff.*; 406 *ff.* For compacts with the Devil see Lea, *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, p. 205; also *History of the Inquisition*, vol. III, p. 424, wherein he notes such covenants made on little rolls of parchment and carried under the arm-pit. (Cæsarius of Heisterbach.)
96. J. B. Carter, *Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, pp. 12–13.
97. See Bibliography of Cases: Bewley, Haliburton, Boston, and Lobb.
98. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, p. 130.
99. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 132–33; also cf. Hose and McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, vol. II, chap. II.
100. Maudsley, *Natural Causes*, p. 32.
101. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 453.
102. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 7.
103. Adams, *Curiosities of Superstition*, p. 243; also Wood-Martin, *Elder Faiths of Ireland*, vol. I, p. 371, where he says that the wail of the banshee resembled the sound of an Æolian harp.
104. *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 453.
105. *Hamlet*, I, 1.
106. Al-Koran, Sura CXIV, last verse.
107. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 453 (note): Dr. Lea cites the case of Vicente Herman, a hermit, tried before the Inquisition who said that "Demons, with the *voice of flies* had been recalling his sins." (*Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, p. 71.) This "buzzing" was characteristic. Cf. J. G. Frazer, *Taboo*, p. 34.

108. *De Vita propria Liber.*
109. *Jewish Encyclopædia.*
110. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 452.
111. Isaiah XXIX, 4.
112. Isaiah VIII, 19.
113. See Bibliography of Cases.
114. "Catarrhal otitis media."
115. Ballinger, *Diseases of the Ear*, p. 735.
116. *Anatomy of Melancholy*, vol. I, p. 436.
117. A. E. Crawley, *Idea of the Soul* (in Wentz, *Fairy-Faith*, pp. 200–6; 239). Frazer, *Taboo*, pp. 26, 300.
118. N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia.*
119. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, pp. 226–27.
120. Cf. Wentz, *op. cit.*, and Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, vol. II, p. 248.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 438; L. Hearn, *Two Years in the French West Indies;* Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, pp. 450 *ff.*; 111 *ff.*; Wood-Martin, *Elder Faiths of Ireland*, vol. II, p. 296. The soul was like a butterfly or a moth. Frazer, *Taboo*, pp. 35–37.
122. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 200 *ff.*
123. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 186–90 *ff.*
124. See Conversions of Pascal, Chingwauk the Algonquin, Catherine Wabose, J. Smith, Henry Alline.
125. N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, p. 240.
126. Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 523 *ff.*
127. Görres, *Mystique Divine*, vol. II, chaps. XIV, XVI.
128. *Mystique Divine*, vol. II, p. 5.
129. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 149–52.
130. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism*, p. 188.
131. Cf. Alphonse de Ratisbonne, Peter Favre, Loyola; and see the memoirs of George Sand and Edmund Gosse. Lea (*Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, p. 36) notes that beads, crosses, blessed medals, satisfied this great demand for the fetich. (*Ibid.*, pp. 76, 204.) The Labarum of Constantine was a fetich. (*Inquisition*, vol. III, p. 394.)

CHAPTER X

1. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 359 *ff.*
2. Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals;* Gregorovius, *History of the Middle Ages;* Hallam, *A View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages;* the *Works* of Henry C. Lea, etc.
3. *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 16.
4. See Salimbene's *Chronicle;* and cf. the extravagances and immoralities of the Mormon revelation.
5. *Middle Ages*, vol. II, pp. 492–93.
6. Cf. F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revival*, p. 9, who notes the Southern Mountaineers and the Russians of the steppes; also see p. 64.
7. *Magie et Religion*, p. 347.
8. *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, pp. 138–39.
9. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 136–37.
10. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 139. Cf. also, Michelet, *La Sorcière.*
11. Cf. Nevius, *Demon Possession in China.*
12. Read the confessions of Madeleine Bavent, Marie de Sains; the Salem trials; read Michelet, *La Sorcière;* and George Sinclar, *Satan's Invisible World Discovered*, containing the trials of Major Weir and his sister in Scotland, in the seventeenth century.
13. A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking, and the Yoruba-speaking People of the Gold-Coast.*
14. W. Notestein, *History of Witchcraft*, p. 3; notes traditions of cannibal feasts among the Irish before the fourteenth century.
15. *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, p. 206.
16. W. Notestein, *History of Witchcraft*, p. 3.
17. Lea, *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. IV, p. 206.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
19. Michelet, in his wonderful chapter on "La Sorcellerie aux convents," thinks that the Sabbat was really the nocturnal revolt of him who was serf and vassal by day, and who by night dreamed of a perverse freedom (*"liberté immonde"*). But Michelet's dramatization of the Sabbat serves only to bring more vividly before

our ideas and eyes, its primordial origins—its persistence as a survival.

20. Lea, *History of the Inquisition*, vol. III, p. 408. (The earliest account is in 1337.)
21. *Ibid.*, p. 508.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 413.
23. Görres, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 226–42; and also cf. the unfortunate Magdalena de la Palude, Michelet, *Histoire de France*, vol. II, pp. 309, 330–32; cf. also Davenport, *Primitive Traits*, p. 64.
24. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 483 *ff.*
25. Riley, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
26. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 583 *ff.*
27. *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 144.
28. *The Making of Religion*, p. 150.
29. *The Golden Bough*, Preface, p. viii.
30. *Les Apôtres*, p. 16.
31. *Work*, vol. III, pp. 233 *ff.*
32. Lavenport, *Primitive Traits*, pp. 64, 20–32, 261.
33. William Vaughn Moody, *Poems*.
34. F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 237.
35. *Primitive Culture*, vol. II, pp. 144–45.
36. A. C. Emmerich, Gertrude of Eisleben, Suso.
37. See "Depression."
38. Fanny Pittar, Jane Hoskins.
39. Mme. Guyon, Blanco White.
40. Salimbene, Angela da Foligno.
41. Francis Newman.
42. Sainte-Chantal.
43. Migne, *Térèse*, vol. III, p. 354.
44. Migne, *Térèse*, vol. IV, "Audi Filia, et Vide," cap. XCVII.
45. *History of Latin Christianity*, vol. VIII, p. 301.
46. Says St. Jerome, "The duty of a monk is not to teach but to weep." Contra Vigilant. cap. XV. Melancholy is thus seen to have been regularly taught and advocated.
47. Gilbert Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 48.
48. Weeks, *Among Congo Cannibals*, p. 298.

49. Cf. J. Macmillan Brown, *Maori and Polynesian*, p. 79, who calls it "the plague of sacredness." J. G. Frazer, in *Taboo*, p. 214 and p. 219, strikingly upholds this idea when he writes of the "few old savage taboos which, masquerading as an expression of the divine will, . . . have maintained their credit long after the crude ideas out of which they sprang have been discarded by the progress of thought and knowledge."
50. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. I, pp. 76–77.
51. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 26.
52. *Journal*, vol. VII (1847).
53. *Miscellanies*, vol. I, p. 81.
54. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. V, pp. 10 *ff.*
55. Cf. Suso, Sainte-Chantal, M. M. Alacoque, James Linsley, etc.
56. E. Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. 384.
57. Sir Matthew Hale. John Wesley cried out that "the giving-up of witchcraft is the giving-up of the Bible!" (Davenport, *Primitive Traits*, p. 141.)
58. George Sinclar's *Satan's Invisible World Discovered* (1685).

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